This is where I side with the Phenomenology of Husserl and stop worrying about such questions :D

I find myself confused, as perhaps many young people do when contemplating the existence of fictional entities such as Santa Claus in the real world.........Now, the issue is more perplexing if we endow Santa Claus the ontological placeholder of living over at the North Pole with his reindeer. — Shawn

The North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus if relations don't ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

Santa Claus is said to be "fictional", yet in what way is the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world any less fictional.

Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of the Mind 1949 included an example illustrating that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world. A visitor to Oxford upon viewing the colleges and library reportedly inquired "But where is the University ?". Ryle discussed the problem in terms of categories. There is the category 1 of "units of physical infrastructure", including those parts that are said to physically exist in the world independent of the visitor, colleges, library, etc., and there is category 2 "institution", including unseen relations between those physical parts, role in society, laws and regulations, etc. The visitor made the mistake of presuming that the "University" was part of category 1 rather than category 2.

My belief is that the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus, as I have yet to come across any persuasive argument that relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

Until the charming teacher in first grade informs you that "santa does not exist", runing you whole day, sometime 1969 .still remember it, not with much pleasure.

For me Santa clause is a patriarchal figure that is omniscient and knows when all children are "naughty" or "nice" and checks that list twice (he's thorough and takes your most recent deeds into account so that you may always have the chance to get in his good books at any moment, even right on the Eve of Christmas before the day of judgement - and the proof, the evidence under the tree - a gift or a bag of coal tells you what he thought of you this year. Although I suspect not many children have ever been truly bad in his eyes (witnessed that bag of coal).

For someone to care about all children everywhere that they might feel blessed with gifts on Christmas, he seems like the absent third parent that, although illusive, has a Great Love for the innocent in society.

He only appears once a year, in secrecy, under the cover of darkness, no child has ever seen him do his Christmas day great works (except for a few minutes at a Santa's grotto maybe). He is inaccesible, existing at the furthest pole, the most barren void, the greatest reach, beyond us all.

He hurtles along at magical speeds, spreading out, almost rippling around the world, on the news, in the papers, his path followed by NASA, confirmed by the postal service which has a direct connection to his letter box, films, stories, songs and plays alike written about him, in reverence of him, known to all but never fully witnessed, having his elves (our actual parents) do his bidding for him - United by something that moves faster than any physical object can - Belief.
Belief of all parents for their children's sake, belief acted out providing Santa's gift under the tree so that evidence of him can be reached, appreciated, by all children.

Santa is in a superposition of very convincingly real (to children) and well, not as much for adults, but amusing nonetheless - the sentiment is no less upheld despite that.

Santa has many parallels with other entities the adult world has written of and discussed at length many times over many millenia. And we can't shake the thought. Nor do we want to, for all the joy it brings not only to the lives of children but to those of the families that love them.

I attempted treating the problem as a reference issue between fictional entities [...] — Shawn

I mean, I'm guessing that didn't end well, as "fictional entity" is an oxymoron?

I mean, I'm guessing that didn't end well, as "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? — bongo fury

Not according to the SEP article Fictional Entities, which write: "While London and Napoleon are not fictional entities, some have thought that the London of the Holmes stories and the Napoleon of War and Peace should be classed as special fictional entities."

Also not according to Alberto Voltolini in his book How Ficta Follow Fiction, A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, where he wrote: " I present a genuinely ontological argument in favor of fictional entities. According to this argument, we have to accept fictional entities because they figure in the identity conditions of other entities that are already accepted, namely fictional works."

The thing is you are assuming there is a reference relation between words and things. If there is no reference relation, the problem disappears, we have no trouble speaking about Santa Claus or Pegasus.

I don't think there is a reference relation between words and things. People refer, not words themselves.

Do you mean, these people deny that "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? Or that they have found that reasoning with oxymorons can end well?

People refer, not words themselves. — Manuel

But what do they refer to?

All kinds of things, ranging from ideas to mythical creatures to a car outside the window and so on.

The act of referring to a specific thing is one of many things we do when we talk. In a normal conversation we do all kinds of things, including showing emotions, laughing, talking with no particular goal in mind.

And then you have the politician, who can spend an hour talking and not saying anything, much less referring to an event or anything of substance.

Do you mean, these people deny that "fictional entity" is an oxymoron - or that they have found that reasoning with oxymorons can end well? — bongo fury

In the sense that fictional is not necessarily contradictory to entity.

The act of referring to a specific thing — Manuel

So we're back where we started. Among this subset of the things we do with language, the acts of referring to specific things, are there acts of referring to specific non-things?

I don't see why Santa Claus would be a "non-thing". It's a mental construction of a person in a red dress living in the North Pole, that's a thing - though it lacks concrete existence in the world.

I mean, most of the words we use all the time, even right now, aren't referring to anything.

Sometimes, we refer as when we speak of that car the ran through a red light or this cool moment in a novel. What's the problem? A "thing" must be concrete? Well, most of the universe isn't. We can't see quarks, but few physicists would say these are "non-things".

In another sense, one can do experiments that show the existence of quarks. Not so with Santa Claus. Neither are concrete.

Yet people speak about Santa Claus all the time, so the issue of the alleged difficulty does not arise, if one drops word-object obligations.

My belief is that the North Pole, reindeer and "real" world are as "fictional" as Santa Claus, as I have yet to come across any persuasive argument that relations do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

My belief is later stated in the OP, that somehow through language we can ascribe ontological placeholders to fictional entities such as Pegasus or Santa Claus. I find this feature of instantiation of imaginary objects perplexing in language. But that's how ordinary language works to my surprise.

I mean, I'm guessing that didn't end well, as "fictional entity" is an oxymoron? — bongo fury

Clearly language goes on holiday whenever we try and actually do that kind of stuff. What are your thoughts about instantiation and ontological ascription such as the case with Pegasus or Santa?

I don't see why Santa Claus would be a "non-thing". It's a mental construction of a person... — Manuel

So Santa is the thought? Or the person thought about? Or both, or neither?

Depends on the context. If you know the mythology behind Santa Claus and want to explain it to somebody, you could say that Santa would be the person thought about.

If you are merely saying that Santa brought gifts, then Santa would be the thought, or so it can be argued.

We don't have a clear notion of what a thought even is.

But generally speaking, this distinction is more semantic than substantive.

I'm with Quine. And Goodman. Words often refer to (or are pretended to refer to, in acts of referring, which are only a game) actual things. Sometimes they fail to refer directly to actual things. Because there's no such thing. That doesn't stop them referring indirectly (but only indirectly) to other things. E.g. to actual Santa stories and pictures, and actual beardy old men.

But generally speaking, this distinction is more semantic than substantive. — Manuel

What distinction? That between a thought and what it's a thought about? You've lost me. My thought about Hitler isn't substantively different from Hitler?

In the sense that fictional is not necessarily contradictory to entity. — RussellA

Fair enough. Do they say that non-actual is not necessarily contradictory to actual?

I think that's quite stringent. Santa isn't an individual and yet is in the domain of discourse. So, what can one do about that?

Santa isn't an individual and yet is in the domain of discourse — Shawn

What do you mean when you say Santa is not an individual? you want to say that Santa is a common subterfuge.

Santa doesn't denote a person in the world, and yet is treated as if he is an individual in the domain of discourse.

I think that's quite stringent. — Shawn

The indirect reference to Santa stories and pictures and actual beardy old men is fairly free, isn't it?

Santa isn't an individual — Shawn

Do you mean there is no actual person answering to the usual descriptions and hence named by the relevant tokens of the word "Santa"? (Good.)

and yet is in the domain of discourse. — Shawn

Well perhaps you are talking here about the name "Santa" (or relevant tokens of it), and not some corresponding person? "Santa" is a name appearing in a declaration of the domain of discourse?

My belief is later stated in the OP, that somehow through language we can ascribe ontological placeholders to fictional entities such as Pegasus or Santa Claus. I find this feature of instantiation of imaginary objects perplexing in language. But that's how ordinary language works to my surprise. — Shawn

I can point to any set of words within a language and give the set a name.

For example, I can point to {"creator", "universe"} and give it the name "godlike".
I can point to {"winged", "godlike", "stallion"} and give it the name "Pegasus".

Also, I can point to {"tree", "snake"} and give it the name "trake"
I can point to {"trake", "invisible", "orange"} and give it the name "trakinor"

"Trakinor" is now a placeholder to the fictional entity trakinor, an invisible orange tree-snake. "Trakinor" has instantiated the imaginary object trakinor.

Is it really the case that naming a set of words is perplexing.

Fair enough. Do they say that non-actual is not necessarily contradictory to actual? — bongo fury

I doubt it. Not-A cannot be A, but an entity can be fictional.

The language regarding Santa Clause exists but he is unable to manifest beyond it. That’s the difficulty with all abstract concepts and universals. There is no referent. The word refers to other words, or to people who are not Santa. Language exists, certainly, but Santa does not.

I can point to {"winged", "godlike", "stallion"} and give it the name "Pegasus". — RussellA

But Pegasus flies. Your set of words doesn't.

Do you mean there is no actual person answering to the usual descriptions and hence named by the relevant tokens of the word "Santa"? — bongo fury

Yes.

"Santa" is a name appearing in a declaration of the domain of discourse? — bongo fury

Is it? I don't think Santa qualifies in the domain of discourse as an individual. Yet, we can instantiate him freely in movies, towards children and anywhere else.

My point, if you will, is if we can freely refer to Santa then what is it that allows us to instantiate him ontologically in the domain of discourse?

Is it really the case that naming a set of words is perplexing. — RussellA

No, that's not the point here. What I'm referring to is the fact that Pegasus or Santa doesn't exist in the world, maybe perhaps Meinongs jungle, but we refer to him as if he does.