And you know as well as I, that unless the power and absolute necessity of a priori reasoning denied by Hume and continental empiricists in general, became part and parcel of the rational human condition, there wouldn’t be a sufficiently explanatory theory, ever. — Mww
the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do. — javra
Overall, a well-thought post. Nothing in it to counter-argue conclusively. That being said, it might be worthwhile to consider the different between reason the faculty, which the infant hasn’t developed, and reason the innate human condition, by which development of the faculty is possible. — Mww
….interested in your point of view regarding these questions…. — javra
In the absence of all present and past impressions, what reasoning might such a hypothetical human yet engage in? — javra
And this via what content? — javra
in Kantian terms, to paraphrase, (…) is it to be assumed that we’d yet hold the ideas of time as space as contents to reasoning? — javra
But I’m here addressing the issue in what I take to be Hume’s favor: where it's argued that reasoning is brought about by impressions - such that there can be no reasoning in the complete absence of impressions and of that which is derived from impressions — javra
I personally neither agree with empiricists nor rationalists, instead viewing both experience and reasoning as essential to epistemological content. — javra
You know what they say: careful what you wish for. — Mww
I also view both empiricism and rationalism equally essential for empirical knowledge, or knowledge of the empirical content of our cognitions. But I think we have just as much capacity for pure rational thought in the form of logical relations, which have no empirical content. But, if I want to prove that logical relation, I must subject it to empirical conditions, let Mother Nature be the judge. — Mww
One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new. — Manuel
The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. — Metaphysician Undercover
So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is still very curious that each perception is new….. — Manuel
…. and that IN our reasoning, we cannot connect our perceptions, though we can postulate an internal cognitive power, which does such binding for us — Manuel
The problem of the connection of perceptions pointed out by Hume remains, or so it looks like to me, in terms of it being fiendishly difficult to focus on each perception and looking for the connection of perception of object O at T1, T2 and so on. — Manuel
The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception? — Manuel
But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events. — Manuel
It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world. — Manuel
Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.
So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated. — Manuel
In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world. — Manuel
Yes, but the representation of these perceptions, is not, re: consciousness. The implication of each new perception is that we have to learn a thing every time we perceive it. — Mww
You mean an internal cognitive power like, “… — Mww
so are we really looking for connection of perceptions — Mww
So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover
But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area. — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects — Metaphysician Undercover
If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive... — Metaphysician Undercover
The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way. — Metaphysician Undercover
if someone represents our observations of change as seeing the way things are at one moment (a perception), then seeing them in a different way at the next moment (the next perception), and we conclude with the use of reason, that change has occurred between these two perceptions, this is really not the way that we actually sense change. Through the senses we are actually perceiving change directly. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is a basic problem with Hume's approach. His proposed separation appears to between the senses, and reason. But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we adhere to the principles then, we sense continuity, but the brain wants to break up the continuity into discrete, or distinct parts for the purpose of understanding. Therefore, individual, fixed and distinct objects is a creation of the brain, hence mind (even reason?) rather than senses. Now Hume says that this is an unjustified creation, an erroneous fiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the problem here is with the sense/reason division. As described above, there is vast area of activity which fits neither category, it lies between these two. We can find other ways of dividing, sense/brain, or body/mind, but each has its own problems of not being able to properly account for everything, sp we get aspects, parts of reality which have no category. This indicates that this sort of division is not the best way to go. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is just assertion. — Srap Tasmaner
I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example. — Manuel
However, each perception we have of the object is new…. — Manuel
Nevertheless, the moment of perception, if you will, is still new: the object ever so slightly changes, and so do we. — Manuel
Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted,
and however like, are still
different from each other ; and let any one upon this -
supposition shew why the fancy, directly and immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu’d, and uninterrupted, and identical; and after he has done this to my
satisfaction, I promise to renounce my present opinion. — 213
The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new
fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy,
by ascribing these contrary qualities to
different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the
continuance to objects. — 215
'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our
resembling perceptions are numerically the same ; and .'tis
this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these
perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even
when they are not present to the senses. — 217
There is no neat way of introducing a new object while separating this strictly from continuity in time….. — Manuel
because again, to register something as new would require us to recognize that the object in front of us is not exactly the same, as the object we were looking at mere moments ago. — Manuel
If you introduce cognition in addition to impressions….. — Manuel
if we can’t distinguish exactness of successive impressions, and if impressions are the source of ideas, then it follows that there would be successively indistinguishable ideas corresponding to those indistinguishable impressions. Then….how would we know there was anything new? — Mww
An object that changes in successive perceptions by the same perceiver, on the other hand, would necessarily be new at the logical level, but may still be represented by the same conception. Healthy apple on a tree, same rotten apple on the ground, is still an apple. Sorta like Descartes’ wax, right? — Mww
That wouldn’t be fair to Hume. I don’t recall his use of the concept, do you? If so, be interesting to read the context. — Mww
we have new perceptions every time we close and then open our eyes. — Manuel
it appears that Hume intends us to understand “new” to merely indicate the difference in existential quality of the impression alone, a contingent condition of the mind, rather than existential quality of that by which the mind is impressed, which is a necessary condition of the object causing the impression. — Mww
If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww
for any singular impression for which constant conjunction of its ideas doesn’t work with congruent certainty as with repetitive impressions, imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it. — Mww
There was subsequently a metaphysical theory perfectly describing how this works, but what would Hume say about it? I suspect he would have rejected it, insofar as having already granted imagination extraordinary power, he would have insisted that power cannot merely be the ground of the greater one the new theory prescribes, especially seeing as how he’s already denied its validity.
You know…..consign it to the flames kinda thing. — Mww
If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww
Is that so clear to you? — Manuel
Some animals see way more colors than we can (….) Or is this fact of perception contingent on the nervous systems they have? — Manuel
Kant did talk about it, but gave it a lesser role than Hume did… — Manuel
…..imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it.
— Mww
Yes, and this may be putting too much power in the imagination. — Manuel
In the Enquiry, of the "missing shade of blue", which destroys his own theory — Manuel
I've given it considerable thought, and I just cannot understand Hume's description of perception as a succession of individual perceptions, related to each other through resemblance. — Metaphysician Undercover
He doesn't properly consider the continuous act of sensing and proposes interruptions to break this act it up into distinct perceptions. (…) this is only done to make perception consistent with thought — Metaphysician Undercover
It’s easy enough to understand, just not easy to accept. Superficially, his account works well enough; it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday. Oversimplification, I know, but still a place to start. — Mww
Maybe that’s exactly the key. If Hume understood it is only possible in humans to have one thought at a time, and asserting the mind to be the container of thoughts, Hume very well could have figured the mind can only do one thing at a time, which must include receiving impressions one at a time, otherwise he suffers self-contradiction. Even though this is logically consistent given the set of premises Hume worked with, it subsequently became obvious the premises were not as sufficiently explanatory as they need to be. — Mww
imagination is a topic which deserves more discussion- it is a very curious fact of human beings — Manuel
it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday.
— Mww
The problem though is that the dog is not the complete perception. — Metaphysician Undercover
The reality is that we can perceive with all of the senses at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Something changing is what causes a noise. — Metaphysician Undercover
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