Is causation linguistic rather than in the world?

invizzy

It seems most people who write about causation take causation to be ‘in the world’ in some way, as some sort of force or a relationship (e.g. perhaps regularity as per Hume) between things in the world or something like that. I think probability raising would be covered by this seeing as we’re talking about probabilities of things in the world.

What are the alternatives?

Perhaps causation is a relationship between a WORD for a thing in the world and the FACT of another thing in the world.

In particular It might be that a cause is when the WORD for the cause can give you information about the effect, and the FACT of the effect can give you information that there is a cause.

I think this can unify Aristotelian causes and what we mean by ‘cause’.

It seems Aristotle’s four causes break down to whether the WORD for the cause is sufficient or not to give you the information about the effect, and whether FACT of the effect is sufficient or not to tell you there is the cause.

Material cause:
So Aristotle would say the bronze causes the statue and one explanation = the words ‘the bronze’ ARE sufficient to give information about the statue (e.g. information about what the statue is made of) however the mere fact there is the statue is NOT sufficient to tell you that there is bronze, only that there might be bronze (i.e. statues can also be marble).

Formal cause:
So Aristotle would say ratio of 2:1 causes the octave, one explanation is that this is a different permutation of necessity and sufficiency = the words ‘a ratio of 2:1’ ARE sufficient to give you information about the octave (in particular about the relationship between its sound waves) but in the case of formal causes the mere fact there is an octave IS sufficient to tell you there is a ratio of 2:1.

Efficient cause:
So this is the example we are more used to. Aristotle’s example is situated in the present such as when the father causes the child, once again another permutation = the words ‘the father’ are NOT sufficient to give you information about the child (i.e. you will need other words too such as in the sentence ‘the father of the child is Terry’) and the mere fact there is there is a child is not sufficient to tell you there is a father (now) only that there might be a father (now).

When we use ‘caused’ in English we are using efficient causes but not talking about what IS, we are talking about whether the causes DID exist. And when we use ‘cause(s)’ we are talking about whether the causes DID, and CONTINUE, to exist.

So a spark caused a fire = ‘a spark’ is NOT sufficient to give information about a fire (i.e. you would need other words such as in ‘a spark started/preceded the fire’) and the mere fact is a fire is also NOT sufficient to tell you there was a spark only that there might have been a spark.

The word ‘cigarettes’ is NOT sufficient to give information about cancer and the mere fact there is cancer is NOT sufficient to tell you there was or is cigarettes, only that there might have been and continue to be cigarettes (so we use ‘cause’).

The words ‘detection of a particle’ are NOT sufficient to tell you the location of a particle and the mere fact there is a location of a particle is NOT sufficient that there is a detection of a particle (only that there is, and was, the possibility of a detection of a particle) = detection of a particle cause(s) the location of a particle.

The only difference with Aristotle’s and our causes are that with Aristotle that there is a child in insufficient to tell you there IS a father now, whereas with ours the cancer is insufficient to tell you if there IS and WAS smoking or cigarettes etc.

Final cause:
So in this example Aristotle tells us health causes walking and this is the final permutations = the word ‘health’ is NOT sufficient to give you information about walking (one would need other words), but the fact there is walking IS sufficient to tell you there is health.

So the four permutations of necessity and sufficiency track with Aristotle’s causes, with efficient cause tracking with ‘to cause’ in English.

What do you think? Could causation be a relationship between words and things rather than things and things?

invizzy

I had a think and it is perhaps even simpler:

Material cause:
So we say the bronze causes the statue = the meaningful use of the words ‘the bronze’ IS sufficient to give information about the particular statue (e.g. information about what it is made of) however the words ‘the statue’ is NOT sufficient to give information about bronze.

Formal cause:
So we say ratio of 2:1 causes the octave = the meaningful use of the words ‘a ratio of 2:1’ IS sufficient to give you information about a particular octave (in particular about the relationship between its sound waves) but here the meaningful use of ‘the octave’ IS sufficient to give you the information about the ratio 2:1 (i.e. that something has it).

Efficient cause:
Aristotle’s example is situated in the present such as when the father causes the child = the meaningful use of the words ‘the father’ is NOT sufficient to give you information about the (particular) child because 'the father' is more general than that, and the meaningful use of the words ‘the child’ is NOT sufficient to tell you about the father i.e. the child might not have a father.

When we use ‘caused’ in English we are using efficient causes but not talking about what IS, we are talking about whether the causes DID exist. And when we use ‘cause(s)’ we are talking about whether the causes DID, and CONTINUE, to exist.

So a spark caused a fire = ‘the spark’ is NOT sufficient to give information about the particular fire, and ‘a fire’ is NOT sufficient to tell you about a spark (in general) i.e. the fire might not have had a spark.

The word ‘cigarettes’ is NOT sufficient to give information about (particular) cancer and ‘cancer’ is NOT sufficient to tell you about cigarettes (in general) i.e. the person with cancer might not have had cigarettes.

The words ‘detection of a particle’ is NOT sufficient to tell you about a particular location and ‘location of a particle’ is NOT sufficient that the detection of a particle = detection of a particle cause(s) a particle to be at a particular place.

The only difference with Aristotle’s and our causes are that ours seem to be in the past tense.

Final cause:
So in this example Aristotle tells us health causes walking = the word ‘health’ is NOT sufficient to give you information about particular walking ‘walking’ IS sufficient to tell you about health.

T Clark

It seems most people who write about causation take causation to be ‘in the world’ in some way, as some sort of force or a relationship (e.g. perhaps regularity as per Hume) between things in the world or something like that. I think probability raising would be covered by this seeing as we’re talking about probabilities of things in the world.

What are the alternatives?

Perhaps causation is a relationship between a WORD for a thing in the world and the FACT of another thing in the world. — invizzy

Two lines of thought.

First, you write about a kind of linguistic creation of causation as a phenomenon that somehow doesn't "really" exist. I understand what you're saying, but I think it's true of many, maybe most phenomena. The physical process I usually think of is force, which is really just a relationship between mass and movement. Speed is just a relationship between distance and time.

Second, the idea that causation is not real, or more accurately is not a useful way of thinking about interactions between phenomena, is not a new one. Bertrand Russell wrote an essay - "On Causation" - in 1912 that claimed it was no longer needed. We've had discussions on that several times on the forum.

Manuel

What do you think? Could causation be a relationship between words and things rather than things and things? — invizzy

IF the word latches on to something, and we can isolate a state before an event and afterwards, and we notice the effect changes the state, we would likely be using the word "cause" correctly. But it's hard to find a "final" cause, other ones, that go deeper could be discovered.

The ideal would be to encapsulate a "thing to thing" relationship, since we are interested in the world.

Your examples of Aristotle's causes are interesting indeed, though perhaps introduce more technicality than is warranted:

So Aristotle would say the bronze causes the statue and one explanation = the words ‘the bronze’ ARE sufficient to give information about the statue (e.g. information about what the statue is made of) however the mere fact there is the statue is NOT sufficient to tell you that there is bronze, only that there might be bronze (i.e. statues can also be marble). — invizzy

This is tricky. Strictly speaking, if you say "the bronze", you need to have the concept "statue", if you lack the concept, bronze won't tell you anything. It's similar to your example of "spark" causing a fire. If you don't know what a fire is, spark tells you very little.

It's true that cause become harder to pin down the more complicated the phenomena you are analyzing are, but I think we would still like to maintain the concept cause as simple as possible.

In the case of someone with lung cancer, we might need to speak of multiple causes. Not only the cigarettes influenced getting the disease, but perhaps also air quality and genetic issues. Here we then speak of multiple causes, but maybe not of different kinds of them.

Worth me thinking about some more though.

Nevertheless, very interesting post.

PhilosophyRunner

Causation is fiendishly difficult (or is it impossible?) to directly observe. Most (all?) of the time we observe causation in some process, what we are really observing is correlation. The stronger the correlation we observe, the more confidently we claim causation. But is it causation?

Banno

↪invizzy

I'll commend to you Anscombe's Causality and Determination.

There's a discussion of it here.

Rather than being either in the world or in the word, causation has a foot in both camps. Perhaps think of it as a way of talking about the world, a grammar or logic that is presumed, with no further justification than its usefulness, but that dissipates when one attempts to examine it.

Srap Tasmaner

with no further justification than its usefulness — Banno

Is this usefulness just brute fact, or can we hope to explain why this grammar is useful?

If Anscombe addresses that, you can just point at her again.

Hmmm. Is there going to be any way to flesh out the idea of using something to do something that doesn't rely on causality?

Gnomon

It seems most people who write about causation take causation to be ‘in the world’ in some way, as some sort of force or a relationship (e.g. perhaps regularity as per Hume) between things in the world or something like that. I think probability raising would be covered by this seeing as we’re talking about probabilities of things in the world.
Perhaps causation is a relationship between a WORD for a thing in the world and the FACT of another thing in the world.
What do you think? Could causation be a relationship between words and things rather than things and things? — invizzy

Perhaps the linguistic confusion you are referring to is due in part to the use of a single English word, "cause", to translate Aristotle's four causal relationships. Today, we usually think of "Causation" in terms of Energy. But for Ari, the word "energeia" simply meant objective (productive) physical "work", and "ation" meant a subjective rational explanation, a reason, a why. We observe the Fact of change, and then explain it in Words.

Apparently, he thought of Causation in terms of changed relationships on several levels of being, such as before & after, which could be either intentional (artificial) or accidental (natural). The most basic relationship is between a "Material" substance (physical properties) and its shape (formal properties) : natural metallic bronze vs culturally-enformed statue. Next, is the "Formal" relationship between the old & new shape : accidental (natural) rock shape vs designed sculpture shape. Then, the sculptor's mental design intent, the "why", is what he means by the "Final" cause.

However, our modern scientific notion of Causation puts the emphasis in the middle, on the "Efficient" cause, which in most cases involves the application of Energy to an object or substance. Natural change is presumed to be random & accidental, while Cultural change is intentional & teleological. It mentally envisions the future state or shape, toward which to aim in the process of applying efficient causation to the material cause. Plan the work, then do the work.

The bottom line is that Aristotle's four causes cover the full range of possible causal relationships : for example, 1> between natural state & artificial state ; 2> original observed form & final imagined form ; 3> between physical force & material bronze ; 4> between innate shape & envisioned alternative (designed) shape. The pre-change state is an observed Fact, while the envisioned state is an imaginary future Fact. The first is a sensory Thing, the second is a mental Idea of a thing.

Plato & Aristotle used the term LOGOS ("word") in reference to rationally caused change, as opposed to natural (factual) change. Our modern language seems to have trouble making such philosophical distinctions. Which may be why Quantum Physics seems so paradoxical & counterintuitive. The Mind of the observer/causer was left out of the equation. :smile:

WHAT WAS THE SCULPTOR THINKING ?

Banno

Is this usefulness just brute fact, or can we hope to explain why this grammar is useful? — Srap Tasmaner

Interesting, but I'm unsure how to address this. In a sense, the grammar just is what is useful here, looking to use rather than meaning. If it wasn't helpful, we wouldn't do it.

Srap Tasmaner

↪Banno

But I think you're saying less than you think you are.

Usefulness admits of comparison: a thimble is useful for emptying a swimming pool, but not as useful as a giant shop-vac on wheels. For that matter, almost anything can be used to empty a swimming pool. A pencil will hold onto a few drops each time you dip it in.

So is this grammar optimal in some way? Do we use it because it is more useful than alternatives? Are some of those alternatives truly awful, like emptying a swimming pool with a piece of paper?

If the claim is only that the grammar is usable, that's a pretty low bar to clear. Thimbles, pencils and scraps of paper clear that bar for emptying swimming pools.

Or is the idea of usefulness just there to point at the purpose for which we use this bit of cognitive-linguistic technology? To point out that the grammar is being used?

Banno

But I think you're saying less than you think you are. — Srap Tasmaner

No doubt this is so - but it might be a start.

Perhaps cause is useful up until the point where we try to define and delineate it, philosophically speaking. A giant shop-vac on wheels will be of no use in emptying a glass of water. That we talk of cause in our day-to-day dealing with the world does not mean that it works in other areas, and moreover, if it is to be taken as a metaphysical principle, that it works in all areas.

The Wittgensteinian argument agains applying our ideas too generally.

Srap Tasmaner

↪Banno

In this scientific age, it seems like the obvious way to take "useful" here is to say it's an approximation, and it's cheap. It's interesting that we can get by with what may be a pretty drastic simplification of what's going on with us and our surroundings; what we idealize as cause-and-effect would be a pattern that events show a tendency to instantiate — reversing things, so that the data seem to approximate the mathematical formula that idealizes and approximates the data. Whatever's going on there, whatever relates those two, is real.

But this is just shifting ground again. We know what it means to say an approximation is useful: when we rely on an approximation, we know our actions will produce a result that's near what's predicted and predictably varying from it. But that very description relies on the idea of an action producing a result, and I find it hard to imagine there will be any way of putting this that doesn't smuggle in causality somewhere. Point being that explaining our reliance on the idea of causation as something we do because it's useful may be no explanation at all. (We rely on causation because we rely on causation.) But it won't fly as description either because it deliberately obscures the place of causality in our thinking.

invizzy

@

↪T Clark

I don’t think think I did a good job of explaining.

I’m not saying causation is not ‘real’ precisely. I’m certainly not making the trivially true claim that causation has no spatiotemporal location like mass and force.

I’m saying, I suppose, that most words refer to things in the world, not necessarily in the sense of in the world as having spatiotemporal location, but broadly, including relationships and even abstract ideas. Democracy is in the world in that sense, even if you can’t touch it.

The claim is that ‘cause’ refers to a relationship between the WORD for the cause and the effect rather than between the cause and effect itself.

So you can have a relationship between the bronze and the statue themselves, which I imagine most people think Aristotle is talking about with ‘cause’. That relationship is about what the statue is made of for instance.

But there’s an interesting relationship between the WORD ‘the bronze’ and a (particular) statue. That’s what I think Aristotle is interested in.

invizzy

↪Banno

Thanks for that article, it was an interesting read. I’d read Anscombe on intentions a while back but this was new to me.

Although I agree that causation is both in the world and and in the word I suspect we might be talking about different things! See the above comment I made to @T Clark

T Clark

The claim is that ‘cause’ refers to a relationship between the WORD for the cause and the effect rather than between the cause and effect itself. — invizzy

Seems like I didn't understand the distinction you were trying to make. To be honest, I still don't. I don't think we need to go any further.

invizzy

Sure if you like, I’m happy to explain though if you or anybody else also finds what I’m trying to say confusing.

Agent Smith

↪Gnomon

Superb post!

Here's what I know about causation:

A causes B IFF

1. A and B are correlated (binary/scalar correlation, positive/negative)

2. There is no C that causes both A and B (rule out 3^rd party causation, is there a tertium quid?)

3. B is not the cause of A (rule out reverse causation; A can't be the cause of B if B precedes A temporally)

4. The correlation between A and B isn't a coincidence (persistence over time; the discovery of a mechanism of causation)

---

Mill's 5 methods to determine causation

1. Method of Agreement:

A B C occur together with w x y
A E F occur together with w t u

Ergo,

A is a necessary cause of w [when w, also A]

2. Method of Difference

A B C occur together with w x y
B C occur together with x y

Ergo,

A is a sufficient cause of w [when no w, also no A]

3. Joint Method

A B C occur with w x y
A E F occurs with w t u
B C occurs with x y

Ergo,

A is a necessary and sufficient cause of w

4. Method of Residue

A B C occur together with w x y
B is the cause of x
C is the cause of y

Ergo,

A is the cause of w

5. Method of Concomitant Variation

A B C occur with w x y

A $\pm$ results in w $\pm$ x y

Increasing/decreasing A causes increase/decrease (positive scalar correlation) or decrease/increase (negative scalar correlation) in w

Ergo,

A is the cause of w — Agent Smith

---

Koch's postulates are the following:

1. The microorganism must be found in abundance in all organisms suffering from the disease, but should not be found in healthy organisms.

2. The microorganism must be isolated from a diseased organism and grown in pure culture.

3. The cultured microorganism should cause disease when introduced into a healthy organism.

4. The microorganism must be reisolated from the inoculated, diseased experimental host and identified as being identical to the original specific causative agent.

However, Koch later abandoned the universalist requirement of the first postulate altogether when he discovered asymptomatic carriers of cholera and, later, of typhoid fever. — Wikipedia

Banno

it seems like the obvious way to take "useful" here is to say it's an approximation, — Srap Tasmaner

That's not something I want to do. I would stand away from pragmatism and utilitarian approaches, since neither goes quite as far as is needed. Supposing that causation stands in need of explanation misunderstands that causation is fundamental to explanation. As Anscombe puts it, a bit of Weltanschauung (p.2); "causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes" (p.6, my emphasis). As a rule can be understood not only by being stated but by being implemented, causation is to be understood by seeing it occur.

But while I think this is right, it is also all too vague and hand-wavy.

Banno

Thanks for that article, — invizzy

Cheers. Anscombe was of course very familiar with Aristotle, however what she is doing in the article does not relate readily to your OP, and her target is more determinism than causation, but there is a firm attack on the " ‘Always when this, then that’" (final paragraph) that

↪Gnomon

and

↪Agent Smith

seem to advocate. It irritates me because (!) I maintain some sympathy for Davidson's treatment of human actions in causal terms.

SO I'm not offering an answer so much as sharing in the puzzle.

Agent Smith

Always when this, then that — Banno

Gracias for bringing that up! The keyword is "control" I suppose.

invizzy

↪Banno

Thanks for clarifying. Yeah I couldn’t immediately see Anscombe in dialogue with my ideas, although I appreciate the relationship to necessity and determinism.

When I am talking about ‘sufficiency’ of course I am talking about whether certain words are enough/sufficient to give information about a particular effect. I’m not sure if everyone participating in the thread quite appreciates what I mean by this although perhaps they do and just disagree!

Srap Tasmaner

Supposing that causation stands in need of explanation misunderstands that causation is fundamental to explanation. — Banno

Okay, right, that's why I bristled at saying something like "taking a causal stance" toward the world is something we do because it is useful. The word "useful" is being asked to do something here that it can't.

PhilosophyRunner

the discovery of a mechanism of causation — Agent Smith

I have thought previously about what exactly comprises a mechanism of causation. And I keep finding that the mechanisms of causation are themselves claims of causation. And so you end up with nested claims of causation like:

I punch you and you flinch. In addition to the correlation I observed, I know punching you causes you to flinch because I know that the punch causes receptors in your skin to send a signal to the brain, which causes your muscle to move. But you see the mechanism of action that I used as a support for causation, is itself comprised of claims of causation. So what is my support for those claims of causation? More claims of causation?

I think it is impossible to describe a mechanism of action without stating a claim about causation (implicitly or explicitly).

Agent Smith

↪PhilosophyRunner

What's your take on how gravity work? Newton famously confessed his ignorance (hypothesis non fingo) in re how mass attracted mass. Albert Einstein came along, 3 centuries later, and explained the mechanism viz. that mass warps spacetime.

That out of the way, it's true that the mechanisms of causation themselves are a series of intermediate causal claims. Interesting.

Gnomon

her target is more determinism than causation, but there is a firm attack on the " ‘Always when this, then that’" (final paragraph) that ↪Gnomon and ↪Agent Smith
seem to advocate. It irritates me because (!) I maintain some sympathy for Davidson's treatment of human actions in causal terms. — Banno

" ‘Always when this, then that’" sounds like absolute Determinism, or Fatalism. But Gnomon "advocates" Compatibilism : freedom within determinism. It assumes that human Will is a non-natural (artificial) Cause. By that I mean, human Culture has found ways to modify natural causation, to suit their own needs & desires. Would Nature put men on the Moon or Mars?

Can you summarize Anscombe's "attack", and Davidson's "treatment"? Do they argue in favor of human FreeWill -- sometimes but not always pre-determined? Is their approach physical or linguistic or noetic? :smile:

Compatibilism is the doctrine that determinism is logically compatible or consistent with what is said to be a single idea of freedom that really concerns us and with a related kind of moral responsibility -- the freedom in question being voluntariness.
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwTerminology.html

Freewill within Determinism :
Science depends on predictable determinism. But philosophy looks for unpredictable unique meanings : "the difference that makes a difference". Free choice interferes with the smooth flow of cause & effect determinism, because it introduces an element of non-random novelty, directed toward self-interest. Even an if-then dichotomy, in a complex system, becomes a multiple-choice question. In a computer, a diode is a simple either-or choice, with no chance for conflict. But in a self-conscious person, each fork in the road has two viable options, the predetermined path or My Way. After countless steps up the ladder from energy exchange, to information flow, to knowledge transfers, metaphysical Consciousness gradually evolves from Quantum Physics.
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page33.html

Gnomon

That out of the way, it's true that the mechanisms of causation themselves are a series of intermediate causal claims. — Agent Smith

I just read in Werner Heisenberg's book, Physics and Philosophy, that "causality can only explain later events by earlier events, but it can never explain the beginning". The First Cause. :smile:

Agent Smith

I just read in Werner Heisenberg's book, Physics and Philosophy, that "causality can only explain later events by earlier events, but it can never explain the beginning". The First Cause. :smile: — Gnomon

:up:

Banno

↪Gnomon

While I worry that further pursuing issues of volition and intentionality will lead us too far from the OP, I'll give potted answers to your questions.

" ‘Always when this, then that’" sounds like absolute Determinism, or Fatalism. — Gnomon

Rather, Anscombe asks what causation is, and puzzles over the "always". It's not material implication, nor modal necessity, nor statistical correlation. Given that the various definitions of causation are fraught, the conclusion may well be along the lines of WIttgenstein's approach to rules. Roughly, while one can't say exactly what causation is, one nevertheless recognises it when one sees it.

The determinism in the article is in contrast, not to freedom, but to indeterminism. Anscombe points out that determinism is an impossible, or at least quite unnecessary, goal for physics.

One does not need compatibilism if cause does not necessitate determination. IF the physical world is not a clockwork mechanism - and it seems it is not - then there is room for free will without resort to compatiblism.

Davidson gave a controversial treatment of intentional action in causal terms, with the example "I flicked the switch, turning on the light and alerting the burglar". For Davidson this forms a single casual chain, in which only flicking the switch and turning on the light were part of my intent, and alerting the burglar to my return certainly was not intentional. Anscombe wished to reserve causality for physical and not intentional happenings. I am not sure exactly how she might deal with Davidson's example.

Banno

↪Srap Tasmaner

There seems to be a bit of a resurgence in pragmatism, with which we might both disagree.

Srap Tasmaner

↪Banno

<offtopic>

I'll consider adding "useful for us to believe" to the OP I want to write about "context dependent" and "purpose relative."

Maybe I'll save it for the one about "from our human perspective."

</offtopic>

Gnomon

Anscombe points out that determinism is an impossible, or at least quite unnecessary, goal for physics.
One does not need compatibilism if cause does not necessitate determination. IF the physical world is not a clockwork mechanism - and it seems it is not - then there is room for free will without resort to compatiblism. — Banno

I'm guessing that Anscombe's assertion that "determinism is impossible" was based on Quantum Probability, Uncertainty and Indeterminacy. But early Quantum physicists (e.g. Einstein) argued that "god does not play dice". The implication being that Classical physics was based on an uninterrupted causal chain (i.e. no miracles). Eventually, Quantum physicists grudgingly revised their classical worldview, to include a bit of indeterminism, as long as it was confined to the invisible quantum level of reality.

From that acccomodative perspective, the universe is still viewed as mostly mechanical & deterministic, but with minor glitches in some of the smaller clockwork cogs. On the scale of Cosmology though, scientists also have to deal with incomplete knowledge of initial conditions : the original setting of the clock. Nevertheless, most physicists act as-if they believe that indeterminacy is an exception to the rule. Hence, free-will philosophers are still challenged to specify some kind of causes to fill any presumed minor gaps in the chain of cause & effect. So, human agency must be somehow justified as compatible with general/universal energy-mediated Causation.

I looked up Donald Davidson to see what he had to say about FreeWill. His notion of "reasons as causes" seems to be compatible with my own concept of Freedom within Determinism, in which human Reason has evolved into a non-physical causal agency that can have physical effects (e.g. to put a man on the moon). What he calls 'reasons" are based on purposeful teleological concepts of a future state that results from human "intentions or motives", rather than natural forces.

Even so, human culture is still working within the general constraints of physics. As President Kennedy said, "we want to go to the moon, not because it is easy, but because it is hard". Collective human Will, finds ways to overcome physical obstacles, not by ignoring physics, but by learning to leverage physics in ways that are un-natural, (i.e. Cultural), but compatible. :smile:

Reasons as Causes :
Davidson’s first major philosophical publication was the seminal paper ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ (1963). In that paper Davidson sets out to defend the view that the explanation of action by reference to reasons (something we do, for instance, when we refer to an agent’s intentions or motives in acting) is also a form of causal explanation. Indeed, he argues that reasons explain actions just inasmuch as they are the causes of those actions. This approach was in clear opposition to the Wittgensteinian orthodoxy of the time.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#ReasCaus

Is causation linguistic rather than in the world?

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