These are from Book I, section II, part VI

"...external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion." (p.67)

"...tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from- ideas and impressions." (p.67)

"The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects." (p.68)

He does call the idea "absurd" in the chapter we are discussing, but what I take him to be saying in these quotes, is that we cannot conceive of them other than by our perceptions.

I'll later share some of Strawson's observations here, in which I think he argues, persuasively, that Hume can readily allow for these types of metaphysical issues to arise, but we cannot make a conclusion one way or the other about them.

But then he goes on to say: "But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe. it between perceptions and objects." (p.212)

I think this last quote is problematic, a stimulus is needed. — Manuel

This is the point I've been trying to make that Hume recognizes the need for laws that govern the relations between perceptions, as Newton gave laws governing the relations between objects. That is, I think he conceived the project this way, to do for thoughts what Newton did for bodies.

I think so too, he even states something similar in the introduction to the Treatise, with the whole "science of man" comment.

As Strawson concludes in The Evident Connection, the failure of Hume's empiricism, admitted by Hume in the Appendix, is that he is actually using more resources of the mind than what his philosophy will allow. But this will force him to explicitly acknowledge a complex mental framework, instead of this notion of a series of perceptions.

a complex mental framework — Manuel

I do think in some ways the question is, how complex? The ongoing debate in linguistics is between those who think some specialized faculty is necessary, and those who think quite general faculties get you language.

I've quoted Herbert Simon's suggestion before, that our mental lives are complex not because our minds are complex *in themselves*, in their machinery, but because our environments are complex, and culture only increases that complexity.

The other major issue seems to be something like this: we know that we are creatures embedded in an environment, all of our science begins with that understanding; but just as surely, we know that *from the point of view* of such a creature, there is only mind. On this, broadly, Hume, Kant, the Tractatus, and modern psychology are agreed. It is not so, but it *must* appear so, from the point of view of the organism.

That's interesting. And Hume was on the right track, broadly, in thinking that what you can learn from this recognition is not what's in the world -- whether there be objects, for insurance -- but something about how minds work.

I think both in themselves and by environment are extremely complex. We aren't even aware of how we produce the sentences that we do at the moment we are writing them and also assuming that what I am saying right now, will resonate with you, as they resonate with me. Even how I move a finger is inscrutable to me.

Nature may find the simplest way of making things work, mind included, but look at fractals, or termite mounds or even the barest of all environmental formations, end up with spectacularly complex and beautiful constructions on the basis of quite simple "tools": rocks, dirt, perhaps rules in the case of the mind, such as recursion.

*from the point of view* of such a creature, there is only mind. On this, broadly, Hume, Kant, the Tractatus, and modern psychology are agreed. It is not so, but it *must* appear so, from the point of view of the organism. — Srap Tasmaner

That's exactly right and should not be controversial in the least.

That's interesting. And Hume was on the right track, broadly, in thinking that what you can learn from this recognition is not what's in the world -- whether there be objects, for insurance -- but something about how minds work. — Srap Tasmaner

Correct. One may disagree with his "bundle view" or his account of self, but he is right on many things, including the fact that what we see is our perception of things, not something distinct from them.

Nature may find the simplest way of making things work — Manuel

The key exemplar of course is evolution by natural selection, a relatively simple mechanism which yields 'endless forms most beautiful'.

It is not impossible that some mechanism just as simple yields the complexity of mind, something like Friston's free energy principle, maybe.

On the inevitability of 'idealism from the inside', I left out the other bit, which Hume doesn't, which is that the organism will believe there are external objects and all that, just as we would studying such a creature in its environment, but the idealism comes in at the explanation stage: that, strangely, in analyzing the behavior of organism, we are driven to imagine that it must behave as if there were only mind, even if, as with our own case, we refuse to believe any such thing. Objects fairly hurl themselves against the mind, but to the mind it's just impressions, from somewhere beyond the Markov blanket.

Perhaps it's that we believe in objects, but our minds do not!

that, strangely, in analyzing the behavior of organism, we are driven to imagine that it must behave as if there were only mind, even if, as with our own case, we refuse to believe any such thing. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. When studies are done on human beings concluding the efficacy of medicine, they assume the patients they choose will count for all people. Likewise with animals. Internalism (which is a kind of idealism) is a given, though not explicitly articulated coherently with enough frequency.

Perhaps it's that we believe in objects, but our minds do not! — Srap Tasmaner

I believe in objects, I don't separate the mind from myself, these I take "for granted". But when I analyze the reasons, as given by Hume, I see that my belief is weaker than I thought, by quite a bit. Stand in front a strobe light that goes on and off very rapidly and examine an object or person moving, you'll quickly see how fallible our reasons for certain beliefs can be, in my experience.

Another way to put what I'm saying: makes no difference to your mind what the source of the perception is. All, as Hume says, are 'on equal footing'.

Here's a choice line from Part II Section VI:

To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.

This is not a unique situation: logic is concerned with the validity of arguments; whether they be sound is someone else's problem.

It may be there is no purely mental difference between a veridical seeing and an optical illusion: the same predictions of your future states are generated. The difference is out in the future, when your expectation is confirmed or must be revised.

As logic is incomplete without some means for determining the truth of premises, so beliefs (expectations, inferences, whatever you like there) would be incomplete without some means of testing and revising them -- so, action.

It may be there is no purely mental difference between a veridical seeing and an optical illusion: the same predictions of your future states are generated. The difference is out in the future, when your expectation is confirmed or must be revised. — Srap Tasmaner

I suspect that this is the case in many instances of hallucinations or erroneous perceptions (visual tricks and the like). Then again, Hume does say "No simple idea without a corresponding simple impression." This is for simple ideas: red, bitter and so on. With complex ideas, it is more difficult.

I think what you say is true, provided we have had first the initial stimulus for us to recognize an object. After then we can say that optical illusions and veridical perceptions are in essence the same.

Except it's not a world of objects but of perceptions; objects are mere prejudice. Empiricism slides into idealism. — Srap Tasmaner

No. it's not the objects that he denies, it's the reasoning. Of course there are objects; of course they aren't in the mind, and of course they are not the product of reason. When you follow strict reasoning you end up with 'Yikes!'. Natural impulses are a better guide.

To begin with the question concerning external existence,
it may perhaps be said, that setting aside the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking substance, our own body evidently belongs to us; and as several impressions appear exterior to the body, we suppose them also exterior to ourselves.
[Snip]
But to prevent this inference, we need only weigh the three following considerations. First, That, properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, regard to but certain impressions, which enter by the senses ; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. Secondly... — P190.

So that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever
shou'd, upon, any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu’d and distinct existence of body. That opinion must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION : which must now be the subject of our enquiry.

These days, we talk about climate models rather than images or imaginings. We know they are made up because we tweak them see how robust the predictions are. The model is not the climate, but the climate is real.

I think it is important to point out, that in Hume's use of the term, "fiction", does not mean what we mean by it today, something not being "real", or belonging to mythical tale or a novel. It simply means "more than is warranted by the empirically available evidence." It is real, in the sense that we do experience the identity of objects, but when we look at the evidence, it turns out to be weaker than we would like. — Manuel

Let me assure you, Hume is using "fiction" in a way which is very customary to us. It means something created solely by the mind, and not representative of reality, non-factual. Of course the fictitious is not warranted by the empirically available evidence, as you say, but it is more than just this, it is also a fabrication. And, if the fiction is believed to be, or presented as, a true representation of reality, it is an error, and a source for deception.

This fiction of the
imagination almost universally takes place ; and ’tis by
means of it, that a single object, plac’d before us, and
survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any
interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity. — 201

That speaks of your concerns that each perception is different, and it is by resemblance that we posit continuity. True. Now he says, on p. 204:

"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions
by the strongest relation and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. "

Italics mine. Each perception is new, and he does not want to distinguish between objects and perceptions. Yet he still speaks of "my chamber", if he didn't have a notion of identity, he couldn't speak like this, because he would have no way to separate his chamber from anything else.

An important, passage, I think, is this:

"We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is forrn'd, and principies from which it is deriv'd."(p.206) — Manuel

This is an example of what Hume calls the "error" of identity at page 202. The error is caused by believing that the fiction, is true reality. Fiction misleads us into error.

To enter, therefore, upon the question concerning the
source of the error and deception with regard to identity,
when we attribute it to our resembling perceptions, notwithstanding their interruption ; I must here recall an observation, which I have already prov'd and explain'd. — 202

The error he describes, is when the mind associates one idea with another, easily passing form the one to the other, because of some relation between them, such as resemblance, causing us to judge them as the same. This disposition, to judge them as the same causes the error of identity. They are not the same. He explains this on 203. The ideas, or perceptions are not the same, they are distinct, yet they cause a similar "disposition" of mind within us, causing us to judge them as the same.

So we have here exposed by Hume, our error of identity. This error is a form of self-deception which further inclines the mind to create a fiction of the continued existence of an object. We readily associate distinct impressions with each other, and we have a disposition to judge them as the same. This judgement of same is an error, and this error causes us to believe in the continued existence of an object.

Yes, he uses "my chamber" to refer to an object with continued existence, in the "vulgar" manner, because this is the only way that we have of speaking, but he is explaining why this is an error. The general population, being unphilosophical, are misled by that error, but philosophers see through it to the reality.

That I may avoid all ambiguity and confusion
on this head, I shall observe, that I here account for the
opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence
of body; and therefore must entirely conform myself to their
manner of thinking and of expressing themselves. — 202

The persons, who entertain this opinion concerning the.
identity of our resembling perceptions, are in general all the
unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, (that is, all
of us, at one time or other) and consequently such as suppose
their perceptions to be their only objects, and never think of
a double existence internal and external, representing and
represented. The very image, which is present to the senses,
is with us the real body; and ’tis to these interrupted images
we ascribe a perfect identity. But as the interruption of the
appearance seems contrary to the identity, and naturally
leads us to regard these resembling perceptions as different
from each other, we here find ourselves at a loss how to
reconcile such opposite ,opinions. The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this
contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken
appearances by the fiction of a continu’d existence, which is
the third part of that hypothesis I propos’d to explain. — 205

This makes Hume a direct realist, in contrast to Kant, who puts back a separate external existence as the unfathomable, (and to Hume, absurd) Noumenon. — unenlightened

Notice, what Srap says, it is a world of perceptions only. It is when we attempt to talk about something which is beyond the perceptions, something external, that the error described above, occurs. We erroneously judge distinct perceptions which resemble each other as the same (btw, this is a central part of Wittgenstein's private language argument, the question of how we can judge two distinct sensations as the same), and then we create a fictitious temporal continuity between these perceptions which have been erroneously judged as the same. We create this fictitious continuity because that's what the judgement of "the same" requires in this case of temporally separated instances, uninterruptedness. Then we assign the "uninterruptedness" to a supposed external object. So this error forms the basis of our assumption of a distinct, external object, with continuous existence.

Except it's not a world of objects but of perceptions; objects are mere prejudice. Empiricism slides into idealism.
— Srap Tasmaner

No. it's not the objects that he denies, it's the reasoning. Of course there are objects; of course they aren't in the mind, and of course they are not the product of reason. When you follow strict reasoning you end up with 'Yikes!'. Natural impulses are a better guide. — unenlightened

You're absolutely partly right.

Of course, he does not deny that there are objects, because he claims that we cannot. I'm happy with the word 'prejudice' there.

On the other hand, he makes no 'argument from instinct' that I can see. He might have, but he doesn't.

And you're right that the intellectual context matters, as you noted before. Descartes does give something like an argument from irremediable prejudice: that which we cannot doubt must be true. Hume (and Kant after) seems to me unmoved by this argument. Why could there not be some falsehood we cannot help but believe?

There are optical illusions like this, that work even when you know they're illusions (the Ames window, the checkerboard illusion and other color constancy shenanigans), because they depend on deepish features of our visual processing. Empiricists love their optical illusions, so Hume, were he aware of these examples, would no doubt consider such things slam-dunk counterexample to any proposed 'argument from instinct'.

No, he is not using the word "fiction" as is used today. A fiction can be useful, some more useful than others. The self is a fiction, yet we don't treat it as we do Harry Potter or something, much of our laws are based on the notion of morality which we attach to a person, also a fiction. Hume talks about his furniture and his chamber, true these are fictions, but very useful ones at that.

This error is a form of self-deception which further inclines the mind to create a fiction of the continued existence of an object. We readily associate distinct impressions with each other, and we have a disposition to judge them as the same. This judgement of same is an error, and this error causes us to believe in the continued existence of an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why I provided in the OP, the following, to which I will add the whole quote:

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187)

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies.

I've talked a lot about the Appendix, I will now quote his famous passage where he argues that he cannot renounce his belief in the existence of external objects, a passage of supreme importance in all of philosophy, in my opinion:

"But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

"In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." (635-636) (Italics mine)

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions." (636), his conclusion remains true to this day.

And a final argument against such a view of denying such objects is when he says, also in the Appendix:

"As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question." (638)

Italics his. Bold mine.

The optical illusion argument makes no sense to me. The illusion in the checkerboard illusion is that there is a checkerboard, not an imaginary checkerboard. If one were to make an actual board with those same shades, it would look like it was badly faded in some areas. On the other hand if one took a regular checkerboard, and reconstructed the whole scene, there would be no illusion because the eye would correctly identify the squares that were the same colour, despite the variation in lighting due to shadows.

Note that everything in the above paragraph in the third and fourth sentence is imaginary. But Hume will have been familiar with rainbows, and I think familiar enough with optics to have some understanding of the phenomenon ... "no one takes a rainbow for a persistent extended object," I seem to hear him say, "and that's why it's a safe place for the wee folk to hide their gold, and for the gods to cross into Asgard."

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214)

On the other hand if one took a regular checkerboard, and reconstructed the whole scene, there would be no illusion because the eye would correctly identify the squares that were the same colour, despite the variation in lighting due to shadows. — unenlightened

It's a nice thought, but demonstrably false.

Here's another video (a bit tech-bro, but that's what you get) about illusions related to color constancy, mostly done with real-life models.

I'm still going back through the section on and off, but we end up with three 'theories', right?

There's (1) the instinctive view that we directly see objects. Then there's (2) the sceptical, philosophical view that only perceptions can be present to the mind, and perceptions don't have the key properties of being distinct from us and constant over time. Then imagination gives us (3) the 'double existence' theory, which posits a constant object of which we have changing perceptions, giving both instinct and reflection whatever they want, without actually justifying this move.

Is that the overall structure as you see it?

On 1 and 2, yes, absolutely.

On 3, let's see... I'd only add or stress that the constant object we posit is identical (it looks to me) to the one we have in our perceptions, and it eases our contradictions with reason and reflection. But, yes, agree here too.

Right, that part is brilliant. Not only is there a double existence, but the perceptions an object occasions exactly resemble it, and of course vice versa. Why? No reason at all. No conceivable reason. It's just the sort of assumption we typically make, with no justification whatsoever. That bit is pretty humbling.

It is a total mind-f*ck. Also that we are, strictly speaking, looking at a new object every time we open our eyes.

Makes no sense at all, but it's what we have.

Makes no sense at all…… — Manuel

It did in 1738.

……but it's what we have.[/quote]

It’s what we had.

Nothing against Hume, he “…. perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical philosophers…”

I mean, I think it does make sense to postulate something "behind" the objects as it were, and you can say that we take object X to be X, in virtue of us: we that recognize it (object X) as having the necessary properties found in all objects of X type, it has these properties and we recognize them as such, because of the type of cognition we have.

Still doesn't solve the issue of the perception being new, nor knowing virtually anything about whatever may be the cause of the object, it remains a postulate only, imo, though it is very reasonable, and I agree with it, on the whole.

Unless you had something else in mind.

You’re agreeing with Hume’s philosophy on human understanding, then?

No. I'm a Chomskyian,

This is a thread trying to explain what Hume believes, I haven't said too much of what I think. In such threads, I think it makes sense to bring out what makes them special or important historical figures.

I think his idea of our minds being like an "empty theatre" and also a bundle of perceptions, to be extremely wrong, heck, Descartes had a more sensible theory of mind than Hume.

What I think Hume gets correct is concerns the nature of perception, how it works phenomenologically, it's as I experience it.

Cool.

Important historical figures, yes.

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies. — Manuel

Yes, "far weaker" indeed. He explicitly describes the reasons for our belief in continued existence as an error, and deception. You can rationalize this however you please.

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable — Manuel

What you quoted clearly supports what I've said. Hume believes perceptions to be distinct from each other, therefore not of a continuously existing body.

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) — Manuel

Yes, this is the point here. Most philosophers except that there is not continuity to our sense perceptions. The necessary consequence of this is that the idea of continuous existence ought to be rejected altogether. However, philosophers, except some skeptics (such as Hume) are reluctant to reject this idea of continuous existence.

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187) — Manuel

The conclusion that continued existence is an erroneous assumption is not completely inconsistent with the assumption of body. It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does. In mysticism and some religions we find the idea that the whole world, every single body uniquely., must be recreated at each moment of passing time. We are led toward this idea because of the reality of change, and the reality of the free will. This constant recreation, which is done in a way that produces the appearance of continuity to us (consider the analogy of a succession of still frames producing a film), is attributed to the Will of God. It is necessary that God acts at every passing moment to maintain the appearance of continuity, the continuance of order, which is known to us as the laws of nature.

We are speaking about different things. The quoted passage is about the reasons surrounding our belief, not about the belief itself.

And even then, he admits that his "hopes vanish", he could not get himself out of his own arguments.

One deals with everyday life, "vulgar reasoning", in which we take for granted and cannot dispute the existence of objects, what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief, not the belief itself, because, as Hume says:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214)

You are focusing on his "profound reflections", while minimizing what "we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse".

It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does — Metaphysician Undercover

This must be true.

“….We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings….”

Nature, in deeming the question of the existence of bodies too important to be determinable by the skeptic, who can’t trust his reason by means of reason anyway, forces the skeptic to grant the principles which in turn make necessary the existence of bodies.

If his reason cannot be trusted with respect to determining the existence of bodies, why would it be trusted to reasonably ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted? Furthermore, why would we be “induced to believe”, when the principle which grants the existence of bodies has been given to us, insofar as Nature has “….not left this to his choice….”?

On the one hand there is no mistaking the existence of bodies, but on the other, the skeptic may actually doubt how it is possible the existence of bodies is given, for the simple reason he has no philosophical system by which it is proved. Which means, in effect, he rejects that Nature has forced him to accept it. So….the section on skepticism of the senses apparently begins with a disguised antinomy.

It almost looks like Hume is chastising skeptical philosophers, but if that is true, it begs the question, why would Kant call him, “…. perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all skeptical philosophers…”, if not to say if one is to be a skeptical philosopher, he should be better at it than anyone else.

All this to show you guys have progressed but I’m still stuck on the first page.

It's a nice thought, but demonstrably false. — Srap Tasmaner

Well I'd need to see that demonstration. But anyways, back to Hume, your fun video actually uses the term 'imaginary' to describe the colour constancy and lighting compensation that happens. Which scores a stupendous predictive hit for Hume, even if I got it wrong.