It's just your peace at all cost immediately sends the wrong information: if you are losing, your way out is to use nuclear blackmail. — ssu

So? A nuclear armed state can hold the world to ransom. So much the worse for nuclear arms proliferation. Perhaps America should have thought of that before it pursued such a risky strategy as the massive anti-nuclear proliferation campaigns have been warning them about for decades.

Now what? What would you have us do? Pretend that Putin can't hold us to ransom just because we don't like that fact? Risk 90 million dead in the first few hours because Putin's a bad man and your limited imagination can't think of any other way of dealing with that than fighting him over territory?

What's your plan to deal with the very real risk of escalation the experts are warning will arise from us not giving Putin a face-saving off-ramp?

Are you seriously suggesting that Putin not getting the slapped wrist he deserves is a comparable risk to nuclear holocaust?

There's no actual 'nuclear ransom' here. Putin himself ruled out the use of nukes in Ukraine. Of course an escalation is always possible, but it is not actually being branded as a threat by the big boy himself.

At this stage, nuclear escalation is an emotional fantasy entertained by some low-level bureaucrats and angry pundits in Russia, and by some knee-jirking western pundits.

I won't build a nuclear shelter in my garden just yet.

Yeah, right. So the top performing superforecasters from the US Government IARPA Good Judgment Project were asked "Will a nuclear weapon be detonated in Europe as an act of hostility before 30 April 2023? "

The results are...

The aggregate forecast was 9%. That’s an extraordinarily high risk for a (just-over)-six-month period – if that level of danger was constant, there would be less than 20% chance of making it through any given decade without a nuclear explosion. The likelihood that the 75 years since the Second World War would have passed without any atomic bombs going off would be minuscule.

But that group’s forecast hides a reasonable amount of variation. Some felt it was as low as 5%; others as high as 20%. — https://www.swiftcentre.org/will-russia-use-a-nuclear-weapon/

...but you know, they did forget to consult a couple of messianic dicks off the internet, so perhaps just "some knee-jirking western pundits" after all, eh? I'd get down there sharpish to deliver your Delphic armchair 'reckon', they'll be keen to lap up such informed wisdom.

Incidentally, they were also asked "Will Ukraine retake all Russian-controlled territories in Ukraine?"...

Ukrainian forces taking any part of Crimea, even for 24 hours, seemed unlikely to the forecasters. “Crimea was not pro-Ukrainian and has a major Russian submarine base on it”, wrote one forecaster. “It is heavily defended and has only two main land access routes. A loss to Crimea would likely be the end of the war for Putin and the area where he is most likely to make a final stand”.

Another thought it was unlikely Ukraine would even try: “I don't think this is likely to happen at all; I don't think the Ukrainians are likely to try to reclaim Crimea offensively, since it doesn't seem militarily or politically tractable”. The group’s combined forecast was 11%.

Once again, though, even if it were to happen, the forecasters did not feel it would change the nuclear risk in a predictable way. “If Putin is backed into a corner as a result of this, a hostile nuclear detonation would be a risk”, wrote one. “On the other hand, if Russia hasn't already detonated a nuclear device by that point, why would they do so after losing territory in Crimea?” The group assigned a 3% chance of a nuclear weapon attack for the month following Ukraine’s capture of Crimea.

Driving Russian forces out of Ukraine altogether was considered even less likely, at 4%

but you know, they did forget to consult a couple of messianic dicks off the internet, so perhaps just "some knee-jirking western pundits" after all, eh? — Isaac

Those experts are not on the Internet yet? You found about them how?

I personally think the fear of nuclear war is based on the idea that Russia is losing in Ukraine. Given the fact that Russia still seems to hold the areas that are strategically most relevant to it, I am skeptical about how desperate they are.

I would expect several rounds of escalations to have to happen, which would likely have to include NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine, before initiating a nuclear attack even becomes a serious possibility for Russia.

With that said, if the Russians would ever be under serious threat of losing Crimea, and all conventional options were exhausted, likely they would resort to nuclear weapons. I guess my point is that that state of affairs is not yet very close.

What is likely happening is that Russia is using nuclear threats to manipulate the foreign public - fear mongering, to erode domestic support in NATO countries.

I personally think the fear of nuclear war is based on the idea that Russia is losing in Ukraine. Given the fact that Russia still seems to hold the areas that are strategically most relevant to it, I am skeptical about how desperate they are. — Tzeentch

Yes, I agree. I don't think it's a coincidence that the estimates of nuclear escalation were similar to the estimates of Ukraine taking Donbas. I think they might be linked.

I would expect several rounds of escalations to have to happen, which would likely have to include NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine, before initiating a nuclear attack even becomes a serious possibility for Russia. — Tzeentch

Maybe, but as Samuel Charap warned "Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania...they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt." A lot of the fear is about misinterpretation of events not intended to provoke (but close enough).

What is likely happening is that Russia is using nuclear threats to manipulate the foreign public - fear mongering, to erode domestic support in NATO countries. — Tzeentch

Yes, I think that's true, but given the risk/benefit environment, it would be nothing short of criminal recklessness to call that bluff.

Supposedly someone inside the Biden administration, not Blinken, had discussions with a high-ranking government official, discussing "red lines", allegedly Russia was told that a mass retaliation would incur a reply by NATO.

I don't know how reliable this info is, but if it is true, it is laughable that NATO can say that "this is a war between Russia and Ukraine", while all the time stipulating what Russia can or cannot do. Imagine Russia and China doing this to the US.

It's stranger than fiction.

What are people making of the Russian retreat from Cherson?

A trap? Or did a deal go down behind the scenes?

Since Cherson may have served as a springboard for future Russian offensives, it seems to me Cherson may have been conceded to Ukraine as a form of 'guarantee' that Russia will not make a bid for Odessa / Transnistria.

Peace talks / a cease-fire may be close.

Now what? What would you have us do? Pretend that Putin can't hold us to ransom just because we don't like that fact? — Isaac

As pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. The US or NATO isn't fighting Russia. Russia isn't attacking the supply lines in Poland. Nuclear deterrence between NATO and the Russia does holds there's no NATO aircraft enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine, even if Ukraine desperately wanted there to be that. Places like Yugoslavia and Libya that did happen. In Ukraine it didn't: NATO isn't going to escalate as Russian deterrence works. And vice versa.

You can always hope that the conflict would stop and of course, that it doesn't escalate. That's a bit different to insist on stopping the war on any terms whatsoever.

Since Cherson may have served as a springboard for future Russian offensives, it seems to me Cherson may have been conceded to Ukraine as a form of 'guarantee' that Russia will not make a bid for Odessa / Transnistria. — Tzeentch

The simple fact is what was already known for a long time: Russia has problem to supply the troops in Kherson region because of the chokepoints of the bridges across the Dniepr. The commanding Russian general Suvorikin acknowledged this: that it simply wasn't possible to supply the troops. Russia wouldn't sacrifice it's best troops, the paratroopers of the VDV for nothing. Yes, now the threat of Russia taking Odessa and contacting the forces in Transnistria has indeed subsided.

As ↪Olivier5 pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. — ssu

The nuclear ransom is exactly what's preventing NATO planes and troops in Ukraine.

If this was pre-nuclear era, we'd already be in WWIII general global conflict, almost guaranteed.

Saying Russia is deterring NATO acting on it's legal and moral beliefs to liberate Ukrainian territory, is exactly the same as saying Russia is holding the territory at nuclear ransom.

Explaining that NATO policy is to go up to the nuclear response line ... but not cross it, is the same as explaining one of the above.

[

The nuclear ransom is exactly what's preventing NATO planes and troops in Ukraine. — boethius

Deterrence and ransom is different.

Putin implying that Ukraine cannot be assisted or otherwise he will use nukes is more of ransom/sabre rattling. The nuclear sabre rattling is an attempt to decrease the military aid to Ukraine.

Russia defending itself or it's aircraft from attack by in the end having nuclear weapons is deterrence.

Supposedly someone inside the Biden administration, not Blinken, had discussions with a high-ranking government official, discussing "red lines", allegedly Russia was told that a mass retaliation would incur a reply by NATO. — Manuel

I think it is reliable, but for the US and NATO to say they will respond to use of nuclear weapons is more an answer to deputy-chairman of the security council and former Russian president Medvedev saying that NATO wouldn't do anything if Russia used nukes in Ukraine.

"I have to remind you again - for those deaf ears who hear only themselves. Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary," Medvedev said, adding that it would do so "in predetermined cases" and in strict compliance with state policy.

When describing a possible strike on Ukraine, a Slavic neighbour which Putin describes as an artificial historical construct, Medvedev said NATO would not get involved in such a situation.

"I believe that NATO would not directly interfere in the conflict even in this scenario," Medvedev said. "The demagogues across the ocean and in Europe are not going to die in a nuclear apocalypse."

Which actually may be so, but to that kind of statement NATO/US has to rattle it's own sabres. And anyway, the first thing would be to make a simply underground nuclear test in Novaja Zemlya.

The commanding Russian general Suvorikin acknowledged this: that it simply wasn't possible to supply the troops. Russia wouldn't sacrifice it's best troops, the paratroopers of the VDV for nothing. — ssu

Also of note, the timing is likely relative US elections.

Also noteworthy is Ukraine claiming that Russia is not withdrawing troops and it could be a trap to inflict further damage on Ukrainian troops. Although that may have changed, it is revealing that Ukraine seems to say they are not in a position to re-conquer the city by force--important subtext--and may also simply be true, and what Ukrainian officials called a "staged event" (which is the definition of a press conference) is to encourage removing as many civilians as possible to turn the city into a battle space.

The prevailing wisdom has been that Ukrainian offensives would stop in autumn and winter, and Russians were trying to make it until then. Of course, supplying troops is different to supplying a whole city of civilians. Or maybe the city will be evacuated but not the area around the damn (i.e. a bridge head maintained non-the-less throughout winter, just abandoning supplying any civilians). It maybe the case that Ukrainians cannot supply the city either.

Yes, now the threat of Russia taking Odessa and contacting the forces in Transnistria has indeed subsided. — ssu

This will only be true once Russian troops are actually withdrawn to the Eastern side, but as far as I know there hasn't been an announcement to withdraw from holding the damn, a position that could be used to simply siege Kherson in the spring if the Ukrainians move into the city. Keep in mind that Ukraine may not be able to supply the civilians in the city either throughout winter, so they may simply not move in for that reason.

So it's not clear what the Russians are even intent on doing at this point, other than strongly signalling not supplying any civilians there.

What is clear is that the Ukrainian offensive for Kherson did not simply break through and successfully siege the city. So to evaluate the military meaning of all this we would need to know casualty figures on both sides, which we don't.

With all the talk of negotiation (on both sides and other parties(like the US and telling Ukraine to say they're open to negotiation and mentioning "Ukraine fatigue") it seems a strong signal that both sides are hurting pretty bad, but I still fail to see any evidence Russian forces, government, economy is about to simply collapse and the front seems stable going into winter apart from Kherson.

With all the talk of negotiation (on both sides and other parties(like the US and telling Ukraine to say they're open to negotiation and mentioning "Ukraine fatigue") it seems a strong signal that both sides are hurting pretty bad, but I still fail to see any evidence Russian forces, government, economy is about to simply collapse and the front seems stable going into winter apart from Kherson. — boethius

At least the discussion of talks shows that there might be a deadlock in the battlefield.

I agree. The war can still continue.

Also crossing the Dniepr is a big difficult operation for Ukraine. And let's not forget that this is one of the poorest nations in Europe that has it's economy severely wrecked. But when the threat is existential, that there's no electricity or people have to go hungry to sleep isn't going to change the will of the Ukrainian people. It's more a question of Western resolve to aid Ukraine. The Russians can take a beating also, and still continue the war.

Deterrence and ransom is different. — ssu

The difference between deterrence and ransom is strictly a legal one.

If I point a gun that may deter you from doing action X, if I'm in the right and you'd be in the wrong, then using the word ransom would make no sense. However, if I'm in the wrong and your in the right (such as if you leave I'll shoot you, unless you give me what I want, such as money) then I'm holding you at ransom.

Ransom always involves deterrence (come and get the thing or people I'm holding ransom, I'll I destroy them and try to destroy you too), as if you do not have some illegal leverage of deterrence then you're clearly not "holding" anything, much less at ransom.

NATO claims the conquered Ukrainian territory is not legally occupied by Russia and they should give it back, so it is entirely reasonable to say (from NATO's point of view) that Russia is holding the territory at Ransom using nuclear weapons, which is what prevents NATO from simply implementing their conception of the law.

Ransom is entirely apt analogy for the situation if you believe Ukraine has been wronged ... or, if you want to be really precise, if you think NATO has some moral or legal commitment to Ukraine given their stated beliefs and what prevents them from acting on those beliefs is nuclear weapons.

For some reason, people do not want to recognise the common sense reality that nuclear powers (including the United States) can do a lot without anyone being able or willing to do anything about it because of said nuclear weapons, as this delusion is required to maintain the belief that compromise should be rejected and that somehow Russia can be "defeated" while also avoiding nuclear war (have your butter and money of the butter, as they say in French, which makes more sense than having cake and also eating it ... which is just the common sense reason for having the cake in the first place, but I digress; what is the heart of the matter is that the West wants to maintain the belief that we can and should impose our will on Russia by force but also wait, wait, wait not too much force so as to avoid nuclear war, and simply ignoring both the conflict in principle and priorities as well as moral and political issues of this position).

Yet what you've provided is evidence that some people think "it was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded". I already knew that. — Isaac

Not just some people. Some experts and that's not all. Probably you missed a couple of things about the expert you cite, Tyler Cowen (as much as you did about Mearsheimer). His article “The Marshall Plan: myths and realities” is a critical view of the Marshall Plan from a liberal (if not Neo-liberal) and anti-keynesian point of view and the conclusion is that the right liberal free market policies and not central planning policies recommended by the US were the main factors to boost growth [1]. So the first fun fact is that while you were insinuating my neo-liberal fundamentalism ("Unless you're fresh out of high school or you've been raised in cult of fundamentalist neo-liberals") yet you cited an expert whose views about the Marshall Plan (or in general [2]?) are more in line with neo-liberal views then mine. In other words, he would credit the post-war growth to the properly freed market forces than to the central planning that the Marshall Plan implied!
The other issue is that Tyler Cowen’s article doesn't offer any in depth study of how the Marshall plan worked in the case of Italy[3] (like these studies did: https://books.openedition.org/igpde/14777 [4] , http://www.giorcellimichela.com/uploads/8/3/7/0/83709646/marshall_plan_draft.pdf [5]), especially wrt the role of private corporations which is relevant for my objection to your idea of post-war reconstruction as "corporate opportunity to 'screw everyone'". Besides, in his closing remarks, while praising the role of good free market policies vs keynesian central planning, Tyler Cowen added: “In most cases, this phenomenon was encouraged by European leaders themselves, such as West Germany's Ludwig Erhard and Italy's Luigi Einaudi, rather than by outsiders.” Yet the fun fact is that Luigi Einaudi himself argued in a long interview: “The Marshall Plan is indispensable for the recovery of the Italian economy” [6]


[1]
U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic poilicies

Policy makers and aid proponents should no longer view the Marshall Plan as an unqualified success. At best, its effects on postwar Europe were -mixed, while its impact on the American economy was negative. The basic problem with foreign aid is that economic growth is not a creature of central planning and direction. Growth is the result of individual initiative and enterprise within a sound legal and economic framework. Government can only supply the framework. Anything more will result in the well-known problems of central or socialist planning: the impossibility of rational economic calculation, the creation of perverse incentives, and the stifling of entrepreneurial initiative, among others. Foreign aid programs always will be plagued by such problems.

In most cases, and certainly in the case of the Marshall Plan, the government-to-government character of foreign aid encourages statism and central planning, not free enterprise. The best way to promote free markets in other countries is to allow their businesses to trade with the U.S. without government interference. This freedom of trade includes not only exporting and importing, but also lending, borrowing, and labor emigration and immigration.

[2]
Israel still has some problems with living standards and income inequality, but it is a classic case of neoliberalism — at least in the economic sphere — mostly working out as planned.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-06/israel-s-economy-shows-that-classical-economic-theory-still-works?leadSource=uverify%20wall


[3]
Italy, moreover, seemed to be seeking market solutions for some of its economic problems but was actively hindered by ECA administrators. The Americans in charge of the ECA in Italy continually were expressing concern about the Italian governments's "excessive" attention to balanc-ing budgets and controlling monetary expansion. U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic policies.

[4]

A provisional conclusion on the impact of the Marshall Plan, therefore, must be that :
- it made a significant contribution to the investment effort of the Italian steel industry in the Reconstruction ;
- it allowed Cornigliano to become the leading firm in the market for thin flat products, thereby establishing the newly formed alliance between Fiat and Finsider at the forefront of Italian manufacturing industry ;
- it allowed many small private producers to reequip themselves and thus participate in the rapid growth of electric steel taking place during the Fifties. The Sinigaglia Plan, therefore, attained only partial success in reorganizing the industry, which also meant that the feud between State-owned and private firms dragged on.


[5]

In this paper, we have examined the effect of the Marshall Plan on the Italian postwar economy. The modernization of transportation systems was associated with (i) an increase in agricultural production despite a decrease in the number of agricultural workers, (ii) more widespread adoption of modern agricultural machines, and (iii) an expansion of the industrial and service sectors . These findings indicate that, in addition to influencing Italian institutions, the Marshall Plan had beneficial effects on local economic development. Within each Italian macro-region, the amount of ERP reconstruction grant money had a profound impact on the economic growth of otherwise similar nearby provinces.


[6] https://loccidentale.it/il-piano-marshall-indispensabile-al-risanamento-delleconomia-italiana/

At least the discussion of talks shows that there might be a deadlock in the battlefield.

I agree. The war can still continue. — ssu

Yes, we agree.

And as we agreed months ago Russia is waiting to see how winter plays out. Already European CEO's are starting to warn about gas supplies in 2023.

So, I think Russia has largely succeeded in this basic objective.

Of course, it is far from clear how winter will actually play out.

There has been several of these general mood swings of clearly wanting to stop the war on all sides ... followed by more war up until now.

When the US administration mentions Ukraine fatigue, I think it is safe to assume these are the Europeans. I think it is also safe to assume Europe could essentially force an end to the conflict if Germany and France wanted to.

The solution would need to be highly creative at this stage, giving both Ukraine and Russia something they want (such as Ukraine EU membership, and ending sanctions against Russia), which, any compromise, will be a victory for Russia due to the West setting the standard of their own success and fully "defeating" Russia including in Crimea.

So, any resolution to the conflict will be temporarily embarrassing, but politicians seems to be starting to calculate the real harms to their own citizens is a higher political liability.

Not nuclear weapons as a first response. What I heard was that the US would sends troops along with other NATO member countries to fight inside Ukraine, if Russia proceeds with the expected escalation coming winter. If this happens (US troops go inside Ukraine), then we are really playing with lava, not fire.

Of course, anyone using the first nuke, must know what the consequences will be, not only for their country, but for the world.

What I heard was that the US would sends troops along with other NATO member countries to fight inside Ukraine, if Russia proceeds with the expected escalation coming winter — Manuel

Where did you hear this?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-white-house-official-involved-in-undisclosed-talks-with-top-putin-aides-11667768988

That's the article which speaks of preventing "escalation", the rest of the info comes through Colonel Macgregor:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJvLVc0gA6M

As for the US troops, here:

https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/increasing-the-us-military-presence-in-poland

and

https://www.army.mil/article/261041/us_armys_warhorse_battalion_assumes_command_of_battlegroup_poland

I don't have a wsj subscription. :sad:

There were two articles about Poland?

Downplaying some issues and "look-there" others seems to be Barbashin's main takeaway. Barbashin also noticed the subtle "justification" of Putinian politics, the autocratic un-democratic rule:

Putin wants the world to forget Ukraine
^{— Anton Barbashin; Al Jazeera; Nov 3, 2022}

Seen that before, and history has. (Perhaps more among religious extremists.) Aligns with the anti-West rhetoric.

What should we expect, though?

Of course Putin wants the US to go away. That's not to say the US shouldn't, just that it might well be what Putin (really) wants for Christmas.

Those other articles aren't paywalled, you should be able to see them.

A similar one was published in the NYT, about 3 days ago.

Just as a reminder in case anyone forgot.

Chapter I, Article 2 of the UN Charter:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Also crossing the Dniepr is a big difficult operation for Ukraine. — ssu

Yes, and that’s what the Russian top brass is counting on: a more defensible position, from which they can bomb Kherson to the ground. Reason for which they emptied it, and even took with them the remains of Potemkin. They want to flatten the town while fixing the Ukrainian forces on the right bank of the Dniepr.

Scattered stories from the frontlines...

Voices from the trenches: Ukrainian soldiers near Kherson share what they feel and fear
^{— The Kyiv Independent; Nov 9, 2022}

Mad Dash to Flee Village Swarming With Putin’s Drunken Troops
^{— The Daily Beast; Nov 10, 2022}

With cell phones being so common, a good deal of footage can be found of bombings, kamikaze drones, tanks exploding, and such. The destruction seems senseless.

a more defensible position, from which they can bomb Kherson to the ground — Olivier5

Others reported the same. They don't seem all that bent on defending this "piece of Russia" (annexed). Maybe the severe threats are more ad hoc...?

Analysis: Russia's planned Kherson retreat a double-edged sword for Kyiv | Via MSN
^{— Reuters; Nov 10, 2022}

Putin makes top brass take the fall for Kherson humiliation – and that’s no accident | Via MSN
^{— The Telegraph; Nov 10, 2022}

If the Russians are actually crossing the Dniepr, they will be very vulnerable to shelling as they rally to the few places where it can be done. The Ukrainians may advance only as far as to make that easier to do. The west bank could turn into a huge prison colony.

Those other articles aren't paywalled, you should be able to see them. — Manuel

But weren't they about Poland?

Regarding the (alleged) Kherson retreat, DShRG Rusich, co-founded by Alexey Milchakov, posted:

And a bunch of cotton wool sharply began to accuse us of provocation, cooperation with the SBU, and so on. And we just stated the obvious - the clowns from the Moscow Region did not learn how to fight normally in 8 months. The city was not destroyed even before the surrender (everything should have been blown up). But cotton wool is grabbing - they have enough excuses for clown AP channels (and channels of supposedly military specialists who are sitting in the rear). For us, this is another betrayal of the Russian people, who believe less and less that "Russia is here forever." What's the next goodwill gesture? Berdyansk or Melitopol? — DShRG Rusich (Nov 9, 2022)

Ironic that the Russian army has bloodthirsty neo-Nazis in their employ. Nothing new though I guess.

In Mar 2022, the Russian conditions for peace were apparently

• recognition of Crimea
• independence of Luhansk and Donetsk
• de-militarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine

NATO requirements might come from a proposal (a couple of documents) put forth by Russia in Dec 2021, some 7 years after Crimea, which includes

All [30 or so] member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States

The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A peace deal (or two, Feb, Sep) in 2022 explicitly with no Ukraine NATO membership was negotiated by Dmitry Kozak but ditched.

So, what's the big deal with NATO anyway? Or, recalling some quotes (Putin et al), what existential threat did/does Ukrainian NATO membership pose against Russia?

• NATO troops/military added in Ukraine could be seen as threatening
• NATO membership would prevent/deter Russia from invasion (or similar)

It's questionable whether the latter can pose such a dire threat.

In 2022, no Ukrainian NATO membership seemed to go down in priority. (Recently, an intact annexed Kherson Oblast also seems to have gone down in priority.) Maybe it was all replaced with the Mar 2022 conditions above?

Anyway, they seem noticeably keen on keeping Crimea Russian. Also a land corridor via Donbas in addition to Kerch. Not a lease on otherwise neutral ground or whatever, but secured Russian land, which any strong military would have gotten in the way of (and still might).