Almost from the beginning, babies like looking at faces. Studies show that infants as young as 2 or 3 months start to make judgments about agency and responsibility and may display approval or disapproval about the behavior of others, including non-human others such as stuffed animals.

Seems likely to me that some of the basis of value is hard wired. Some is also probably associated with early contact with family and others. Some is likely associated with later learning and cultural influences.

TO value something, one discriminates against an infinitude of other things.
and,
Nihilism trumps value by asserting that everything has equal value, and thus makes the assignment of value a subjective assertion/judgment. — Question

To value some property (attribute, thing) is not to disvalue all other properties of that type. I value (for example) kindness, my beloved, philosophy, good art, much scientific knowledge, Leeds United.

I've been reading Joseph Raz but find it hard to build a theory out of the sorts of thing I value, or the process that seems to be involved. Have you had any luck?

That's an interesting thing. There are many things to value in life. I suppose biologically we are indeed pre-programmed to like or otherwise have a predisposition to like or value certain things from an early age.

My idea is that the things valued non-materialistically are rather vague and well, metaphysical. Although great works of art presuppose certain things to be of value or to be held in esteem, they are otherwise quite useless as things that help us survive, or perhaps?

It seems there are different categories of 'value'. One can value certain things while disregarding others. To value the material, one becomes a slave to the means and the end of possessing said object of desire.

I'm wondering if someone can simplify this highly abstract talk about value. There are a plethora of things that we value, that are manifest in the political theories we subscribe to, ethical frameworks, identity, and so on.

Can anyone chime in and simplify this abstract concept to some logical simples? Are we to resort to Platonic forms, the value of truth, and love for knowledge in order to simplify this abstract thought, although it seemingly even becomes more abstract the more you want to ground what is of value to oneself.

Thoughts?

Have you had any luck? — mcdoodle

Not really. As of recent, I started valuing 'nihilism' for being so elegant and exact. It's hard to value anything when you realize that truth is the only thing worth valuing, and there seems to be an abundance of truth in nihilism and its derivative absurdism. I guess I'm taking a sociological and Nietzschean turn as of recent.

Nihilism trumps value by asserting that everything has equal value, and thus makes the assignment of value a subjective assertion/judgment. — Question

Isn't this self-defeating? If everything is of equal value and the act of valuation is simply subjective then Nihilism too is nothing more than a matter of taste and whim.

No, that's distinct from [asserting a value] (I like oranges) and whether [objectively there is value in your preferences and tastes] (good for you!).

And how does one go about making the distinction?

And how does one go about making the distinction? — TheMadFool

Well, I think normatively is the only answer. So, if everyone likes oranges, then it's a property of us humans that we like oranges. But, since there is nothing that we can all 100% agree on that is a property of being the way we are, especially in matters of abstract concepts etc., then nihilism fills the void?

Wat are your thoughts in general, not specifically in regards to mine? — Question

Well, I'm not a fan of the word "nihilism," because it gets thrown around in such a wide variety of ways that one always needs to explain what one has in mind anyway.

At any rate, I'd clarify this: "Nihilism trumps value by asserting that everything has equal value" so that it reads "Nihilism trumps value by asserting that everything has equal objective value."

I agree that value is subjective. And re T Clark's comment, for example, that doesn't make valuation not subjective. Subjective doesn't refer to anything like "not hard-wired." If it's something the brain is doing as mentality, it's subjective, whether that's "hard-wired" or only winds up being wired via development, including environmental influences, etc.

This I don't agree with if taken literally: "TO value something, one discriminates against an infinitude of other things." Since we can't think of an infinity of other things.

So, you're blurring the line here with what is subjective and objective, I'm assuming?

So, what is it that you are disagreeing with here? I can say that we often think in opposites. There are an angel and a devil on my shoulder. I can count to 10 and -10 if I so want to. There are males and then females. The opposite of going down is up. The glass in half empty and half full. I think you get the point by now?

So, you're blurring the line here with what is subjective and objective, I'm assuming? — Question

Not at all. I'm stumped why you're thinking that.

So, what is it that you are disagreeing with here? — Question

I wasn't really disagreeing with anything. I was just saying that (a) we can't think of an infinity of things, and (b) I'd clarify that "nihilists" are saying that there's no objective value. They're not saying that there's no value, period, because they belive there is subjective value.

As of recent, I started valuing 'nihilism' for being so elegant and exact. It's hard to value anything when you realize that truth is the only thing worth valuing, and there seems to be an abundance of truth in nihilism and its derivative absurdism. I guess I'm taking a sociological and Nietzschean turn as of recent. — Question

I'm the opposite, though. I like virtue ethics, because that seems to be how people are: we value clusters of attributes or characteristics - virtues - and we disvalue other clusters - vices. Ethical judgment involves weighing them in any given situation, in a shared society. The shared society has many shared values, or it wouldn't function as well as it does. I'm an eco-leftie, but out in civil society I'm an active person with others of very different political persuasions, and part of this is just because we share a valuation of dialogue, working with others, enjoying arty or intellectual play and getting stuff done. And then in everyday transactions with any human fellows, much of our valuation is shared, or we'd keep coming to blows, or be unable to run organisations together.

Nihilism seems systematic, to me, and therefore not at all absurdist - the fact that Beckett is funny for instance constantly lifts him, for me, from nihilism, because he values the entertainment and release of laughter, as well as the theatrical/artistic experience. People who believe in an 'ism' usually find it hard, in my experience, to laugh at mockery of their ism because they don't see the absurd side of it.

That's an interesting thing. There are many things to value in life. I suppose biologically we are indeed pre-programmed to like or otherwise have a predisposition to like or value certain things from an early age.

My idea is that the things valued non-materialistically are rather vague and well, metaphysical. Although great works of art presuppose certain things to be of value or to be held in esteem, they are otherwise quite useless as things that help us survive, or perhaps? — Question

It is my understanding that there is a hardwired capacity for learning language built into human nature. The structures and grammars of all the human languages represent manifestations of that capacity. The next question I would ask is not "yeah, but how does that explain the works of Shakespeare?"

At any rate, I'd clarify this: "Nihilism trumps value by asserting that everything has equal value" so that it reads "Nihilism trumps value by asserting that everything has equal objective value." — Terrapin Station

Subjective doesn't refer to anything like "not hard-wired." If it's something the brain is doing as mentality, it's subjective, whether that's "hard-wired" or only winds up being wired via development, including environmental influences, etc. — Terrapin Station

I don't quite get the second quoted text. Are you say that to have a mentality is not subjective? If so, then yes, I would agree that in that aspect of human nature there is some objectivity in having certain beliefs about the world. Although, a can of worms opens up in assessing if the beliefs are in accordance with reality as to not make the term 'objective' indeterminate and not distinct from 'subjective', which is a tough thing to assess and validate if not by the scientific method.

I guess that should suffice to answer the ambiguity.

They [nihilists] not saying that there's no value, period, because they belive there is subjective value. — Terrapin Station

Hmm, that's interesting. Though, I am sure you see the paradox in taking that stance?

I'm the opposite, though. I like virtue ethics, because that seems to be how people are: we value clusters of attributes or characteristics - virtues - and we disvalue other clusters - vices. Ethical judgment involves weighing them in any given situation, in a shared society. The shared society has many shared values, or it wouldn't function as well as it does. — mcdoodle

I have long been interested in virtue ethics; but, I had my issues with it. Let me present the case with the near perfect ethical theory made by Rawls, called Justice as Fairness, in which he invokes the veil of ignorance to resolve ethical dilemmas, this (the veil of ignorance) is the golden rule manifest. Now, I assume you have some knowledge about his 'veil of ignorance'. To be quite honest, there is no need for virtue ethics to come along and save an ethical situation. One needs only have a semblance of egoism and desire to be treated just the same as any other person in some ethical dilemma. Now, where is the need for virtue ethics? There is none because everyone wants to be treated fairly unless there's a pathological issue with said individual.

I hope I presented the issue somewhat clearly?

People who believe in an 'ism' usually find it hard, in my experience, to laugh at mockery of their ism because they don't see the absurd side of it. — mcdoodle

Well, with nihilism there is the negation of the very 'ism in it, subjectively and objectively. Does that make things redundant to human wants, preferences, and needs? I'm not entirely sure; but, to some extent, yes.

I don't quite get the second quoted text. — Question

In other words, T Clark pointing out that something is hard-wired has no impact on whether it's subjective rather than objective.

Hmm, that's interesting. Though, I am sure you see the paradox in taking that stance? — Question

There's no paradox there, so no, I have no idea what you'd believe is the paradox.

I honestly don't even know what we're arguing over. Is it the subjective, objective, or something in between?

Rawls, called Justice as Fairness — Question

I think Rawls and virtue ethics are two very different tracks and I don't go down the Rawls track for many reasons which would take another thread. But the key issue about value is that Rawls seems to answer the question you were posing in your OP. You just have to value 'fairness' and 'social justice', get back to the original position, draw the veil of ignorance and everything falls into place, on Rawls's account. How does your agreement with Rawls square with your search for an account of 'value'?

A leftie like me has common ground with many people to the right of the quintessentially liberal Rawlsian account. I'm not a liberal, I'm a socialist (though in 'virtue ethics' the two may find plenty of common ground). Only the other day someone in the Shoutbox was quoting the phrase 'social justice tribunals' derisively: the very terms Rawls uses as anchors are contested. Nor - to my mind - is 'social contract' the right basis for an ethics of the polis. I'm not a contractarian. The very notion of a contract is likewise contestable.

So...I go back to the subtler, in my view, account of ethics that comes from virtue, contextualised by socio-political understanding.

I'm agreeing with you for the most part. (It's important to not think that someone is arguing with you just because they're replying in an analytic way.)

At this point I'm just curious what you feel is a paradox with "Nihilists are not saying that there's no value, period, because they believe there is subjective value."

How about truth/falsity. If something is true isn't that a value judgement, is it objective or subjective? Don't truths about the world like scientific truths, claim a natural/intrinsic objectivity, an objectivity that does not depend on our existence. Human truth/falsity is about us as living beings collectively or singly, shouldn't we ask if they also can be categorized as objective or subjective? So then objective human truths are not possible, in the same sense as truth/falsity claimed regarding the world. I suppose that human truths involve what must apply to man qua man, that this type of truth/falsity involves universality, which is as objective as human truths can get, that universality is not the same as objectivity in humans.

Equal gender rights, the right to practice religion freely, speak freely...et al may have universal validity, but many cultures curtail these rights, and the relativist might say that each of these rights are only applicable relative to each specific culture. But I think it can be held that these rights are universal for man, and that their truth or falsity must be supported, not culturally/relativistically but rather universally as part of what it means to be able to flourish as a human in the world.

How about truth/falsity. If something is true isn't that a value judgement, is it objective or subjective? — Cavacava

"Value judgments" usually denotes good/bad, right/wrong, worthwhile/waste-of-time, beautiful/ugly etc. etc. -type judgments, not true or false.

Objective/subjective has an ontological component (in fact I'd say it's only ontological). It's about where something occurs. Does it occur in minds (which I'd say are brains functioning in particular ways), or does it occur external to minds?

"Value judgments" usually denotes good/bad, right/wrong, worthwhile/waste-of-time, beautiful/ugly etc. etc. -type judgments, not true or false.

So are you saying that truth/falsity are not judgements but statements of fact (or not), that their content does not contain any value claims. If someone tells me it is raining and I say it is not raining we are claiming mutually exclusive facts. Don't we normally ask who's right and who's wrong, which amounts to the same thing as asking which statement is true and which is false, in asking this aren't we asking how we are to value these statements.

In other words, T Clark pointing out that something is hard-wired has no impact on whether it's subjective rather than objective. — Terrapin Station

I agree that value is subjective. And re T Clark's comment, for example, that doesn't make valuation not subjective. Subjective doesn't refer to anything like "not hard-wired." If it's something the brain is doing as mentality, it's subjective, whether that's "hard-wired" or only winds up being wired via development, including environmental influences, etc. — Terrapin Station

I agree with Terrapin Station - saying something is hardwired says nothing about whether or not it is subjective.

So are you saying that truth/falsity are not judgements but statements of fact (or not), that their content does not contain any value claims. — Cavacava

No, I'm not saying that. It's just that "value judgments" traditionally only refers to opinions re morals, aesthetics, tastes, preferences and the like in the vein of good/bad and so on.

It's confusing perhaps because true and false are considered truth-value, and I'd agree that one is making a judgment (about propositions) one one assigns truth-value.

I make a strong distinction between truth and facts.

Are you two related, x) @Terrapin Station & @T Clark?

It seems to me that the only things in life worth valuing are biological. Therefore, can anything be said about the abstract? Should we just do as the philosophers tell us and cherish what we have and all the amenities that we enjoy?

Objective/subjective has an ontological component (in fact I'd say it's only ontological). It's about where something occurs. Does it occur in minds (which I'd say are brains functioning in particular ways), or does it occur external to minds?

I don't think we separate ourselves from the world, until we become aware of our self. It is only upon attainment of self consciousness that a child begins to separate itself from the world, the child's experiences becomes mediated as its unity of apprehension (the ego) forms . The ego which is capable of taking the world and itself as something aside from itself, as an object, and in doing this the child loses its immediate connection, and its intimacy with its experiences is lost. So no, I don't think there is an ontological locational component in the subject/object relationship. We are entities in a world, and we make this shit up.

I think "brains functioning in particular ways" is an impoverished concept. n.b., I am not saying it's wrong, it's just not up to the task in my opinion.

Do you believe that we have minds?