Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics. — Banno

You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. — ucarr

That does not follow.

From this we understand language is an integral component of physics, and thus our thoughts possess materiality no less than the mountains and rivers surrounding us. Experimental results showing inescapable entanglement of observer and observed, with macro-scale dimensions of super-atomic universe stabilizing super-position of the wave function into discreteness, confirm the interweave. This is simultaneously confirmation of Logos in the Neo-Platonic and Christian senses. Thus the miracles of Jesus, sinless practitioner of Logos, are scientifically verifiable phenomena. — ucarr

Nor this.

Your response seems disingenuous. On the one hand you claim that Planck units are "fictitious" and then on the other you claim that "falsity often works well". :roll:

By way of summary of what I have said:

Some of what is called metaphysics is just nonsense.
Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics.
Some of what is called metaphysics has been clearly defined, by Popper, Watkins, etc, according to it's logical structure.
So, some of what has been called metaphysics is legitimate, some not. — Banno

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

↪ucarr

Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics?
— ucarr

This is like asking if physics masquerades as linguistic conceptualization, or if linguistic conceptualization shares fundamentals with physics. Of course, the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. — ucarr

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the first section above, you say "Some of what is called metaphysics..." implying this "some" can have a legitimate label other than "metaphysics." As an alternate, legitimate label, I say "physics." It's logical for me to say this because, in your statement, you claim this "some" is integral to physics.

in·te·gral | ˈin(t)əɡrəl, inˈteɡrəl |
adjective
1 necessary to make a whole complete; essential or fundamental: games are an integral part of the school's curriculum | systematic training should be integral to library management.
The Apple Dictionary

If a is essential to b, then a is of the essence of b.

es·sence | ˈesəns |
noun
the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, especially something abstract, that determines its character: conflict is the essence of drama.
• Philosophy a property or group of properties of something without which it would not exist or be what it is.
The Apple Dictionary

As "essence" is defined above, we see that if a is of the essence of b, then a is of the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of b. This is another way of saying a and b are one. In making your claim above, you are equating some of metaphysics with physics. It follows from here that therefore, Kant and/or other metaphysicians, when making claims essential to physics, and thus identical to physics, are no less physicists than Einstein, an indisputable physicist.

Show me where my above logic is flawed.

In section two above, Joshs claims

these [metaphysics_physics] are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. — Joshs

And he also claims

There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

We see from the above that Joshs links metaphysics_physics as cofunctions, with the additional detail that metaphysics is a pre-condition of physics. This conjunction of co-functionality and causality intuitively feels to me messy and wrong. Also, the temporal element of causality placing metaphysics prior in time to physics I think contradicted by empirical experience.

You can't cogitate the metaphysics of a material object prior to its existence because material objects cannot be cogitated - which to say, cannot be rationalized - into being. The existence of material objects is always axiomatic. No existence of any kind has ever been rendered such (extant) via reasoning.

This leads me to the following difficult conceptualization: all of existence is physical, and yet the metaphysical is integral to this physicality. I proceed forth from this puzzle by claiming metaphysics_physics are coordinate and contemporary with each other. Furthermore, metaphysics_physics are both independently and mutually non-reductive. Lastly, all of the preceding suggests to me our universe is an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices.

You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. From this we understand language is an integral component of physics, and thus our thoughts possess materiality no less than the mountains and rivers surrounding us. Experimental results showing inescapable entanglement of observer and observed, with macro-scale dimensions of super-atomic universe stabilizing super-position of the wave function into discreteness, confirm the interweave. This is simultaneously confirmation of Logos in the Neo-Platonic and Christian senses. Thus the miracles of Jesus, sinless practitioner of Logos, are scientifically verifiable phenomena. — ucarr

Nor this [Nor does the above follow logically]. — Banno

In counter-narrating the claims of Joshs, I assert the physicality of language (and therefore the physicality of metaphysics). As examples of the physics of language, I cite the Pentatuch (Genesis) and the miracles of Jesus.

Show me where my logic is flawed.

↪Metaphysician Undercover Your response seems disingenuous. On the one hand you claim that Planck units are "fictitious" and then on the other you claim that "falsity often works well". :roll: — 180 Proof

Amen!



I think the characterization of your latest post by 180 Proof is spot on.

I strongly suspect process philosophy, as expressed in its claims, is much more nuanced than your present language communicates.

Over time I think you should re-read process philosophy with an aim to achieving a closer and deeper reading of the material. At present your interpretations are simplistic and your defensive counter-narratives broadsides that don’t do justice to the ideas.

It's logical for me to say this — ucarr

"Some metaphysics is integral to physics. This is metaphysics. Therefore this is integral to physics".

I don't think so.

I assert the physicality of language — ucarr

Type/token.

You can't cogitate the metaphysics of a material object prior to its existence because material objects cannot be cogitated - which to say, cannot be rationalized - into being — ucarr

What if we were to think of metaphysics as a necessary, always present network of presuppositions and expectations that allows objects in our world to appear as what they seem to be to us? For instance, perceptual psychologists know that when we recognize physical objects through vision, sound or touch, the stimuli we are actually exposed to is very minimal. We fill in the rest from memory in the form of expectations. What we bring to a material object like an apple to a complex perceptual-motor schema based on a numerous previous encounters with it and other objects in our world. This schema includes expectations concerning how the visual image of the apple will change when we move our head or eyes or body in a certain way, it includes our expectation that the object has dimensions and if we walk around it wee will see the side or back of it. It includes expectations of how it will feel when we lift it up , or how it will sound. None of these attributes are immediately present to us in the object. In fact, what is immediately present is only a flowingly changing series of perspectival data, not a unified material object. The material object is a construction that we impose on the experience, an ongoing hypothesis that the series of perspectival bits amounts to a unified thing, as well as how this assumed object will respond when we interact with it in various ways. This perceptual schema is a kind of mini-metaphysics, linked to more encompassing schemes of understanding concerning the nature of the world within which the apple appears to us and its relation to our minds and bodies.

This leads me to the following difficult conceptualization: all of existence is physical, and yet the metaphysical is integral to this physicality. I proceed forth from this puzzle by claiming metaphysics_physics are coordinate and contemporary with each other. Furthermore, metaphysics_physics are both independently and mutually non-reductive. Lastly, all of the preceding suggests to me our universe is an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices. — ucarr

If this is the case, what does this contribute to your understanding of the world and models of reality?

You are again addressing the issue in terms of metaphysical worldviews rather than, as I specifically asked for, metaphysical concepts. So as to try to be on the same page, metaphysical concepts include those of ontology - which is what you so far are strictly focused on - but also very much include those of identity and change, space and time, causation, and necessity and possibility. A reference for this is the non-exotic, standard fare, Wikipedia page on metaphysics.

Asking the same question I previously asked in greater detail: How can one justify physicality in manners that make no use of identity or change, space or time, causation, and necessity or possibility? All these being subjects of metaphysics and most of these not being topics of investigation in physics.

Notice I specifically said:

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts?

... rather than "metaphysical worldviews". And I know that in my many posts in this thread I've repeatedly made explicit mention of identity and causation as metaphysical concepts requisite for the study of physics.

A foundational plank in the edifice of my concept of ontology says, "Material objects cannot be justified." — ucarr

This is clearly not the case. One noteworthy example to refute the affirmation is that of materialism as metaphysical worldview, i.e. as ontology. But then the same can also be said for non-physicalist ontologies such as Peirce's objective idealism, which also justifies the reality of material objects. ... Unless one assumes that ("true") justification produces infallible results, which I for one don't find in any way warranted.

If

"Some metaphysics is integral to physics. This is metaphysics. Therefore this is integral to physics". — Banno

gets modified to

"Some metaphysics is integral to physics. This is metaphysics $\leftrightarrow$physics. Therefore, metaphysics = physics for $\sum_{i=mp}^{i=p}$". — ucarr

You have a statement that correctly interprets my verbal claim, however

A$\leftrightarrow$[AAA…] ∦ ∫$\leftrightarrow$$\sum_{i=mp}^{i=p}$

so your refutation fails because of irrelevance.

I assert the physicality of language
— ucarr
Type/token. — Banno

Language, although iconic, is not abstract. Likewise thought.

That right there is some mad shit. That ends this chat.

Your argument is predicated upon an inter-relationship between external stimuli/internal processing. If newborns could survive in sensory deprivation chambers (they can't) no suppositions (verifiable in behavior), pre or post would evolve internally*. I presently see no way to uncouple (or semi-uncouple) metaphysics from physics.

*Let's say some infantile suppositions do evolve within. I argue the source of such suppositions is still external i.e. the intra-mural particulars of the deprivation chamber communicated to the infants senses.

Your response seems disingenuous. On the one hand you claim that Planck units are "fictitious" and then on the other you claim that "falsity often works well". :roll: — 180 Proof

You think I'm disingenuous, then you must actually believe that falsity may work well, and you are guarding yourself against it. In reality falsity works very well, far more often than it ought to. That's why there's such a thing as deception.

There's obviously no logic which allows you to proceed from "it works well", to "therefore it's true". Mathematics, which works well as a tool, is categorically separated from propositions which state truths. So, as any mathematician will tell you, their axioms are neither true nor false. Therefore by introducing "it works well" as evidence of truth you have simply demonstrated a category mistake.

*Let's say some infantile suppositions do evolve within. I argue the source of such suppositions is still external i.e. the intra-mural particulars of the deprivation chamber communicated to the infants senses. — ucarr

I didn’t mean to leave the impression that I thought a metaphysical framework is generated ‘in the head’ before and outside of exposure to an outside world. On the contrary, every moment of experience is an interaction with an outside. The self , and all its contents of belief, are modified in some small fashion in their identity each moment through this exposure. So inside and outside, subject and object, are not two separate realms, they are only poles of an indissociable interaction. Through this interactive experiencing we construct and evolve schemes of understanding and predicting ( metaphysics) the behavior of aspects of our world. In sum, metaphysics isnt in the head, it is in patterns of schemes of interaction with the world.

My point is that in making this argument, we are a long way away from the empirical objects that are talked about in physics and chemistry. Using the physical object as the starting point for our understanding of the self-world interaction is getting it backwards, because we are starting with a sophisticated metaphysical scheme without recognizing that modern concepts of the physical object are the products of a long constitutive development , the evolution from one metaphysical scheme to the next( scientific paradigms) that involves the communication among many subjective perspectives within an intersubjective scientific community.

...to me our universe is an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices.
— ucarr

If this is the case, what does this contribute to your understanding of the world and models of reality? — Tom Storm

ma·trix | ˈmātriks |
noun (plural matrices | ˈmātrəˌsēz | or matrixes)
1 an environment or material in which something develops; a surrounding medium or structure: free choices become the matrix of human life.

In my Apple Dictionary I have an animated graphic most instructive. It starts with a black dot (point) that expands to a line that expands to an area that expands to a cube that expands to a hypercube.

This exemplifies "an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices."

This is my view of the ultimate medium, reality.

Making things interesting is the fact the world is full of Hemingway knockoffs who keep telling me most ideas beyond beer, dames, sports and money are twaddle spewed by idlers who need to get real jobs. You can however get exemption from assignment to the woo woo chorus by scoring a career that pays living wages for commercially viable twaddle (academics/entertainment).

I didn’t mean to leave the impression that I thought a metaphysical framework is generated ‘in the head’ before and outside of exposure to an outside world. — Joshs

...subject and object, are not two separate realms, they are only poles of an indissociable interaction. — Joshs

Through this interactive experiencing we construct and evolve schemes of understanding and predicting ( metaphysics) — Joshs

Using the physical object as the starting point for our understanding of the self-world interaction is getting it backwards, — Joshs

In your first three statements quoted above, you acknowledge the physics_metaphysics relationship as being a kind of mobius strip of "indissociable interaction."

In your fourth statement quoted above, you jump to a linear-time conceptualization of the physics_metaphysics relationship. You ascribe to me an erroneous sequencing that makes physics prior to metaphysics (and thus falsely causal) while implying with "backwards" that the correct sequencing makes metaphysics prior to physics (and thus correctly causal).

...because we are starting with a sophisticated metaphysical scheme without recognizing that modern concepts of the physical object are the products of a long constitutive development , the evolution from one metaphysical scheme to the next( scientific paradigms) that involves the communication among many subjective perspectives within an intersubjective scientific community. — Joshs

In your fifth statement quoted above, you proceed to an argument that buttresses metaphysics as the cause of physics by stating that "modern concepts of the physical object are the products of a long constitutive [cerebral] development..."

Your statements, considered as evidence, suggest deep internal conflict within your mind. You know cerebration is indissociable from experience, and yet, when push comes to shove, according to your heart's desire, you must assert that metaphysics is both temporally and logically antecedent to physics.

You go all the way to implying humans cannot perceive physical objects but through the lens of humanity's collective conceptualization (over time) of physical objects.

We're wrestling with a gnarly interweave. This interweave is a complex nexus of bi-conditional syntheses_analyses. Both poles are foundational to sentient life. Their dance together, a swirling dervish, creates a dynamism of yin-yang conflict, the soul of great debates.

In ascribing to me a false linearity with physics in the front position, you mis-read me. I've been saying for some time now, "physics_metaphysics are coordinates and contemporaries."

What's hard to do is talk about physics_metaphysics in a way that removes temporal and logical sequencing from their inter-relationship. This difficulty here in the west is partly do to the influence of our classical culture, scientific and religious, that tends to elevate the value of cognition (especially abstractions) above the value of the physical. Removing TLS (Temporal Logical Sequencing) places the poles onto level ground qualitatively, and that's hard to do because it bucks twenty centuries of bias.

Your statements, considered as evidence, suggest deep internal conflict within your mind. You know cerebration is indissociable from experience, and yet, when push comes to shove, according to your heart's desire, you must assert that metaphysics is both temporally and logically antecedent to physics. — ucarr

Why not look at physics as a particular invention of modern science dating back to the 17th century? Aristotle introduced a physics but it was very different from modern physics. Prior to the Greeks, many cultures had their own versions of what we call ‘physics’. So the development I described as leading up to modern physics is a historical sequence of changing theories concerning the nature of objects. When I say that metaphysics is prior to modern physics I just mean that theorization is ‘prior’ to any particular historical content of a theory. Put differently, what all kinds of theories of objects have in common is that they are all theories, even though only one of them represents modern physics. In another few hundred years we may be using a theory of the real world that no long calls itself physics and no longer deals with what we today think of as material objects. So ‘physics’ and ‘material object’ may be historically transient concepts , but theory and metaphysics, like self-world interaction, are common to all eras of scientific inquiry. Metaphysics is not prior to the self-world interaction, but it is prior to ( the condition of possibility for) modern physics.

Strawman. I have not made any claims about truth-values, but you have. I took issue with your claim that Planck units are "fictitious"; I claim instead that they are approximative (precision metrics). Rulers – measurements – are not truth-bearers, that's your misunderstanding, MU. You conflate, or confuse, epistemology with ontology, typical idealist / platonist mistake (i.e. reification fallacy).

You are again addressing the issue in terms of metaphysical worldviews rather than, as I specifically asked for, metaphysical concepts. — javra

Metaphysical concept Vs. Metaphysical worldview > Is the difference that concept is an abstract idea whereas worldview is an abstract idea in application to the real world and thus contextualized empirically?

I believe the main function of metaphysics is taking abstract concepts and contextualizing them empirically. Its job is to show how ideas operate in our everyday lives.

It is the job of science to discover abstract descriptions of the world via experimentation. Einstein does this with Relativity.

It is the job of metaphysics to normalize empirically those descriptions of the world that are abstract, thus making them pictures of the everyday world. Heidegger does this with ontology.

Asking the same question I previously asked in greater detail: How can one justify physicality in manners that make no use of identity or change, space or time, causation, and necessity or possibility? All these being subjects of metaphysics and most of these not being topics of investigation in physics. — javra

If I make one substitution to your above statement to the following effect "How can one contextualize physicality in manners that... and necessity or possibility?" then I get a statement that leads directly into> metaphysics normalizes empirically those descriptions of the world that are abstract i.e. "identity or change, space or time, causation, and necessity or possibility."

Normalize means herein to place into an operational environment. For an example consider that Spacetime, as an abstract concept, actually is grounded in a string of neural networks communicating via modulated electric currents. From this cerebral ground, the metaphysician talks about how it is that a ball rolls downhill and comes to rest there. She then goes on to talk about how humans, living within a gravitational universe, must strive, via sweat and brow, to conform to a moral imperative that mandates a vigorous work ethic that, at bottom, is counterforce sustained against a world of resistance. The scientist discovers the math narrative of spacetime. The metaphysician narrates the moral compass described by the the curve of spacetime in humans' everyday world.

Indeed, metaphysics is morally grounded.

As far as how to justify physicality (in a way that makes use of identity or change, space or time, causation, and necessity or possibility), abstractions such as those listed here become indirect objects "affected" by justification of a string of neural networks communicating via modulated electric currents i.e. by justification of abstract concepts within one's head.

When the metaphysician tells me I must work hard and strive to achieve worthy goals, she's dialoguing with her concept of spacetime, an abstract concept neurally grounded within her head. That is what she justifies. She makes no direct justification of a ball rolling downhill.

Metaphysical concept Vs. Metaphysical worldview > Is the difference that concept is an abstract idea whereas worldview is an abstract idea in application to the real world and thus contextualized empirically? — ucarr

Well, the metaphysical ideas of identity and causality, for instance, are themselves abstracted from experience, and most (if not all) of these abstracted ideas of metaphysics are in application to the "real world" as we best interpret it.

As to the issue of normalization, I merely intended to evidence that there cannot be concepts in physics without a preestablished foundation of metaphysical concepts. Whereas the contrary is not true: one can work with metaphysical concepts abstracted from experience - however tacitly they might be held - without in any way entertaining concepts in physics: for one example, via a good measure of trial and error, a toddler will actively learn and apply metaphysical concepts such as those of identity/change and causation - this non-linguistically - without making use of concepts pertaining to physics, be it Newtonian physics or that of relativity.

That said, I in general do agree with the notion of normalization as your present it, which, if I’m not mistaking your position, can be express as follows: metaphysical worldviews ought to account for all the data which humans have accumulated in the span of our history.

I would only add the understanding that our so far established inferences from said data do not equate with the data itself - hence making possible paradigm shifts (taking the form of novel metaphysical understandings) that better account for today’s data than today's inferences (paradigms) do.

ma·trix | ˈmātriks |
noun (plural matrices | ˈmātrəˌsēz | or matrixes)
1 an environment or material in which something develops; a surrounding medium or structure: free choices become the matrix of human life.

In my Apple Dictionary I have an animated graphic most instructive. It starts with a black dot (point) that expands to a line that expands to an area that expands to a cube that expands to a hypercube.

This exemplifies "an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices."

This is my view of the ultimate medium, reality. — ucarr

Not sure I follow. Are you saying that the possibilities for a human life are immeasurably fecund and the most authentic life is one of continual learning and reinvention?

Making things interesting is the fact the world is full of Hemingway knockoffs who keep telling me most ideas beyond beer, dames, sports and money are twaddle spewed by idlers who need to get real jobs. You can however get exemption from assignment to the woo woo chorus by scoring a career that pays living wages for commercially viable twaddle (academics/entertainment). — ucarr

This I do partly understand. Sounds like something a resentful man might say about their need to feel superior to others. I'm sure that can't be you. Personally I think dames and money sound a lot more fun than metaphysics and science (beer and sports I have no use for).

What do you think of @joshs interesting point:

Put differently, what all kinds of theories of objects have in common is that they are all theories, even though only one of them represents modern physics. In another few hundred years we may be using a theory of the real world that no long calls itself physics and no longer deals with what we today think of as material objects. So ‘physics’ and ‘material object’ may be historically transient concepts , but theory and metaphysics, like self-world interaction, are common to all eras of scientific inquiry. Metaphysics is not prior to the self-world interaction, but it is prior to ( the condition of possibility for) modern physics. — Joshs

:up:

When I say that metaphysics is prior to modern physics I just mean that theorization is ‘prior’ to any particular historical content of a theory. — Joshs

Let's focus on the difference between historical priority and categorical priority.

With the former, we have a linear sequence of ordinal positions. As the sequence grows it increases the number of positions prior to latter positions. If this ordinal sequence expands along a temporal axis, then we have an expansion of historical priors. A latter position may or may not inhabit a causal relationship as a derivative of a prior. Thus a prior position and a latter position might be logically equal, with a relationship devoid of the attribute of derivation. Their respective dates of temporal occurrence have no bearing upon their logical equality.

With the latter, we have an analytical sequence of logical positions. As the sequence grows it increases the number of derivatives with prior causes. Each latter position inhabits a causal relationship as a derivative of a prior.

With categorical priority, the temporal axis of dates of occurrence of positions is excluded. This means that a position temporally latter can be logically prior to a position that predates it. Thus a scientist of antiquity who, after observing a stone roll downhill numerous times, declares that space is a neutral expanse inside of which a tug of war rages between a little stone (the one rolling down the hill) and a big stone (earth at the bottom of the hill), makes a statement derivative of Einstein's Relativity. This notwithstanding the scientist of antiquity working twenty centuries before Einstein.

This is so because the ancient theory, having no concept of light speed velocities, comprises a volume of truth content derivative of Relativity, a concept comprising a volume of truth content containing both everyday and light velocities.

My position rejects the categorical priority of metaphysics WRT physics, modern or otherwise.

Metaphysics is not prior to the self-world interaction, but it is prior to ( the condition of possibility for) modern physics. — Joshs

With your statement above, do you reject the categorical priority of metaphysics WRT physics, modern or otherwise?

I ask this because saying "Metaphysics is prior to the condition of possibility for modern physics." is far from saying "Metaphysics is only temporally prior to modern physics."

With the former, you leave in the proviso that "a sequence of necessary metaphysical concepts predates their culmination in modern physics."

Well, the metaphysical ideas of identity and causality, for instance, are themselves abstracted from experience, and most (if not all) of these abstracted ideas of metaphysics are in application to the "real world" as we best interpret it. — javra

You, like Joshs, acknowledge the person-world interaction (PWI) as the starting point for cognition. IOW (In other words), PWI is the ground of cognition. I'm struggling to see how metaphysics jumps to the top of the logical flow chart WRT (With respect to) translation of PWI into awareness_analysis_understanding.

As to the issue of normalization, I merely intended to evidence that there cannot be concepts in physics without a preestablished foundation of metaphysical concepts. — javra

...one can work with metaphysical concepts abstracted from experience - however tacitly they might be held - without in any way entertaining concepts in physics... — javra

With the above two statements you begin to claim metaphysics is the first category of learning done by humans. The suggestion is that metaphysics is cognitive scaffolding for logical structuring of data from scholarship across the spectrum of academic disciplines.

a toddler will actively learn and apply metaphysical concepts such as those of identity/change and causation - this non-linguistically - without making use of concepts pertaining to physics, be it Newtonian physics or that of relativity. — javra

Also, humans first learn metaphysically from informal empirical experience, such as that of a child learning causation after touching a hot stove.

In my view your examples show categorical learning across the spectrum of academic disciplines occurring simultaneously with generalized logical organization of over-arching, multi-discipline concepts. I'm wondering if you and Joshs are crediting the broad reach of metaphysics that over-arches the spectrum of disciplines and empirical experiences with the additional merit of logical priority to said without warrant.

The crux of our disagreement might be your view: placing metaphysics logically first, conflicting with my view, placing metaphysics_physics logically simultaneous. (Note - In the preceding sentence, "physics" is a special usage gathering the spectrum of academic disciplines and empirical experiences under the rubric "physics.")

Generalization of logical data organization to a multi-disciplinary scope of inclusion does not necessarily grant such expanded scope logical priority to the disciplines included.

On the contrary, exploration within the separate disciplines generates discipline-specific data which is then subsequently generalized to a scope of application perhaps characterizable as metaphysics.

I accept top placement of metaphysics on a flow chart tracking scope of inclusion.

I don’t accept top placement of metaphysics on a flow chart tracking logical priority.

I think you and Joshs, in your conceptualization of metaphysics, are conflating scope of inclusion with logical priority.

In my Apple Dictionary I have an animated graphic most instructive. It starts with a black dot (point) that expands to a line that expands to an area that expands to a cube that expands to a hypercube.

This exemplifies "an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices."

This is my view of the ultimate medium, reality.
— ucarr

Not sure I follow. Are you saying that the possibilities for a human life are immeasurably fecund and the most authentic life is one of continual learning and reinvention? — Tom Storm

You and I live in a reality that has three spatial dimensions expanded + spacetime. Time and motion are a part of everything we do in our lives.

I'm saying our universe, as evidenced by QM and string theory, includes expanded spatial dimensions additional to the four mentioned above. Newly discoverable types of time and motion are available for our enrichment. In saying this, I'm answering your earlier response to something I said (both quoted below).

This leads me to the following difficult conceptualization: all of existence is physical, and yet the metaphysical is integral to this physicality. I proceed forth from this puzzle by claiming metaphysics_physics are coordinate and contemporary with each other. Furthermore, metaphysics_physics are both independently and mutually non-reductive. Lastly, all of the preceding suggests to me our universe is an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices.
— ucarr

If this is the case, what does this contribute to your understanding of the world and models of reality? — Tom Storm

I accept top placement of metaphysics on a flow chart tracking scope of inclusion.

I don’t accept top placement of metaphysics on a flow chart tracking logical priority.

I think you and Joshs, in your conceptualization of metaphysics, are conflating scope of inclusion with logical priority. — ucarr

Speaking for myself, while I can respect your view, I’m still very much inclined to that of logical priority. I can't envision anything being inferred about the physical world in the absence of, again, identity/change and causality. Whereas, as previously noted, from my pov ideas of identity/change and causality can be entertained and made use of in the absence of inferences regarding the physical world.

Generalization of logical data organization to a multi-disciplinary scope of inclusion does not necessarily grant such expanded scope logical priority to the disciplines included. — ucarr

To be clear, I'm not affirming that one must first be a metaphysician (a philosopher specializing in the study of metaphysical concepts) in order to then be a physicist - or anything similar. I'm only suggesting that physics, or even the notion of physicality as we adults know of it, is impossible without first holding some estimate of what identity and causality are - these being metaphysical concepts. Again, such that a baby will need to first make some inference of what identity and causality are prior to having any possibility of making inferences regarding what is and is not physical.

The crux of our disagreement might be your view: placing metaphysics logically first, conflicting with my view, placing metaphysics_physics logically simultaneous. — ucarr

So its said, I agree with this assessment.

Yet, for my part, I'm OK with agreeing to disagree on what I find to be a relatively minor difference.

I'm only suggesting that physics, or even the notion of physicality as we adults know of it, is impossible without first holding some estimate of what identity and causality are - these being metaphysical concepts. — javra

This seems overstated. There's a difference between 'working assumptions' and well-defined, or determinate, 'concepts'. Belonging to the world to begin with, we study and intervene in the world by relying on working assumptions (heuristics) e.g. "identity", "causality", "physicality" long before we (have need to) reflect on them as categorical properties of the world (re: metaphysics), thus, ta meta ta physika, or "the book after the book on nature".

I'm saying our universe, as evidenced by QM and string theory, includes expanded spatial dimensions additional to the four mentioned above. Newly discoverable types of time and motion are available for our enrichment. In saying this, I'm answering your earlier response to something I said (both quoted below). — ucarr

Thanks for clarifying.

Premise – {a,b,c} ⇚⇛ a,b,c

Set abc leads to a,b,c as independent members of itself and independent members a,b,c independently and respectively lead to set abc.

Argument

Set abc includes members biology, chemistry, physics. These disciplines are grounded upon general concepts of set abc and are thus members of set abc.

The particulars of each discipline imply, as generalizations, the general concepts of set abc. This allows us to say a,b,c independently and respectively lead to set abc.

The general concepts of set abc lead to the particular applications a,b,c and vice versa.

This argument therefore supports {a,b,c} ⇚⇛ a,b,c.

Conclusion

The greater scope of inclusion (of a set) does not necessarily logically prioritize this set above its members.

The upshot of the above argument is that the discovery of science and the general conceptualization of metaphysics comprise an oscillation between deduction/induction.

The claim made directly below exemplifies with particulars the oscillation between deduction/induction.

Of course a cutting edge philosopher must have absorbed the most most advanced scientific ideas of their day. This is because those sciences are philosophical positions articulated via the conventionalized vocabulary of science. If they don’t, they will simply be repeating what a science has already articulated. The same. is true of science. If an empirical
researcher in psychology or biology has not assimilated
the most advanced thinking available in philosophy they will simply be reinventing the wheel. — Joshs

There is an open, bi-directional flow between the two poles. For these reasons, I claim that physics_metaphysics are logical contemporaries. Anyone who performs both functions moves between the roles of scientist and metaphysician.

There are some useful distinctions between the two roles.

Science is discovery through direct interaction with the material universe. In the wake of these discoveries, generalizations can be induced as metaphysics.

If a thinker induces generalizations a priori, henceforth oscillating therefrom to the particulars of their application, s/he is first a scientific theoretician and thereafter a scientist.

When a thinker induces generalizations from scientific premises, theories and experimental data, s/he is a metaphysician.