Redness, the visual sensation I experience when an object or light source designated "red" enters my visual field . — hypericin

Which one? The one you experienced with the red post box, or the one from the red wine, or the red rose, or the red car...which of them is the 'red' one?

Babies begin to see red after a few weeks. — hypericin

Babies respond to different wavelengths. Plants do that too. Do they have 'experiences of red'?

Which one? The one you experienced with the red post box, or the one from the red wine, or the red rose, or the red car...which of them is the 'red' one? — Isaac

"Red' is a generalization applied to all of them. The experience is the experience regardless; is the post box red or maybe more orange, is the red wine red or burgundy, the rose red or dark pink, and so on. You're not going to convince me that I don't see colours or that there are no animals who see colour on account of not undergoing the requisite social induction.

"Red' is a generalization applied to all of them. — Janus

How?

I think the main difference is that I can show you an apple, but I can't show you my experience. I can show you my expression of pain, but not the pain itself.
— Luke

First, I think you can show me the experience. If you prick your finger with a pin, you can show me the experience by pricking me with a pin. — Jamal

I didn't say I can't show you "the" experience. I said I can't show you "my" experience.

Are the experiences the same? Well, there’s no numerical identity, but there’s some level of qualitative identity. — Jamal

How do you know that "there's some level of qualitative identity"? Can that ever be anything more than an assumption?

There can’t be total qualitative identity because that would be equivalent to numerical identity, and that would require that I experience the pinprick as you, which is just to be you. I don’t think it’s right to describe this as ineffability. — Jamal

I have not described this as ineffability. I have said that language may not be able to communicate one person's experience such that another can "fully" understand their experience only from the language.

I see this kind of how I see perception. Some around here will say that perception is deficient or distorted because we perceive in a particular way which is determined or conditioned by our anatomy and physiology and our behaviour in our environment. This view presumes that perfect, undistorted perception would be a view from nowhere or, in Kant’s terms, an intellectual intuition. This is a bad account of perception. — Jamal

I don't presume or have any sympathy for an undistorted view from nowhere.

'Red' is the word used to denote the colour of the post box, wine and rose in the example you gave.

That's language. You were denying the role of language. I was asking how this 'generalization' was carried out absent of language or socialisation.

Gross, but appropriate in an inappropriate kind of way.

No one can describe such an experience, no-one can pin down such an experience — Isaac

It's ineffable.

there's no mechanism in the brain which could account for it, there's no cortex in the brain which could process it — Isaac

You must possess a preternatural understanding of what the brain can and can't do.

there are no tests for it... and every test that's ever been done to try and identify such a thing has failed utterly. — Isaac

No tests and all the tests fail, things are looking grim for team experience.

There's absolutely no evidence for it. — Isaac

Don't believe your lying eyes.

Which one? The one you experienced with the red post box, or the one from the red wine, or the red rose, or the red car...which of them is the 'red' one? — Isaac

No "the", these are all "red experiences". Is this going somewhere?

Consciousness is a mystery, to which sticking your head in the sand and pretending it doesn't exist is not a solution.

That's language. You were denying the role of language. I was asking how this 'generalization' was carried out absent of language or socialisation. — Isaac

I denied the role of language in determining the colours seen, but of course language is involved in conceptualizing and talking about the colours seen, including the kind of gross generalization involved in referring to all those differently coloured objects as "red". Do you deny that animals can recognize different colours although they have no language?

of course language is involved in conceptualizing and talking about the colours seen, including the kinds of gross generalizations involved in such things as referring to all those differently coloured objects as "red". — Janus

So 'red' is a social construct.

From where do we learn that the wine and the post box are of similar enough colour for the experience they produce to be the same 'red experience'? Language. Culture.

Do you deny that animals can recognize different colours although they have no language? — Janus

Yes, in the main. I would deny the claim that animals have no language, but I doubt any are sophisticated enough to delineate colour terms.

So 'red' is a social construct.

From where do we learn that the wine and the post box are of similar enough colour for the experience they produce to be the same 'red experience'? Language. Culture. — Isaac

The concept of red, as in a grouping of similar colors under the rubric of a single word, is a social construct. But this is trivial, this is just how language works, there are only so many words. Other cultures divide the colors among their limited allotment of color words differently. So what. None of this has bearing on your radical and unsupported claim that the phenomenal experience of red is an illusory social construct.

You said...

When I was a small child I learned to associate this sensation with "color", and this variety of color sensation with "red". — hypericin

I asked...

Which sensation? — Isaac

You replied...

Redness, the visual sensation I experience when an object or light source designated "red" enters my visual field . — hypericin

Now you're saying there's no 'the'. So which sensation did you learn to associate with the word red as a child?

From where do we learn that the wine and the post box are of similar enough colour for the experience they produce to be the same 'red experience'? Language. Culture. — Isaac

Of course we learn colour terms via culture. They are part of language obviously.

Yes, in the main. I would deny the claim that animals have no language, but I doubt any are sophisticated enough to delineate colour terms. — Isaac

Animals have no symbolic language such as we do, But some animals can undoubtedly recognize different colours. You could set up an experiment to show that, for example dogs, might respond differently to different coloured cards where a green card meant getting fed and a blue card meant being let out for some exercise, and where the cards were tonally identical, which would rule our their responding to different shades of grey, (I remember reading that dogs can see certain colours, but I can't remember which ones, so my suggested experiment is just an example).

You could set up an experiment to show that, for example, dogs, might respond differently to different coloured cards where a green card meant getting fed and a blue card meant being let out for some exercise, and where the cards were tonally identical, which would rule our their responding to different shades of grey, (I remember reading that dogs can see certain colours, but I can't remember which ones, so my suggested experiment is just an example). — Janus

So has this been done? It doesn't seem much of a point to say that an experiment could show what you believe to be the case.

As I said before. Plants respond to different wavelengths. Are you prepared to say that plants have experiences?

As I said it is just an example of a possible experiment I thought of, so I don't know. But dogs are said to be able to see colours, so I guess some experiments have been done which demonstrate that. It would be easy enough to check on the Net.

I've saved you the trouble

So are you prepared to say plants have experiences?

I can get a spectrometer to respond one way to green light and another to red. Did the spectrometer just have two 'experiences'?

Now you're saying there's no 'the'. So which sensation did you learn to associate with the word red as a child? — Isaac

There is not one single red sensation, it is a family. I learned to associate a spectrum of color sensations corresponding to a spectrum of light centered around 700nm or so as "red".

The linguistic association between this set of sensations and a word is of course socially mediated, that is no great insight. But this is not to say that the sensation itself is somehow socially mediated, or somehow doesn't exist.

Since plants, not to mention spectrometers, don't possess central nervous systems and brains it might be thought to be implausible to claim they have experiences. Dogs possess both those, and if you owned dogs I think it would seem plausible to you that they do have experiences.

Of course we can't know for sure that any beings other than ourselves have experiences, although language capable humans can report their experiences, so we can be justified in thinking it more or less certain that they do. Are you prepared to say that a human being who had been raised without learning language would have no experiences?

I see no reason to think there is not a distinction between having and reporting experiences and that having them is not contingent on being able to report having them. But again, there is no way to be absolutely certain either way.

I didn't say I can't show you "the" experience. I said I can't show you "my" experience. — Luke

Yes, but as far as showing me your experience has any meaning at all, it means just the same as showing me the experience, which is why I put it that way and why I made the point.

How do you know that "there's some level of qualitative identity"? Can that ever be anything more than an assumption? — Luke

There is little that is more certain than that we share lots of things, so I wouldn't want to characterize it as merely an assumption. (Obviously though, I could have lost the feeling in my finger, so we're not always right).

I have not described this as ineffability. I have said that language may not be able to communicate one person's experience such that another can "fully" understand their experience only from the language. — Luke

My point was that this is tantamount to saying what I said.

I don't presume or have any sympathy for an undistorted view from nowhere. — Luke

I didn't think you did. It's precisely because I thought you didn't that I used it as an analogy to help get across my point.

But this is going around in circles and I don't think you're reading me charitably, even though I'm being pretty clear. If I'm misunderstanding something (to do with knowledge and understanding I suppose), then you could try to explain what it is.

If you're claiming we don't have experiences of red and pain, you're making a strong claim and you'll need a strong argument for it.
— frank

It's a 'strong' claim because you said so?

Hers' my 'strong' argument for it. There's absolutely no evidence for it. No one can describe such an experience, no-one can pin down such an experience, there are no tests for it, there's no mechanism in the brain which could account for it, there's no cortex in the brain which could process it, and every test that's ever been done to try and identify such a thing has failed utterly. — Isaac

It's a strong claim that we don't have experiences because it's counter to common sense. If you don't have that, you wouldn't notice.

Lack of evidence is not evidence of lack. Try again.

This ineffable thread surely is effing along nicely

How long is a thread about what cannot be said? — Banno

It is said that each string has two ends. It is sad that each thread has two ends. One of the two ends may be never finished, completed, and final; but not to say it ends in infinity, as infinity is not one given number, it is not one given point.

Is "ineffable" ineffable itself? "That which cannot be said." But I just said it, did I not.

To the list in the Opening Post, I'd add one more category of ineffable: That which ONE can't say, but OTHERS can. For instance, a child gets a stomach cramp. It is an ineffable feeling for her; she never got it before, she has no concept of what to compare it to. So this three-year-old says to her mommy, "Mammy, mammy, I am experiencing and ineffable sensation in my lower abdomen." To which her mother replies, "Oh, darling, my Sweetness, it's nothing but a fleeting stomach cramp." To which the child replies: "Ah? Well, I'll be. In that case, make it a stiff one, please, Mammy." This discourse happens of course in none else but an English household.

And life goes on. Ob-la-dee, ob-la-da.

I re-read my post. Infinity: it is an effable word, everyone knows it, yet its true meaning is ineffable. It can be called a name, but its essence is not conceivable by the human mind. We have a category of imagination for the concept, but can't be experientially proven to be, as no human in history has experienced infinity.

Is there a word for this? Something that can be said, clearly and unambiguously, everyone knows what the speaker has in mind, but still, the thing just said can't be fathomed by human minds? Other concepts in this category are god, particularly the modern theological concepts of solitary gods, zero, nothing, love, life, the essence of humour.

This ineffable thread surely is effing along nicely — Heracloitus

Canada coach John Herdman wasn’t trying to be disrespectful when he said the next mission for his squad was to “eff Croatia", he was just setting the tone for the F match.

https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/canada-coach-john-herdman-eff-croatia-comment

And so the Croatian coach replied with everyone has their own communication style. I'm not sure it's a nice thing to say but that's his right.

If "eff" was hate speech, the right to use it would be denied, and "eff" would be officially ineffable.

There is not one single red sensation, it is a family. I learned to associate a spectrum of color sensations corresponding to a spectrum of light centered around 700nm or so as "red". — hypericin

How did you identify that the sensation was a 'colour sensation'?

Are you prepared to say that a human being who had been raised without learning language would have no experiences? — Janus

I don't think anyone 'doesn't have experiences'. I said earlier that experiences are post hoc constructions, they're narratives we use to make what just happened in our brain more predictable (understandable in more colloquial terms). We weave together disparate, and often completely contradictory processes into one coherent narrative after the mental events themselves have already taken place and then 'prune' our connections to those process via the hippocampus to create a false memory of how things went down - one which eliminates all the contradictory and inexplicable stuff. That process will (theoretically) happen in a newborn as much as in a language-less adult - though nether have been so thoroughly tested as normal adults. But our word 'red' acts as an off-the-shelf ready-made narrative (one used pretty specifically for communication as well, not one much used for understanding life in general). So anyone having a 'red' experience' is, by definition, using that off-the-shelf narrative.

What actually just went on in their brain which the narrative was chosen to help explain has nothing whatsoever to do with 'red'. It may have been triggered by wavelengths of light. It may, as in @Banno's mention of blind people using colour words, be completely unrelated to such triggers.

The point is that any use of the public narrative 'red' is, by definition, public.

It's a strong claim that we don't have experiences — frank

It is.

Your quote...

f you're claiming we don't have experiences of red and pain — frank

Yes, but as far as showing me your experience has any meaning at all, it means just the same as showing me the experience, which is why I put it that way and why I made the point. — Jamal

Casting it in terms of "the" experience, as though there is only one to be had, seems little more than a stipulation that two people cannot each have different experiences or different feelings in relation to undergoing the same experience.

There is little that is more certain than that we share lots of things, so I wouldn't want to characterize it as merely an assumption. (Obviously though, I could have lost the feeling in my finger, so we're not always right). — Jamal

Sharing lots of things is not the same as sharing everything. It is in those unshared differences that I claim ineffability may reside. Also, in what sense would you be "wrong" if you lost feeling in your finger?

My point was that this is tantamount to saying what I said. — Jamal

Returning to what you said, how are you not arguing for total qualitative identity (e.g. wrt the pin prick)? I actually don't follow why total qualitative identity entails numerical identity. I imagine it might be possible for two people to have total qualitative identity in relation to a particular experience (e.g. seeing a red patch) while remaining separate people. Perhaps I've misunderstood what you mean by "total qualitative identity"?

But this is going around in circles and I don't think you're reading me charitably, even though I'm being pretty clear. — Jamal

I'm sorry that you feel I'm being uncharitable. I'm only trying to get my point across, but I'm probably not doing a great job of it.

I'm sorry that you feel I'm being uncharitable. I'm only trying to get my point across, but I'm probably not doing a great job of it. — Luke

Same here! No problem Luke: right now I don't have any more words.

Your quote...

f you're claiming we don't have experiences of red and pain — Isaac

See I knew you weren't denying that. You're too smart for that.