Just so you know where I'm coming from, I'm a physicalist.

Re your argument, though, why couldn't someone argue that, assuming the law of conservation is correct, nonphysical souls nonphysically affect the physical universe, so that their not adding any physical energy?

By the way, empirical claims are not provable, as even as a physicalist, I'm an antirealist on physical laws.

Thanks for your comment, and yes I appreciate that scientific laws are not deductively valid but the sheer inductive weight of evidence in support of the two laws evidenced, coupled with the fact that it seems inconceivable to imagine how they may be broken, even in principle, leads me to conclude that they are as provable as provable gets in the realm of experience. There is no requirement for the laws to be deductively infallible but rather empirically necessary.

Are you familiar with the Princess of Bohemia's letter written in Response to Descartes, when he posited the existence of a non-extended, causally relevant mind? She argued that in order for anything to interact there must be some shared property through which the interaction might occur i.e. if two things share absolutely no properties then they cannot causally interact. Relating this to the rebuttal you offered; it is logically impossible for a nonphysical thing to affect a physical thing - there isn't a single property they share in virtue of how the two things are defined. Whether or not you agree with the Princess I think is irrelevant - if you cannot conceive of a single way in which the physical might interact with the non-physical, which I don't think you can (just as you cannot imagine a square circle) then it must be said to be logically impossible.

Do you find these responses satisfactory?

Define "God." Gods that require free will in order to be internally coherent. No. Gods that are like what Calvinists believe in? Completely fine.

She argued that in order for anything to interact there must be some shared property through which the interaction might occur i.e. if two things share absolutely no properties then they cannot causally interact. — James McSharry

I'm sure I read that way back when, but I don't recall it. What was the argument for it?

I reckon that she was trying to say a "non-physical mind" cannot possibly interact with the physical world by definition...

I reckon that she was trying to say a "non-physical mind" cannot possibly interact with the physical world by definition... — VagabondSpectre

"By definition" wouldn't be a very good argument though, haha.

Not really, no. But such is the nature of arguments pertaining to "consciousness" due to it's prevailing mysteriousness...

Hey. I am trying to access the page to your article but your link appears to be broken. Could you fix the link, or else summarize your argument here?