I don't remember agreeing (but I did follow orders) - I remember being told what the names of colors were and getting them wrong. I still do, as I am color blind. — Tom Storm

For many, “mommy” and daddy” are the first words we willfully consent to using - though, granted, we might not have memories of it. Color words come later- and whether or not we use these terms correctly is not pertinent to the issue I was addressing. At issue here, if you’d want to get in it philosophically, is this: how does one first come to use any term if not via agreement with those who so use these terms? (This regardless of whether the agreement is obtained via coercion from others or via one’s own willful inclinations.)

I have to say parsing the notion of color as a pathway to understand the merits of the term ineffable is bloody dull. — Tom Storm

I can get that, but you speak as though you’re forced to partake.

Thirteen pages in and I am no closer to understanding what ineffable means other than the literal definition and associated, shall we say, poetic uses. — Tom Storm

For my part, I don’t see what all the hubbub is all about. If meaning is use, then the word means whatever its use intends it to mean. Haven’t heard of “ineffable” being spoken of by people, except in certain academic and philosophical circles. But if one wants to say that, for example, “my joy is indescribable” or else “beyond words” well, when it gets the point across it has meaning to both the speaker and the listener. Case closed as far as I’m concerned.

Is it not the case that some people believe there are quasi mystical matters that are beyond words while others think that everything can be understood or, at least, turned into words? It's hardly a surprising bifurcation. — Tom Storm

As to this issue, I’d phrase it in more blunt terms: does one find that reality is - or else can in principle be made - equivalent to words?

If so, then everything that is can be expressible via words. If not, then some things of which we can be aware of will not be accurately expressible via words.

Maybe I'm missing something here, but I so far don't see it.

Besides, there’s a lot more to meaning and its conveyance than words: I can verbally tell you anything about my state of being but if my body posture and mannerisms express otherwise, what will you make out of my words? And as to non-verbal communication, think of the Mona Lisa smile: other than by pointing fingers at it, literally or via words (as in, “the Mona Lisa smile”), I so far don’t know of anyone that has managed to accurately convey it linguistically (other than via poetry, maybe).

Do you think that this notion of ineffable for some is a gateway to transcendence - a path for theists, idealists and assorted wacky metaphysicians to find solace?

Kate Bush fan... — Banno

Ah.. she's the classic film buff that work is based on the 1948 movie.

The dance is a cure for those who would sanctify words. — Banno

I prefer my illness to your cure.

"Better the bottle than Bannoland", saith the foxy Fly.

Do you think that this notion of ineffable for some is a gateway to transcendence - a path for theists, idealists and assorted wacky metaphysicians to find solace? — Tom Storm

Doubtless it could be, for some. But for most, it leads to petrification, often in the form of religious or philosophical dogmatism. Transcendence is silent. Before enlightenment, carry water, chop wood. After enlightenment, carry water, chop wood.

I prefer my illness to your cure. — unenlightened

But you enjoy commenting on the dance. You are here, after all.

I can get that, but you speak as though you’re forced to partake. — javra

Projection. Just an observation on my part. :wink: @Banno is convincing me that it matters.

As to this issue, I’d phrase it in more blunt terms: does one find that reality is - or else can in principle be made - equivalent to words?

If so, then everything that is can be expressible via words. If not, then some things of which we can be aware of will not be accurately expressible via words.

Maybe I'm missing something here, but I so far don't see it. — javra

Not sure how one goes about answering this question. My intuition is that words are like crude building blocks we use to make (describe) our reality. We don't use them consistently and many of our problems arise from definitional confusions, misuse of words and subjective interpretations.

Besides, there’s a lot more to meaning and its conveyance than words: I can verbally tell you anything about my state of being but if my body posture and mannerisms express otherwise, what will you make out of my words? — javra

Indeed. Is it not the case that most human communication is non verbal? But isn't this also a set of signs and signifiers we can interpret - or we wouldn't be able to read people as well as we often do. Having worked with pretty tough prisoners, I know that nice words like, "How are you, Mate? " can mean, 'I'm going to smash you.' And based on reading the incongruent body language, I know to move away or duck.

"Better the bottle than Bannoland", saith the Fly. — Janus

There can be purpose, utility, in remaining in the trap.

There can be purpose, utility, in remaining in the trap. — Banno

As there can be in believing one has escaped a trap one has merely imagined.

...a trap one has merely imagined. — Janus

Like your mountain?

Not sure how one goes about answering this question. My intuition that words are rather clumsy building blocks we use to feel our way around. — Tom Storm

I could be on board with your metaphor of "clumsy building blocks". As to the question itself, please go for it if you find any faults; I'll rephrase it for easier criticism: The "is everything linguistically expressible" issue boils down to "can reality itself be in principle made equivalent to words".

So, which is the trap: imagining that there is a real, determinate mountain there independent of human experience and conception or imagining that the mountain is an appearance resulting from an interaction we cannot get to the bottom of?

Does freeing oneself from the bottle consist in believing that we know some unimpeachable fact of the matter concerning the reality of the mountain, or does it consist in becoming comfortable with uncertainty?

You are here, after all. — Banno

No, I am not there. No I am not commenting. I am elsewhere and resisting.You reduce me to the words and then point out the contradiction, and that is the giant turd of analysis.

Like your mountain? — Banno

Imaginary mountains are definitely a (no)thing round here. Try this fictional one for size

As the question of public justification takes center stage, it becomes clear that posing the problem of justification in terms of a deliberative or a bargaining problem is a heuristic: the real issue is “the problem of justification”—what principles can be justified to all reasonable citizens or persons. — 6. Conclusion: The Social Contract and Justification

The attempted justification is that we agreed to use "red" for red; but we didn't get nay such choice.

...that is the giant turd of analysis. — unenlightened

...with which you still play.

Bloody Huge Grant. So fucking nice.

Without turning crimson, as I previously said, you can nay it any time. Languages after all evolve via such yey and nay of peoples all the time. Whether it's at all in one's pragmatic favor to do so is a different matter.

Whether it's at all in one's pragmatic favor to do so is a different matter. — javra

Decidable?

Decidable? — Janus

Meaning?

Can you determine whether or not it is in one's "pragmatic favour"?

you can nay it any time. — javra

Of course, having never said "yea".

giant turd of analysis — unenlightened

Bloody Huge Grant. — Banno

forget Hugh Grant: as @Bartricks would say, " Bloody Hugh Janus".

The "is everything linguistically expressible" issue boils down to "can reality itself be in principle made equivalent to words". — javra

I think this is a fair and obvious question. My intuition says it's unlikely. Of course there's a lot hiding in those words 'everything' and 'reality'.

The attempted justification is that we agreed to use "red" for red; but we didn't get nay such choice. — Banno

Agreement is a bad word. It's more of a social requirement or convention.

Can you determine whether or not it is in one's "pragmatic favour"? — Janus

If you're speaking in general, it's contingent on a lot of factors. Choosing not to ever say "red" would hence likely not be in my pragmatic interests. Choosing to not say "ineffable" on the other hand ...

Here's something more palpable, with the strong caveat that no undertones are in any way intended: People nowadays commonly enough express "fuck you" to others when upset with the other. Seeing how "fuck you" implies "may you be raped", one could then in theory make a concerted effort to cease saying this term to others (given that one detests rape for any reason and in any context). Maybe replacing it with "to hell with you" or, if this is too spiritualistic sounding to one's ears, maybe via the coinage of some new terminology. One person can so decide / determine. Were others to then follow suit, maybe such as due to admiration or else finding it pragmatic in their own lives, it would then be a sub-cultural use of language that distances itself from the current norm. Where the vast majority of people to in due course so choose to use alternatives to "fuck you/him/them/etc.", then this use of "fuck you" will in effect then have become a thing of the past.

Again, no undertones intended.

Same can be said with replacing "pimping" (directly implying being a pimp with whores) with something like "stoked" (which need not refer to drugs) or, else, some newly coined terminology.

It costs me nothing to willfully choose not to say "may someone be raped" or else "this is pimp-like behavior and thereby good". Here, it would be in my pragmatic favor - given my ethical values - to not use the terms "fuck you/him/them/etc." and "pimping". Whereas I find no personal interest whatsoever in not using the term "red" - it improves my ability to communicate without in any way compromising my ethical nor aesthetic values - though its up to me to not use the term in practice.

Aesthetics are a big part of language - "Bank of Billy" rather than "Billy's Bank" - but this is a whole other issue all together.

It's not a mathematical type of determination, but it in such roundabout ways I find that it can be more or less decidable / determinable, yes.

It's not a mathematical type of determination, but it in such roundabout ways I find that it can be more or less decidable / determinable, yes. — javra

:up: Makes sense, in different contexts in regard to saying 'yes' or 'no' to the use of loaded words.

Can you determine whether or not it is in one's "pragmatic favour"? — Janus

If one can feel their teeth, it's not one's pragmatic favour. Inappropriate link

a private sensation is nicely pummelled by Isaac's asking which private sensation...

...why, the red ones, of course...

It's a quite vicious circularity. — Banno

Cool, that is exactly what one would expect of something that cannot be described, only named.

something that cannot be described, only named. — hypericin

What is it that you suppose is named here?

…..and when we accept the natural limitations of a given system, we don’t need to lament what it can’t do. — Mww

For a philosopher with the desire to know, the idea that there might be things which are impossible to know is cause for lament.

….but can never evolve out of the kind of system it is. (Remember….dialectical consistency) — Mww

As I said, this is a semantic issue. How would you define "the kind of system it is"? Remember, it is common knowledge that human beings evolved from single celled organisms. So if it is the case, as you say, that the system which comprises the human capacity to understand has natural limitations as to how far it can evolve, you must bear in mind how far it has already evolved. It appears to me that thus "kind of system", one which has evolved from a single celled organism to the extremely complex reasoning human being, doesn't have a whole lot of natural limitations.

….an unjustified assertion, insofar as it is impossible to know all the things there are. The very best to be said is the mind has the capacity to know all things presented to it. — Mww

Sure, this is my "unjustified assertion", that the human intellect has the capacity to know all things. And your "unjustified assertion" is that there are things which can never be apprehended by the mind because they will never appear to it. The difference is that my unjustified assertion provides a good healthy inspiration for human beings to seek out and try to understand all aspects of the universe. Your unjustified assertion is like a degenerative disease of the human being, because it inclines the reasoning being to think that everything which is hidden from it at the present time will always be hidden from it, thereby extinguishing the human being's motivation to learn.

….it is absurd to suppose understanding of all things. The occasions in which some things are misunderstood verifies limits. Nothing ever being misunderstood is the only sufficient ground for the possibility of understanding all things. — Mww

I can't see why you think that this is an absurd goal. Yes, it is a lofty goal, but why dismiss lofty goals as absurd? If a youngster comes to you and says my goal is to some day win the World Cup, would you tell the child that this is absurd, and send them home crying by shattering their dreams? I don't think you would, because the proper action is to encourage the child who has lofty goals. Philosophy is similar, except that we are grown up, so we make goals which are not personal but communal. We have very lofty goals which a philosopher knows will likely never be fulfilled in his or her lifetime. But each small step taken is a step toward that lofty goal, which would only be a step taken in vain, therefore not inspired to be taken at all, if the goal was designated to be absurd.

On and on it goes. Give it up and go have a turkey leg or something. — Mww

There you go, making your defeatist attitude explicit.

The salient point with regard to the topic, what cannot be said, remains the fact that we do talk about red. Hence red is not ineffable. The retort is something like, that we can talk about the colour red but not the sensation of red. This sits oddly in the mouths of those who also claim that the colour red is the name of a sensation. And it is wrong, since we do talk about the sensation of red. — Banno

I agree that there is no ineffable sensation of red in the guise of something like a qualia. I also agree that red only has meaning as something we talk about. But I argue that in order to understand perception as simultaneously private and public, rather than as one or the other, we have to recognize that in perceiving color or anything else, we must ‘talk’ to ourselves, and this is the essence of perception. Whatever we have learned about the meaning of words, objects and colors through prior interchange with others contributes to the background informing our self-speech, just as what we have learned about the perceptual world though solitary exploration of it does. When we are alone and deciding what colors to use in a painting we are creating, we draw from that previous merged public and private history with color, but then transform that history in applying it to the present task.

Perception doesn’t just draw from an archive of previous experience with words and perceptions, it always uses that knowledge in new ways. Just as the use of words between people is a language game, the use of prior knowledge about perception in new perceiving is a ‘perception’ game, a kind of language game that takes place in solitary situations. We ask ourselves ‘which’ sensations, and answer them to ourselves through such games which are neither strictly private nor public. They are private only in the sense that we renew the meaning of perceptual experience in every new context of engaging with the perceptual world, without the need to have another person there to respond to us.

They are public in that new perception forces us outside of the archive of previous perceptual meaning, interrogating and modifying our expectations. We are not just in our heads when we construct an experience of red, we are thrown into new situations with red which alters the meaning of past experience. If it is the discursive exposure to another in a use situation which is the requirement for answering the question “WHICH private sensation?” , then this requirement is already met in solitary perception, since to recognize any aspect of our environment is to use our previous experience with it via the transformation ( use) of expectation through my discursive exposure of my past with the fresh novelty of immediate context This is how perception functions by talking to itself. My self-speech is more than just a proxy, an already archived record of my history of discourse with other persons. Asking ourselves what we mean by red , in the context of the solitary perceptual ‘language’ game, is asking ourselves in a fresh way what is at stake and at issue in using a perceptual sense, and the answer comes from both the world of speaking communities we participate with and the solitary world of light and sound and touch.

If you're claiming we don't have experiences of red and pain, you're making a strong claim and you'll need a strong argument for it. — frank

It's a 'strong' claim because you said so?

Hers' my 'strong' argument for it. There's absolutely no evidence for it. No one can describe such an experience, no-one can pin down such an experience, there are no tests for it, there's no mechanism in the brain which could account for it, there's no cortex in the brain which could process it, and every test that's ever been done to try and identify such a thing has failed utterly.