So now you're talking about freedom, not death. If the animals were free prior to us killing them for food, then it would be ethical? I can see that as an argument. It would still apply to pets, which, by and large, aren't free — Isaac

I don't believe I ever talked about death. The claim is that other species have a right to their own lives. Whenever we can, we should respect that. Is it therefore ethical to kill a free living animal for food? I would say yes, if there are no other alternatives.

How? Dogs are perfectly capable of living free, they do so in large packs in many southern European cities. So how is restraining them on a lead and imprisoning them in a house 'guardianship'? — Isaac

One could take the view that owning a pet is against the principles I have outlined. But like I said, this is about guiding what people choose to do. If someone still wants to own a dog, for example, I am simply pointing out that it seems a lesser form of exploitation than raising chickens for eggs. All we can do is offer guidance to people, from there they get to make their own choices.

Yet all you have given so far as unethical is lifespan (the foreshortening of it)... So if all you've got as non-ethical is the reduction of lifespans, then high-welfare farming is the most ethical way to treat animals. — Isaac

I don't think you have properly understood my proposition. The problem is nothing to do with the lifespan of a farmed animal or the fact it gets killed. The argument is that other animals have a right to their own lives and to be treated fairly, including the right not to be treated cruelly. On these grounds, we should choose not to farm animals for the same reasons we shouldn't farm humans. That is, it is not ethical to own a human, to treat a person as property, to use them as a means rather than an end. So, our first priority is not create farmed animals in the first place. However, there is no law preventing that so the best we can do as ethical members of society is to not support these systems of exploitation by not buying their products. This is exactly how we might behave in the case of human exploitation. If we know that product X is produced by enslaved teenagers in Country X, teenagers who are killed at 20 because they are less useful at their job, the only ethical thing we can do is not to buy that product. We *can* also protest against Country X, of course, but that has no guarantee of success.

Agreed. But that's not the argument you made. It's got nothing to do with Veganism... Then you're using a different definition to most. That might be part of the misunderstanding here... Veganism is not just a position that we ought act ethically toward animals, it is a declaration of what that ethical treatment should entail. It bypasses the debate about what constitutes ethical treatment and substitutes its pre-conceived notion of the solution. — Isaac

I do not agree with you. If under Articles 3-5 it is not ethical to enslave humans, then we have already specified what is ethical. The same applies in the case of other species. Which is exactly what veganism is. It isn't simply a diet.

I don't believe I ever talked about death. The claim is that other species have a right to their own lives. — Graeme M

Then I'm unsure what ethical concern you're raising against welfare-concerned farming. The animals 'have' their own lives.

The argument is that other animals have a right to their own lives and to be treated fairly, including the right not to be treated cruelly. On these grounds, we should choose not to farm animals for the same reasons we shouldn't farm humans. That is, it is not ethical to own a human, to treat a person as property, to use them as a means rather than an end. — Graeme M

So you've no objection to hunting?

How do you feel about factory work? Is it your view that factory workers have chosen to work in those conditions of their own free will?

What about free-grazing? Would you object to that?

If under Articles 3-5 it is not ethical to enslave humans, then we have already specified what is ethical. The same applies in the case of other species. Which is exactly what veganism is. — Graeme M

No. Veganism would preclude hunting, for example.

It [veganism] isn't simply a diet. — Graeme M

Magnifique! On point mon ami, on point!

Veganism is the half-open flower of morality. We still have a long way to go, oui monsieur?

Then I'm unsure what ethical concern you're raising against welfare-concerned farming. The animals 'have' their own lives. — Isaac

Again, let's consider the human example, because I am arguing for the same consideration of basic interests. Is it ethical to own slaves? I would say no, and I think that is generally agreed by most people today. The issue isn't how well the slaves live, it is the fact they are slaves in the first place.

So you've no objection to hunting? — Isaac

Well, I do object to sport hunting or trophy hunting. Personally I am a little on the fence about people in Western societies hunting for food - by and large I don't think we need to and it is definitely acting against the interests of the animals. Still, if it's legal then people can do it. My argument is that if we wish to protect the interests of other species we probably should choose not to hunt animals for food. In the case of people living where that is a necessity, then I think it is ethical.

How do you feel about factory work? Is it your view that factory workers have chosen to work in those conditions of their own free will? — Isaac

Depends on which factories. Generally speaking, people working in lowly paid jobs are exploited because they do not get to share fairly in the profit of their labour. However as a society we have agreed that a fair wage is sufficient to minimise this form of exploitation. If they are working in third world conditions where they are not paid enough and are coerced into those jobs, then I would say this is wrong. The best I can do is choose not to buy products from the companies that do this.

No. Veganism would preclude hunting, for example. — Isaac

Well, I've already answered that. Yes, veganism would preclude that in the cases where it is not necessary, just as I said above. That is a consistent position. The definition of veganism includes the caveat "when possible and practicable". Which is precisely what I say when I use the caveat "whenever we can". But again, no-one is forced to be "a vegan", so all we can do is hope people choose to act ethically. The proposition I am making is to outline what ethical means in this context. From there, people get to make their own choices.

Absolutely!

My argument is that if we wish to protect the interests of other species we probably should choose not to hunt animals for food. — Graeme M

But you said...

am arguing for the same consideration of basic interests. Is it ethical to own slaves? I would say no, and I think that is generally agreed by most people today. The issue isn't how well the slaves live, it is the fact they are slaves in the first place. — Graeme M

I don't see how that applies to hunting. You seem to have gone back to this being about foreshortening life.

as a society we have agreed that a fair wage is sufficient to minimise this form of exploitation. — Graeme M

As a society we've agreed that farming is a reasonable way to create food. I don't see how your argument works here.

Why? This is Graeme M's thread about veganism and you posted a claim on it. Why are we now discussing a caricature of a theory of mine that I haven't even mentioned? — Isaac

You were the one refuting my claims against the naturalistic fallacy (ancestors etc). Thus I refuted that refutation. When arguing someone in good faith, it’s reasonable to anticipate similar arguments if they are consistent with their reasoning (ie community and historical practices somehow confer morality- conflated perhaps with moral sense, etc).

You were the one refuting my claims against the naturalistic fallacy (ancestors etc). Thus I refuted that refutation. — schopenhauer1

A claim is not defended by pointing out that an alternative claim is wrong unless the two claims are mutually exclusive.

A claim is not defended by pointing out that an alternative claim is wrong unless the two claims are mutually exclusive. — Isaac

You are not the only one who gets to attack bucko. Sometimes you gotta move your queen back a space.

whenever we can — Graeme M

when possible and practicable — Graeme M

Which is never! @schopenhauer1 is correct when he points out life is game invented by a psychopath who creates people like us to play it whether we want to or not, offering us two and only two choices: Algos ( :up: )/Thanatos ( :down: ). Why do I feel like a Roman Emperor ... at a gladiatorial game? :snicker:

I don't see how that applies to hunting. You seem to have gone back to this being about foreshortening life. — Isaac

Hmmm... Are you sure you are acting in good faith here? It would be good if you were willing to be more open to the proposition rather than simply trying to find weaknesses. The claim is straight-forward. Like humans, other animals deserve to have their basic interests protected. If a basic interest is to be free to conduct one's own life (which is what is meant by the right to life, liberty, freedom and not be enslaved), then a) we should not breed them to be used as property and treated as a means rather than an end, AND b) we should not kill them when we do not need to.

I am not sure what is inconsistent or unreasonable about this, presuming we agree that other species deserve this kind of consideration.

As a society we've agreed that farming is a reasonable way to create food. I don't see how your argument works here. — Isaac

We have agreed (somewhat) that a fair wage is a reasonable antidote to workers being exploited. Is animal farming a reasonable antidote to the problem of animals being treated as property and being exploited? It's difficult to see that it is for the simple reason the problem is the farming itself.

Now, I am not saying that someone cannot believe that ethical farming practice isn't sufficent to ensure ethical food production. I am saying that given that such is very much in the minority, shouldn't an ethical society be open to considering the ethical claims of veganism? What individuals decide is up to them, but I would hope that evaluating an ethical issue would be a priority of an ethical society.

It would be good if you were willing to be more open to the proposition rather than simply trying to find weaknesses. — Graeme M

Philosophers are in the demolition business. They love to tear down what others (attempt to) build because they, being perfectionists, believe there really is not point to houses that have structural flaws which collapse when subject to even teeny amounts of stress. When you see philosophies, think of a city in the 3^rd world - all buildings are shoddily-built, easily reduced to rubble when put to the test - just waiting for a (philosophical) earthquake to level it. Re Paradigm shifts, si señor/señorita?

It would be good if you were willing to be more open to the proposition rather than simply trying to find weaknesses. — Graeme M

Then I'm unsure why you would post it to a public discussion forum. I should think a leafleting campaign, or blog would be the more appropriate medium for seeking approval or support.

The claim is straight-forward. — Graeme M

It may seem that way to you. The point of posting in a discussion forum is surely to discover if it also seems that way to others. If you already have all the answers then one wonders what the point was.

other animals deserve to have their basic interests protected. If a basic interest is to be free to conduct one's own life (which is what is meant by the right to life, liberty, freedom and not be enslaved), then a) we should not breed them to be used as property and treated as a means rather than an end, AND b) we should not kill them when we do not need to. — Graeme M

Neither (a) nor (b) follow from your premise alone. You've drawn no connection at all between liberty and being used as an end.

Workers are all used as ends (their labour), yet we don't say that humans are mistreated to be used that way.

Nothing about killing something interferes with it's liberty other than by foreshortening its life. If foreshortening life is unethical, then it's hard to see how lengthening it (above average) is also unethical. Farmed animals often live longer than their nearest wild equivalent.

You need to show some link between being farmed and some conflict with what you have good reason to believe the animal's best interests. Welfare-friendly farming gives animals a pleasant life, longer and easier than their wild ancestors. They are killed before dying naturally, but this doesn't foreshorten their life because absent this arrangement they would have most likely died beforehand from the sorts of natural causes the farmer protects them from.

They are 'used' toward an end, but so are all employees.

Your objections either don't seem to apply, or apply also to humans where some exchange of freedom for welfare is made.

It may seem that way to you. The point of posting in a discussion forum is surely to discover if it also seems that way to others. If you already have all the answers then one wonders what the point was. — Isaac

I don't mind the idea being critiqued but I feel you are simply restating your objection in different ways and I keep answering the same way. It is pretty unproductive. That said, the actual topic isn't whether my proposition is perfectly correct but rather why is it the case that an ethical society shouldn't wish to treat this ethical issue seriously. I have explained why the ethical basis for the proposition is consistent with everyday human ethics and why we can make similar decisions about the things we do in this regard.

You agree in regard to "factory" farming which as we know is about 90% of farming, yet it seems impossible for this debate to gain any traction with people generally, being rejected as some kind of subversive foolishness at best or lunatic anti-society at worst.

So the real question is, if we can reframe the vegan argument so that it makes sense in the context of our general ethical outlook, shouldn't society be more open to actual genuine debate around the issue?

In the case of your objection which is - as best I can tell - that animals can be farmed ethically, then your personal choice would be to buy only meat and dairy from those kinds of producers. Which is entirely consistent with the proposition I have made. What I am suggesting is that in the absence of laws proscribing behaviours, the best we can do is be open to learning about how various animal-based industries operate, consider these in the context of the three ethical principles I describe and then decide what we want to do. But for that to actually have any effect on making things better (eg with regard to CAFOs), then we have to agree there is a rational ground for thinking that way.

My proposition is meant to offer a rational, defensible and consistent ground for genuine consideration of the problem. It really isn't that hard.

I have explained why the ethical basis for the proposition is consistent with everyday human ethics and why we can make similar decisions about the things we do in this regard. — Graeme M

I guess the crux of this matter is to what extend everyday human ethics should also apply to animals. You take the position that it should apply almost completely (citing human rights), but I don't think that is the dominant ethical view in today's society. I would say the dominant view is that we owe some level of ethical responsibility to animals, but far short of the ethical responsibility we owe other humans.

Thus I argue and that today's ethical society does not require veganism in the way you suggest, as your extrapolation of human rights to animal rights is not the current ethical view of modern society. Today's standards treat the ethical responsibility to animals as lesser than that to other humans.

Maybe that will change over time, so if you were to write this post again in 2100, maybe then you would be correct about the modern ethical standards of 2100.

In the case of your objection which is - as best I can tell - that animals can be farmed ethically, — Graeme M

You arent paying attention to what you are reading if you think this is the counter argument Isaac is offering.

Neither (a) nor (b) follow from your premise alone. You've drawn no connection at all between liberty and being used as an end. — Isaac

Answer that. This is a counter argument to what you are saying. If you cannot answer it, your position is refuted so address it if you want to be taken seriously.

Nothing about killing something interferes with it's liberty other than by foreshortening its life. If foreshortening life is unethical, then it's hard to see how lengthening it (above average) is also unethical. Farmed animals often live longer than their nearest wild equivalent. — Isaac

This too. Don’t be confuses by the mention of farming, its the bolded portion you need to answer for your position to stand.

Your objections either don't seem to apply, or apply also to humans where some exchange of freedom for welfare is made. — Isaac

Again, address these claims made by Isaac. If you cannot refute this then your argument doesnt stand.
The fact that you only got “animals can be farmed ethically” from reading Isaacs posts is amazing to me, and it should give you pause on your own position that you have so clearly failed to comprehend counterpoints made against it. This is a very good sign that you haven’t considered the issue thoroughly. Also a good indicator you are making an ad hoc argument, rather than in good faith.

I guess the crux of this matter is to what extend everyday human ethics should also apply to animals. You take the position that it should apply almost completely (citing human rights), but I don't think that is the dominant ethical view in today's society. — PhilosophyRunner

I agree this isn't the dominant position; my claim is that it should be for already well established reasons. I am saying that the ethical principles are the same whether applied to humans or other species. Not all human rights can apply, of course, but the core ones relating to the right to life, liberty and freedom from cruel treatment should.

We could of course take the view that humans just are far more important and only they deserve this kind of consideration, but when we dig into why this might be the case we seem to end up with the likelihood that other species deserve the same consideration.

Again, address these claims made by Isaac. If you cannot refute this then your argument doesnt stand.
The fact that you only got “animals can be farmed ethically” from reading Isaacs posts is amazing to me, and it should give you pause on your own position that you have so clearly failed to comprehend counterpoints made against it. This is a very good sign that you haven’t considered the issue thoroughly. Also a good indicator you are making an ad hoc argument, rather than in good faith. — DingoJones

I don't see the case you are making. Consider in the light of human rights as expressed in those core three articles. The aim is to prevent the treatment of humans as property and to prevent them being used as a means rather than an end. It also seeks to ensure that humans are free to live their lives on their own terms. Nothing about that suggests that it is fine to own a person, to breed humans as needed as a means to some end, nor that it is right to kill a person.

Isaac is arguing that we can choose to do that in relation to other humans. I don't think we can - their rights are inherent and inalienable except when forfeited (as happens for example when someone attacks someone else with the intent to do them harm). In the case of animal farming, it is the act of ownership and use as a means that breaches the ethical principle (or the animal's right, if you prefer). His argument about how well they are treated when alive doesn't bear on the question of whether it is right to own them, breed tham, and use them. Of the three principles, we have breached the first two by farming them. We *might* be able to treat them well while they live and thereby meet the duty in the third principle, but even that is questionable because I think we would agree that killing a human being for our own ends is a "cruel or inhuman" treatment and if so, it is also cruel when applied to another animal.

I am saying it is not controversial to argue that humans have a right not to be treated the way farmed animals are. As I am proposing that the exact same ethical principles should apply to other species, it is therefore not ethical to farm them. Whatever reasons can be adduced that show why we cannot do so to humans also apply to other species.

Ok, maybe I misunderstood the argument you were making.

When you started with "Modern ethical principles," I took that to be the dominant ethical principals in today society. In which case modern ethical principals do not require veganism.

What I now think you are arguing is that modern ethical standards are wrong and your would like to change them. Is that correct? I'm not against that in this case.

I agree that modern ethics doesn't seem to include the just treatment of other species in this way. My topic is to pose the argument that modern ethical societies should. In my post, I explained why that is the case. I also outlined why, given that such rights have not been awarded, the best we can do is act as though they have been.

the actual topic isn't whether my proposition is perfectly correct but rather why is it the case that an ethical society shouldn't wish to treat this ethical issue seriously. — Graeme M

If your position wasn't correct, would that not be an ideal candidate for a reason why it is not taken seriously?

I have explained why the ethical basis for the proposition is consistent with everyday human ethics and why we can make similar decisions about the things we do in this regard. — Graeme M

You don't do 'explaining' here because such an activity is reserved for when the notion in question is to be understood by the interlocutor (such as a teacher-student relationship, or the giving of an instruction). You've presented a proposition which may or may not be coherent. Either clarifying, defending or modifying it is the response to criticism.

In the case of your objection which is - as best I can tell - that animals can be farmed ethically, then your personal choice would be to buy only meat and dairy from those kinds of producers. — Graeme M

This just re-affirms the obvious - that we each act according to our own ethical standards. It's conceited for you to assume that others not acting so compassionately toward animals is an indication that they just haven't thought about it. It may be an indication that they have thought about it but reached a different conclusion to you.

I am saying it is not controversial to argue that humans have a right not to be treated the way farmed animals are. As I am proposing that the exact same ethical principles should apply to other species, it is therefore not ethical to farm them. Whatever reasons can be adduced that show why we cannot do so to humans also apply to other species. — Graeme M

No, they can't.

Firstly, we've agreed there are many caveats to the principles you've outlined, even for humans. Take children, for example. Are they free to leave the school grounds or the home whenever they feel like it? No. Are children free to dress and behave how they see fit? No. Are children considered the property of their parents (in that their parents have the right to treat them in any way that is within legal boundaries)? Yes. So already for nearly a quarter of the population we have exceptions to the liberty ethic on the grounds that "it's for their own good". We also have various arrangements set up where liberties are exchanged for welfare gains (most employment arrangements are like this, but the capitalist economy as a whole can be seen as such an arrangement). We have exceptions to killing too, such as in war ("for the greater good"), euthanasia (where one's liberty and one's lifespan conflict), and you mentioned self-defence.

So we have a few general principles which are punched through with contextual exceptions.

Animals aren't humans, So their context is different. If their context is different, then their contextual exceptions will be different. Their particular set of caveats will be different to the set humans have.

To demonstrate this, consider if you saw on the news that humans were being chased down and killed by armed thugs. You'd feel compelled to stop this situation. But when, on a nature documentary you see a gazelle being chased down the street by a lion the ethical response would not be the same. If you don't allow this exception, then you are suggesting (as I know some radical vegans do) that we should bring about the extinction (or otherwise render harmless) all predators. Why don't we?

So if you're going to simply say "look at the animals that are farmed - we wouldn't ethically treat a human that way so we shouldn't do so with other animals" and call it an argument, the easiest counter is to say "look at the prey animals that are in the wild - we wouldn't leave any humans in those circumstances so we shouldn't do so with other animals".

If you have an answer to that question - if you have a reason why you think it is wrong, or unnecessary to interfere with the 'appalling' conditions that prey animals live in in the African savanna, conditions we would be monsters for allowing other humans to endure unaided, then you have your first caveat, your first difference of circumstance between humans and other animals.

Other people simply have a different such list perhaps to you.

So any debate about veganism has to be a debate about what is on that list of differences and why.

If your position wasn't correct, would that not be an ideal candidate for a reason why it is not taken seriously? — Isaac

I mean in the sense that perhaps I have explained poorly. Your approach has been purely to find fault, which is fine, but I am also interested in why it is a rational and defensible argument.

You don't do 'explaining' here because such an activity is reserved for when the notion in question is to be understood by the interlocutor (such as a teacher-student relationship, or the giving of an instruction). You've presented a proposition which may or may not be coherent. Either clarifying, defending or modifying it is the response to criticism. — Isaac

Feel free to insert "clarifying", "defending" or "modifying" in place of "explaining".

This just re-affirms the obvious - that we each act according to our own ethical standards. It's conceited for you to assume that others not acting so compassionately toward animals is an indication that they just haven't thought about it. It may be an indication that they have thought about it but reached a different conclusion to you. — Isaac

This is just restating what I have proposed. My proposition is that IF our ethical principles are valid, it is reasonable to apply them to the case of other species. I think the public debate should be more informed in this regard whereas it typically is not. If after that an individual prefers to act contrary to the principles outlined, that is their choice.

Firstly, we've agreed there are many caveats to the principles you've outlined, even for humans. Take children, for example. Are they free to leave the school grounds or the home whenever they feel like it? No. ... <snip> ...If you have an answer to that question - if you have a reason why you think it is wrong, or unnecessary to interfere with the 'appalling' conditions that prey animals live in in the African savanna, conditions we would be monsters for allowing other humans to endure unaided, then you have your first caveat, your first difference of circumstance between humans and other animals. — Isaac

The difficulty I have with this section is that you appear to me still to be arguing against something I haven't said, or more exactly to be trying to find a way to misinterpret the principles outlined.

What if we just step back from all of your loopholes and caveats about human rights and tackle the main concern. Do you think it ethical to own human beings, breed them for your own ends, and kill them when you wish to further those ends? If not, then such matters as children leaving school grounds or being "owned" by their parents are irrelevant. If yes, then we can't discuss this any further because you wish to hold a view that I do not think is generally held by most modern societies.

Also, raising the matter of the ethical nature of relations between other species is clearly irrelevant. Why would you do this unless you simply refuse to contemplate the proposition and prefer to be contrary just fo the sake of it? The fact we don't excuse thugs killing people because lions kill zebras gives rise to the reason why we might not excuse the killing of farmed animals because lions kill zebras.

In the case of human rights, we are specifically constraining our ethical concern to how human beings affect other human beings (relations between people). Similarly, our ethical concern in the case of animals rights is only in the context of how human beings affect other species (relations between people and other species).

I am also interested in why it is a rational and defensible argument. — Graeme M

I can't make sense of this expression. It sounds like you've already decided the argument is rational and defensible, but you want to find out why. That seems like an oddly dogmatic approach.

This is just restating what I have proposed. ... If after that an individual prefers to act contrary to the principles outlined, that is their choice. — Graeme M

No, I wrote about people reaching different ethical conclusions to you, not about people agreeing with your conclusions but ignoring them.

Do you think it ethical to own human beings, breed them for your own ends, and kill them when you wish to further those ends? — Graeme M

The answer is "no, with caveats". It's not a question that can be answered with a simple yes or no. There are caveats where we use other humans to our own ends, there are caveats where we kill other humans to our own ends. That is the conclusion of the examples I gave. It's the reason I gave them.

In the case of human rights, we are specifically constraining our ethical concern to how human beings affect other human beings (relations between people). — Graeme M

I mean this is patently false. Again the reason why I provided the example I did. If other humans were suffering as a result of frequent animal attacks, or frequent earthquakes, or volcanoes... We don't wash our hands of the humanitarian issues because they were not caused by other humans. We have barriers in place to prevent such tragedies because we care about the humans who would otherwise suffer. So if our ethical concerns extend without caveat, to other animals, then why do we not similarly protect prey from the suffering at the hands of their predators. A lion is no less a natural occurrence than an earthquake. We evacuate people from the vicinity of the latter, ought we evacuate prey from the vicinity of the former?

I mean this is patently false. Again the reason why I provided the example I did. If other humans were suffering as a result of frequent animal attacks, or frequent earthquakes, or volcanoes... We don't wash our hands of the humanitarian issues because they were not caused by other humans. We have barriers in place to prevent such tragedies because we care about the humans who would otherwise suffer. So if our ethical concerns extend without caveat, to other animals, then why do we not similarly protect prey from the suffering at the hands of their predators. A lion is no less a natural occurrence than an earthquake. We evacuate people from the vicinity of the latter, ought we evacuate prey from the vicinity of the former? — Isaac

This is just bad reasoning. Ethics can only go human-to-animal, and not animal-to-human or animal-to-animal as it is obvious most animals cannot, by their biological nature, ethically reason (though perhaps things like fairness and compassion play some roles- another discussion). Rather, the question becomes, how do we humans (who do have capacity for ethical reasoning), treat other animals? Because animals cannot ethically reason, it does not negate them to "thus, humans can treat animals as beings deserving of being killed for X reasons by humans". Rather, if we "know" what is going on and the animal does not, the onus is on the person who "knows" what is the case. There is no onus for a lion or whatnot. They cannot help but kill. You cannot reason with them.

Of course being NOT a consequentialist, silly reductio ad absurdums like, "But humans DO know that animals will get killed by other animals", doesn't come into play in most deontological discussions of rights and ends. Animal-to-animal relationships are categorically not in the "rights' purview. Humans need only stick to human-to-human or human-to-animal relations.

And so, as far as animal-to-animal relationships, that is not in our realm, as it is two non-reasoning animals. You cannot blame animals for something they cannot reason about. While it is tragic for the animal being eaten, and a pessimistic part of life (see my pessimism), it is not a matter of human ethics that this takes place and we don't prevent every single instance of this. It actually speaks to a larger pessimism itself (that it needs suffering to sustain life).. But being that animals can't ponder this tragedy, they are to some extent going to be subject to their instincts and what happens to them as a result of other animals' instincts.

Conversely, by letting animals follow their nature (again, being animals that CANNOT reason by their nature), it is protecting their rights to follow the ends of their animal interests. We can argue about what kind of animals deserve this protection, but that would be a different argument. Do mice deserve the same protection as a cow or a great ape? Does a chicken deserve the same protection from harm than a mosquito or fish? I think there are good answers to this based on empirical evidence, but that would then be a different argument and a red herring.

Also, can people protect their own interests against aggressive animal behaviors and such? Of course. Animals need not be treated EQUALLY to humans, when it comes to moral reasoning. It simply stands that we have an obligation towards them, as sentient beings, to not cause unnecessarily harmful behavior towards them. And that is the key part.

Similarly to antinatalism, I think the basis of ethics lies in not causing unnecessarily harmful behavior, when you can prevent it. For a person, that might be not causing for a new person to play an often harmful game that they cannot end, (and have little say in their choices and harms they will encounter), except suicide. For an animal it may be not killing them if you don't need to. Killing for food may be less harmful than simply killing an animal for no reason, but killing for food if you don't have to is still problematic.

So why do we protect other humans from natural (non-human) causes of harm, but not other animals?

So why do we protect other humans from natural (non-human) causes of harm, but not other animals? — Isaac

Well, we should try to if they are in our protection.

Well, we should try to if they are in our protection. — schopenhauer1

On what grounds do they become "in our protection". Why are the gazelles on the African savannah not in our protection, but the humans at risk from the drought are?

Why are the gazelles on the African savannah not in our protection — Isaac

Because were are not kings with dominion over the earth with all animals as our subjects for protection. That's an odd and antiquated way of looking at it.

were are not kings with dominion over the earth with all animals as our subjects for protection. — schopenhauer1

Why not. Why are we not morally responsible for other animals?

Why not. Why are we not morally responsible for other animals? — Isaac

Because there is a distinction with the "natural world" and the human world. The natural world is that which does its thing without human (beings who are self-aware and can reason) influence and conversely, doesn't directly influence humans. But there can be a case that, if humans have the time and resources, why not go above and beyond (supererogatory actions) and preserve that which might be saved?

You really are scraping the bottom here.