Note how "metaphysics," in making its approach towards meaning, incorporates "physics."
Also note how metaphysics, epistemology and consciousness studies are currently grappling with the experience of and conception of matter.
What is matter? What is physical? What is the interweave of matter and consciousness? These are questions very much intestate. — ucarr
If you're saying metaphysical physics is the necessary pre-condition for physical physics, then how do you explain away the physical brain observing the physical earth being a ground for not only the discipline of physics, but also the ground for cerebration populated by metaphysical notions?
[...] I smell the presence of idealism herein. — ucarr
I’m asking this with the perspective that were this to not be possible (and I currently find that it is indeed not possible), then the very notion of physicality would be founded upon the study we term metaphysics – rather than on the study we term physics – such that the study of physics is itself contingent upon the study of metaphysics. — javra
How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics? — javra
What do you mean here by "justify ... occurrence"? — 180 Proof
(This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.) — javra
Definitions are not as useful as is often supposed in settling disagreements. Philosophy is not just providing definitions.Do you agree that philosophy has an interest in distilling those attributes common to all types of metaphysics deemed valid? This interest strives toward defining metaphysics in terms of broadest generality. — ucarr
See Confirmable and influential Metaphysics or just about anything by Midgley. Any demarcation between physics and metaphysics will be arbitrary.Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics? — ucarr
Your original expression, javra, suggests 'reifying the abstract category' in the question raised which is nonsensical. — 180 Proof
Your original question confusedly suggests so the way you'd formulated it. That's your fallacy, not mine.So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"? — javra
I don't see how my Peircean-Wittgensteinian "stance" relates in any (non-trivial) way to Joshs' p0m0. — 180 Proof
So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"? — javra
Your original question confusedly suggests so the way you'd formulated it. That's your fallacy, not mine. — 180 Proof
It's common to claim that all scientific statements are falsifiable, and to add that the demarcation between physics and metaphysics is this falsifiability.
If that's so, then conservation rules are not part of physics, but of metaphysics. — Banno
This also demonstrates the absurdity of ↪javra
's attempting to force physics and metaphysics into a hierarchy. One does not "sit" on the other. — Banno
This also demonstrates the absurdity of ↪javra 's attempting to force physics and metaphysics into a hierarchy. One does not "sit" on the other. — Banno
The first law is not provable. We cannot, have not, checked out every apparent change in total energy and found that the total energy is constant.
The first law is not falsifiable. To be falsifiable, we would have to find an instance where the total energy did not remain constant. But suppose we do find an apparent case in which the total amount of energy increases. We would have to show that the energy responsible for that increase did not come from anywhere else. But again we cannot check everywhere. — Banno
This makes total sense. Is your point here not the fact that physics rests on metaphysics? — Tom Storm
How so, given examples such as that you've just mentioned? — javra
So we count the conservation laws not as physics but as metaphysics? Think on that for a bit. These are the core, fundamental rules of physics, and yet not part of physics? — Banno
spell it out, I'm old and dim. — Tom Storm
Seems to me you have given your argument a self-inflicted injury. To maintain your definition of metaphysic you have to claim that a central, constituent part of physics is not physics. — Banno
What I've posited is a reductio, that proceeds by assuming that we can differentiate between physics and metaphysics, taking the strongest example, falsification. I then show that this has as a consequence that stuff that is central to physics - conservation laws - are not actually part of physics. — Banno
As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. — javra
As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. — javra
As practiced by physicists, themselves. Without a lot of help from metaphysicians outside the science. — jgill
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