Agency entirely dependent on the weapons of others, isn't agency. And pointing out the influence the US has over this conflict is hardly anti-American, it's realistic. — Benkei

I disagree. Your attitude is Western hubris in short (assuming that Ukrainians wouldn't fight if it wasn't for the West). I think the Ukrainians would fight even if they didn't have the backing of the West. Or in such numbers.

First of all, Ukraine didn't collapse, it fought back. For Putin to succeed, he would have needed the Ukrainians to be as passive as the Czechs were in 1968. They were not. Hence the less than 240 000 or so invading force of Russia simply couldn't take out all of Ukraine and hold it. Likely the fighting would be going around Kiev, perhaps also Kharkov would have fallen and Ukraine wouldn't have made the gains as it did now. Ukrainians wouldn't be holding the initiative as now, that's for sure.

Weapons don't mean anything if there isn't the will to use them. And Ukraine still had a lot of weapons for an European country.

I really don't give a fuck what matters to Ukrainians, why would I? — Isaac

We surely have seen that.

And hence as you cannot comprehend them, your views aren't much worth of discussion. Just gaze at your own navel.

I disagree. Your attitude is Western hubris in short (assuming that Ukrainians wouldn't fight if it wasn't for the West). I think the Ukrainians would fight even if they didn't have the backing of the West. Or in such numbers. — ssu

They might have fought and Ukraine would've been Russian in the first week. You seem to forget western support was there well before the war started.

Impossible. They aren't the Dutch.

(Btw, thanks for the Leopard 2 tanks and the MLRS systems you sold us.)

So it was a Ukrainian missile. Which I'm sure the Ukrainians knew but blamed on the Russians any way. Either Zelensky is optimistic about escalation not really escalating to something I'd rather not think about or that was a hell of a cynical political move.

Après moi, la deluge!

The theories don't interest me. — Isaac

Interesting... Do facts interest you at all?

Either Zelensky is optimistic about escalation not really escalating to something I'd rather not think about or that was a hell of a cynical political move. — Benkei

Or he just genuinely believes that the missile that crashed in Poland was not fired by Ukraine. It's not like the evidence is out there for everyone to see.

Let's assume that's true. On the basis of belief but not evidence, because that's difficult to get by according to you, he thinks it's perfectly fine to follow a political line aimed at escalation? I still think that's cynical, possibly more so because then facts aren't relevant to his position and we should worry that Zelensky will go to significant lengths to ecalate the conflict.

Thanks for the... cash? I guess.

So you think the Soviet Union would have gone fine on with unlimited weapons armament during the Cold War. One fifth going to defense spending wouldn't be enough? No. And on the other hand the West, which just was putting 5% into defense spending, it wouldn't have been detrimental to brush off any kind of talk of arms reductions and spending on other issues? Usually leadership of a country is rational, at least about it's popularity and survival. — ssu

By forced I really mean forced, and not "have really good reasons".

I think the Germans had really good reasons to agree to a surrender anytime before sending literal children to go fight in the front lines, but precisely since they weren't forced to surrender until Berlin was overrun.

Which was exactly my point, you can just not agree to things even if the alternatives are worse.

Not only you had a leadership that wanted Gotterdämmerung for Germany and Germans, but also because the Nazi government had no option. Remember Yalta. There was (luckily) the ability for separate peace for Finland, but that option wasn't open for Germany. Something that is a very good choice: if the allies would have stopped at the borders of Germany, it's likely that the Nazi regime would have survived and Germans wouldn't be such pacifists as they are now. — ssu

Are you really arguing the Nazi's government had no other choice than to send children to fight in the front lines?

Obviously they could have surrendered when the war was clearly lost and the outcome of occupation unavoidable. That's not what they want, but when you can't stop your enemy that's what happens.

I think that we are just arguing about just when a country needs to do a decision and when not to. I would just emphasize that a country that has started a war has gone to the extreme and doesn't back out of it's decisions for minor inconveniences. — ssu

I'm not even sure what we're arguing about.

The others were arguing there are valid preconditions for negotiating (such as "trusting Putin" or NATO will "guarantee" the agreement ahead of time, or Putin must no longer be president of Russia, or Russia pulls all forces out of Ukraine etc.).

Of course, nothing stops a party from throwing down preconditions as a negotiating tactic, but it's absurd to say that is some actual barrier of some kind. Obviously you can always negotiate without preconditions and this is the vast majority of negotiations. Lawyers even have an expression "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed!" and variations on that.

This whole preconditions thing is that whenever Zelensky doesn't want to negotiate, instead of saying he could but he won't, he says there's some reason he can't negotiate or then simply won't negotiate until such-and-such. People can defend such things as "good diplomacy" or that Ukraine will "win" so don't need talks and can just troll the media or whatever, but the disagreement here is people defending these arguments at face value; that there really is reasonable preconditions required for peace talks.

You can always ask for conditions to be met, either as a good faith gesture or then as a way to not-talk, but it's absurd to say you really can't talk due to this or that, unless there's some sort of actual practical barrier; which is obviously almost never the case between states.

Talks of course may not succeed but clearly parties to a dispute can talk if they want and see if there's enough common ground to work out a deal.

The alternative to talks is more warfare. If you don't need a deal, but can get what you want by force, then you don't need talks.

But the contradiction Zelenskyites get into is when they argue Ukraine wants a peace deal but refuses to talk, and not-talking is justified even if they really do want a peace deal.

The only position that coheres with wanting a peace deal is wanting to talk and try to work out a peace deal. The only position that coheres with refusing to talk is not wanting a peace deal that can only be achieved through talks, and therefore more war (which can be a reasonable decision if you believe you will get what you want at the end of more fighting).

Inventing some obstacles to talks, that is obviously not there, is just bad faith and ridiculous to anyone familiar with talking.

"The probability of a Ukrainian military victory — defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they claim as Crimea — the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily," Milley told a news conference at the Pentagon.
https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-military-victory-unlikely-soon-top-us-general-says/6837655.html

Right, and I took the case of the US and the Soviet Union both as a way to illustrate this general point, and to compare it to the hypothetical case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia. — neomac

What general point?

Having nuclear deterrence was not a "pre-condition" to entering non proliferation treatise, as countries with zero nuclear deterrence (including Ukraine) enter the same agreements.

There are lot's of reasons to sign a treaty with another country, but that they are somehow guaranteed to follow the treaty is not one of them.

Presumably an agreement is good for both parties (otherwise why would both parties agree to it?) and the reason to believe the counter party will follow the agreement is whatever reasons for them to be in the agreement in the first place are really there and persisting (at least long enough for it to be worth it for your own goals; for example the non-aggression pact between the Nazi's and the Soviet Union).

However, there is simply no system of "guaranteeing" any party will actually follow any agreement.

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?! — neomac

Please read.

There are two meanings to guarantee: certainty or then purely ornamental expression of confidence that is in no way certain.

If I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow or that we cannot time travel to stop the Ukraine war from happening, I truly believe that is certain and am using guarantee to express certainty. If I say I guarantee you'll have a great time at my party, that is obviously not certain and the word is purely ornamental; the meaning of the phrase "you'll have a great time at my party" doesn't really change if I add guarantee to it or not.

Likewise, if a company promises you something and doesn't deliver, you could sue them. Again, there would be little difference in such promises and their litigation with or without the word guarantee. The argument "aha! I said I would do it in the contract but I didn't guarantee it!" isn't a good legal argument. Words that emphasise but don't change meaning are ornamental in linguistics. Ornaments can still have consequences. For instance, if I say my promise is a "super duper, mega, no doubts, fantastico guarantee" and then don't deliver, judge will for sure not reward me for adding all these arguments to a promise, the basic legal decision would be about what the promise was and if I delivered it and what the liability is in the context. For embellishing my promise a judge may see it suitable to embellish the damages, but the decision would be about what was the promise, that I "super promised" doesn't really matter to the legal decision as such (did I promise, or didn't I, did I deliver or didn't I, was there good reasons for that, or not); a promise is a promise is a promise; adding "I guarantee it" to a promise doesn't change it's ontological or epistemological status.

In relations between states there is the additional problem that there are no judges that decide anything. Everything is "voluntary". So, in such a context, adding "guarantee" is even more ornamental than in private dealings, as you cannot even go to a judge and complain that this asshat not only promised and didn't deliver, but was an arrogant reckless idiot and claimed to be certain about it (so even more reason to not take mitigatory steps).

As I've described, the reason to assume other parties would follow the deal is not some legalistic reasoning that simply doesn't apply in a non-legal context, that the US "guarantees" something.

One maybe more or less confident a deal will be followed, but the evaluation has little to do with any legal wording or obligations (which simply don't exist in international relations).

Let's assume that's true. On the basis of belief but not evidence, because that's difficult to get by according to you, he thinks it's perfectly fine to follow a political line aimed at escalation? I still think that's cynical, possibly more so because then facts aren't relevant to his position and we should worry that Zelensky will go to significant lengths to ecalate the conflict. — Benkei

The fact is that the US and Poland have both said conflicting things within their own nations so there's nothing conclusive at all about this. However, if it was Russia's, then Zelensky knows that it won't lead to an Article 5 consequence, because it's most likely a misfire, but still serious, which would result in an Article 4 event.

Such an outcome would drastically put pressure on Russia and could very well be a pressure point that leads to actual progress with Russia scaling down and retreating. Russia's answer to anyone who tells them to scale back and retreat has so far been a blunt "no" and there's nothing the world can do about it, but if they were responsible for an attack on a Nato nation, Nato could pressure Russia but "play the good guy" and say they won't escalate this if they don't need to, as long as Russia starts complying.

Such a thing could actually lead to real constructive peace talks since so far the problem with anyone suggesting peace talks, to this date, has been that they ignore the fact that Russia's "demands" in such peace talks have been "a total surrender of Ukraine".

It's irrational to think that this is a black-and-white scenario and that if some Russian just took a piss on the wrong side of the Polish border it would lead to Article 5. Maybe the ones thinking Nato is a movie villain warmongering organization believe this but it's not how things are.

What general point? — boethius

Here: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.

Having nuclear deterrence was not a "pre-condition" to entering non proliferation treatise, as countries with zero nuclear deterrence (including Ukraine) enter the same agreements. — boethius

If you think that's what I claimed. You are twice wrong (and for the fifth time!) as I explained here:

I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ).

However, there is simply no system of "guaranteeing" any party will actually follow any agreement. — boethius

You forgot there are two meanings? Are you reading yourself? And neither Russia nor Ukraine would look for the kind of system of "guaranteeing" that you are imagining, of course. They are looking for the "security guarantees" that can be implemented.

There are two meanings to guarantee: certainty or then purely ornamental expression of confidence that is in no way certain. — boethius

Please read.

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?!
Even our legal system grounded on the coercive power of a democratic central government can not make certain that our rights will be protected as it is expected, often it may look pretty darn disappointing at it. Yet I wouldn’t consider our legal system “ornamental”. Even NATO membership doesn’t make sure that everybody will act according to commitments. Yet I wouldn’t consider NATO membership “ornamental” (were this the case NATO enlargement wouldn't have been perceived as an existential threat by Russia, right?!).
“Voluntary” means that there is no apparent coercion, it doesn’t mean “for free” or “at whim”: in the domain of international relations there are explicit/implicit costs/benefits to join/challenge a certain order that rational political agents must take into account to optimise their strategy wrt potential/actual competitors/allies in the global arena.

Calling such "security guarantees" "ornamental" is a way to dismiss them which is unjustified from an international relations perspective (even if they are not certain). Your disquisition about the semantics of "guarantee" is irrelevant and embarrassingly clouding your reasoning about basic concepts of international relations. Suck it up and move on.

Let's assume that's true. On the basis of belief but not evidence, because that's difficult to get by according to you, he thinks it's perfectly fine to follow a political line aimed at escalation? — Benkei

If Zelensky believes in good faith that the missile was sent by Russia, then he is not following a political line in saying so. He is just saying what he believes is the case.

Not everything Ukrainian is necessarily sinister, you know?

the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily," — neomac

The probability of Kherson being liberated so soon was not very high either. The morale and readiness level of Russian troops is unknown but probably very low, and for all we know, the whole Russian war effort could crumble tomorrow. So I agree a quick ending is unlikely, but not impossible.

I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ). — neomac

Obviously it's not a "necessary condition" (which would obviously be false statement as that would mean it would literally not be possible to sign such an agreement). Necessary conditions would be things like "existing" as some deal making entity, and also "able to communicate" in order to engage in said deal making.

However, the fact that non-nuclear states both can for pretty clear rational reasons (of making the world as a whole a safer place and being unable to compete in the nuclear game anyways) and actually do engage in non-nuclear proliferation treatise, often the exact same ones as the nuclear powers, is pretty clear indication that your idea of a "rational requirement" is also obviously false.

Which, again, is what you state:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Now, the meaning of this paragraph is clear, that you are arguing US and Soviet Union could enter these agreements somehow due to having nuclear weapons, a "pre-condition" (rational requirement if you want to change goal posts there), and you even specify "Ukraine doesn't have" ... what don't they have? The pre-condition, therefore Ukraine should not enter the same sorts of agreements.

Which links up with the fundamental issue under discussion, which is the level of certainty Zelensky should (or even can) have for signing a peace agreement. Zelensky has been demanding certainty (which is certainly rational to want) but phrasing things in absolute terms like "pre-condition" (you use this term because Zelensky uses this term), but obviously eventual certainty, guarantees, etc. are not preconditions to negotiate.

Of course, parties have reasons to agree or not.

If all you're saying is nuclear powers had reasons to signup to nuclear non-proliferation, and non-nuclear states had other reasons, obviously. Likewise, both the US and Soviet Union and other states would have their own evaluation of their confident other parties will follow those agreements, maybe try to find out about it to do something (such as the network of sensors and radiation testing to detect non-treaty nuclear tests) ... maybe try to break the agreements themselves.

All you're doing now is moving the goal posts from defending Zelensky's statements of "preconditions" (which simply don't exist, as you yourself note they are obviously not "necessary", which precondition would usually literally mean in that if a precondition wasn't necessary then obviously it's not a precondition) to removing all meaning from your original argument so as just to say "parties have their own reasons to agree to something", which is pretty common feature of agreeing to something.

There can be lot's of reasons to agree to something; one such reason is that you will lose the war anyways so there's no point continuing to fight, there's literally zero confidence the agreement will be followed but ... continued fighting no longer serves a purpose. In other words, the "rational requirement" of confidence a party will actually respect an agreement, can literally be zero but still rational to agree to.

However, the fact that non-nuclear states both can for pretty clear rational reasons (of making the world as a whole a safer place and being unable to compete in the nuclear game anyways) and actually do engage in non-nuclear proliferation treatise, often the exact same ones as the nuclear powers, is pretty clear indication that your idea of a "rational requirement" is also obviously false. — boethius

For the sixth time, the general principle is the following: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations.
I'm not relating states attitude toward agreements and negotiations to one specific type of deterrence.
What is rational is to reliably relate available means wrt desired goals. Any rational agent will take into consideration available means to sanction agreement defection. For example, for countries without nuclear bombs it could be to military ally with those compliant which have them and apply economic/diplomatic sanctions to the rogue countries.

Now, the meaning of this paragraph is clear — boethius

I'm responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.

Zelensky has been demanding certainty (which is certainly rational to want) but phrasing things in absolute terms like "pre-condition" (you use this term because Zelensky uses this term). — boethius

It isn't absolute, for 2 reasons: first it's not a necessary condition, and secondly, it's conditional on the rationality of the agent. Concerning Zelensky perspective I clarified my point: since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like).

You didn't even quote who is understanding "security guarantees" in terms of certainty. So everything you said about it sounds like a strawman argument which you are idly looping over.

Looking forward to explaining all that to you for the 7th time, dude.

Looking forward to explaining all that to you for the 7th time, dude. — neomac

As you must know, some posters are more interested in spreading confusion and misunderstanding than in understanding anything.

For the sixth time, the general principle is the following: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations. — neomac

That's in no way a "pre-conditon" in the sense Zelensky uses it, or the sense you clearly were using it.

Saying parties take information into account to make decisions ... is obvious.

The subject was if "preconditions" were reasonable, an example of a precondition mentioned by Zelensky and Zelenskyites here was "trusting Putin", I pointed out that's not a precondition to enter an agreement, parties (even states) that don't trust each other enter into agreements.

Your rebuttal to this was that US and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and "Ukraine does not have!" (Exclamation mark!) That this was a "precondition" in your words. So clearly some condition that made it reasonable of US and Soviet Union that Ukraine doesn't have so doesn't make it reasonable ... otherwise you would have stated "well, of course it's a precondition for the US and Soviet Union, a condition Ukraine doesn't have, but of course Ukraine could enter those same agreements without the precondition I'm talking about, especially because Ukraine itself signed some of the same treatise vis-a-vis nuclear weapons" but by then maybe you'd perhaps even realise "hmm, I'm either not making any sense whatsoever or saying nothing at all, certainly not rebutting Boethius' point".

Now, you've moved the goal posts to from the nuclear weapons being a "precondition" to the nuclear weapons being a "rational requirement" to now just "taking into account".

Obviously "rational agents" take into account what other agents can and cannot do.

You are saying absolutely nothing other than people make decisions based on the information they have, sometimes rationally according to your standard of rationality you're invoking.

So, where is the debate on this topic: obviously the "precondition" of Zelensky isn't some actual precondition that would prevent him from talking or agreeing to something, and if it's a "rational requirement" that would depend on a lot of things (such as if he can just go ahead and "defeat" the Russians or not, if the Russians can defeat him, if fighting for time or a better negotiation position later is worth the lives lost or not, if the Russian economy will collapse and Putin is ousted from power one way or another; in brief everything we've been discussing this entire thread).

Obviously decisions would be based on evaluating the situation and what one believes about the future, what people believe about intentions of people involved, trust and so on.

What Zelensky has been trying to argue is there is some basic short circuits around all that sober consideration of the circumstances that justifies his decision to have an uncompromising diplomatic position that would result in extended warfare into potentially the far future requiring Western support.

Now, we may see why Zelensky would want simple arguments that would justify his position to not compromise so his backers don't get angry with him. The subject under discussion is whether those simplistic arguments to basically not enter any discussion that may actually reach a compromise by invoking "preconditions" (such as won't talk to Putin, or US guarantees, or Russian forces must withdraw entirely, or won't offer any territorial concessions etc.) are "actual preconditions", as Zelensky presents them, or are just a way of saying he's not going to compromise and has no justification for not compromising, he's willing for another 100 000 of his citizen's lives "thrown into the abyss" (as apparently pentagon officers put it) simply to not compromise and perhaps not accomplish anything further militarily as perhaps everything they could reasonably accomplish militarily they have already done so (as another pentagon officer has apparently noted).

But, if there is some version of "precondition" that's not some vacuous tautology and is in some way connected to the subject matter (Zelensky's clear meaning and functional use of the term as justifying his decisions), then present an argument.

However, rebutting my point and then later explaining you literally have said nothing of substance whatsoever in relation to my point, just reminding us that decisions are in fact based on information the people making decisions have, or then at least "rational agents" base their decisions on what they know, you have literally said absolutely nothing.

That's in no way a "pre-conditon" in the sense Zelensky — boethius

Quote Zelensky. And then comment. Besides I didn't claim anywhere that I would use the word "pre-condition" the way Zelensky does.

Saying parties take information into account to make decisions ... is obvious. — boethius

Saying that nothing is certain in this life... is obvious.

So, where is the debate on this topic: — boethius

Security guarantees (or equivalent).

But, if there is some version of "precondition" that's not some vacuous tautology — boethius

As if you knew what "tautology" means

just reminding us that decisions are in fact based on information — boethius

Never made such a claim. On the other side you are trying to sell us that international relations is matter of "certain" or "ornamental". That is substantive steamy bullshit. Period.

conditional on the rationality of the agent — neomac

I think the forum should nominate prizes for pseudo intellectual bullshit, and I nominate this phase.

Concerning Zelensky perspective I clarified my point: since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like). — neomac

First, your idea that the US and Soviet Union entered non-proliferation agreements based on the idea they could deter the other from not breaking them with their nuclear weapons, is simply false. US and Soviet Union could sign a non-proliferation treaty one day, break it the next day, and the situation would just return to what it was before, neither would rationally (nor did in practice) consider nuking the other simply for breaking a treaty. They would nuke the other if they genuinely believed they were being or about to be nuked.

So, maybe think it through and see your delusion here about how the world works. Why would they nuke each other for breaking a treaty that was intended to lower the chances of nuking each other? Ok, treaty didn't work, situation returns to higher odds of nuking each other.

The US did not "use its deterrence" as a basis to believe the the Soviet Union would abide by the treaty. At no point did either party sign thinking the other would stick to the agreement or be nuked. The nuclear weapons, and their mutual fear of them, was what the negotiation was about (the common ground, common risk, they both wanted to lower), but not itself a way of "dealing" with the other party.

Read some history or maybe just think through the implications of what your saying.

As for seeking NATO deterrence because Ukraine does not have deterrence, this is certainly a rational desire, but it is not a rational diplomatic goal because NATO will never provide it.

There is no reason for NATO to nuke Russia if there is a peace agreement and Russia violates it vis-a-vis Ukraine. If Russia re-invades we'd just be back to where we are currently, there is no circumstances, and certainly no wording of any treaty, that would be some rational basis for NATO to nuke Russia for violating it.

Now, by all means, change your goal posts again to just "for Ukraine to agree, they'd need to be somewhat confident the agreement is better than the alternatives, and somewhat confident Russia would follow it due to a bunch of reasons".

First, your idea that the US and Soviet Union entered non-proliferation agreements based on the idea they could deter the other from not breaking them with their nuclear weapons. — boethius

Never made such a claim. Quote where I did.

is simply false. US and Soviet Union could sign a non-proliferation treaty one day — boethius

Besides, since when conceivable possibilities constitute evidence to falsify factual claims? Here: The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was recognized that the Cold War deterrent relationship between just the United States and the Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, escalation in tensions, and nuclear conflict (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons)

Security guarantees. — neomac

First, as a general principle, this is not a "precondition" or "rational requirement" as a state may surrender simply because they are losing.

Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro".

Whatever Russia promises to do, and does not do, obviously nothing stops them, and there is no meaningful leverage NATO would have anyways that would actually stop them short of nuclear weapons, which obviously they won't be "deterring" Russia with concerning Ukraine.

We can be pretty sure of this because NATO has already applied maximum pressure of sanctions and arms supplies and this hasn't "deterred" Russia from their course of acton, so presumably if Russia invaded again then the reasonable bet is we'd (at best for Ukraine) just be back in this same situation; West angry about it, sanctions up the wazoo, providing arms ... and that's it.

Whatever US promises to do and doesn't do, there would unlikely be any consequences at all.

But whatever the consequences for breaking the agreement, they would not be "much" as some sort of contractual result.

The consequence for Russia of reinvading Ukraine would be war and likely sanctions and international pressure, perhaps from their own partners if it's a second time around of this mess for no reason.

This would be the reason to expect Russia to abide by a peace agreement, to avoid the negative consequences of war they have also experienced.

However, being nuked by the USA would not be a reason.

If there's a peace deal and then later war resumes, the reasonable expectation is that the parties to the agreement will do in the future whatever their policy is then in the future anyways.

For example, let's say in the future Europe's and US economy is really hurting, monetary crisis, real domestic problems, in addition to potential war with China invading Taiwan any moment, all sorts of messes all around the world, and they simply don't have the capacity for this same kind of conflict, pour in billions and billions ("carte blanch"), then what we would expect is that their policy then would be "sorry Ukraine, but you're on your own this time" regardless of what is written on any piece of paper.

If the policy in the future is not to intervene for reasons, then the answer about the agreement will be "yeah, well", as we saw about the Crimea annexation in 2014.

Why wasn't the word "assurance" meaningful? Well, it was just ornamental for and a stand in for "trust us bro". Why does a promise not matter because the word "assurance" instead of "guarantor" used to embellish it?

Because nothing actually legal is going on and the promises don't need to be kept, regardless of what words you use.

And hence as you cannot comprehend them, your views aren't much worth of discussion. — ssu

Who said anything about comprehending them? I said I don't care what matters to them, not that I don't comprehend them.

And in either case, explain why that makes my views not worth discussing? Why are only views relating to what matters to Ukrainians worthy of discussion?

Never made such a claim. Quote where I did. — neomac

I've quoted it back to you several times:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Read your own words.

"this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" and you even note "Ukraine doesn’t have!".

The meaning could not be more clear that it was rational for the US and the Soviet Union to "rationally pursue" these non-proliferation agreements, despite not trusting each other, because they both had nuclear weapons ... and ... "Ukraine doesn’t have!"

It cannot be clearer that your implication is that it would not be rational for Ukraine to enter the same agreements without nuclear weapons.

An argument that is clearly false, especially as Ukraine and many other non-nuclear states pursued and signed up to the very same agreements.

Since, you moved the goalpost from "pre-condition" (the word you use) to "rational requirement" to "taking into account".

Yes, obviously all parties took into account the nuclear weapons other parties had or didn't have in negotiating and agreeing to non-proliferation treatise.

If you're really saying now that what you really meant was that the US took into account the Soviet Unions nuclear weapons, vice-versa, and non-nuclear states did the same, everyone took into account stuff, it's just a farcical level of bad faith.

Either Zelensky is optimistic about escalation not really escalating to something I'd rather not think about or that was a hell of a cynical political move. — Benkei

Yes. There's simply no good way for Zelensky to come out of this (though I'm interested in how the media will spin it).

Or he just genuinely believes that the missile that crashed in Poland was not fired by Ukraine. It's not like the evidence is out there for everyone to see. — Olivier5

Don't be absurd. World leaders ought not simply announce any matters they happen to believe like fucking children with no filter. His words could have brought NATO into a war with Russia on false premises. That's negligence on a criminal level.

First, as a general principle, this is not a "precondition" or "rational requirement" — boethius

That's not what I claimed.

Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro". — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

there is no meaningful leverage NATO would have anyways that would actually stop them short of nuclear weapons, which obviously they won't be "deterring" Russia with concerning Ukraine. — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

We can be pretty sure of this because NATO has already applied maximum pressure of sanctions and arms supplies and this hasn't "deterred" Russia from their course of acton, so presumably if Russia invaded again then the reasonable bet is we'd (at best for Ukraine) just be back in this same situation — boethius

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and it didn't finish to pay. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism.

Whatever US promises to do and doesn't do, there would unlikely be any consequences at all. — boethius

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments.

But whatever the consequences for breaking the agreement, they would not be "much" as some sort of contractual result.

The consequence for Russia of reinvading Ukraine would be war and likely sanctions and international pressure, perhaps from their own partners if it's a second time around of this mess for no reason.

This would be the reason to expect Russia to abide by a peace agreement, to avoid the negative consequences of war they have also experienced.

However, being nuked by the USA would not be a reason.

If there's a peace deal and then later war resumes, the reasonable expectation is that the parties to the agreement will do in the future whatever their policy is then in the future anyways. For example, let's say in the future Europe's and US economy is really hurting, monetary crisis, real domestic problems, in addition to potential war with China invading Taiwan any moment, all sorts of messes all around the world, and they simply don't have the capacity for this same kind of conflict, pour in billions and billions ("carte blanch"), then what we would expect is that their policy then would be "sorry Ukraine, but you're on your own this time" regardless of what is written on any piece of paper. — boethius

More claims and conjectures and ornamental blablabla.

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments. — neomac

I argue these points at some length, literally cite the claims I'm rebutting that you just continuously deny ever making.

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and might pay more. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism. — neomac

Do you see Russia stopping the war of their own accord?

No. So, obviously the cost of their adventurism is a cost they are willing to pay.

So, what would be the reason to assume they are not willing to pay the same cost in the future?

Not really any. So, "rationally" it would be nice to have some better reason, such as the US nuking Russia on behalf of Ukraine and being deterred that way. The only problem is there's no rational reason for the US to sign up to that, much less actually do when called upon.

Which is the core fallacy of Zelenskyites: that whatever is good for Zelensky to be true (at least according to him) we should also believe is true, or at least nevertheless support whatever he wants and is trying to get in saying whatever we agree isn't true.

A nice connection to the missile issue. Is Zelensky talking out of his ass? Zelenskyites: Sure, maybe. But that's just all rational decision making that we should support and encourage escalation, if that's what Zelensky wants, it's just clever to use the missile issue to try to escalate. You see, he "believes it" so it's ok to say what you believe even if you have no evidence for it.

The fact is that the US and Poland have both said conflicting things within their own nations so there's nothing conclusive at all about this. — Christoffer

Bollocks. Poland have done zero investigation beyond simply looking at the parts (which, since both Russia and Ukraine overlap in armaments, tells you nothing), and the US have investigated (albeit unfinished) with the single most well-informed intelligence network the world has ever known. to suggest that somehow the facts are still 'up in the air' is ridiculous fawning.

Oh, and...

Andrzej Duda, the Polish president, said that from the information Warsaw had, the missile was “an S-300 rocket made in the Soviet Union, an old rocket, and there is no evidence it was launched by the Russian side”.

He added that it was “highly probable that it was fired by Ukrainian anti-aircraft defence” and “unfortunately fell on Polish territory”. — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/poland-president-missile-strike-probably-ukrainian-stray

But of course you have to immediately spin it to some pro-Ukrainian stance.

if it was Russia's, then Zelensky knows that it won't lead to an Article 5 consequence — Christoffer

Anders Aslund immediately took to Twitter and Urged the President to "Bomb Russia" on the basis of exactly that article.

Russia's "demands" in such peace talks have been "a total surrender of Ukraine". — Christoffer

I've not read this. What source are you getting that from?