I'd guess part of the issue - aside from the situation in Syria, which Israel is currently fine with - is that, Russia may make customs to Israel very problematic, or could even prohibit it.

That means less settlers in Israel, so it's not something they would like to deal with. I'm sure there are other ties that are of importance, but I don't know the details.

I don't think the settlers in Israel would affect Russia much, but it might be an issue for Israel's internal politics. The settlers tend to be extremely right wing, and vote for the more radical parties in Israel.

But all of this is pure speculation, until we know how Israel deals with Ukraine's plea, we're totally guessing.

@Isaac, here's one for your consideration.

The Battle of Culiacán:

Back in 2019, the Mexican government arrested a son of crime boss El Chapo, who, in turn, worked for crime boss El Mayo. In response, El Mayo had 100s of gunmen attack civilians and government targets. Eventually, the Mexican President released the arrested son to prevent further killing and violence. (Government forces and cartel gunmen shook hands.) Some said that El Mayo had become government, or whatever along those lines.

But, this is just an example of ... power ... ethics ... "don't negotiate with terrorists" (Chatham House) ... collateral damage ... who protects who (from)? ... democracy, roles of electees ...

Tensions:

• saving lives (perhaps minimize suffering / maximize well-being)
• giving in versus standing up to attackers (perhaps courage versus cowardice)
• dis/allowing offenders/thugs to continue/escalate offending (compromise, future)
• doing the right thing

I (personally) don't think there's a one-size-fits-all, though maybe standing on principles can sometimes deter malefactors from going there, or make them reconsider.

Anyway, in the present case (different from the example above), millions of Ukrainians have fled, and many are fighting, apparently with notable unity/cohesion/direction. Can we easily say what the right thing to do is?

Russia already moved to drive The Jewish Agency for Israel out of Russia. This is Israel's outreach organization that assists Jewish immigration. It has maintained its presence in Russia since the Perestroika. Court hearings on the case have repeatedly been postponed. Perhaps this is just Russia's way of applying pressure to Israel, or perhaps they are worried about immigration that has sharply accelerated since the announcement of the mobilization.

Anyway, in the present case (different from the example above), millions of Ukrainians have fled, and many are fighting, apparently with notable unity/cohesion/direction. Can we easily say what the right thing to do is? — jorndoe

I don't think we can. Contrary to the strawmen I'm not arguing for any particular solution. I'm arguing that just such an uncertainty as you paint here genuinely exists (I'm doing that by showing alternatives are plausible). The right course of action is not clear, it's not ludicrous, insane, or Putin-apologist, or whatever the latest...to advocate an alternative strategy than 'feed Ukrainians weapons until they win'.

As to the issues in question, my twopenneth...

• saving lives (perhaps minimize suffering / maximize well-being) — jorndoe

I think it's a very hard sell, given the fact that Ukraine are no angels themselves, to say that more lives would be lost ceding territory than by continuing war. Another year of war is likely to produce another few hundred thousand casualties. There's simply no reason to think anywhere near that number more would arise from Russian peace-time occupation than from Ukrainian.

• giving in versus standing up to attackers (perhaps courage versus cowardice) — jorndoe

I don't see the argument here. Clearly a successful Ukrainian defense isn't going to send any kind of 'message' about the morality of attacking foreign countries. The US attacks foreign countries all the time and gets away with it. The world's moral compass is hardly on the line here (as opposed to elsewhere).

• dis/allowing offenders/thugs to continue/escalate offending (compromise, future) — jorndoe

In war, clearly some invasions are successful, others aren't. It's always been that way. The fact that some invasions fail doesn't seem to have acted as a deterrent before, I don't see why it would suddenly start doing so now.

• doing the right thing — jorndoe

This is where the most interesting argument is. What is the right thing that isn't already covered by your first point? What legitimate moral interest do we have aside from the humanitarian one?

↪neomac
The fact that I have lived here all my life and people should not be forced to flee their home as a result of political malpractice? Hello? — Tzeentch

Hello, indeed I never heard people being forced to flee their homes just “as a result of political malpractice”: usually people are forced to flee their homes for reasons like somebody bombed my house, or the government is killing people if they don’t wear headscarf as the morality police requires, or life here is so shitty that I’m ready to cross a sea on an overcrowded and unsafe boat in the middle of the night to god knows where instead of remaining here. So… interesting, I’ll add that one too to my list.
Now that you are forced to flee your home where would you like to go live: Russia, China or Iran? Did you start browsing some brochures?

if our Western purported facts and moral opinions are absolutely "true" (this was the premise of my argument, that we Westerners have the truth) it's still important, even under these conditions of being ultimate arbiters of truth, to understand how other people elsewhere see things, even if it's not true, for the purposes of decision making. — boethius

For example, the West genuinely seemed to believe that the massive sanctions (that US policy-wonks kept calling "the nuclear option" for years) would destroy the Russian economy as the whole world would follow them. It seemed of genuine surprise to the US and European administrations that nearly the entire rest of the world noped out on those sanctions and the Russian economy was not destroyed.
Western politicians and western media then just basically ignored the issue. — boethius

I find your observation pertinent but not enough to support the claim “the central geo-political question of this war is the challenge to Western moral leadership” for 3 reasons:
First of all, notice that this propaganda battle is an asymmetric battle which is essentially fought within the West, because in anti-Western authoritarian regimes, the power of the anti-western propaganda is overwhelming wrt the pro-western propaganda (and add to the level of censorship, also the language barrier), hence the importance of the foreign minorities living in the West to spread pro-Western propaganda in anti-Western authoritarian regimes. Now as long as those minorities are already enough supportive of the Western propaganda, the West doesn’t need to push on the pro-West propaganda harder.
Secondly, one might think that since in the West we live in democracy the West is too vulnerable to anti-Western propaganda by authoritarian regimes. Yet during a war anti-Western propaganda machine is easier to constrain through censorship of foreign infowar channels, disinfestation of foreign agents in politics and media, and/or less resources from the authoritarian regimes to invest in the propaganda machine in the West. Besides the more bluffs of the official anti-Western scaremongering propaganda are called out by the West, the less effective the anti-Western propaganda becomes. Consequently, the battle propaganda becomes a less critical front for Western governments.
Thirdly, and most importantly, talking of moral-leadership and related morally-loaded vocabulary is a way for politicians and media to appeal to the masses, not really to directly address other decision makers, allies or competitors. And since power (not propaganda) is at the core of geopolitical struggles, what really matters is to impact the view of the decision makers, not necessarily the masses’ views. Then the decision makers can tell people whatever they find instrumental in bridging the gap between propaganda and reality, or simply ignore it and rely on people’s forgetfulness.
That’s why even if your observation is pertinent, I wouldn’t overemphasise the role and impact of such propaganda battle. The fact that you do shows more about your personal investment in that battle, then the centrality of the question itself.

Can you clarify how you're measuring "economic, infrastructural, human, political damage”? — Isaac

Well, I’m not measuring anything myself. I rely on public stats one can easily find online from official or credible sources. Surely it’s difficult to assess the overall global impact of a war that is still ongoing, with short and long terms effects, considering also that war can inflict direct damages on any material and social dimension. But also in this case the internet can help: https://news.un.org/pages/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/GCRG_2nd-Brief_Jun8_2022_FINAL.pdf
However the crucial point is not the numbers per se, but the fact that all these damages resulted from the decision of a single individual to start a war in defiance of the American led Western hegemony. And it is precisely the geopolitical significance of this war to the global order that magnifies the importance of any material and human damage caused by this war, especially from the Western prospective. And rightly so.

I'm not talking about astrology, I'm talking about experts in their field. — Isaac

I simply mean that neither position is contradicted by overwhelming evidence to the contrary and each position is supported in the field of qualified experts. Basic minimum standards. I didn't think this would be complicated. — Isaac

I see. And who are the “experts in their field” arguing that “Western countries should ‘mount a multi-billion dollar campaign’ to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts”?
Who are the “experts in their field” arguing that Ukraine would NOT have a better chance to grow in terms of civil rights within the western sphere of influence (e.g. by joining NATO and EU) than within the Russian sphere of influence?
And by “arguing” I mean employing actual cold-blooded “experts in their field” arguments, not expressing wishes or voicing propaganda slogans.

In technical fields it ought also have support from at least some experts in that field. There's nothing controversial to argue with here. — Isaac

Well, we might still disagree on how to asses experts. And even on how one cites experts.

A fixed pool of evidence can support multiple theories since any given pool of evidence supporting a theory is not exhaustive of all the evidence there is. — Isaac

I don’t really see how this hypothetical scenario helps you here. First of all, you didn’t offer any argument showing that the same fixed pool of evidences can support both the claim that Russia is military performing well and failing to perform well on the battlefield, or both that surrendering to Russia is better for Ukraine than to keep fighting and vice versa, or both that Ukraine wants to keep fighting and it doesn’t. On the contrary, the divergence typically starts with a reference to different set of evidences: e.g. if I talk about the deaths in Ukraine, you talk about the deaths in Yemen; if I talk about the Ukrainian popular support to Zelensky you talk about the philo-Russian views in Crimea and Donbas, if I talk about the improvements of ex-Soviet joining NATO and EU republics in terms of human rights, you talk about some plans to boost human rights in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, Kenya, Namibia, and Peru. The alternative is often to discredit the evidences with claims like “it’s nothing more than propaganda”, or my capacity of reading the evidence (I’m cherrypicking or my own evidence contradicts my own claims).
Secondly, if our positions were really in the situation you described, there are still rational requirements that could constrain the number of possible theories: 1. Cognitive costs: a cognitively more economic theory is preferable to a more cognitively expensive if the same have equal explanatory power 2. Explanatory/predictive power when widening the range of evidences (in physics a certain set of evidences is good to support both newtonian physics and relativity, but a wider range of evidences supports one and not the other) 3. Congruence with a wider range of other supported theories in related domains.
But we didn’t really go into any such assessments: for example how is your position fitting into a sensible geopolitical theory? Mearsheimer’s views or Isolationist views could be useful to blame the US for this war, smart choice. But are they useful to support your claim that “Western countries should ‘mount a multi-billion dollar campaign’ to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts”? I deeply doubt that.

You're not discriminating between rational and irrational, for Christ's sake. You're not God. You're discriminating between reasons you prefer and reasons preferred by others. You not agreeing with a set of reasons doesn't render them "irrational", epistemic peers disagree, it's quite normal and doesn't require one party to have lost the power of rational thought. — Isaac

One can still discriminate between rational and irrational without being God (you too try hard to do it [1]). Besides this is necessary if one cares to choose rationally. Disagreements are normal of course but often they are due to the fact that we fail to discriminate rational and irrational convictions: so it’s not always about preferences as you put it, it’s also about intelligibility and compliance to shareable rational standards. Unfortunately we may fail on that more often than what we could hope, because we are cognitively/morally limited creatures and dramatic political events can easily push all of us out of our cognitive/moral comfort zone. Once again: I’m not interested in assessing people here, just in their arguments, and I don’t care if you think otherwise. So feel free to play dumb all you want.

Or...we could read posts like grown ups and assume that not everything has to contain moral condemnation of Russia. — Isaac

If you want to talk about war crimes for the war in Ukraine, there is an entry in wikipedia that summarises the situation better than that single Amnesty article could, that’s all. And if your objective was to provide a source without “a moral condemnation of Russia”, I’m afraid that article isn’t a big help once you read it carefully.

[1]

Yes. There's no need to start over. Your reasoning is flawed for the reasons boethius has already given - You have failed to take any account of the costs. It's insane to propose a course of action based only on the potential benefits without even holding a view on whether they outweigh the potential costs. — Isaac

It could well be that actually. They wouldn't want more people leaving Russia at the moment.

They might even be looking for Israeli settlers to join the reserve troops. It wouldn't be suprising. But there's also the Syria element you mentioned.

None of this is something that Israel would like to face or worry about. But it has to give some sort of reply to Ukraine on the weapons issue, though they have supposedly given Ukraine military intelligence regarding Russian troop location, according to Haaretz.

So, they are caught in balancing act.

Surely it’s difficult to assess the overall global impact of a war that is still ongoing, with short and long terms effects, considering also that war can inflict direct damages on any material and social dimension. But also in this case the internet can help: https://news.un.org/pages/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/GCRG_2nd-Brief_Jun8_2022_FINAL.pdf — neomac

Your argument requires a comparison, it cannot be supported by the provision of only one side. You argued that the effect was greater than... that requires two sources showing that one is greater than the other. Providing one source and saying "wow, that looks really big" is not sufficient.

it is precisely the geopolitical significance of this war to the global order that magnifies the importance of any material and human damage caused by this war, especially from the Western prospective. — neomac

So I was right with "...you reckon" then, since none of that can be quantified and rests entirely on your subjective opinion.

I see. And who are the “experts in their field” arguing that “Western countries should ‘mount a multi-billion dollar campaign’ to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts”?
Who are the “experts in their field” arguing that Ukraine would NOT have a better chance to grow in terms of civil rights within the western sphere of influence (e.g. by joining NATO and EU) than within the Russian sphere of influence?
And by “arguing” I mean employing actual cold-blooded “experts in their field” arguments, not expressing wishes or voicing propaganda slogans. — neomac

I'm simply not playing this childish game.

1) Look back through my posts. I've cited dozens of experts, yet still this cheap rhetorical trick is trotted out every few pages "where's your evidence", as if it hadn't already been supplied in droves.
2) You cannot expect to keep shifting the burden of proof and act as if that was a counter argument. If you think there are literally no experts advising multi-billion dollar campaigns against poverty, famine, pollution, and disease, then you're the one who needs to supply evidence to back up such a wild claim.

Well, we might still disagree on how to asses experts. And even on how one cites experts. — neomac

I don't see how. The qualification of experts is pretty standard, as is the method of citation. But sure, if you think there's some non-standard method you want to employ, I'm all ears.

you didn’t offer any argument showing that the same fixed pool of evidences can support both the claim that Russia is military performing well and failing to perform well on the battlefield, or both that surrendering to Russia is better for Ukraine than to keep fighting and vice versa, or both that Ukraine wants to keep fighting and it doesn’t. — neomac

As I said, you need to meet a minimum threshold of comprehension to take in part in discussions at this level. If you seriously don't understand how evidence underdetermines theories then I can't help you (not on this thread anyway - feel free to open a thread raising the question and we can discuss it there).

there are still rational requirements that could constrain the number of possible theories — neomac

There are, yes. That's the nature of the subsequent discussion. If you have any arguments from those measures then crack on, let's hear them. "I doubt that" is not an argument.

One can still discriminate between rational and irrational — neomac

To paraphrase Van Inwagen, if you and your epistemic peer disagree, you must accept the possibility of your epistemic peer group being wrong, and that includes you. You cannot resolve a disagreement about what is rational by appeal to what is rational.

If you want to talk about war crimes for the war in Ukraine, there is an entry in wikipedia that summarises the situation better than that single Amnesty article could, that’s all. And if your objective was to provide a source without “a moral condemnation of Russia”, I’m afraid that article isn’t a big help once you read it carefully. — neomac

I want to do neither. The argument was about whether Ukraine had committed war crimes, I posted an article proving they had. That's it. It does not need to further caveats to remind everyone that Russia has too, and the suggestion that Wikipedia is a better source than an actual published paper is too absurd for further comment.

Much speculation; bombing proceeds. :/

I'll just note that the more complex (or "chained") the speculation, the less accurate it's likely to be.


Anders Åslund, Ukraine’s six key conditions for peace talks with Putin’s Russia (Aug 24, 2022):

1. recovery of occupied Ukrainian territory
2. credible security guarantees
3. Russia to pay up for rebuilding what's been destroyed
4. Russian Black Sea Fleet to leave base in Sevastopol, and don't come back
5. Ukrainians to be permitted to leave Russia; children taken to Russia must be returned
6. prosecution of Russians who have committed serious war crimes at The Hague

Still fair, still unrealistic. Let's see 5 though, can also serve as a goodwill gesture.
Peace talks could aim at a neutral Ukraine (no NATO), which would address one of Putin's arguments.

Don't try to change the subject.

You tried to imply that being "free" to become a political refugee means one is not being forced - a truly vile statement.

Five years later, in 2013, the United States proved its willingness to follow through on its 2008 promises, when it supported regime change in Ukraine during the Maidan protests. — Tzeentch

I would agree the way you describe it: US supporting a regime change. Yet notice that a lot of Ukrainian administrations have gone since then as there have been elections.

Yet NATO membership isn't just what the US wants. (Which can be seen from the situation of Finland and Sweden). Hence NATO membership was off: something NATO or the US wouldn't publicly admit, but just as de facto thing like Turkey is not going to get EU membership.

From that point onward, the threat of US-backed regime change in Ukraine was a fact. That's what Russia reacted to in March of 2014, and the subsequent 2022 invasion of Ukraine was an unavoidable consequence. — Tzeentch

More like unavoidable consequence of the annexation in 2014 going so well and the territorial objectives that Russia has.

No. The US and NATO had been pushing for membership for years, as I’ve demonstrated. — Mikie

NATO pushing? NATO is made of sovereign states, hence it's like the idea of EU pushing something.

No one is denying what Russia did was wrong. I’m not just focused on the US. I’m talking about the very real threat Russia faced prior to 2022 and prior to 2014, which so far you have dismissed, ignored, or minimized. That’s not an unbiased picture either. — Mikie

Earlier Yugoslavia/Serbia, later Iraq, Libya and Syria faced a threat from NATO. Not Russia. Russia has a nuclear deterrence, hence NATO will not attack it.

It's delirious to think NATO would be a threat to Russia as the organization attacking it. It's a threat to Russia's aspirations to regain back it's Empire that it lost when Soviet Union collapsed, that's for sure. And that's why countries are joining or wanting to join NATO: for a reason that we have now seen is real, not only something hypothetical.

NATO is an existential threat to Russian imperialism. That's the true reason for Putin to be against NATO.

Will the war have the effect of cementing Putin's control over Russia? Or loosen it?

The problem with saying Russia was threatened, so we should have seen this coming, is that no one saw it coming. Biden was ridiculed across the globe for warning that Putin was about to invade. Nobody believed it even in Russia and Ukraine. — frank

Or several people here on this forum, who thought it all was American propaganda.

It's hard to know what will happen to Putin and his hold on to power. Dictators can suffer humiliating defeats and then still carry on... just like Saddam Hussein did after Desert Storm. Czar Nicholai the II did face political turmoil after the Russo-Japanese war, but it took World War I to finally sweep him out of power.

And let's face it: if Putin would get an armstice or a frozen conflict on these frontlines at present, he could say the war has had been a great success.

And let's face it: if Putin would get an armstice or a frozen conflict on these frontlines at present, he could say the war has had been a great success. — ssu

It doesn't look like the Ukrainians are in the mood. The war crimes just keep rolling out day after day.

No. The US and NATO had been pushing for membership for years, as I’ve demonstrated.
— Mikie
NATO pushing? — ssu

Yes, as I've now demonstrated several times.

NATO is made of sovereign states, hence it's like the idea of EU pushing something. — ssu

You're just running out of things to say, apparently.

Earlier Yugoslavia/Serbia, later Iraq, Libya and Syria faced a threat from NATO. Not Russia. Russia has a nuclear deterrence, hence NATO will not attack it. — ssu

Oh, ok. I guess that settles it.

It's delirious to think NATO would be a threat to Russia as the organization attacking it. — ssu

:up: Cool.

NATO is an existential threat to Russian imperialism. — ssu

There's no evidence for Russian imperialism, actually. It's a false narrative. No one had accused Putin of imperial ambitions for 14 years -- and then suddenly that was the official story: imperialism.

Anything to deflect away from the fact that the US and NATO were pushing for Ukrainian (and Georgian) membership, starting in 2008, which was clearly and consistently said by Russian to be a threat -- for years. Those statements and warnings were repeatedly ignored. Once there was finally a reaction, after 6 years, in Crimea, and a further 8 years in Ukraine, it's supposed to confirm the story. Sorry, but you're ignoring history and evidence.

Imagine during the Cuban Missile Crisis people saying that the US was overreacting, and that "it's delirious to think Russian involvement in Cuba is a threat to the US." Maybe they would have been right, but that's completely beside the point.

It is widely and firmly believed in the West that Putin is solely responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis and certainly the ongoing war. He is said to have imperial ambitions, which is to say he is bent on conquering Ukraine and other countries as well—all for the purpose of creating a greater Russia that bears some resemblance to the former Soviet Union. In other words, Ukraine is Putin’s first target, but not his last. As one scholar put it, he is “acting on a sinister, long-held goal: to erase Ukraine from the map of the world.” Given Putin’s purported goals, it makes perfect sense for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and for the alliance to increase its force levels in eastern Europe. Imperial Russia, after all, must be contained.

While this narrative is repeated over and over in the mainstream media and by virtually every Western leader, there is no evidence to support it. To the extent that purveyors of the conventional wisdom provide evidence, it has little if any bearing on Putin’s motives for invading Ukraine.

Mearsheimer

There's no evidence for Russian imperialism, actually. It's a false narrative. — Mikie

Oh false narrative? You must be trolling.



What is annexing more territories from Ukraine into Russia other than pure classical imperialism?

What is Novorossiya anything than imperialism? Or in Putin the Great's words (from the last annexation):

As you know, referendums took place in the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. Their results have been summed up, the results are known. People made their choice, a clear choice.

And this, of course, is their right, their inalienable right, which is enshrined in the first article of the UN Charter, which directly speaks of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Today we are signing agreements on the admission of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic, the Zaporizhia Region and the Kherson Region to Russia. I am sure that the Federal Assembly will support the constitutional laws on the adoption and formation in Russia of four new regions, four new subjects of the Russian Federation, because this is the will of millions of people.

I repeat: this is an inalienable right of people, it is based on historical unity, in the name of which the generations of our ancestors won, those who from the origins of Ancient Russia for centuries created and defended Russia. Here, in Novorossia, Rumyantsev, Suvorov and Ushakov fought, Catherine II and Potemkin founded new cities. Here our grandfathers and great-grandfathers stood to death during the Great Patriotic War.

That above is one big imperialist speaking.

Those statements and warnings were repeatedly ignored. — Mikie

On the contrary. Ukraine and Georgia aren't in NATO. Putin was heard, but as I've said now many times, NATO cannot give a veto to Russia on the matters. But you don't have to go to Russia's friends like Turkey or Hungary, even Germany was saying it won't happen.

You simply cannot deny that. :lol:

↪neomac
Don't try to change the subject.

You tried to imply that being "free" to become a political refugee means one is not being forced - a truly vile statement. — Tzeentch

The subject is you not the refugees. "I asked you for clarifications: the idea of being "forced" suggests me the idea that you can not free yourself from something which you find undesirable. So if you live in the West and you do not like it, what is preventing you from leaving it?"
So when you wrote: "Being free to flee from political malpractice somehow means one was never forced to undergo it?", I thought you as an avg Westerner were comparing your fate in the West with the fate of the refugees from non-Western country, which I find laughable.
If you were talking about something else, I couldn't get it from your answers.

So finally Putin declare martial law... to the territories his army has taken over and are now fought over.

As if those territories wouldn't otherwise be treated as in wartime.

That above is one big imperialist speaking. — ssu

I don't see it. He's not telling the truth about the referenda, of course.

None of this lends like slightest evidence to the accusations of imperialism. But if you want to ignore the historical record on this and go with the mainstream Western narrative, I won't fault you for it. It could turn out true, I suppose. The evidence speaks against it currently.

Those statements and warnings were repeatedly ignored.
— Mikie
On the contrary. Ukraine and Georgia aren't in NATO. — ssu

They were repeatedly ignored. The US and NATO continued on the same path they started in 2008, reiterating their stance multiple times, and deploying weapons and training in Ukraine.

Cuba never launched missiles into the US either. So by your logic, it was never a threat -- since it didn't happen.

even Germany was saying it won't happen. — ssu

When was Germany saying it won't happen? At the 2008 NATO summit? At the 2021 summit? In September of 2021, when the White House affirmed it would continue to support Ukraine's joining, and that "We intend to continue our robust training and exercise program in keeping with Ukraine’s status as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner"?

Or are you just referring to Scholz? Who apparently believes, as you do, that Putin is an imperialist?

Sorry, the facts remain the same even if Germany -- which nearly always bows to US power -- says that it was "not on the agenda." The documentary record says otherwise. Not to mention the weapons and training provided by the West to Ukraine, all in spite of consistent warnings from Russia.

The same is true of China, incidentally. There will eventually be a reaction if the US keeps pushing on Taiwan. Then I'm sure you'll retroactively accuse China of "imperialism," no?

It's a false narrative — Mikie

Nah.

NATO's a threat to Putin's ambitions, a threat to free Kremlin movements/actions, to Putin's Russia bulging. Should be clear to anyone. NATO isn't an existential threat to Russia, cultural or otherwise. Well, except (ironically perhaps) Putin's moves have put Russians in danger. (Nov 6, 2014; May 19, 2021; Feb 14, 2022; Feb 22, 2022.)

Russia's a direct and present, tangible threat to Ukraine (and perhaps some neighbors). Including cultural: Jul 12, 2021; Mar 17, 2022; Mar 18, 2022; Mar 22, 2022; Mar 25, 2022; Apr 5, 2022; Apr 12, 2022; May 6, 2022; Sep 6, 2022; Sep 9, 2022; Sep 13, 2022; Sep 14, 2022; Oct 17, 2022. No wonder the Ukrainians sought NATO protection.

Keep up. (Long thread.)

But, granted, NATO might a factor somewhere.

Peace talks could aim at a neutral Ukraine (no NATO), which would address one of Putin's arguments.

What I don't buy in Mearsheimer's argument is how one motive for Putin to invade has to exclude all others. Whatever degree Putin was motivated to invade because of his perception of what NATO is doing does not confirm or deny other motivations.

Saying that the Ukrainians should not be supported is a Putin talking point. The Ukrainians would have fought back anyway. Whatever game of Risk Mearsheimer is playing, it has nothing to do with the brutality being experienced by actual people. We are way past coulda, shoulda, woulda.

NATO isn't an existential threat to Russia, cultural or otherwise. — jorndoe

NATO expansion was seen as a threat to Russia, as they stated clearly for years. Whether it was “really” a threat isn’t relevant— they gave reasons, many times, and these reasons were no more ridiculous than the ones the US has claimed over the years.

The fact is that Russia had been saying, for years, that involvement in Ukraine, including the push for NATO membership, was a threat.

No wonder the Ukrainians sought NATO protection. — jorndoe

Was there a major Russian threat from 2000 to 2008? What was that threat?

Keep up. (It's a long thread.) — jorndoe

I’m not interested in childish remarks like this. Keep it respectful and stick to arguments or don’t bother with me.

I’d suggest reviewing what I’ve written and engage with that. Merely asserting NATO was no threat isn’t an argument.

Whatever degree Putin was motivated to invade because of his perception of what NATO is doing does not confirm or deny other motivations. — Paine

Very true. But I’ve yet to see evidence of his imperial ambitions. Even with this invasion, the facts simply don’t align with it. We can discuss that if you’d like. But I’m not excluding it as a possibility— only that I’m unconvinced by that possibility. Another possibility is he's just an evil madman. I'm unconvinced by that too, incidentally -- although it may be true.

Saying that the Ukrainians should not be supported is a Putin talking point. — Paine

I think the Ukrainians should be supported.

Whatever game of Risk Mearsheimer is playing, it has nothing to do with the brutality being experienced by actual people. We are way past coulda, shoulda, woulda. — Paine

I’m not sure what this means. Why is he playing a game of Risk? I agree we’re past coulda woulda shoulda, but understanding the causes of this war is still relevant.

Even with this invasion, the facts simply don’t align with it. — Mikie

Whatever Putin's ambitions may be, he kicked off his invasion by saying what he had said before:

In a televised address to the nation, Putin explicitly denied that Ukraine had ever had “real statehood,” and said the country was an integral part of Russia’s “own history, culture, spiritual space.

This erasure of identity is not justified on the basis of making sure Ukraine remains neutral. It is saying that if you insist upon preserving this identity, Russia has the right to end you. The rules of engagement employed demonstrate that this was a sincere statement of purpose. If that is not evidence enough of aggressive intent, I don't know what could be.

Why is he playing a game of Risk? — Mikie

In Mearsheimer's discourse, there are only two agents, the U.S. and Putin. There are no Ukrainians, no Russian people, and no other states with their own interest. It is a game where only one or the other can win, in other words, a game of Risk played with actual humans.

In a televised address to the nation, Putin explicitly denied that Ukraine had ever had “real statehood,” and said the country was an integral part of Russia’s “own history, culture, spiritual space.

I would suggest reading that speech -- not a Time article about the speech.

Regardless, it's odd that we should take what Putin says seriously in this case, and yet ignore his warnings about NATO.

In any case:

To the extent that purveyors of the conventional wisdom provide evidence, it has little if any bearing on Putin’s motives for invading Ukraine. For example, some emphasize that he said that Ukraine is an “artificial state“ or not a “real state.” Such opaque comments, however, say nothing about his reason for going to war. The same is true of Putin’s statement that he views Russians and Ukrainians as “one people“ with a common history. Others point out that he called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Of course, Putin also said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” Still, others point to a speech in which he declared that “Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.” But as he went on to say in that very same speech, in reference to Ukraine’s independence today: “Of course, we cannot change past events, but we must at least admit them openly and honestly.”

To make the case that Putin was bent on conquering all of Ukraine and incorporating it into Russia, it is necessary to provide evidence that first, he thought it was a desirable goal, that second, he thought it was a feasible goal, and third, he intended to pursue that goal. There is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on February 24th.

In Mearsheimer's discourse, there are only two agents, the U.S. and Putin. — Paine

If you think this, then you're simply unfamiliar with Mearsheimer. This is false.

I did read the whole speech. The intention to erase that state does not have to be stated as a goal if it has already been said to not exist.

If you think this, then you're simply unfamiliar with Mearsheimer — Mikie

Which portion are you thinking of?

Edit to Add: All of the references to what Putin was thinking to divine true intentions is what I see as making it all about his agency. We can't peer into his brain, but we can see what he does

, OK, no predicting the future then, we can run with that.

So, fast forward to today. What do we have? Just the facts.

A Russia with nuclear weapons on their doorstep? A Russia invaded by NATO (or anyone, for that matter)? Anyone having threatened Russia with invasion? A defeated Russia having been forcibly split into several nations? A Russian culture being wiped? Heck, a Russia having been blocked (by NATO) from invading Ukraine?

Nah. (Well, don't know about Chinese or Indian nuclear weapons here.)

There are sanctions on Russia (not so much a NATO thing, though). And, a NATO with more troops than Russia.

We have a Norway Finland Estonia Ukraine with nuclear weapons on their doorstep (don't know about Canada), and an autocracy flaunting them. We also have the Russian submission-machine having rolled out in Ukraine: bombing killing ruining shamming. A Donbas that's been an organized Russian staging area for some time. Crimea land grab. Plans. A fifth of Ukraine declared part of Russia by Putin.

Russia's a direct and present, tangible threat to Ukraine (and perhaps some neighbors). Including cultural: Jul 12, 2021; Mar 17, 2022; Mar 18, 2022; Mar 22, 2022; Mar 25, 2022; Apr 5, 2022; Apr 12, 2022; May 6, 2022; Sep 6, 2022; Sep 9, 2022; Sep 13, 2022; Sep 14, 2022; Oct 17, 2022.

I suppose we could go back to speculating.
Had Ukraine become a NATO member before 2014, I'm guessing Russia would be intact (like today), and Ukraine as well (unlike today). Any fair reasons to think otherwise?

Such destruction.

Civilians To Be Evacuated From Ukraine's Kherson As New Commander Says Situation 'Tense' For Russian Forces (RFE/RL; Oct 18, 2022)

Ukrainians told to 'charge everything' as power grid hit by Russia (BBC; Oct 19, 2022)

Russia Abandons Kherson as Putin's Army Flees Back Across Dnieper (Newsweek; Oct 19, 2022)

The fact is that Russia had been saying, for years, that involvement in Ukraine, including the push for NATO membership, was a threat. — Mikie

NATO caca.