Ukraine Crisis

Isaac

As ↪Olivier5
pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. — ssu

What kind of answer is that? I've supplied a stream of qualified experts talking about the very real risk of escalation to nuclear weapons and your counter is to cite some nobody from an internet forum? Is that the best you can do?

Probably you missed a couple of things about the expert you cite, Tyler Cowen — neomac

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of the Cowen article? If I want an economist's critique, I'll ask an economist, not some nobody on an internet chat forum. You're not qualified to say to what extent Cowen's conclusions are reasonable.

I made a point about post war reconstruction being always an opportunity for profiteering, you said that wasn't true because of the Marshal plan. To maintain that critique you have to show that it is not possible that it's true - ie that no experts think that. Not that some experts don't think that. All that latter shows is that there's disagreement. I've stated a position and supported it with relevant expert opinion. You're also entitled to your opposing position supported by expert opinion.

If you want to start claiming my position is actually wrong, or untenable, then we have an asymmetric argument. To support my position I only need to show it's plausible. To support yours you need to show mine is actually impossible. A much higher threshold of evidence.

Now we could argue ideologically about which of the two opposing plausible positions we ought to support. But we cannot argue technically about which position is most plausible. We're not economists (at that level). If a fully qualified, peer-reviewed economist thinks the Marshall plan did not significantly contribute to the successful reconstruction of postwar Europe, then you are not in a position to gainsay that, no matter what your little Google-Scholar trawl dragged up.

Olivier5

Voices from the trenches: Ukrainian soldiers near Kherson share what they feel and fear
— The Kyiv Independent; Nov 9, 2022 — jorndoe

Nice piece. This journalist, Igor Kossov, seems pretty good. I’ll follow him from now on.

Olivier5

So a bunch of unknown dudes off the Internet guessestimated that there is a 9% chance a nuclear warhead is detonated in Ukraine or Europe over the next 6 months. What does that mean?

The figure is just a guess, nothing more.

The important point is not in the number 9. It is that this war has increased the risk of nuclear escalation, compared to pre-february level. And it is now not negligeable. It follows that this war cannot continue for several years without running a significant risk of nuclear escalation.

I agree with their forecast, interpreted as such.

ssu

Not nuclear weapons as a first response. What I heard was that the US would sends troops along with other NATO member countries to fight inside Ukraine, if Russia proceeds with the expected escalation coming winter. If this happens (US troops go inside Ukraine), then we are really playing with lava, not fire.

Of course, anyone using the first nuke, must know what the consequences will be, not only for their country, but for the world. — Manuel

First and foremost, this is a sabre rattling response to Russia's sabre rattling, the potential use of nuclear weapons with conventional forces. And this response hasn't been official. It has been given to the media by other retired people, who have said that this kind of response has given to Russian counterparts behind closed doors, not openly.

This means that Joe Biden and the West haven't drawn a public red line like Obama did in Syria (and failed).

If Russian would use nukes, the claimed Western response would be to target Russian forces in occupied Ukraine and the Black Sea fleet. The response would be done by the Air Forces and cruise missiles. For ground forces to go into Ukraine is a huge, slow operation.

But let's think just how credible the Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons is. What do they really gain? Would China really support this? Besides, that Russia withdraws from Kherson shows that cool heads prevail and they can make rational battlefield decisions and aren't confined to what it politically looks like. After all, the military leadership announcing that they will withdraw from Kherson is a humiliating defeat for Putin.

ssu

Ironic that the Russian army has bloodthirsty neo-Nazis in their employ. Nothing new though I guess. — jorndoe

Nothing new, but dramatic changes can happen.

Alexandra Polinova from the now banned Memorial said the obvious: it is actually Russia that needs to decolonize.

There should be another narrative than the imperialist one when it comes to what Russia is. This narrative creates the reality were Russia sees necessary to intervene and dominate it's near abroad. First and foremost, the collapse of the Soviet Union, is seen as a mistake. An unfortunate accident. Russia is seen to be an multi-ethnic Empire and therefore it should obviously control what has been part of the Empire. And this makes everybody so nervous about Russia. It's not acting as a normal country. Yet the imperialist narrative dominates official Russia. It is fomented with the huge conspiracy that the West is against Russia, hence to defend itself, it has to attack.

Is change possible?

Russia does have the groundwork of a legal system, if truly used, to make it to be a justice state. But there should be a dramatic change, something equivalent of a revolution. Otherwise views that are in the West confined to the political fringe will stay dominant in Russia. Putin just bowing out won't change the political landscape, if someone then just inherits the security system.

Anyway, they seem noticeably keen on keeping Crimea Russian. Also a land corridor via Donbas in addition to Kerch. Not a lease on otherwise neutral ground or whatever, but secured Russian land, which any strong military would have gotten in the way of (and still might). — jorndoe

This is what is basically left now for Putin. No overthrow of the Ukrainian government and replacement with a pro-Russian regime, no larger Novorossiya.

Crimea may be the real question.

neomac

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of the Cowen article? If I want an economist's critique, I'll ask an economist, not some nobody on an internet chat forum. You're not qualified to say to what extent Cowen's conclusions are reasonable. — Isaac

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of my of assessment of the Cowen article? You cited Tyler Cowen to support your claim. You assessed an expert source as good enough to support your claim or question mine, even though you are no expert. Now I'm claiming you are wrong also based on the source you yourself cited.
Your questioning my expertise is unjustified. If you have teeth issues you go to a dentist not to a gynecologist, I suppose. Why is that? Because you are supposedly enough well educated to distinguish a gynecologist from a dentist, even though you can hardly be called an expert on any such matters or even an expert at distinguishing gynecologists from dentists, right? And if you are not enough educated, you can still learn these kinds of assessments from other educated people who are not experts either.
The article main point is focused on policies and the conviction that Marshall Plan’s related keynesian recommendations weren’t effective (liberist, pro-free market policies were!). It’s not focused on the contribution of the private sector to the Italian reconstruction with the money of the Marshall plan at all! But that's what's relevant for my objection to you, and what's should be relevant for you to counter it.
To distinguish the scope of my studies wrt Tyler Cowen’s article, and related main findings one doesn’t need to be an expert. It must be educated enough and read it carefully.

I made a point about post war reconstruction being always an opportunity for profiteering, you said that wasn't true because of the Marshal plan. — Isaac

I didn’t claim anywhere that the Marshall Plan was everywhere a success, my exact words were: “If your claim - more charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction as such, then one must take into account the Marshall Plan after WW2”.

To maintain that critique you have to show that it is not possible that it's true - ie that no experts think that. — Isaac

If you want to start claiming my position is actually wrong, or untenable, then we have an asymmetric argument. To support my position I only need to show it's plausible. To support yours you need to show mine is actually impossible. — Isaac

These are false alternatives. One could simply argue that his position is more plausible than yours. That’s what I’m doing.

Isaac

These are false alternatives. One could simply argue that his position is more plausible than yours. That’s what I’m doing. — neomac

No. One couldn't. Not unless one is a qualified economist. Neither you nor I are in a position to judge the relative plausibility of economic theories.

Same goes for military analysis, geopolitics... All the other issues you seem to want to try this on. You are not qualified to judge them on their technical merits, no matter how much things seem clear to you.

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of my of assessment of the Cowen article? — neomac

Because we are qualified to judge those matters. There's no body of knowledge about things like this, every human is just as qualified as every other. Rationality, ethics, art, values, ideology... We can, and do, discuss the relative merits of these matters because we're all equally qualified to do so.

If you disagree with Cowan's ideology we have a matter for discussion (though I too disagree with his ideology, so it might be quite a short one). If you disagree with his conclusion I couldn't care less, because you're not qualified to judge the validity of his conclusion.

neomac

If you disagree with his conclusion I couldn't care less, because you're not qualified to judge the validity of his conclusion. — Isaac

I don't care about Tyler Cowen’s conclusions either. I'm just questioning what you can infer from it wrt your claim that post-war reconstructions is "a corporate opportunity to 'screw everyone'". Indeed he's article is not focused on the contribution of the private post-war corporations e.g. to the Italian reconstruction at all (as the studies I linked are)! And given his liberal position, I guess he would not agree with your claim either [1].

No. One couldn't. Not unless one is a qualified economist. — Isaac

I disagree. To distinguish the scope of the studies I linked wrt Tyler Cowen’s article, and related main findings one doesn’t need to be an expert. It must be enough educated and read the articles carefully (especially if one wants to draw inferences from them).

[1]
Notice also that your original claim required just a single counterexample:

It's a pattern repeated over and over - War -> reconstruction requirements -> corporate opportunity to screw everyone.

I can't think of a single example from history where that's gone well for the inhabitants. Can you? — Isaac

Manuel

↪ssu

Yeah, it could well be sable rattling. Nukes would only be used if NATO fights Russia, in Ukraine they would serve little purpose outside of mass murder, with little by way of military advantage, if any.

I don't know, but, it would be good to tone these things down, as much as possible.

boethius

Yeah, it could well be sable rattling. Nukes would only be used if NATO fights Russia, in Ukraine they would serve little purpose outside of mass murder, with little by way of military advantage, if any. — Manuel

This is very naive.

Although tactical nukes have never been used in a battle and we don't "know" what affect they would have, the idea we can assume they would be useless seems ill advised.

Significant effort is placed on making as big conventional bombs as possible for certain tasks, tactical nuclear weapons just allows bigger bombs for those purposes, for example destroying hardened (but not nuke hardened) command bunkers may only be possible with nuclear weapons.

There's definitely a lot of negative political consequences to using nuclear weapons, but the idea they wouldn't provide any tactical military advantage is I think extremely foolish. The relevance being that the purely military motivation to use them is genuine, and therefore political effort should be made to avoid that happening (setting a path of the banal and regular use of tactical nukes in wars to come and insane proliferation of everyone "needing them", a process already happening due to the war so far).

There is possibly "sound military reasons" the US and Soviets developed things like the nuclear artillery shell, nuclear bazooka, nuclear mines, nuclear air-to-air missile, nuclear torpedos, even a nuclear bullet was made at one point of californium.

The reasons these tactical nuclear weapons systems were developed in vast quantities was that their developers envisioned their utility.

Paine

The collapse of Russian forces in Kherson has Ukraine posting the following:

Ukrainian intelligence agency tells remaining Russian soldiers in Kherson to surrender

Manuel

but the idea they wouldn't provide any tactical military advantage is I think extremely foolish. The relevance being that the purely military motivation to use them is genuine, and therefore political effort should be made to avoid that happening — boethius

If they use them in Ukraine, not as a reaction to NATO getting directly involved, then by using them they will get NATO directly involved. Which would soon escalate to full on nuclear war. Therefore, the advantage of using them in Ukraine, as the situation currently stands, if of no advantage to Russia, outside of reminding NATO of the consequences of direct conflict.

But that's the threat of use, not the actual use. Actual use as of now, would be suicide.

boethius

If they use them in Ukraine, not as a reaction to NATO getting directly involved, then by using them they will get NATO directly involved. — Manuel

Also not a fact. There is really no rational reason for NATO to intervene even if Russia uses nuclear weapons.

It's precisely because of this basic rational situation (that NATO has no actual alliance with Ukraine, no legal basis to directly intervene, and no political or moral reason to risk full scale nuclear exchange to make a point about Ukrainian borders), that the weapons systems and information to Ukraine has been a very slow and controlled process, seeing how each weapons system plays out before providing the next, is because Russia may indeed simply resort to tactical nuclear weapons rather than face defeat by NATO weapons systems.

Keep in mind that since the start of the war, or even before, NATO could have provided and trained on things like F-35 and all related weapons systems, NATO tanks and other tracked vehicles, long range HIMARS, cruise missiles, etc.

The reason we don't see more advanced capabilities, but the line is drawn at short range HIMARS, is because sophisticated enough NATO weapons systems may provoke a nuclear reaction and NATO has no rational response to that.

Hence, the policy is to supply Ukraine ... but not too much as to create both motivation and justification for the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

The entire situation revolves around nuclear weapons and the fact no one has any rational desire to use them or see anyone else use them (including the Russians, as otherwise they would have just opened with a tactical nuclear barrage).

So, it's a geopolitical puzzle NATO is trying to solve by getting what they want by force without the Russians resorting to nuclear weapons in response. Russia is of course just trying to get what they want by force the ol' fashion way, counting on NATO not intervening "enough" due to said nuclear weapons. NATO's policy position is basically trying to answer the question of is there an "enough" force (vis-a-vis supplying arms) that implements their policies but is not "enough" to provoke Russia into a nuclear response.

And this basic dynamic is what is driving the apparent "stability" of the front lines. If Russia has too much success NATO pours in arms to stop it, otherwise it risks severe embarrassment that the mighty NATO can't even slow down the Russians with all their fancy equipment and satellites, but if Ukraine has too much success the other way then NATO stops pouring in more weapons so as not to provoke a nuclear response.

The resulting situation is an attritional war in which there are conventional options that are more effective than nuclear weapons (such as shutting down Ukrainian electricity grid).

Where nuclear weapons would be seriously considered by the Russians is if the front line collapse we keep hearing about (a real front line collapse, not just mostly orderly withdrawal from a region, but Ukraines actually winning militarily and no other way to stop their advance) actually happens. In such conditions tactical nuclear weapons can destroy critical hardened bunkers, critical logistics hubs, as well as advancing armour columns.

However, it is precisely because nuclear weapons would be useful to stop any otherwise actually unstoppable Ukrainian offensive that (in my view) NATO limits weapons supplies to very limited gains in non-critical regions that the Russians can tolerate.

For example, it is certainly embarrassing to withdraw from Kherson, but it's something the Russians can tolerate; it is a tiny nuisance compared to some real advance in Crimea about to take the port of Sevastopol, to put things in perspective of NATO is no where close to providing Ukraine with the weapons systems and training required to even attempt to achieve.

boethius

But that's the threat of use, not the actual use. Actual use as of now, would be suicide. — Manuel

There is severe negative political consequences of Russia using nuclear weapons right now, which explains why they haven't used them.

However, it would not be suicidal. There is zero reason for the Russians to believe and zero reason for any official or officer anywhere in all of NATO to believe, that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be met with a US nuclear response.

Indeed, when the offensives were gaining ground and it seemed like front lines really were totally collapsing (and the fact only then did the Russian strike the power grid for the first time and also blowup a damn I think indicates it was a real risk from their perspective as well; maybe not no where near as high as the Western media belief of the war essentially being over and Ukraine won at that point, but still a big enough worry to act upon), the US took great efforts to explain to Russia and the media that there are conventional response options to the Russian use of nuclear weapons at the US's disposal.

Logic being that it would be morally and politically justifiable for the US to retaliate with conventional weapons and Russia would have no moral or political justification to respond with nuclear weapons against the US, and so if they could not respond in kind conventionally then it does make sense.

However, the Russians can also retaliate conventionally to a US conventional retaliation, such as cutting undersea communication cables and blowing up satellites, even cause a full on Kesler syndrome, and the Russian made clear to explain to the Americans and the media that they can and would do these things.

Fortunately for the world these scenarios did not play out, but that would be the likely next phase of a nuclear strike in Ukraine. The followup question would be what the US retaliation to the Russian retaliation would be, and the Russian response to that, and if that cycle would end by one of the parties or would a conventional retaliation, if bad enough, provoke a nuclear retaliation.

Questions no one knows the answer to.

Why anyone with any actual experience of geopolitical diplomacy including people like Kissinger advocate a diplomatic resolution of the conflict and the West compromising and also ending the charade that they have no moral imperative, political responsibility, and negotiation leverage to negotiate but that it is "Ukraine that must do so".

jorndoe

:D

At the time of voting in the annexed regions:

Either we win, or you lose. — Putin (para)

Understood, sir. — Manager (para)

Voting results:

Donetsk ···· 99.2%
Luhansk ···· 98.4%
Zaporizhia · 93.1%
Kherson ···· 87.1%

Frankly speaking, I was not just happy, but surprised with the results of the referendums. [...] We've decided and I've decided for myself: it's going to be how the people say. And the results are more than convincing and absolutely transparent, beyond any doubt. — Putin

This is a subject of the Russian Federation, this status is legally defined and fixed. There are no and cannot be any changes here. — The Kremlin said that the Kherson region remains a Russian region · Dmitry Peskov · Nov 11, 2022

Manuel

Logic being that it would be morally and politically justifiable for the US to retaliate with conventional weapons and Russia would have no moral or political justification to respond with nuclear weapons against the US, and so if they could not respond in kind conventionally then it does make sense.

However, the Russians can also retaliate conventionally to a US conventional retaliation, such as cutting undersea communication cables and blowing up satellites, even cause a full on Kesler syndrome, and the Russian made clear to explain to the Americans and the media that they can and would do these things.

Fortunately for the world these scenarios did not play out, but that would be the likely next phase of a nuclear strike in Ukraine. The followup question would be what the US retaliation to the Russian retaliation would be, and the Russian response to that, and if that cycle would end by one of the parties or would a conventional retaliation, if bad enough, provoke a nuclear retaliation. — boethius

Well, what has been conveyed to Russia is that NATO would reply seriously, taken to mean, destruction of the Russian military by conventional means. How the heck does that not practically guarantee a nuclear response?

I mean, Russia can claim to be able to destroy these satellites and underseas communication, but with NATO next door, how much time will they have? A direct confrontation between Russia and NATO will almost certainly lead to a catastrophe.

If it did not, and NATO felt quite confident Russia would not use nukes, then it could have implemented a No-Fly Zone and limit Russian advances. So that signals that they know what's at stake.

neomac

2b38020fe1745c9da10f77bb4d055b34e919ee1893e0d040a099321b50e90fcf_1.jpg

Olivier5

Kherson is free. That was fast .

Ukraine is "almost in full control" of Kherson according to Yuriy Sak, an adviser to Ukraine's defence ministry.

Cheering crowds greeted Ukrainian troops as they arrived in the only regional capital to have been captured by Russian forces since its invasion in February.

Earlier, Ukrainian flags appeared in Kherson after Russia said it had completed the withdrawal of thousands of troops.

But Sak says some Russian soldiers left in the area are taking off their military uniforms, and trying to blend in with locals.

The Kremlin's spokesman meanwhile rejects that losing the key southern city is a humiliation for Vladimir Putin.

Source: BBC

jorndoe

Creepy (also point 5 of Anders Åslund's conditions):

Child abductions in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
^{— Wikipedia}

Ukraine parents ‘want their children back’ from Russia
^{— Al Jazeera; Oct 7, 2022}

How Moscow grabs Ukrainian kids and makes them Russians
^{— AP News; Oct 13, 2022}

Russia abducting Ukrainian children, putting up for adoption in Russia
^{— The Jerusalem Post; Oct 17, 2022}

How a Mariupol father survived a Russian POW camp and traveled to Moscow to save his kids
^{— Meduza; Nov 4, 2022}

Are they trying to mitigate a demographic type problem or something?
(They seem to have the machinery in place and running; I'm vaguely reminded of a recent TV show.)

Earlier, I read those reports with a grain of salt, but they've been consistent for some time now.

Paine

↪jorndoe

I am concerned that even if Russia tried to start returning children, the process of reversing adoptions would be a bureaucratic nightmare. The reports of children being sent far east suggests an intention to make the abductions irreversible.

boethius

Kherson is free. — Olivier5

Kherson is not "free". None of the critical fundamental freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom to associate etc.) are currently available in Ukraine (on both sides of the conflict).

Furthermore, as has been discussed multiple times there is no noticeable difference in governance quality between Ukraine and Russia.

Kherson has been reconquered by Ukraine, and, at best, you could say it will be free later, maybe, someday.

That was fast . — Olivier5

It has not been fast. The offensive to take Kherson started in September, and Ukraine has not really defeated the Russians militarily. Ukraine has suffered significant losses to pressure the Russians to simply leave, while Russia has suffered a political embarrassment and loss of a bridge head, but no catastrophic collapse of their armed forces in the regions as was predicted and promised by pro-Zelenskyites.

The conflict is now entering "winter mode".

At the moment there seems signals to negotiate on all sides.

The Kremlin's spokesman meanwhile rejects that losing the key southern city is a humiliation for Vladimir Putin. — Olivier5

This is accurate, the war is not over and the withdrawal was orderly and not thousands of Russian troops cutoff and surrounded and holding on for weeks and months without Russia being able to rescue them and ultimately surrendering.

We have not witnessed Russian lines collapsing due to the hypothesised low moral and a massive rout and chaotic fleeing and swimming across the river. Which even if that's still not "losing the war" would be at the level of humiliation.

However, as I mentioned months ago, taking Kherson would be the first (small) step in taking back by force all the other regions.

So, Ukraine has made that first small step, but not in a decisive military way and with significant casualties.

boethius

Well, what has been conveyed to Russia is that NATO would reply seriously, taken to mean, destruction of the Russian military by conventional means. How the heck does that not practically guarantee a nuclear response? — Manuel

That's extremely far fetched.

Supplying arms is one thing. US et. al. supplies a lot of arms to a lot of people, as do the Russians and Chinese. It is historically not considered an act of war; people got to make money somehow.

Also, as important, supplying arms does not risk any of your own troops.

There is zero reason to believe that NATO would attack Russia ... even more so if what you say is true and doing so would "practically guarantee a nuclear response". Certainly there is no rational basis to take actions that would guarantee your citizens being nuked if there is no need to.

Ukraine is not part of NATO and has no alliance with any NATO country.

There's plenty of political reasons not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine (why they haven't been used) but there is zero reason to believe a NATO conventional response, much less nuclear response, is a practical deterrent.

The reason not to use tactical nuclear weapons is mainly China and India would not approve, along with the Russian population, and also Russia itself does not want further proliferation of nuclear weapons which the use of a nuke would super charge (Russia has nukes already, so zero interest in other parties getting them).

However, one can imagine some short term military crisis large enough that the above considerations are no longer paramount. Hence, NATO is careful not to create such chaotic circumstances with their drip feed arms supply policy.

What helps this drip feed policy is that Russia simply withdraws rather than risk some chaotic military collapse (i.e. NATO can calibrate their support to "pressure" but not enough for Ukraine to actually route the Russians, at the cost of thousands of Ukrainian lives to make up for a lack of weapons systems); the long term consequences of this situation seem far from stable.

jorndoe

↪Olivier5

, according to the Kremlin, Ukraine is now occupying Russian territory, according to the Ukrainians, they've now taken Ukrainian territory back. Can't both be right. :)

RogueAI

Ukraine is riding high, so is now the time to deal? The U.S. and EU peoples won't back a proxy war forever. Already you're hearing grumbling from the Democratic progressive wing. Given Ukraine's successes recently, but also their long-term dependence on ephemeral foreign aid, what kind of realistic deal would they go for? Would they demand half a trillion in reparations for the damage the Russians have caused? What territories would they cede?

jorndoe

↪RogueAI

, I'm guessing they'll be partying the weekend over in Kherson, or some will anyway. Come Monday it'll be (back to the) hangovers.

RogueAI

↪jorndoe

Right, but what's the endgame? America can fund a proxy war for quite awhile, but we have notoriously short attention spans. And who's going to fund the Ukrainian rebuilding effort???

Olivier5

↪Olivier5, according to the Kremlin, Ukraine is now occupying Russian territory — jorndoe

Yes but then, according to the same Kremlin buffons, there is no war in Ukraine...

Olivier5

None of the critical fundamental freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom to associate etc.) are currently available in Ukraine — boethius

That's just another blatant lie.

Tzeentch

↪RogueAI

Likely the deal has already been struck.

The United States pressured Ukraine to show willingness to negotiate a few weeks ago.

Then Russia gives up Kherson as a form of 'guarantee' that no offensives for Odessa or Transnistria will take place.

Russia is probably well-prepared to defend against any Ukrainian offensives (apparently several defensive lines have been created), thus this situation with Kherson in Ukrainian hands is a stable state of affairs for both sides.

My guess is some form of peace talks are going to take place soon.

boethius

That's just another blatant lie. — Olivier5

You can't ban the opposition parties, ban dissenting media, ban people leaving the country, impose marshal law (i.e. no due process), and then call what you have "freedom".

And whenever these subjects come up, Zelenskyites love to explain how they are obvious and necessary measures to fight a war. Zelensky is fighting a war!! Zelenskyites will say.

Which Zelenskyites are free to argue, but the premise is that Ukrainians cannot be free, at least for now. You can argue they cannot be free for now to fight a war for freedom! But your statement was about freedom in the here and now.

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