Specifically what Hume is saying here is that we can have no idea of existence, an idea that we might join to another idea, as a way of having the idea of something existing. It's about our conceptions, not logic, not language. Might Hume have taken another line? Might he, for instance, have said, that to imagine an object differs from imagining it as existing in that the latter is more vivid, or more complete, or something like this? There would still, I think, be no distinct conception of existence. Even if he were to say that conceiving an object as existing is the usual conceiving but accompanied by some particular feeling, that leaves the conception the same, and this is Hume's only point.
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Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind [ argued earlier ]; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.
That is, when we try to conceive the 'external objects' that occasion our perceptions, we have nothing but perceptions to work with — we have no other material with which to construct a conception of 'object', no material that would make such a conception a distinct sort of thing from a perception.
Or: try as you may to conceive, for once, of an external object, itself, you will only produce another idea, an idea derived from previous perceptions, impressions and ideas. It's all your mind can do; there is only one sort of object available to your mind, a perception, and any attempt to bring some other kind of object, whatever it may be, into your mind will fail utterly or substitute an idea of that other kind of object. — Srap Tasmaner
Are you remaining within the chapter? — Manuel
I think that some of this may be alleviated once you get to the part in which he discusses the imagination. — Manuel
So far as I can see, he's still talking about our perceptions of the object, and then the problem is how do these perceptions tell us something about the existence and continuity of these objects ("body"), which "we must take for granted." — Manuel
Ultimately, Hume is trying to convince his perceptions that they are perception. — Richard B
He doesn't really need the tyranny of Nature here, does he? The sceptic is not admitting anything of any consequence. — unenlightened
The idea of existence conjoined with the idea of any object makes no addition to it, but existence conjoined with the idea of any object adds everything to it. — unenlightened
As the above makes clear, I don't think so. I think Hume's idea is that it's irrelevant what the source of our impressions is; however they come to mind, they are now mental phenomena, and whatever principles govern the relations among mental phenomena must be mental principles, not such principles as we imagine govern the behavior of external objects. — Srap Tasmaner
Some of what? — Srap Tasmaner
The word might be in there somewhere, but there doesn't seem to be much use made of the idea; the whole flavor of the account is causal, mechanical. — Srap Tasmaner
Even if there are principles connecting objects to each other 'out there', beyond our minds, those principles apply to objects, not to our perceptions of them — thus we must have our own mental principles, which will apply to our perceptions, in order to conceive something like causality. — Srap Tasmaner
we need principles that will relate certain perceptions to each other. — Srap Tasmaner
The word might be in there somewhere, but there doesn't seem to be much use made of the idea; the whole flavor of the account is causal, mechanical. — Srap Tasmaner
Yes. I think he has in mind something like mechanical, but also something like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. Perceiving is like breathing or seeing, we can't not have perceptions. — Manuel
we need principles that will relate certain perceptions to each other. — Srap Tasmaner
VERY perceptive. This is one of the reasons he gives in the Appendix for, essentially stating that his system fails, or as he puts it "my hopes vanish". This is one of the things he cannot account for, how perceptions relate to each other. The other being that we really do perceive continuity in the objects. In other words, he has used these two principles: the uniting principle and the continuity principle (my terminology, not his), without being able to justify them, but he isn't able to renounce either of them. — Manuel
Of course you can disagree with Hume; but can you make a case against his view?
For instance, Hume's view as I'm presenting it (not sure I'm getting him right) could be tweaked to more closely resemble relatively mainstream psychology: to claim some physical law governs the behavior of external objects is to describe our expectations about their behavior, which will for us just be particular sensory experiences and that's what we're actually predicting.
There's (not coincidentally) a similar perspective flip in the subjective account of probability (and thus of statistics).
So what's the critique of such views beyond mere disagreement? — Srap Tasmaner
There is no claim that perceptions are the only kind of objects, or that all objects are really perceptions, but only that the only kind of object in our minds is perception.
The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking, we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.
And that's the pointer to our section, Part IV Section II, where he will refer back to this section: — Srap Tasmaner
We may, therefore, conclude with
certainty, that the opinion of a continu’d and of a distinct
existence never arises from the senses — 192
You represent the conceptions of external objects as being dependent on, or necessarily caused by, perceptions. This denies the possibility that a representation of external objects could be entirely fictitious, imaginary, created completely by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's best that you give proper context to "continu'd existence". This is what is expressed by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. — Metaphysician Undercover
like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. — Manuel
That's exactly right, or at least, that's how it looks like to me as well. — Manuel
This is somewhat paradoxical, given his reputation and thrust of his thought, an argument for innate faculties, — Manuel
is indicative of the external existence of objects — javra
Still, what I’ve read about Hume is often quite different than what I gathered from directly reading Hume. For one example, to me, Kant borrowed from Hume rather than debunking him. — javra
It's very hard for me to sustain his though experiment, that once we stop perceiving an object, we don't have many good reasons (although something must be there, in the world) to suppose it continues to exist. For as he says (I know I'm re-quoting him, but, he articulates it so well): — Manuel
But it is very, very clear, that Hume was what is now called a "mysterian", which should be the common- sense view that we are natural creatures, and hence some things are beyond our capacities, as some things are beyond the capacities of dogs or birds. — Manuel
we have indications of the existence of external objects, — Manuel
Not what I intended at all. I was, I thought, following Hume's usage in using the word 'perception' to cover both impressions and ideas; so a perception is something present to the mind, of whatever source, a perceiving that is done 'by the mind's eye' we might say. — Srap Tasmaner
As I watch the birds flitting about in my front yard, I have an impression of a bird first here, then there, then there, as it moves from tree to tree. On a naive view, we might say there is a body, some force is applied to that body, and thus the body is caused to move through the air. We can see in the bird's flight inertia, which carries it along a certain path (modified by gravity and drag) until it flaps its wings again, adding a new vector which modifies its course, and so on.
Now consider me watching this: I have an impression of the bird; that impression is replaced by a different one with the bird elsewhere. Did my impression of the bird move? Of course not; I'm sitting on my porch and all my impressions of the bird are in the same place. Did my impression of the bird acquire an inertial force carrying it from one place to another? Perforce, no: my impression did not move; my impression had no such force applied to it. — Srap Tasmaner
We grant to each what it desires (nature and reason), but it is something we do,we don't have a choice. — Manuel
the skeptic says that we do have a choice in this matter, and even that our belief in such objects is unfounded and therefore a bad choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
So skepticism affords us the capacity to believe what you say we have no choice but not to believe. And to validate this statement "we don't have a choice", we need to determine the cause which produces this as a necessary effect. — Metaphysician Undercover
Reading between the lines, it seems to me an inscrutable fact about how we experience the world. We strongly believe in the continuity of objects, but they change all the time. As do our perceptions. — Manuel
But textually, I see no easy answer. In my own opinion, putting Hume aside, it's not evident what this necessary effect would be. — Manuel
If an object has continuous existence, it must continue to be the object which it is, or it becomes something else. That's what change does, it annihilates the object as being what it was, to be something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, that the object is continuous is supported logically, but that the object is distinct is not. This is the consequence of him trying to make the assumption of "object" (as a distinct individual) consistent with sense perception which is continuous. The object loses its status of being a real distinct individual, because it requires the dual status, of two separate instances, and memory to relate them. And the separate instances are similar rather than the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
The "necessary effect" is the assumption itself, the assumption of a body, or an object. If we have no choice in this matter, as Hume says, then this assumption must be taken as necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.
I don't see how this follows. I mean, one can use the example of the Ship of Thesus: we replace on part of the boat with new wood and discard the old parts, it's literally not the same object - as it has new pieces in it, but we still recognize it as the same ship.
Likewise, if we are looking at a flower, miniscule parts of the flower are blown off by the wind, so it's literally not the exact same object one moment to the next, but we still recognize it as the same object. You can think of it as flower at T1 and flower at T2. — Manuel
We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say,
that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that
the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent
at another. By this means we make a. difference, betwixt
the idea meant by the word, object, and that meant by ifself
without going the length of number, and at the same time
without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity. — p201
There is an issue around the individuation of perceptions.
There's that passage where Hume claims perceptions are exactly what they appear to consciousness as, etc etc, so he's basically claiming they are self-individuating. — Srap Tasmaner
So we still do not get at the source of individuation — Metaphysician Undercover
But Hume explicitly doesn't care.
Same page is where he says all these mental phenomena (perceptions, feelings, ideas, what have you) are 'on the same footing.' And he assumes they are presented to the mind as discrete, already individuated packets.
He is absolutely *not* going to say they are shaped by the mind, because that suggests there is something to be shaped, something that already has a distinct existence outside the mind. But he explicitly wants only to look at perceptions etc. insofar as they are dependent on the mind: for Hume they exist at the moment we are conscious of them, and that's it. — Srap Tasmaner
The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning
the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of
body
Hume accepts the usual argument as a step toward considering perceptions only, however they appear to the mind — Srap Tasmaner
Yeah, this will be interesting to discuss, I'll get back to you sometime tomorrow, there's a lot to say here. — Manuel
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being. — Part III, Section V, p. 84
my chamber — Manuel
This table ... preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. — Section XII, Part I
Then he explicitly concludes that the senses themselves cannot produce this separation. The senses don't distinguish what is part of yourself, and what is not. — Metaphysician Undercover
P188.For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions, we have already shewn its absurdity. — Hume
The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body : And my reasonings on this head I shall begin with a distinction, which at first sight may seem superfluous, but which will contribute very much to the perfect understanding of what follows. We ought to examine apart those two questions, which are commonly confounded together, vizi. Why we attribute a CONTINU’D existence to objects, even when they are not present to the senses ; and why we - suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception.
The search is for a ground, a bedrock for knowledge. For Descartes, reason, for Hume, perception. Thus he (Hume) looks for causes of belief not reasons for belief. And as we know from elsewhere, he also argues that causes are unfounded ideas, that arise from but are not present in perception, along with continued existence and distinct existence.
We have something vaguely of the form P → Q → ~P. Yikes.
And it happens all over the place, his description of his chamber being another example, and his simple reliance on his own identity. — Srap Tasmaner
Hume says you cannot argue your way out of a paper bag, but fortunately you don't have to, because the world is already present and available to be made sense of. — unenlightened
But then where does that leave this argument which originally established that only perceptions not objects are present to the mind? If we can't contrast the apparent extension of the table with its 'real' extension, then we have no argument at all. — Srap Tasmaner
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