against all evidence — Olivier5

What evidence?

You've resorted to citing yourselves now. Barely a shred of 'evidence' has been presented over the last dozen pages at least, just uninformed opinion.

Cite some of this 'evidence'.

Cite some of this 'evidence'. — Isaac

The Russian retreat from Kherson.

The Russian retreat from Kherson. — Olivier5

And how's that evidence opposing @boethius's position?

What position, exactly?

What position, exactly? — Olivier5

The one you're arguing against, of course. The one you're suggesting 'all evidence' is against. The one which support of, against all this evidence, makes one pro-Russia.

You didn't follow the conversation. All I am saying here is that @Tzeentch has displayed a pro-Russian bias in his interpretations of events on the battlefield, as evidenced by his take on the retreat from Kherson. He cannot imagine (or admit) that the Russians are forced to leave Kherson so he must imagine that there is some mysterious secret peace deal behind it all.

He cannot imagine (or admit) that the Russians are forced to leave Kherson so he must imagine that there is some mysterious secret peace deal behind it all. — Olivier5

Yep. So how is...

The Russian retreat from Kherson. — Olivier5

...evidence that Russia was forced to retreat from Kherson, as opposed to @Tzeentch's theory that they left in preparation for a peace deal?

You're citing the mere fact that they retreated, you've provided no evidence at all of why.

Anders Åslund's suggestion came up earlier, others have been aired — jorndoe

He's literally just called for a start to world war three on a whim

Fucking twat.

He cannot imagine (or admit) that the Russians are forced to leave Kherson — Olivier5

I cannot imagine that Russia would give up Kherson freely, and loudly announce it, since it goes against any principle of two nations being at war.

You have a tendency in misinterpret my posts, and falsely give them a "pro-Russian" twist, so you can then discredit them on the basis of being "pro-Russian" - everything to avoid having to deal with the logic of the argument.

cannot imagine that Russia would give up Kherson freely, — Tzeentch

They didn't. They were forced to give it up.

evidence that Russia was forced to retreat from Kherson, as opposed to Tzeentch's theory that they left in preparation for a peace deal? — Isaac

That's an easy one: there's no evidence of any peace deal, and the Russian general admitted on TV that they couldn't supply the troops on the right bank of the Dniepr and thus had to withdraw. So as far as the evidence goes, the retreat of Kherson was NOT the result of a secret peace deal but the result of months of fighting.

there's no evidence of any peace deal — Olivier5

You said "all evidence" pointed toward some theory the opposite of which would require one to be pro-Russian to believe it. Lack of evidence either way is not "all evidence".

Russian general admitted on TV that they couldn't supply the troops on the right bank of the Dniepr and thus had to withdraw. — Olivier5

Yes. You missed the bit where the theory included Russian collusion.

How could I miss this gem? The Russians are -- against all evidence -- pretending to be forced out of Kherson, all in the service of (secret, of course) diplomacy and peace! That one is a BEAUTY. Mr Putin deserves the Nobel peace prize.

against all evidence — Olivier5

Are we starting again?

What evidence do you have which proves the reasons for the Russian retreat are solely the strength of the Ukrainian advance, and could not be influenced by back door negotiations?

That is not what @Tzeentch is saying though.

They didn't. They were forced to give it up. — frank

Yes, yes. The logistical situation and all that - the common military response would be to reduce the amount of troops occupying Kherson to a managable level without announcement, leaving only tripwire forces and artillery scouts, etc. to make the enemy guess and pay with indirect fires should they advance - urban areas are perfect for that.

Giving up ground for free with loud announcement is not a typical military action, regardless of what position these troops found themselves in, which is why it is likely the town was abandoned under loud announcement for other reasons - a deal potentially, which is given some credit due to Zelensky talking about "the end of the war" shortly after the retreat from Kherson, even though there's no reason to assume that the retreat from Kherson in any way signaled a retreat from the occupied territories.

I hope you'll agree that a complete collapse of the Russian lines is not in the cards any time soon, so why would he be saying this, if there wasn't some deal made?

That is not what Tzeentch is saying though. — Olivier5

Indulge us - what do you think I'm saying? :lol:

The theories don't interest me. Your attitude toward them does.

You're trying to deny a theory by presenting evidence to support an alternate one. It's obviously incoherent (unless the two theories are mutually exclusive), but this tactic has become more and more popular on social media lately.

I'll wait for @Tzeentch to correct me.

Giving up ground for free with loud announcement is not a typical military action, regardless of what position these troops found themselves in, which is why it is likely the town was abandoned under loud announcement for other reasons - a deal potentially, which is given some credit due to Zelensky talking about "the end of the war" shortly after the retreat from Kherson, — Tzeentch

It's just far fetched that the Russians would divest themselves of their assets prior to official negotiations.

I hope you'll agree that a complete collapse of the Russian lines is not in the cards any time soon, so why would he be saying this, if there wasn't some deal made? — Tzeentch

I don't know.

It's just far fetched that the Russians would divest themselves of their assets prior to official negotiations. — frank

Perhaps giving up Kherson, the potential springboard for future offensive operations towards Odessa, was a prerequisite to starting those negotiations.

I don't know. — frank

Well, then we have ourselves a mystery, and all I'm doing is trying to make sense of it, while accounting for those things that seem to make little sense.

I have nothing to correct, and your representation of my view is fair.

I have nothing to correct, and your representation of my view is fair. — Tzeentch

Good, glad I wasn't misrepresenting you too badly. Then @Olivier5's position becomes all the more bizarre. Your view is apparently rendered implausible merely by the existence of an alternative theory. Weird.

what do you think I'm saying? :lol: — Tzeentch

Well, you are not saying that the reasons for the Russian retreat are partly the strength of the Ukrainian advance, but could also be influenced by back door negotiations. Your stance is less half-assed than that. It is that the Russian decision to leave is primarily the result of a peace deal secretly in the making.

The precondition of any agreement is that the parties involved have some reason to pursue an agreement. Having nuclear weapons is not a "pre-condition" for entering that "kind of an agreement".

Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.

What you are saying is both meaningless and false.

The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason. — “boethius

Dude, for the third time, you are mistaken about what I claim. I didn’t write anywhere that nuclear weapons is a “precondition of any agreement”. Means of deterrence available to the US and the Soviet Union (i.e. the nuclear arsenal) during the Cold War were factors rationally taken into as incentives toward solving conflicts through relatively balanced agreements. Since Ukraine can not count on equivalent deterrence means, then Ukraine can not rationally pursue with Russia the kind of agreements that the US could rationally pursue with the Soviet Union. Yet the US/NATO may have a strong rational incentive to weigh in and back up Ukraine at the expense of Russia as long as Russia is perceived as a threat to the West. And by this way some “security guarantees” may be implemented e.g. to replace NATO membership.

This is what Russia wants: Negotiate with the West, the counter-party with the actual leverage (the weapons, the money, the economic sanctions). — boethius

Russia as a declared challenger of the Western-led world order wants to negotiate with the West in position of strength. US/NATO as the challenged power has a strong rational interest to the exact opposite.

Ukraine will not and cannot get any sort of guarantee from the US, or anyone else, in the "sense of certainty". — boethius

Who is talking of “security guarantees” in terms of certainty? You didn’t quote anybody.

Again, if Ukraine signs, their guarantors sign, and then the "guarantors" don't do what they guaranteed, or did it in a bad faith way that is not fit for purpose. Is this a guarantee?

There are two meanings to guarantee commonly used: certainty (I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow) and a promise that is in no way certain (satisfaction guaranteed!). Now, the talk of US nuking Russia or doing something else, if they don't abide by the agreement or reinvade or whatever, if meant as a guarantee in the second sense (a promise that maybe kept, maybe not, the word "guarantee" just being an expression of confidence by a party that could be trying to deceive you), I have no issue. However, if people want to be able to actually visualise how Ukraine could be certain the agreement would be followed, and what the guarantee is in this sense, then we definitely seem to agree that there is no such guarantee.

Now, if such wording is useful diplomatically and adds some prestige reasons as additional motivation for parties to ensure the agreement happens, sure, have at it, add the word guarantee and "guarantor" after every sentence. — boethius

I don’t know who are the people you are referring to. We will see what security guarantees are going to be negotiated/implemented, if needed. From an international relation perspective, I find simply myopic to downplay the fact that States (like Russia and Ukraine) are seeking “security guarantees” just because such “guarantees” are not certain.

is exactly what I'm describing to explain why “guarantee” in such agreements would be ornamental and not representing something actually certain.
I point our your explanation is the same as mine (Ukraine will never get any sort of guarantee from anyone, other than ornamental) ... and then you complain that I'm not using your definition of international law as entirely voluntary? — boethius

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.

Perhaps giving up Kherson, the potential springboard for future offensive operations towards Odessa, was a prerequisite to starting those negotiations. — Tzeentch

You've got Zelensky negotiating from a position of power.

Dude, for the third time, you are mistaken about what I claim. I didn’t write anywhere that nuclear weapons is a “precondition of any agreement”. — neomac

You literally stated nuclear weapons were the precondition for the US and Soviet Union entering various non-proliferation agreements:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Which was your example: "Ukraine doesn't have!" nuclear weapons.

But obviously even in your example nuclear weapons aren't a "pre-condition" (your exact words), because plenty of other non-nuclear states entered the same nuclear non-proliferation treatise.

It's late here, so I'll get to the rest of your comments tomorrow, but ... maybe spend that time to read your own words.

You literally state "this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue".

What was the "pre-condition"? "taking into account the deterrence means they both had".

Which is obviously contradicted by other non-nuclear states doing the same thing, so obviously nuclear weapons isn't a pre-condition for "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue", as other actors pursued the same agreements without having nuclear weapons.

Therefore, in the words of my sweet, innocent legal colleagues: Quod erat demonstrandum!

You've got Zelensky negotiating from a position of power. — frank

Who would be setting the terms has not been made clear in the proposal. If it is in line with the view that Ukraine is merely a proxy for foreign powers, Zelensky will have little to do with the actual deal. If the Ukrainian government does have some agency, despite their reliance upon foreign support, the deal would probably be something worked out between them as an approach to the Russians.

Whatever influence the Ukrainians may have in a conclusion of hostilities, they will need the foreign powers to see that the Russians honor their side of it. The removal of sanctions will probably be based upon demonstrations of good faith.

The idea the Russians conceded territory for the sake of a bargaining position certainly does not fit with any notion of Ukrainian agency. The missile attacks upon civilian targets immediately after the retreat solidify the Ukrainian commitment to further war.

Fierce offensives by the Russians are underway. Something more than some of them being saved from destruction is needed to signal a willingness to negotiate.

You literally state "this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue".

What was the "pre-condition"? "taking into account the deterrence means they both had". — boethius

Right, and I took the case of the US and the Soviet Union both as a way to illustrate this general point, and to compare it to the hypothetical case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia.

Which is obviously contradicted by other non-nuclear states doing the same thing, so obviously nuclear weapons isn't a pre-condition for "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue", as other actors pursued the same agreements without having nuclear weapons. — boethius

You got it all wrong for the forth time despite all the clarifications I already provided to you!
Now I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).
I claimed that available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations. In the particular case of the US and Soviet Union joining the NPT (and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), they were factoring in the deterrence means available to them (i.e. nuclear weapons).
I also claimed that since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).

In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum. — wiki

Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like — neomac

good luck with that!

You've got Zelensky negotiating from a position of power. — frank

What do you mean?

That Zelensky is making demands to start negotiations?

I don't see why that would be anything strange. As many as theorized, there's a good possibility Russia has reached its strategic goals (land access to Crimea) and if that is the case, they are likely looking to end the conflict sooner rather than later. Giving up Kherson may very well be the price.

Giving up Kherson may very well be the price. — Tzeentch

Giving up the land bridge and Dombass would be more likely to work.

No. No one is forced to make agreements.

Even if a party can't possibly win, even then sometimes a party will not surrender and the other party does what they want by force without any agreement at any point about it. — boethius

So you think the Soviet Union would have gone fine on with unlimited weapons armament during the Cold War. One fifth going to defense spending wouldn't be enough? No. And on the other hand the West, which just was putting 5% into defense spending, it wouldn't have been detrimental to brush off any kind of talk of arms reductions and spending on other issues? Usually leadership of a country is rational, at least about it's popularity and survival.

In no way true. There is always the option to keep fighting, even in a hopeless military situation (see: Nazi's sending children to fight) and just having all your positions overrun and your high command captured and / or run away. — boethius

Not only you had a leadership that wanted Gotterdämmerung for Germany and Germans, but also because the Nazi government had no option. Remember Yalta. There was (luckily) the ability for separate peace for Finland, but that option wasn't open for Germany. Something that is a very good choice: if the allies would have stopped at the borders of Germany, it's likely that the Nazi regime would have survived and Germans wouldn't be such pacifists as they are now.

Certainly parties enter agreements because they think it's a good idea, but no one's ever forced to. — boethius

I think that we are just arguing about just when a country needs to do a decision and when not to. I would just emphasize that a country that has started a war has gone to the extreme and doesn't back out of it's decisions for minor inconveniences.