It would be a collection of parts without any parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

An empty collection is a collection of no parts. A non-composite object.

The appeal to fundamental particles does not help you because they are obviously not known as concrete entities. — Metaphysician Undercover

What? They are particulars located in space and time. Why would they not be concrete entities?

But "same" is the relationship which a thing has with itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Such a relation, if it can even be regarded as a relation since it is between one thing (?), is usually called identity, as far as I know.

So if two distinct things are "the same" with respect to being red, then the concept of "red" cannot be a resemblance relation, which is a relationship of similarity — Metaphysician Undercover

Resemblance comes in various degrees and you can understand sameness as maximum or exact resemblance. So the meaning of resemblance also covers sameness.

If it is the case, that "A universal circle looks more like a recipe how to create all possible circles", then I do not see why you want to describe this as a resemblance relation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because the recipe describes relations between particular circles, like translation, rotation, scaling. These are mappings between parts of one particular circle and parts of another particular circle. They specify how particular circles are similar.

When x participates in resemblance with y, z, ... , it means there's soomething common to x, y, z, ... and that something, a property p, is what a universal is. In short resemblance and universal are the same thing or, more accurately, they don't seem to be different enough to justify the kind of distinction the OP wishes to make. Just saying ... I dunno!

In short resemblance and universal are the same thing or, more accurately, they don't seem to be different enough to justify the kind of distinction the OP wishes to make. — Agent Smith

The title of my OP is asking whether there is such a distinction.

An empty collection is a collection of no parts. A non-composite object. — litewave

Litewave, a collection is not an object. Therefore an empty collection is not a non-composite object.

They are particulars located in space and time. — litewave

They have no location, that's the issue with quantum uncertainty.

Because the recipe describes relations between particular circles, like translation, rotation, scaling. — litewave

No, the recipe for making a circle, which you produced, does not describe relations between particular circles.

Resemblance comes in various degrees and you can understand sameness as maximum or exact resemblance. So the meaning of resemblance also covers sameness. — litewave

Exact resemblance is incoherent, for the reasons you described. If there is supposed to be no difference between two things, they cannot be assumed to be two things, they must be one and the same thing.

Litewave, a collection is not an object. Therefore an empty collection is not a non-composite object. — Metaphysician Undercover

A particular apple is a collection of its parts. Is the apple not an object? What is an object then?

They have no location, that's the issue with quantum uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Still the elementary particles are particulars and not universals, no? And I am saying that any particular is a collection.

A particular apple is a collection of its parts. Is the apple not an object? What is an object then? — litewave

An object is much more than a collection of parts. Each different object has its parts ordered in a particular way. It is the order of the parts which creates the unity which you seem to want to call a collection. A collection with no parts (if this could be in some way coherent) has no order, therefore cannot be an object.

The title of my OP is asking whether there is such a distinction. — litewave

Does my comment not address your question adequately? If no, why?

An object is much more than a collection of parts. Each different object has its parts ordered in a particular way. — Metaphysician Undercover

In set theory, ordered sets/collections (which have members arranged in a particular order) can be defined out of unordered sets. For example an ordered set (a, b) is a set with members a and b which are ordered in such a way that a comes first and b comes second, and it can be defined as an unordered set of sets { a } and { a, b }:

(a, b) = { { a }, { a, b } }

A set with the opposite order can be defined as follows:

(b, a) = { { b }, { a, b } }

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_pair#Kuratowski's_definition

You can define any order, any mathematical structure in set theory.

Does my comment not address your question adequately? If no, why? — Agent Smith

Your comment said that my OP wishes to make a distinction between a universal and a resemblance relation when I in fact question that such a distinction exists.

In set theory, ordered sets/collections (which have members arranged in a particular order) can be defined out of unordered sets. — litewave

But mathematics doesn't give us a true representation of what an object is. Math is composed of axioms which are produced from the imagination. That's what I told you earlier, why the relation between two things, described by a universal, need not be a "resemblance" relation, if universals are constructed by the mind. The relation might be completely arbitrary, as demonstrated by set theory, which allows an ordered set to be constructed from an unordered set. This means arbitrary relations can be assigned to a group of things with no relations.

An "unordered set", a group of things which have no order, is really an incoherent fiction, an impossible situation, because things must have position. So mathematics clearly does not give us a true representation of the reality of objects.

An "unordered set", a group of things which have no order, is really an incoherent fiction, an impossible situation, because things must have position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objects in a topological space can have a position in such a space. But a topological space is just a special kind of collection and there are many other collections that are not topological spaces. So an object doesn't necessarily have to have a position in a topological space.

As I said, that's a fictional, imaginary, representation of what an object is. And if you look back at where I first engaged you in this thread, you'll see that my principal objection to your proposal is that you take the existence of particulars for granted. Then you claim that people construct universals from these particulars which are taken for granted. So the problem here, is that what you have taken for granted is a fiction, and this undermines your entire proposal as completely unsound.

In reality, you have shown that you construct a representation of a particular, an object, from some preconceived universals, set theory, but then you've tried to claim that universals are derived from particulars. However, you have just demonstrated the opposite of what you claim. The notion of "an object" or a particular, is actually derived from preconceived universals, so the conception of universals is prior to the apprehension of particulars.

In reality, you have shown that you construct a representation of a particular, an object, from some preconceived universals, set theory, but then you've tried to claim that universals are derived from particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am saying that particular collections are made up of particular collections, not constructed from universals. I take particular collections as granted because I see them all around me and because for any particulars there necesarily seems to be a collection of them, and universals don't seem necessary to explain the existence of particulars.

the conception of universals is prior to the apprehension of particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

But there are very good reasons people think it goes the other way.

For most people, for most concepts, acquaintance with instances of the concept precede, in time, the possession of the concept, and exposure to those particulars is instrumental in acquiring the universal they fall under. That's the argument from ontogeny: you are acquainted with moving, barking, licking particulars before you know that they are dogs. And there is a related argument from phylogeny: modern humans have a great many concepts that they were taught, often through the use of exemplars, but it stands to reason that not every human being was taught: there must have been at least one person who passed from not having to having a concept unaided. In essence, we imagine that person somehow teaching themselves a concept through the use of exemplars, and we imagine that process proceeding as we do when analyzing a population of objects, looking for commonalities.

In thinking about this thread, I was reminded of the Sesame Street approach to teaching about classes, an approach presumably backed by research, probably the most famous educational bit in Sesame Street:



(The irony of this song, "One of these things is not like the others. One of these things doesn't belong," in a show teaching inclusion and tolerance, was not lost on the makers of the show, and the bit was largely retired in favor of "three of these things go together," which is not much of an improvement.)

What's of interest here is that resemblance is not only relative, but comparative: resemblance is a three-way relation, a given object resembles another more, or less, than it resembles a third.

No, I am saying that particular collections are made up of particular collections, not constructed from universals. I take particular collections as granted because I see them all around me and because for any particulars there necesarily seems to be a collection of them, and universals don't seem necessary to explain the existence of particulars. — litewave

That's an irrational, infinite regress, which we already discussed when you said that an object is a collection of objects. The problem is that you've created a vicious circle by saying that a collection is made of collections, and you have no indication of what a particular is. A "collection" is a universal, a group of many. Now you want to deny that a collection is a universal, and claim that is a particular.

You claim to see collections existing as particulars all around you. Please explain to me how you think that you are seeing a collection as a particular when you haven't even said what a particular is. Perhaps an example or two?

For most people, for most concepts, acquaintance with instances of the concept precede, in time, the possession of the concept, and exposure to those particulars is instrumental in acquiring the universal they fall under. That's the argument from ontogeny: you are acquainted with moving, barking, licking particulars before you know that they are dogs. And there is a related argument from phylogeny: modern humans have a great many concepts that they were taught, often through the use of exemplars, but it stands to reason that not every human being was taught: there must have been at least one person who passed from not having to having a concept unaided. In essence, we imagine that person somehow teaching themselves a concept through the use of exemplars, and we imagine that process proceeding as we do when analyzing a population of objects, looking for commonalities. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, this is the effect of teaching, learning. From the perspective of learning, we see the particular as essential to learning the universal, because this is the process which taught us. However, the particular is a tool of the teacher, who already understands the universal to be taught. So from the learner's perspective, the particular appears to be essential to the learning process, as necessary for it, but it is really a weak sense of "necessary", as what has been determined by the teacher as needed, required for the process. It is not a true logical necessity because it might be possible that the student could learn the universal in another way.

This is what Plato looked at in The Meno, with what is referred to as the theory of recollection. The student is induced to produce the universal without the use of a demonstration with particulars, and the observers conclude that the student must have already somehow had the universal in his mind. So they propose, as a solution, that the student must have somehow had the universal in his mind, from a past life, and recollected it. You can see that the proposed solution is inadequate, but it gives us a good representation of the problem. Aristotle gave a better solution, by saying that the student has within the mind, the potential for the universal, prior to actually formulating it.

But use of the particular, as a teaching tool necessitates in a stronger way, that the existence of the universal to be taught preexists the use of the particular through the concept of causation. And if the potential for the universal, which precedes the actual existence of it in the mind, does not necessarily require particulars for its actualization, then what does constitute the actual existence of the universal?

hat's of interest here is that resemblance is not only relative, but comparative: resemblance is a three-way relation, a given object resembles another more, or less, than it resembles a third. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree, there always must be a third in this form of comparison, because two will always be other than each other. But this only demonstrates that "resemblance" is not the true principle by which we categorize. In reality, we produce the category, like "dog" in your example, and judge the thing directly as to whether it fits the category, without comparing it to others within our minds So you see an animal and call it a dog, without performing mental comparisons. And learning the category is a matter of developing the capacity to do this, not a matter of learning how to compare. That's why learning the category is the important aspect, and it consists of seeing examples, not of comparing three things.

The material of the Sesame Street skit is only used to demonstrate that the category has been learned. That's why it gets sort of controversial, because to demonstrate that one knows the group, a person is asked to say what is not part of the group, as a simple form of confirmation. In reality an act of exclusion is not necessary if one has learned the category. We simply need to judge and include members as a part of the group without indicating what is not a member. This is like determining what pleases you without any reference to what displeases. And the commonly touted principle, that one must know "what X is not", in order to know "what X is" is a false principle. It seems to be based in the faulty idea that one must demonstrate one's knowledge, to have it.

You claim to see collections existing as particulars all around you. Please explain to me how you think that you are seeing a collection as a particular when you haven't even said what a particular is. — Metaphysician Undercover

A particular is an object that is not a property of any object. As opposed to a universal, which is a property of some object. A general collection or collection "in general" is a universal that is a property of every particular collection. A particular apple is not a property of anything, but general apple is a property of every particular apple.

Your comment said that my OP wishes to make a distinction between a universal and a resemblance relation when I in fact question that such a distinction exists — litewave

I thought I did clarify my views on that score. The two concepts - universal & resemblance - are, how shall I put it?, not mutually exclusive. In fact the former seems to arise from the latter in a most exotic manner.

Too theoretical and insubstantial. Please give examples.

Too theoretical and insubstantial. Please give examples. — Alkis Piskas

For example, what is a universal circle? It doesn't look like a particular circle because every particular circle is continuous in space and around a particular point in space but a universal circle is not supposed to be located in any continuous area of space. A universal circle looks like certain deviations from any particular circle and thus more like a resemblance relation among particular circles.

A universal triangle is simply the resemblance of any particular triangle to any other triangle. The resemblance consists of a set of properties common to all objects of a given kind/type i.e. in what way, for instance, is one specific circle like any other circle. In short, as I said before, resemblance and universal are the same thing.

For example, what is a universal circle? It doesn't look like a particular circle because every particular circle is continuous in space and around a particular point in space but a universal circle is not supposed to be located in any continuous area of space. A universal circle looks like certain deviations from any particular circle and thus more like a resemblance relation among particular circles. — litewave

Well, that's nice and inspiring, yet it is still too theoretical. I mean, not quite tanglible. I, personally, cannot even imagine how it would look like.
Anyway, it's OK.

Ok then.

A universal is supposed to be a general property that is somehow instantiated/exemplified in particular objects (instances/examples) that have this property, which coincides with a particular resemblance relation among these particular objects. For example, redness as a universal is instantiated in particular red objects, which coincides with a particular resemblance relation among all red objects: they all resemble each other in the sense that they are all red. — litewave

I have the desire to drag in "fractals" to explain my views on this interesting topic. What is a fractal but something that at large scale (universal) is also exemplified in its smaller units (particular objects). There is a clear relationship between all things from top to bottom and back via the magnitude of the fractal. "as above so below".

Many believe if the universe has a clearly defined set of rules from which all things emerge, evolve or are created then the universe is a fractal. Qualities of the entire thing reflected in individual things, systems of things and people - creativity, destruction, rationality and irrationality, attraction and repulsion, etc. And people would also be built of the same processes from the ground up, structures, cycles and regulations (hormones) , hierarchies of cells and tissues.

"made in its image" as it were. When one takes psychedelic consciousness altering drugs they often report seeing fractals. Perhaps this is why.