The referendums don't really mean anything — jorndoe

What I'm asking is if Russia think those areas are part of Russia and they defend them as they would any other part of Russia, then the belief that "Ukraine could never successfully invade Russia" seems to imply Ukraine could never successfully invade Donbas. Or, vice versa, if Ukraine have good chance of retaking Donbas, then they have a good chance of invading Russia and taking Russian territory. I don't see how an opinion (like that of the UN) can affect relative military strengths.

As you know, personally I think that it's a balanced metric. I think NATO-supported Ukraine could retake Donbas, but it will be a hard fight. But I'm not also trying to claim that Russia's fears were nonsensical because NATO-supported Ukraine could be no threat to them territorially, so I've got not contradictory beliefs there to try and reconcile.

The referendums mean a lot. They mean that the regions being fought over are now considered (by the Russians) to be part of Russia. That means that, in their eyes, Ukraine are now the aggressors. If you seriously don't think that means nothing then you've massively underestimated the Russian propaganda effort. If they can turn an invasion into a 'special operation' then think what they can do with a couple of maps showing the new 'officially voted for' border of Russia.

this recent counteroffensive carried out by Ukraine is a huge embarrassment for Russia and this is something which adds more fuel to the fire. — Manuel

Yes indeed. Russia's had enough real failures to account for before even thinking about the social media exaggerations of it's incompetence. They've really got to pull a massive victory and fast. There's a host of options they might try toward that end which we ought to be trying everything in our power to avoid. Unfortunately social media has a mind of its own.

There are no "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin. — neomac

Sometimes I don't quite know what to say yo some of your responses. If you're seriously convinced that the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now then I don't think my producing any contrary figures will help.

A few million are currently at severe risk of starvation (according to UNICEF) in Afghanistan.

Off the top of my head, something like 10-20,000 are killed in the Myanmar conflict in a year, a few thousand a year every single year for decades in the Mexican war on drugs. The US supported war in Yemen has killed over a million with a similar annual death toll to Myanmar.

A failure to tackle air pollution kills 100,000 or more people every year in India. Even here in England there are something like 100-150,000 deaths a year from all causes that could be avoided through public health interventions.

There's wars in Ethiopia and Somalia which, coupled with famines, cause thousands of deaths every year. Half a million children are at risk of death from the latest drought and that's barely even made the inside pages of most newspapers, nearly twice that in Sudan...

But my feelung is that none of this is going to penetrate your social-media-soaked echo-chamber. So yes, Putin's invasion of Ukraine is the worst event ever, no one else ever does anything this bad and we definitely ought to throw as many Ukrainians as we can get our hands on at him to protect ourselves from his blatant attempt to take over the world. It's definitely not a regional conflict like hundreds before it.

, equivocation aside, the Russian autocrats can say and do whatever, and that's what they do — with or without others.
Should others then stand idle by, if they propagandize (their population) into justifying/eliciting a world war, nuclear war, a(nother) catastrophe?
Letting them run their course isn't an answer, standing up is.
Fortunately, the current crisis isn't there, but some are standing up (on the high ground).

(Hmm perhaps a public ceremony isn't so far out after all... :smile:)

A separate idea, while babbling anyway: How about a different sort of talks and negotiations, one that's more direct, persistent, ongoing? Central/involved leaders have a direct line and are expected to talk with the rest frequently, promoting negotiations, perhaps compromises, and initiating putting guarantees on paper (formalized). They'd be recorded or something, so the world could figure out what's on their minds. This would sort of force participants to think about and address things, not just listen to their own generals.

As an aside, the borderless world is a neat idea, sort of. ^{(726952, 746063)}
John Lennon, 1971.
It's just far from the current world, whether by traditions, cultures, whatever, and doesn't seem feasible, at least not for a good while.

Should others then stand idle by, if they propagandize (their population) into justifying/eliciting a world war, nuclear war, a(nother) catastrophe? — jorndoe

No, but we should, in our planning, take account of the effect of such propaganda. If Ukraine invading Russia is out ofvthr question, then Russia considering Donbas to be Russia matters a lot.

How about a different sort of talks and negotiations, one that's more direct, persistent, ongoing? Central/involved leaders have a direct line and are expected to talk with the rest frequently, promoting negotiations, perhaps compromises, and initiating putting guarantees on paper (formalized). They'd be recorded or something, so the world could figure out what's on their minds. This would sort of force participants to think about and address things, not just listen to their own generals. — jorndoe

Isn't this something like the UN? I mean, I think it's a great idea, but you need to flesh out some of the details.

the borderless world is a neat idea, sort of... It's just far from the current world, whether by traditions, cultures, whatever, and doesn't seem feasible, at least not for a good while. — jorndoe

Of course, very far. But we don't have to actively promote nationalism, we can just reluctantly accept its current existence. Putting who owns what above human lives is always reprehensible, sometimes monstrous. We're neither Westeners, nor Russian's nor Ukrainians, were just people. I find all this bollocks about a 'nation's right to exist' really sickening. The last thing we want in this excessively divided world is more fucking divisions.

The NATO summit of 2008, for those that remember, made it very clear indeed: — Xtrix

Did it? Really, look at that text you quoted.

But Putin has had notable success in blocking NATO membership for its former Soviet neighbors — Ukraine and Georgia.

And then that was in 2008. That it was said over fourteen years ago and again just proves my point. And Scholz made that statement THIS YEAR. Yet no matter how much assurances Putin got about Ukraine not going to join NATO, Putin didn't care a shit about it when he launched the attack. It was never was about NATO membership in the first place. NATO enlargement was a point like for Bush "spreading democracy" when he invaded Iraq. Yeah, it's important for the US. The simple undeniable fact is that Putin could have prevented Ukraine's NATO membership with far less than attacking Ukraine. Hence it's bizarre to cling on to this idea that "NATO made Putin do it".

Perhaps you believe also that Turkey's on the cusp to become a member of the EU too? EU and Turkey have had discussions about membership for ages. :snicker:

it's bizarre to cling on to this idea that "NATO made Putin do it". — ssu

Just a quick reminder...

If you want to give a serious counterargument, how about actually engaging in what I say and not a strawman? — ssu

Oh and a bonus gem from the same post...

My point is that Putin invaded Ukraine because of a) wanting to make Russia great again, b) because of NATO enlargement — ssu

Did it? Really, look at that text you quoted.

But Putin has had notable success in blocking NATO membership for its former Soviet neighbors — Ukraine and Georgia. — ssu

Yes, success in blocking it. What was being blocked?

And then that was in 2008. That it was said over fourteen years ago and again just proves my point. — ssu

And reiterated in June of 2021, which I quoted.

And Scholz made that statement THIS YEAR. — ssu

Blinken— far more importantly — made the statements I cited THIS YEAR as well.

This story that Putin was given “every assurance” is just false.

It was never was about NATO membership in the first place — ssu

What is it about, then? I’ve heard a number of stories about being anti-democracy, having imperial ambitions, and being an evil madman. But I don’t find any of that compelling, based on the facts. Maybe it’s true — But I think after years of saying the same thing, consistently, it’s no surprise that something would eventually happen.

The simple undeniable fact is that Putin could have prevented Ukraine's NATO membership with far less than attacking Ukraine. — ssu

Like what?

Hence it's bizarre to cling on to this idea that "NATO made Putin do it". — ssu

I’m not clinging to that idea — I think the evidence points in the direction that it’s the main factor, yes.

Anyway — you’re getting emotional, I think. Remember what I mentioned earlier: I’m not defending Putin, and I’m biased towards emphasizing the role of the US because it’s where I live.

Isaac, I have been pretty consistent about this.

I haven't denied that NATO is one reason. What I have said again and again is that it isn't the most important reason, and it would have been taken care of without attacking Ukraine. Hence the NATO argument simply doesn't cut it as an explanation for Putin's actions. Just like "spreading democracy" was a reason for Bush to invade Iraq. But "spreading democracy" simply isn't the most important reason for the war in Iraq and to emphasize this reason simply makes an inaccurate answer for the reasons for the invasion.

I find all this bollocks about a 'nation's right to exist' really sickening. — Isaac

I believe it was a product of Israeli propaganda, which serves to silence critics of Israel.

The rights that should be afforded, and are granted at least in rhetoric, are peace and security. Of course, you can't have these if you don't exist, pace anti-natalists, but existence is a given for these rights to come into effect. Adding "right to exist" affords nothing to already existing rights, except for dubious rhetoric.

This story that Putin was given “every assurance” is just false. — Xtrix

Ukraine wasn't let into NATO. Not for two decades. That is a fact. And extremely likely that would have continued because Russia could easily pressure this. Far more easily than making an all-out invasion on Ukraine.

You do understand that attacking Ukraine on February 24th changed a lot?

Finland and Sweden wouldn't have applied for NATO membership if 2/24 hadn't happened. That is just the reality.

Now that NATO membership of Ukraine might really be in the works.

I’m not clinging to that idea — I think the evidence points in the direction that it’s the main factor, yes. — Xtrix

How can territorial annexations be less important?

I’m biased towards emphasizing the role of the US because it’s where I live. — Xtrix

You should not be biased. The reasons should be the same where ever you look at it. Understanding that people look differently at things doesn't mean that there cannot be objectivity.

If you're seriously convinced that the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now — Isaac

I’m not convinced that “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now”. But if your imagination tells you otherwise, what can we do about it? Right?

A few million are currently at severe risk of starvation (according to UNICEF) in Afghanistan.

Off the top of my head, something like 10-20,000 are killed in the Myanmar conflict in a year, a few thousand a year every single year for decades in the Mexican war on drugs. The US supported war in Yemen has killed over a million with a similar annual death toll to Myanmar.

A failure to tackle air pollution kills 100,000 or more people every year in India. Even here in England there are something like 100-150,000 deaths a year from all causes that could be avoided through public health interventions.

There's wars in Ethiopia and Somalia which, coupled with famines, cause thousands of deaths every year. Half a million children are at risk of death from the latest drought and that's barely even made the inside pages of most newspapers, nearly twice that in Sudan… — Isaac

is your conviction that we, the West, should “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world while avoiding to meddle in regional conflicts around the world like in Yemen and Ukraine? Is that it?

I find all this bollocks about a 'nation's right to exist' really sickening. — Isaac

I do not believe Ukrainians are fighting for an abstraction like this, do you? Even to say "self determination" instead is just shorthand for saying they want their families, homes, businesses, friends, libraries, parks, opera houses, and, you know, etc., not to exist only at the mercy of a large group of armed people who don't even live there. It couldn't be less abstract for them.

It is unavoidably abstract for us, but we can still understand, at least intellectually, why they are fighting, and call that "what they're fighting for." I'll also say that I'm betting a lot of Ukrainians are grateful there was already a state apparatus in place, and an armed forces, else they would absolutely be at the mercy of any armed group, whether a foreign government's army or criminals and outlaws. Part of the point of the state, and worth preserving even though it can be abused, as Russia is doing.

Well said.

It spells out what I was thinking in my statement upthread that insisting that there can be only one overriding purpose is to ignore the reality of a confluence of purposes.

Ukraine wasn't let into NATO. Not for two decades. That is a fact. And extremely likely that would have continued because Russia could easily pressure this. Far more easily than making an all-out invasion on Ukraine. — ssu

It’s true that Ukraine wasn’t admitted, but for a reason: Russia objected strongly to it. Nevertheless, attempts kept being made, before and after Crimea and right up to Blinken’s remarks. The threat was very real — and it’s the threat we’re talking about and which you're minimizing. The “assurances” you refer to are just false— you’re overlooking events from 2008 onward.

Even up to the present year:

"They must understand that the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward"
“if our proposals are rejected ... we will make a decision on how to ensure our security in a reliable way,” -- Lavrov, January 2022

This was indeed rejected, and Russia invaded Ukraine a month later. I already mentioned Blinken's response.

There were other threats also besides NATO membership, which we can get into. Weapons, military training, etc.

You deny that this is the main reason. I think it is the main reason. There are other reasons which we can talk about. Believing that the main reason is to "make Russia great again" doesn't have much evidence supporting it, but I'm interested in whatever you have.

How can territorial annexations be less important? — ssu

Less important than what?

I’m biased towards emphasizing the role of the US because it’s where I live.
— Xtrix
You should not be biased. — ssu

Silly comment. We're all biased. When I say biased here, it's a matter of emphasis. I put more emphasis on the US, because it's my country. It also happens to have contributed significantly to the war.

Understanding that people look differently at things doesn't mean that there cannot be objectivity. — ssu

Which is why I've given facts -- like the 2008 NATO summit, the 2021 NATO summit, the public statements by the White House in September of 2021 and by Secretary of State Blinken in January 2022. All part of the public record, all show exactly what Manuel had mentioned (and you disputed): repeated warnings from Russia ignored; the US pushing for NATO membership and involvement with Ukraine for years.

You do understand that attacking Ukraine on February 24th changed a lot? — ssu

It didn't change the historical record.

Can anyone see parallels between this Ukraine conflict and the Spanish Civil War 1936-9?
Then as now, via proxy, the various world powers probed each others military capabilities, weapons, and tactics in preparation for the main show to follow.

That is too simple of an explanation of what is going on but if that is the process, the Russians just blew their resources on a war game.

No one's marching on Moscow, has expressed wanting to, threatened with.
This part is about Ukraine, sovereignty, self-determination, self-power.

Ukraine member of NATO ...
• Russia less of a threat to Ukraine (limit Kremlin's free movements/actions)
• NATO more of a threat to Russia, cf Putin's speeches
In Ukraine's own interest, now proven, not hypothetical.
In Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia's interests.

Ukraine not member of NATO ...
• Russia more of a threat to Ukraine (proven, non-hypothetical)
• NATO less of a threat to Russia
In Russia's interest. (More Kremlin freedom.)

Ukraine neutral ...
• free to pursue EU/whatever affiliation/memberships
• not thoroughly demilitarized in light of present crisis

The Ukrainians have nonetheless changed stance on occasion, entertained options in public, shown willingness to hear others, and it's their homes and lives.
I'm guessing they don't have much patience left for those saying that NATO is an existential threat to Russia and calling it a day.

Is this assessment influenced by any partisanship?

It’s true that Ukraine wasn’t admitted, but for a reason: Russia objected strongly to it. — Xtrix

Not only that would have guaranteed that Ukraine wouldn't have become a NATO member, Ukraine was neutral and there was large support for Ukraine being and staying neutral... until Russia made it's land grab and started this long war. If you take away from the view what Russia has done and just focus on the US, you simply paint a biased picture which isn't truthful.

The threat was very real — and it’s the threat we’re talking about and which you're minimizing. The “assurances” you refer to are just false— you’re overlooking events from 2008 onward. — Xtrix

If you don't take into account the hostility and aggression of Russia, the territorial annexations and talk of Ukraine being an artificial country etc. then you are simply denying that Russia's actions here do matter. It's hostility is the only cause why NATO is enlarging now on it's borders with Finland and Sweden.

Perhaps you don't understand political discourse. NATO has a charter, it cannot go against it's charter and formally give Russia a veto on just how applies for it. But it's members can surely de facto give that to Russia and had given that to Russia when it came to Ukraine. But this fact seems to evade you.

Can anyone see parallels between this Ukraine conflict and the Spanish Civil War 1936-9?
Then as now, via proxy, the various world powers probed each others military capabilities, weapons, and tactics in preparation for the main show to follow. — yebiga

Spanish civil war was truly a civil war: no other country had territorial ambitions on Spain. The Syrian civil war would be more similar.

Better example would be the Korean war. There actually China, the Soviet Union and the US and Western allies were engaged in combat and not just sending arms. (Soviet Air Force was fighting with the USAF in "Mig Alley", which both side kept a secret)

I'm guessing they don't have much patience left for those saying that NATO is an existential threat to Russia and calling it a day. — jorndoe

I'm guessing that is not only confined to Ukraine.

I haven't denied that NATO is one reason — ssu

...

It was never was about NATO membership in the first place. — ssu

I’m not convinced that “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now”. — neomac

There are no "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin. — neomac

is your conviction that we, the West, should “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world while avoiding to meddle in regional conflicts around the world like in Yemen and Ukraine? Is that it? — neomac

Roughly, yes. Where by 'meddle' you mean 'supply arms to'.

I do not believe Ukrainians are fighting for an abstraction like this, do you? — Srap Tasmaner

Some I'm sure, but not all. I don't believe that 'Ukrainians' are an homogeneous group all fighting for a single definable reason. But I was talking about the foreign policy of our governments, not the motivation of Ukrainian soldiers.

My point is that there's no humanitarian objective in assuring something like a nation's 'right to exist'. For a third party (us all as outside observers) the loss of Ukrainian control over some territory ought have absolutely no moral weight, it matters not one jot who owns what, it matters how the people within that territory are treated.

If we're concerned that Russia will treat the occupants worse that Ukraine would (I've argued against this assumption, but let's hold it for the sake of argument) then the humanitarian problem is the way the Russian government treats its subjects, not which parts of the world it owns. We don't solve that problem by repelling it from Ukraine. The problem still exists, everyone in Russia still suffers from it. We solve the problem by enforcing changes in the way Russia is governed. And if we can do so, then, again, it doesn't matter one jot which bits of land they have control over.

We could claim that it's a numbers game (we don't want Russia to control more people the way they do), but that would be a ridiculous claim because the numbers involved are tiny compared to the effort put in - we'd be better off losing $40billion in sanctioning China with over a billion people whose lives might be improved by any human rights gain thus made. I don't buy that we're in Ukraine to secure a minor improvement in the human rights of the citizens there by ensuring they're controlled by the world's number 122 in the corruption index instead of the world's number 136. There are easier ways of making a few points gain in human rights, as Ukraine's recent history has shown.

to say "self determination" instead is just shorthand for saying they want their families, homes, businesses, friends, libraries, parks, opera houses, and, you know, etc., not to exist only at the mercy of a large group of armed people who don't even live there. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think this can be right because it's the case no matter what, governments rarely live in the places they govern. Ukraine is 800 miles across there's no single notion of people who "live there" that makes any sense here. Many of the Russian soldiers probably live closer to Donetsk than the government in Kiev do. And let's not pretend the government in Kiev aren't "a large group of armed people". The Amnesty International report I cited earlier details the treatment of the people of this region by government forces prior to the invasion. Their families, homes, businesses, friends, libraries, parks, opera houses were hardly in a a state of Utopian freedom.

we can still understand, at least intellectually, why they are fighting, and call that "what they're fighting for". — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I agree. I've said as much before. What the Ukrainians fight for, though, is not our concern. We ought not have foreign policies geared around helping other nations achieve whatever it is they happen to want, we ought have foreign policies geared around achieving the greatest humanitarian improvements we can practically achieve.

If the Ukrainians are passionate about their own self-governance and want to fight for it, that's entirely their lookout. It should be absolutely no concern of ours, and in fact, if, by fighting, they put more people at risk of humanitarian crisis than they would by surrendering then we ought actively oppose their decision.

What I'm arguing against is the oft repeated theme that it is 'up to the Ukrainians' and we ought support them in their decision. 'The Ukrainians' are not a unit, it means absolutely nothing other than that some ruling classes made some deal to draw a line around some particular bit of the map. There's no moral weight whatsoever behind what an arbitrarily drawn sample of the human race want to happen.

The war is currently in Donbas. So there's a border region either side (the rest of Ukraine one side, Russia the other) What moral reason is there to take more account of the views of the people on one side of that border than the other? Why not ask the Russians on the Ukrainian border what they feel? It's an arbitrary line on a map and doesn't delineate any racial grouping of like-minded peoples.

I'll also say that I'm betting a lot of Ukrainians are grateful there was already a state apparatus in place, and an armed forces, else they would absolutely be at the mercy of any armed group, whether a foreign government's army or criminals and outlaws. Part of the point of the state, and worth preserving even though it can be abused, as Russia is doing. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that's exactly the point I'm making. The colour of the flag above the parliament doesn't matter. The quality of the government does, and so effort put into retaining one colour over another is only of value to the extent that it represents the least harmful way of improving (or maintaining an improvement) in that quality.

With Ukraine, the two governments in question are not that far apart in terms of human rights and the human costs of maintaining one over the the other are enormous (some 40,000 dead in a year). There are easier and much less costly ways of improving the human rights record of whatever government happens to be in control of any given region. Who that government happens to be ought not be any more important than a matter of regional administrative bureaucracy.

I’m not convinced that “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now”. — neomac


There are no "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin. — neomac — Isaac

Oh, you see “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now” is the same as "no 'local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty' causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin"?! I don't: in my claim I didn't just talk about deaths and misery, and "single" wasn't qualifying the "costs".

Roughly, yes. Where by 'meddle' you mean 'supply arms to'. — Isaac

Now:
How likely is that Western citizens members of ethnic minorities (say Ukrainians, Iranians, Taiwanese) will see regional conflicts (like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Iranian revolts against the Iranian regime, the China's claims over Taiwan) as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that Western commodity traders and industry who partnered with some state muddled in some regional conflict, will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that the piece of Western economy relying on Western commodity trades and industry will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that Western political representatives and media industry who feed on ideological, religious and national differences and global threats or opportunities will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that Western military and/or geopolitical experts (like Mearsheimer or Kissinger) will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in, especially when allies, strategic partners and Great Powers hostile to the West are involved?
How likely is that historians would find historically plausible to expect that Western countries “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts?
How likely is that for any of the above subjects “meddling in regional conflicts” equates to everything except 'supply arms to’?
How likely is that for authoritarian regimes (like Russia, Iran and China) their “meddling in regional conflicts” equates to everything except 'supply arms to’?

And then that was in 2008. That it was said over fourteen years ago and again just proves my point. — ssu

Five years later, in 2013, the United States proved its willingness to follow through on its 2008 promises, when it supported regime change in Ukraine during the Maidan protests.

From that point onward, the threat of US-backed regime change in Ukraine was a fact. That's what Russia reacted to in March of 2014, and the subsequent 2022 invasion of Ukraine was an unavoidable consequence.

Again, not speaking in terms of good guys-bad guys, but these are just the facts, which you keep misrepresenting.

Is this assessment influenced by any partisanship? — yebiga

I don't think it would be partisan to note that Putin started the annexations with the hope of maintaining 'normal' relationships with Russia's trade partners. The land grab in 2014 did not bring a global response large enough to threaten that normalcy. The one in 2022 does.

Nothing about the progress of the invasion suggests it is going as planned for Russia. If it is a practice round, it is a very expensive one.

Ukraine was neutral and there was large support for Ukraine being and staying neutral... until Russia made it's land grab and started this long war. — ssu

No. The US and NATO had been pushing for membership for years, as I’ve demonstrated. After repeating now several times, if you’re not interested in looking at what was said at NATO summits, by the White House, by Blinken, and by actions like providing weapons and training, then I’m not sure how else to proceed.

“Large support” from whom? There’s large support for a two state solution in Israel, too — in the international community. But that won’t happen, because Israel and the US reject it. The same here — Germany and others have said some reasonable things, but capitulate to the US nearly every time.

If you take away from the view what Russia has done and just focus on the US, you simply paint a biased picture which isn't truthful. — ssu

No one is denying what Russia did was wrong. I’m not just focused on the US. I’m talking about the very real threat Russia faced prior to 2022 and prior to 2014, which so far you have dismissed, ignored, or minimized. That’s not an unbiased picture either.

izing. The “assurances” you refer to are just false— you’re overlooking events from 2008 onward.
— Xtrix

If you don't take into account the hostility and aggression of Russia, the territorial annexations and talk of Ukraine being an artificial country etc. then you are simply denying that Russia's actions here do matter. — ssu

There were no annexations in 2008, which is when this started — thanks to ridiculous moves by the Bush administration.

Of course Russian actions matter, but you’re mixing timelines. You denied Manuel’s assertion that there were repeated threats to Russia regarding NATO. That denial is unfounded.

Again I recommend reading the Bucharest summit transcripts.

Perhaps you don't understand political discourse. — ssu

:roll:

But it's members can surely de facto give that to Russia and had given that to Russia when it came to Ukraine. But this fact seems to evade you. — ssu

Russia does not have a NATO veto, de facto or otherwise. It managed to delay membership of Georgia and Ukraine, but the US and NATO continued pushing through weapons, training, and the promise of future membership — as was literally reiterated all the way up to the 2021 summit.

That fact seems to evade you.

NATO threat to Russia was very real, and supported by the facts — should we choose to look at them. Or we can go with our feelings.

Oh, you see “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now” is the same as "no 'local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty' causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin"?! I don't: in my claim I didn't just talk about deaths and misery, and "single" wasn't qualifying the "costs". — neomac

Then I return to being completely at a loss as to your argument. It seems to be little more than "Putin is the biggest threat to civilisation because I reckon he is"

How likely is that... — neomac

I don't know why you're asking these questions of likelihood, they seem completely unrelated to the point at hand. I'm disputing your claim the the Western world ought to help Ukraine best Russia by military force. I'm not arguing what is most likely to happen, the two are, tragically, quite unrelated.

Nonetheless, your answers (to whatever end)...

How likely is that Western citizens members of ethnic minorities (say Ukrainians, Iranians, Taiwanese) will see regional conflicts (like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Iranian revolts against the Iranian regime, the China's claims over Taiwan) as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in? — neomac

Moderately likely.

How likely is that Western commodity traders and industry who partnered with some state muddled in some regional conflict, will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in? — neomac

I don't care.

How likely is that the piece of Western economy relying on Western commodity trades and industry will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in? — neomac

Again, I don't care.

How likely is that Western political representatives and media industry who feed on ideological, religious and national differences and global threats or opportunities will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in? — neomac

Very unlikely.

How likely is that Western military and/or geopolitical experts (like Mearsheimer or Kissinger) will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in, especially when allies, strategic partners and Great Powers hostile to the West are involved? — neomac

Moderately likely, there's a range of opinion from isolationists to full on hawks.

How likely is that historians would find historically plausible to expect that Western countries “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts? — neomac

Pretty likely.

How likely is that for any of the above subjects “meddling in regional conflicts” equates to everything except 'supply arms to’? — neomac

Unlikely. Our main means of meddling in conflicts is to supply weapons.

How likely is that for authoritarian regimes (like Russia, Iran and China) their “meddling in regional conflicts” equates to everything except 'supply arms to’? — neomac

More likely. Authoritarian regimes are often also more militaristic and so more likely to actually take part, but only if the conflict is local.