I agree that parties should be negotiating if not peace at least an armistice for the winter. But I'm afraid Ukrainian hardship will be used as leverage instead.

I think one of the bigger problems is Ukraine wanting security guarantees. It's not getting them from the West, no mutual defense pacts and no joining NATO. That last option was already explicitly taken off the table by several NATO members.

Possibly Ukrainian security can be created through a demilitarised zone but I'm not sure how much sense that makes with Crimea containing an important naval base. Nevertheless perhaps a DMZ for grounds forces along the Eastern Ukraine-Russia border would be enough. You can't invade with boats after all.

The second problem is how much land the Ukrainians are willing to part with. Negotiating now means giving up land and if the Ukrainians can continue to make gains, then the timing is not good for them. And that's also dependent on "ally fatigue", which I thought weird was openly communicated. Why not say "hey, Russia, we'll probably blink before you so just keep it up and you'll get the upper hand". That only makes sense if Russia has communicated a palatable (to NATO/USA) solution to the conflict.

It's a simple question. Ought the Ukrainians fight this imperial aggressor to regain their lost territory? Not "will they?", "ought they?" — Isaac

They naturally ought to fight, and that fight has been proven very successful. An invader that thinks your sovereign state is artificial, that ought to be part of Russia (because of history) and you ought to be Russian and you don't deserve to have your own country, as we have seen from what kind of actions implemented on the occupied territory, is the worst kind of occupier.

But you don't care a damn about the Ukrainians, aren't interested at all and simply have no idea just why they should defend themselves.

When you don't get this kind of truths into your head, as noted, there's no point of continuing this topic with you.

I have trouble understanding the war aims of the people who are argue "for Ukraine." . — Manuel

Very simply: a free Ukraine and a free Russia.

Roberta Metsola
@EP_President

The @Europarl_EN [European parliament] is under a sophisticated cyberattack. A pro-Kremlin group has claimed responsibility.

Our IT experts are pushing back against it & protecting our systems.

This, after we proclaimed Russia as a State-sponsor of terrorism.

My response: #SlavaUkraini
4:45 PM · Nov 23, 2022

if you fall in line with Western Propaganda (US, EU, British, Australian), you are being brave, support democracy and are against dictatorship.
If you disagree and think this war should end now, then one is a Putin Supporter and a sympathizer for dictators. — Manuel

I think that polarization is inevitable as well as the risk of being perceived by other interlocutors as serving somebody else's political agenda (implicitly or explicitly). The reason is that we are part of a competitive game (at all levels) that is bigger than us and the endgame will impact all of us. So whatever nuance and impartiality one may want to put in their own views, it is likely going to get lost in the process of collective choice making. In other words, we can reason and analyse geopolitical conflicts of such magnitude for the intellectual fun of it (or for moral concerns?) in a forum but in the end we can't likely hope to be more than polarised political "meme" vectors in the geopolitical arena.

By now the Palestinian cause is widely recognized, up until the mid-early 2000's, if you supported Palestine, you were a terrorist sympathizer. Do they have a chance to get a two-state solution? Israel is uninterested and is instead stealing everything of value in the West Bank. What options do they have? They could try and change Israeli society from the inside through the Arab parties - unlikely to happen but it's an option.

Or they could keep forcing for a two-state solution, which is what is recognized by international law. Regardless of how they act, they will be killed, as can be seen almost every day in Israeli news. It makes sense for them to get a state, if only to be able to live a semi normal life.

The Kurds have been betrayed by everybody at one point or another. They do have a quite advanced society, which merits autonomy. Will they get it? Who knows. These topics deserve whole threads not brief comments. — Manuel

The reason why I cited those examples (along with the Afghan case) is because you claimed: As I see it, by arguing that Russia will end up with a portion (if not all of it) of the seized territory, it is pointless to let civilians die with no realistic hope of retaining such lands. The story of those people fighting for their "claimed" land for generations shows that their motivation and endurance is not weakened by to the kind of reasoning that makes you think their fight is pointless. And Ukrainians may show analogous motivation and endurance wrt the Russians, no matter how much land Russia has currently annexed nor to what extent it has military means to preserve it.

But on to the important issue, what was there in Afghanistan than the Soviet Union cared enough about such that they would resort to nuclear war? Did "the West" sanction the Soviet Union for going into Afghanistan? Did the West say that victory for them means that the Soviet Union cannot win this war?

Was the global economy in a fritz because of Soviet war in Afghanistan?

No - these are quite different times. The stakes are much higher in all respects. — Manuel

You are moving from what is at stake for Afghans (which is relevant to guide our expectations about their behavior and prospects of success), to what is at stake for all other players. So I’d say we concur on a couple of points: first, if we want to better assess the relevance of a conflict for us we should move from the stakes of one player to the stakes of all other players directly and indirectly impacted by such conflict (including us). Second, the Ukrainian conflict risks to become a more open & direct confrontation between Russia and the West than the Afghan proxy war because Russia has annexed Ukrainian territories [1].
Therefore I wouldn’t talk just about what Ukrainians want and can achieve at the expense of Russia, but also about what the West wants and can achieve at the expense of Russia.


[1] FYI, concerning Western sanctions against the USSR for the soviet aggression in Afghanistan, you can read here: http://www.americanstudies.history.knu.ua/en/archive/11-2/2021-11-kovalkov/

How could you possibly know that I’m not one of ‘them experts’, for one — Olivier5

This is why I like discussing with you. You never fail to disappoint. Just when I think your defence mechanisms can't get any more ridiculous, you come out with "I might be an expert". Priceless.

Hey, we might all be experts. Bagsy being the spy.

My analysis is that a very small risk of nuclear escalation exists, additional to what this risk has historically been before February. This risk has evidently already been factored in by NATO members, as evidenced by the lack of allied support for a brand new Ukrainian airforce for instance. That decision was already some form of yielding to the superpower nuclear status of Russia. I think it was enough. In fact I wonder if we shouldn’t revisit the issue of some no-fly-zone, given the current abuse of civilian targets by Russia. — Olivier5

My analysis is that a significant risk of nuclear escalation exists, additional to what this risk has historically been before February. This risk has not fully been factored in by NATO members, as evidenced by the continued supply of weapons for instance. That decision was already some form of yielding to the superpower nuclear status of Russia. I think it wasn't enough. We shouldn’t revisit the issue of some no-fly-zone, given the current risk of severe escalation by Russia.


So that's our uniformed, pointless analyses done. How dull.

Anything of interest to add? Like why you prefer your analysis over that of the experts reaching a different conclusion? You know, the sorts of matters laymen can discuss on a discussion forum.

If you spent less time trying to make everyone else's views out to be "absurd" or, "biased", or uniquely "ideological", and spent a little more time defending why you've chosen your beliefs we might have a more fruitful discussion.

They naturally ought to fight — ssu

OK. So why?

Now we've got past the pointless repetitions of the mere fact that they're probably going to fight and into the matter of interest - on what moral grounds ought they fight?

Do they have a moral right to some piece of geography? If so, did Russia have a similar moral right to Chechnya?

Do they have a moral duty to fight aggressors? If so, then why do we not? Why is NATO not there too?

Do they have a moral right to respond as they see fit? If so, does that autonomy extend to Pro-Russian elements in Crimea and Donbas?

I can clearly see a moral allowance for fighting back. If someone comes to take what's your by force, it seems fair use equal force to retain it. But I can't see how you're getting from a moral allowance to a moral duty - that they actually ought to fight back, not merely that they could.

And when doe they have any moral compulsion to take into account collateral damage? If their actions risk nuclear escalation, or if their action risk further starvation, or health risks in less well-off countries, are they absolved of all responsibility? How so?

Now we've got past the pointless repetitions of the mere fact that they're probably going to fight and into the matter of interest - on what moral grounds ought they fight?

Do they have a moral right to some piece of geography? If so, did Russia have a similar moral right to Chechnya?

Do they have a moral duty to fight aggressors? If so, then why do we not? Why is NATO not there too?

Do they have a moral right to respond as they see fit? If so, does that autonomy extend to Pro-Russian elements in Crimea and Donbas? — Isaac

If you do not clarify what you consider "moral ground" vs "non-moral ground" and "moral right" vs "non-moral right", "moral duty" vs "non-moral duty" and there is no convergence in the usage of such notions, you and your interlocutor will inadvertently talk past each other. Examples may be very helpful in clarifying things: e.g. "If someone comes to take what's your by force, it seems fair use equal force to retain it". Here is mine "if someone comes to take what's legitimately yours by force, it seems fair to use all force it's necessary to retain it if not more to deter or disable the robber, or even other potential robbers from trying to do it again".

If you do not clarify what you consider "moral ground" vs "non-moral ground" and "moral right" vs "non-moral right", "moral duty" vs "non-moral duty" and there is no convergence in the usage of such notions, you and your interlocutor will inadvertently talk past each other. — neomac

I'm interested here in why people believe the things they do, so there's no need for me to clarify anything in the respect you suggest. I'd be as interested in any answer regardless of the definitions used. In fact the more diverse the definition, the better.

As far as I'm concerned something like "moral ground" just defines a set of conditions. The debate is about what sorts of conditions belong in that set. If I pre-define the set, then the conditions which belong in it become a matter of mere accordance with that (my) definition. A fairly boring exercise in consistency - we might as well be doing maths. The interesting discussion is in the disagreements about the definition (about what belongs in that set) and the reasons for believing in those criteria.

You're asking me to clearly define 'chair' and then ask people if, according to my criteria, the thing they're sitting on is, in fact, a chair.

I've no interest in that. I want to know what people think the thing they're sitting on is. I want to know if they think it's a chair.

So that's our uniformed, pointless analyses done. How dull. — Isaac

Speak for yourself. All you can do is parrot little me, incapable as you are to contribute original ideas.

But what if your mission here was different from just contradicting whatever Olivier says, in a manic, mechanical manner? What if you developed your own ideas and personality, and let the chips fall where they may? It won't be the end of the world if once in a while you happen to agree with me, or with someone else here.

Like why you prefer your analysis over that of the experts reaching a different conclusion? — Isaac

Most experts I've read from (French dudes you wouldn't know of) seem to agree that Ukraine has a good chance of recovering territories, that the Russian army is disorganized and liable to collapse, that Putin's territorial ambitions need to be pushed back against, that the risk of nuclear escalation is exaggerated by Kremlin-affiliated cretins, and that it won't succeed in intimidating Ukraine or NATO. Now do tell what the 'experts' that you are reading about are saying. I'm sure you can find some anglo boys out there, barely weaned from their mother's milk and with fresh oxbridge degrees in their pocket, whom I would not have heard of.

Most experts I've read from (French dudes you wouldn't know of) seem to agree that Ukraine has a good chance of recovering territories, that the Russian army is disorganized and liable to collapse, that Putin's territorial ambitions need to be pushed back against, that the risk of nuclear escalation is exaggerated by Kremlin-affiliated cretins, and that it won't succeed in intimidating Ukraine or NATO. — Olivier5

So, do I take it you've no intention of giving any explanation as to why you've chosen to believe those experts (nor even telling us who they are it seems). How dull.

We're not conducting a poll. We're not compiling a database of 'things Olivier thinks'.

We're having a discussion. So to take part you need to be able to support your position, explain why you prefer some explanations over others. Otherwise there's nothing to discuss.

do tell what the 'experts' that you are reading about are saying. — Olivier5

You're embarrassing yourself. Anyone following the thread can see that I've already done that in spades.

As far as I'm concerned something like "moral ground" just defines a set of conditions. The debate is about what sorts of conditions belong in that set. If I pre-define the set, then the conditions which belong in it become a matter of mere accordance with that (my) definition. A fairly boring exercise in consistency - we might as well be doing maths. The interesting discussion is in the disagreements about the definition (about what belongs in that set) and the reasons for believing in those criteria. — Isaac

If you want to have a fair intellectual debate on matter of morality you have to be ready to explicit your own set of conditions and your own reasons for believing them to others as well. Otherwise your interlocutor has no compelling reason to find your interest in their views or questioning their views intellectually challenging (even more so if you do not care about consistency). This becomes evident when you frame a problem within your idiosyncratic set of assumptions which others do not necessarily share and then you complain that they keep dodging your questions based on such assumptions (like "How many lives is that region's choice of governance worth?") precisely for that reason.

And if you are interested in the disagreement then why you write comments such as the following?

This is why I like discussing with you. You never fail to disappoint. — Isaac

So that's our uniformed, pointless analyses done. How dull. — Isaac

Anyone following the thread can see that I've already done that in spades. — Isaac

I don't read your posts much, so I wouldn't know. Last time I did see one of your "experts", he looked 20 years old and fatuous, like a young you, which is perhaps why you chose him?

My go-to experts on military mattersd in Ukraine are Michel Goya, ex-colonel and military historian and commentator, Xavier Tytelman from the website Air&Cosmos, ex-military pilot and aviation specialist, and the good guys in ISW. I also consult this Youtube channel, signaled here by another poster and generally informative.

We're having a discussion. So to take part you need to be able to support your position, explain why you prefer some explanations over others. Otherwise there's nothing to discuss. — Isaac

There is never anything to discuss with you, and we are certainly not having what I would call a discussion. We would need some mutual trust to have a discussion. At best, I use you as a pretext for posting.

Russia risks becoming ungovernable and descending into chaos
https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/18/russia-risks-becoming-ungovernable-and-descending-into-chaos

My go-to experts on military mattersd in Ukraine are Michel Goya, ex-colonel and military historian and commentator, Xavier Tytelman from the website Air&Cosmos, ex-military pilot and aviation specialist, and the good guys in ISW. I also consult this Youtube channel, signaled here by another poster and generally informative. — Olivier5

So why them?

Which one said that, for example,...

the risk of nuclear escalation is exaggerated by Kremlin-affiliated cretins — Olivier5

...and why did you choose to believe them over, say, Swift Center analysts, or Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s deputy secretary general from 2012 to 2016, who said that Western leaders had concluded that Russian plans to use nuclear weapons in a major crisis were sincere, raising the risk from any accident or misstep that the Kremlin mistook for war, or Dmitry Gorenburg, an analyst of Russian military policy who said "The escalation dynamics of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia could easily spiral into a nuclear exchange", or Samuel Charap, Russian foreign policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, who said "Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania...they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt", or Christopher Chivvis, Senior Fellow and Director American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment who said "Scores of war games carried out by the United States and its allies in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine make it clear that Putin would probably use a nuclear weapon if he concludes that his regime is threatened. In most games, Russia still responds with a second nuclear attack, but in the games that go “well,” the United States and Russia manage to de-escalate after that, although only in circumstances where both sides have clear political off-ramps and lines of communication between Moscow and Washington have remained open. In all the other games, the world is basically destroyed"?

What is it about the message of the people you choose to believe which makes it so attractive to you?

why did you choose to believe them over, say, Swift Center analysts, or Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s deputy secretary general from 2012 to 2016, who said that Western leaders had concluded that Russian plans to use nuclear weapons in a major crisis were sincere, raising the risk from any accident or misstep that the Kremlin mistook for war, or Dmitry Gorenburg, an analyst of Russian military policy who said "The escalation dynamics of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia could easily spiral into a nuclear exchange", or Samuel Charap ... — Isaac

Because I don't know who these guys are, never heard of them, and have not assessed their credibility and biases critically and effectively as I tend to do before I trust folks. What I am not prepared to do is trust average 'experts' out there whom I haven't assessed first. Unlike you, I have no intellectual inferiority complex.

So, should a times come when I need to study those guys, I will study them and their biases, and I might end up using them if I can trust them enough. In the meantime, I don't see a point.

I don't know who these guys are, never heard of them, and have not assessed their credibility and biases critically and effctively. — Olivier5

Interesting. So, your study of the credibility and biases of the sources you do use - how was that carried out, and what were the results?

Take...

this Youtube channel, — Olivier5

...for example. What checks did you carry out as to their credibility and bias? What was it about the results which satisfied you?

Should a times come when I need to study those guys, I will study them and their biases, and I might end up using them if I can trust them enough. — Olivier5

Odd. What might prompt such a time? You read a quote from someone with apparent credentials (I supplied their qualification details) saying that the position you support might well lead to nuclear war, and you think "well, maybe something will crop up where I need to check these guys out, but threat of nuclear war isn't it" - well, what the fuck is?

So, your study of the credibility and biases of the sources you do use — Isaac

You don't?

(I supplied their qualification details) — Isaac

I don't know even their organisations. Never heard of "Swift", for instance.

What might prompt such a time? — Isaac

I could come across one of these guys saying something I find interesting or dubious enough that it warrants additional review.

What checks did you carry out as to their credibility and bias? — Isaac

I checked his sources as much as possible , anbd found out that he relies on microdata from Ukrainian and Russian foot soldiers on the front, Russian milbloggers, and satelite imagery analysis - also uses a lot of excellent newspaper sources such as Medusa. I looked at the amount of data vs interpretation in his videos, at the consistency of his message over time (contradictions are a bit tell tale sign) and consistency with other trusted sources e.g. ISW (the main benchmark of everyone right now), also at the amount of bad news (for Ukraine) he is channeling and the distance he takes with official Ukrainian positions, the latter as a check for wishful thinking tendencies. He past those tests, though I find his quality to be decreasing over time: he provides less and less data, and more and more interpretation, perhaps because less and less open source info is available.

All this to show that this source assessment is not something done once and for all, but a "living document".

I don't know even their organisations. — Olivier5

You don't know who NATO are? Never heard of RAND Corporation? Never come across Carnegie Endowment?

What about the US intelligence service? Heard of them. Their director Avril Haines warned that Putin was likely to use nuclear weapons if he felt an existential threat to Russia and that "We do think that [Putin’s perception of an existential threat] could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine, and that Nato in effect is either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine"

Or perhaps the most senior intelligence official in the US isn't qualified enough for you. Perhaps she ought to have consulted some bloke off YouTube or a retired pilot.

That would be ideal. Hard seeing it actually happening. Not impossible, obviously, but I don't see what possible things must happen for such a situation to materialize.

So whatever nuance and impartiality one may want to put in their own views, it is likely going to get lost in the process of collective choice making. In other words, we can reason and analyse geopolitical conflicts of such magnitude for the intellectual fun of it (or for moral concerns?) in a forum but in the end we can't likely hope to be more than polarised political "meme" vectors in the geopolitical arena. — neomac

Very much so. I mean the caveats and nuances one may argue for, in the end, are "just" that, caveats and nuances, the "endgame" being the same (from your "opponents" perspective).

This generalizes to a larger phenomenon (I think), which is, one simply creates "shortcuts" for other points of view, in philosophy, politics and everything else. Otherwise, it would take forever to do any political discussion - or any other discussion.

The story of those people fighting for their "claimed" land for generations shows that their motivation and endurance is not weakened by to the kind of reasoning that makes you think their fight is pointless. And Ukrainians may show analogous motivation and endurance wrt the Russians, no matter how much land Russia has currently annexed nor to what extent it has military means to preserve it. — neomac

That's correct. And obviously, they should react in whatever way they think makes sense for them (in so far as each person has a particular perspective on this war).

That doesn't alleviate or address my issue, which is, they may continue to do this, but I have reasons to believe that Russia will take the territory it wishes. So the deaths do end up being in vain, having achieved no specific goal, as in, dissuading Russia from doing what its doing, or creating more awareness for this war (which has enough eyes on it as it is) and so on.

In that respect, I think deaths with no goals in mind, are pointless and sad.

The issue w/Palestine has been different. It took many, many, many thousands of brutal deaths for Palestinians to even be acknowledged as human beings in the eyes of the US public - which is the one that matters. Israel could carry out no occupation without US aid.

Even if Palestinians gave up today, Israel will treat them exactly the same as if they struggled from time to time. That's a situation which is intolerable, given it's been going on for over 50 years.

You are moving from what is at stake for Afghans (which is relevant to guide our expectations about their behavior and prospects of success), to what is at stake for all other players. So I’d say we concur on a couple of points: first, if we want to better assess the relevance of a conflict for us we should move from the stakes of one player to the stakes of all other players directly and indirectly impacted by such conflict (including us). — neomac

Sure. Which is why I said that this situation in Ukraine now bears little (save superficial) resemblance to Afghanistan.

Yes, they will need to consider what would be a fair deal to them, as well as to Russia. It won't be trivial, but it must be done.

Which is why I said that this situation in Ukraine now bears little (save superficial) resemblance to Afghanistan.

Yes, they will need to consider what would be a fair deal to them, as well as to Russia. It won't be trivial, but it must be done. — Manuel

You switched back to what the Ukrainians want. But we wanted to consider all other players too. Russia is not the only other player. There is also the West front supporting Ukraine, and the Rest front supporting Russia or trying to remain neutral. And the problem I see is that Russia doesn't simply want to take a piece of land from Ukraine, but it wants to do it expressly in defiance and at the expense of the West/NATO/US: starting with the violation of international law till aiming at establishing a new World Order in alliance with at least two other authoritarian regimes (China and Iran) [1]. Besides Russia is capable to blackmail the West (and the rest of the world) with wheat and gas supply (among others), threaten it with nuclear weapons, fund pro-Russian lobbies in the West, conduct cyber-warfare against Western facilities/institutions and project military assets in Africa, Middle East and Mediterranean sea through the Black Sea (basically encircling Europe), while increasing Putin's authoritarian regime and spiking Russian budget for military expenditure [2] with the money earned during Putin's 20 years of happy business with the West, instead of investing this money to improve and widen system of rights, education and welfare for his people.
So I do not see how exactly letting Russia get what it wants expressly out of fear of Russia under the eyes all other authoritarian challengers of the West is to the best interest of the West (if you care for the West, of course).
Do you have any ideas about this issue? Maybe we can try see things from a different perspective: maybe it's not simply that the West is helping the Ukrainians but also that the Ukrainians are helping the West.

[1]
https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-meets-with-members-of-the-valdai-club/
http://clcr.over-blog.com/article-putin-s-munich-speech-93308395.html
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/14/china/xi-putin-meeting-sco-summit-analysis-intl-hnk/index.htmlhttps://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/towards-asian-geopolitical-alliance
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/07/28/the-axis-of-russia-iran-and-china-birth-of-a-new-world-order/

[2]
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1203160/military-expenditure-russia/

Jeez dude, you are going in that direction?

I don't even know how to reply to this, because it looks to me so, so far removed from actual possibility. There's been talk - for some time now - of the whole "decline of the American Empire" and so on, because of how China is growing and is now (or is about to be) a bigger economy and so forth.

First of all, this overlooks a crucial problem for China: drastic declining population numbers. This is going to severely impact economic output.

But the main point to me anyway, is to ask, how many military bases does the US have around the world? Around 750.

How many does Russia have? 20. What about China? 1. That makes a grand total of 21 military bases vs 750.

I think such numbers are useful in projecting actual power and the capacity to get countries to do what you want. Right now, Russia is barely managing Ukraine, how can they expand more? And after this war, the Russian population is surely going down, along with birthrates.

China has Taiwan. That they can't take. They're extending to the "South China Sea" and well as the Silk Road, it brings forth some influence sure. Nowhere near the US.

Iran is not worth talking about, until we mention a much more problematic country in all respects: Saudi Arabia. And Israel too.

So we are as far apart as possible on this issue.

That entire post is build on the predicate that the West is a power for good. Which it mostly only is when you actually live there. For the rest of the world it's been mostly shit.

Yep, that's exactly right.

Also, it's weird to seriously consider that Xi will rule over everybody. Like, what?

But the rest of the world knows quite well just how friendly the West can be...

You don't know who NATO are? Never heard of RAND Corporation? Never come across Carnegie Endowment? — Isaac

Never indeed, for the latter. RAND is a military think tank with good analysts but strongly connected to the US military-industrial complex, which implies a significant bias towards their interests and thus a tendency to take any threat to US military dominance very very seriously, if not to exaggerate them. As for NATO, it is not a think tank or anything like that, and ex NATO officials may disagree with one another on this issue. I’d be surprised if they didn’t.

maybe it's not simply that the West is helping the Ukrainians but also that the Ukrainians are helping the West. — neomac

Of course they are, which is why the West helps them. I mean, I subscribe to your analysis. Ukraine is about the ushering in of a post-UN world, without any notion of collective rules and security, a world dreamed and made by dictators, for dictators.

Also, it's weird to seriously consider that Xi will rule over everybody. Like, what? — Manuel

Taiwan, for a start.

First of all, this overlooks a crucial problem for China: drastic declining population numbers. This is going to severely impact economic output. — Manuel

Like the Chinese don't know how to automate?

Do they have a moral right to some piece of geography? — Isaac

As an Englishman, do you have a moral right to some piece of geography, like where you live?

I can clearly see a moral allowance for fighting back. If someone comes to take what's your by force, it seems fair use equal force to retain it. But I can't see how you're getting from a moral allowance to a moral duty - that they actually ought to fight back, not merely that they could. — Isaac

It's not about duty. It's simply a very rational response. When you can defend and protect yourself from a hostile attack, do so. Russians aren't control of Kyiv as they wanted. They failed to capture it and put a puppet regime in place... and get that Novorossiya, that they have dreamed about.

It's the simple fact that the attack is about imperialism in it's most aggressive, most ugliest form: when your country is "artificial" and actually said to be part of your neighbor, now somehow governed by "neonazis", everybody should understand how bleak the future is under such control. We have already seen the Russification efforts in schools in the occupied territories and the forces evictions/relocations of Ukrainian people and children to Russia. We've seen the mass killings. And the attacks on hospitals and civilians. And you can just follow what actually Russians and above all, what Putin is saying. But you don't, so you think there would be nothing different in Ukraine if it's part of Russia or an independent country.

Why would you as a tankist care because it's not the evil US doing the bad things.