You think like this because you likely think like Quine and his ilk think, that scientific models of what things are and how to talk about them are models for philosophical thinking. One has to think, if you will, out of the box. — Constance

I think Quine would think that philosophy is continuous with science, but in a more general way. So his “ilk” would be Einstein, Newton, and Bohr.

You think like this because you likely think like Quine and his ilk think, that scientific models of what things are and how to talk about them are models for philosophical thinking. — Constance

No, I don't think that scientific models of what things are and how to talk about them are models for philosophical thinking. I've argued avidly against science encroaching on philosophical thinking, in various places, over many years.

I haven't been arguing for what you think I've been arguing. It is simply not the case that there is a binary choice between science and phenomenology. Which is just as well, since phenomenology remains vexed.

Banno's claim that an exhaustive list of instructions will not give one knowledge of how to ride a bike. — Luke

Here's were that is from:

Or, suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list! — Banno

Suppose I had instead said,
"suppose someone had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would they then be a bike rider? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list!"

What would you make of that?

To continue with this thought, if I ask someone “do you know how to ride a bike”, and she proceeds to repeat the manual on how to ride a bike. Does she have knowledge, or just demonstrated recall of a manual? I give her a bike and she cannot ride it, she does not know how to ride a bike.

:up:

I believe you have this backwards. First, we come to learn a language from our follow human beings in world of stable objects and entities. Afterwards, we begins to learn more sophisticated concepts like images, impression and sensation against this stable background. — Richard B

So, prior to learning a language nothing at all is experienced?

That's the thought: there is more to bike riding than the manual, but that "more" is effable: "get on your bikes an ride", to quote Freddy. Seems that @Luke may have been distracted by the word "know".

So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list! — Banno

And so what is missing in order to ride the bike? Just, and only, the learning to ride. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list either! Because what is learned is knowledge that cannot be verbalized.

Just, and only, the learning to ride. — hypericin

No.

Just, and only, the riding of the bike. — Banno

These are not the same.

And?

Indeed.

You're deflections, one-liners, non-arguments approach ineffability themselves.

"Whereof one cannot argue, thereof one must be silent."
.

Aww, love you, too.

If you want a discussion, be interesting.

I’m wondering if you are familiar with the ways in which Husserl and Heidegger, respectively, burrowed within the grammar of formal logic to expose it as a derived abstraction of more fundamental constituting performances ? For instance, are you aware of how Husserl, in Formal and Transcendenral Logic, took Frege and Russell’s starting point in the propositional
copula and traced it back to a developmental sequence of constituting intentions? — Joshs

I am asking myself, do I want to read Formal and Transcendental Logic? Yes. But do I have it. No, but I'll get it. I'll read it and get back to you. As always, so appreciative of your references, etc. It motivates.

Get back to you....I'll keep it short.

"Whereof one cannot argue, thereof one must be silent." — hypericin

Not silent. "Whereof one cannot argue, thereof one must distract, insinuate, cast aspersions, baldly assert, pontificate or utilize some other deflection designed to blind oneself and/ or others from the vacuity of one's position".

"Whereof one cannot argue, thereof one must distract, insinuate, cast aspersions, baldly assert, pontificate or utilize some other deflection designed to blind oneself and/ or others from the vacuity of one's position". — Janus

No.

"Whereof one cannot argue, thereof one must be silent." — hypericin

These are not the same.



Hey, this is easy!

, , have fun, chaps. Let us know when you want to get back on topic.

You got it!

have fun, chaps. Let us know when you want to get back on topic. — Banno

There is no topic, or at least none to speak of; it drops out of the conversation.

There is no topic — Janus

"The Insufferable?"

Here's were that is from:
Or, suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list!
— Banno
Suppose I had instead said,
"suppose someone had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would they then be a bike rider? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list!" — Banno

Why are you asking me to suppose this? How about you reply to my previous post instead? But fine, I'll play along.

Firstly, what counts as a "bike rider"? Is it someone who knows how to ride a bike or is it someone who is riding a bike? Presumably it's the latter since you are now trying to distance yourself from your contradictory claim regarding knowledge.

So your question then becomes: "suppose someone had a list of the instructions of riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would they then be riding a bike?"

No. Obviously, it doesn't follow that a person with a list of instructions is riding a bike.

Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list!" — Banno

So, in conclusion, riding a bike is not something to add to the list of instructions. So, what was your original point supposed to be? I can't make sense of the quote if it isn't about knowledge.

What would you make of that? — Banno

I would wonder why you asked whether a person with a list of instructions is riding a bike. I would also wonder what that has to do with the present discussion on ineffability.

Furthermore, I now wonder why you are trying to pretend as though your point was not about knowledge when it clearly was.

For example, prior to the above quote, in your second post to this discussion, you said:

If what we know is believed, justified and true, it is propositional, and hence statable. But can one put into words how one rides a bike or play guitar? Tacit knowledge is a candidate for the ineffable. — Banno

The only reason I can see for you now backpedalling on this knowledge issue is because you have finally realised that the original quote (at the top of this post) is indefensible and inconsistent with your beliefs about ineffability.

Seems that Luke may have been distracted by the word "know". — Banno

Yeah, I get "distracted" when you make contradictory claims.

To continue with this thought, if I ask someone “do you know how to ride a bike”, and she proceeds to repeat the manual on how to ride a bike. Does she have knowledge, or just demonstrated recall of a manual? I give her a bike and she cannot ride it, she does not know how to ride a bike. — Richard B

Do you believe it's impossible for someone to learn something only by telling them how? If I tell you how to turn the television on by saying "press the big red button on the remote control", do you think it impossible to know how to turn the television on?

Why are you asking me to suppose this? — Luke

Because it gets to the intent of the post, without the "knowing" that confused the issue so. But suit yourself, you are not under any obligation.

...riding a bike is not something to add to the list of instructions. So, what was your original point supposed to be? — Luke

That riding a bike is not something to add to the list of instructions. I kinda said that, a few times.

Look, the point could have been expressed more clearly, Thank you for point this out. Now go back to the original post and look again.

Or go do something else. As you will. :roll:

Because it gets to the intent of the post, without the "knowing" that confused the issue — Banno

Okay, so what was the original intent if it wasn't about knowledge?

I think Quine would think that philosophy is continuous with science, but in a more general way. So his “ilk” would be Einstein, Newton, and Bohr. — Richard B

The question then is, do Einstein and the rest provide an explanatory basis for philosophical questions? No, I say, simply. His naturalism leads to statements like this:

the terms that play a leading role in a good conceptual apparatus are terms that promise to play a
leading role in causal explanation; and causal explanation is polarized. Causal explanations of
psychology are to be sought in physiology, of physiology in biology, of biology in chemistry,
and of chemistry in physics—in the elementary physical states

Causal explanations in scientific settings, moving down the line to physics, which is the resting place for inquiry. How THAT can account for things like value and knowledge I would like to know. How is a causal relationship an epistemic one?

It is simply not the case that there is a binary choice between science and phenomenology — Banno

Yup.

I don't think that's true, because we can know-how, collectively. That's basically the whole process of production -- to analyse a process, divide up the labor and specialize to form a social organism. — Moliere

That is not a collective know-how, it's a collective production. Each individual involved in the production has one's own know-how necessary to play one's own part in the production, but there is no single know-how which is proper to the whole, only a product. The product is proper to the whole, as a product of the whole, but there is no specific know-how which is proper to that product because the same product could be produced in different ways. That the same product can be produced in numerous different ways, i.e. the same end can be reached with different means, is evidence that there is no specific type of know-how which can be directly related to the end product. "Know-how" refers to the means not the end.

We know how to do many things together. — Moliere

This, I believe is a misrepresentation, for the reason explained above.
In order for you and I to do something together, I must know how to do my part, and you must know how to do your part. Since what I am doing would be completely different from what you are doing, it is very clear that your required know-how would be completely different from my required know-how. And, neither of us could be playing both roles at once. Since no-one can play that role of multiple positions at one time, this purported 'act of the whole' cannot be accounted for as a type of know-how.

Therefore there is no such thing as the know-how of both of us together, because no one could be able to do both parts at once, so this needs to be called by a name other than "know-how". The unity of parts working toward a common goal, what you call doing something together, is clearly not a form of "know-how" but something distinct. That is why Plato classed "the good" as distinct from knowledge, as Constance and I discussed earlier in the thread. And the "just" "State" was described as the state where each person did one's own thing without interfering with others. Notice that the State is a state, and acts are proper to the individual members of the state. And know-how is proper to acts, not to states of being.

Further, the process of learning, at least in the industrial world, is transferred -- that's what socialization is all about. And, for creatures like us, given how long it takes for our offspring to become productive, and how much education it takes to make us productive in our societies, we intentionally transfer knowledge to the young all the time. It is taught. There is a teacher, and a student, and the students are given rules to follow -- including the social organization of the school itself, teaching children to behave in an industrial society. — Moliere

Your missing the point Moliere. If knowledge is a property of the whole, then it is not transferred in the act of teaching and learning, because it's not a property of the individual, to be transferred from one to another. You can't have it both ways, arguing that knowledge is a property of the united whole, as you do above, and then turn around and say that knowledge is a property of individuals, which is transferred from one to another. You are talking about two distinct things here, one, the property of the whole, the other the property of the individual. If one is "knowledge", the other cannot be, because the two are completely different.

Causal explanations in scientific settings, moving down the line to physics, which is the resting place for inquiry. How THAT can account for things like value and knowledge I would like to know. How is a causal relationship an epistemic one? — Constance

Let's consider this from Quine (from Two Dogmas), " As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posit comparable, epistemologically, to gods of Homer, and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proven more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience."

So how does Quine come to such a position. (From the Pursuit of Truth): "From impacts on our sensory surfaces, we in our collective and cumulative creativity down the generations have projected our systematic theory of the external world. Our system is proving successful in predicting subsequent sensory input." And thus we have the start of Quine's naturalized epistemology. In a nut shell, our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors. In contrast, I presume, phenomenology starts with appearance of things, or things as they appear in our experience, from a first person point of view, then attempt to define the phenomena on which knowledge claims rest or achieve some sot of knowledge of consciousness.

I believe an exhaustive list of instructions will not give one knowledge of how to ride a bike, because I'd say that we do have to actually do something in order to learn. I have read my piano books, but practicing them everyday is how I learn (in a more perfect me, at least) — Moliere

I've never argued against the fact that "we do have to actually do something in order to learn". I take it that a person with a copy of 'The Dummy's Guide to Riding a Bike' will actually get on the bike in order to learn how. In fact, I assume that would form part of the instructions.

But I also want to say that this doesn't make it ineffable -- where you say an exhaustive list will give someone knowledge, I'm hesitant because I'm thinking about how practice seems to be needed too. — Moliere

Of course practice is needed. Is actually doing the activity to be learned something that would be omitted from the instructions? Does your recipe book not instruct you to pre-heat the oven and combine certain ingredients together, etc? Is there some knowledge not included in the recipe for (e.g.) how to bake bread, in principle? In what way does a recipe book not give you knowledge of how to bake bread? What knowledge is missing from the recipe (i.e. the list of instructions for how to bake bread)?

Working my way through an example-- anyone who didn't know how to ride a bike, supposing this was a good list of instructions, would upon reading it now know how to ride a bike. Hence, it is effable, by your account. Right? — Moliere

Right.

Right! I think what I want to say, though, is that after being shown, what was ineffable is no longer ineffable. And, if that be the case, it suggests that we could continue this process of turning what is, right now, ineffable to us -- into something which is no longer ineffable. — Moliere

If nobody verbally expressed what was shown, and if it can only be shown and cannot be said, then I don't see how it is no longer ineffable. How has it become effable?

Wouldn't we just have to know everything in order to be able to say, definitively, this is what can be said while gesturing to what can't? — Moliere

Do you need to know everything in order to know how to play the piano or how to bake bread? If the knowledge of how to play the piano or how to bake bread cannot be entirely contained in a list of instructions, then you might say that at least some of that knowledge is ineffable.

But then there's the case of coming-to-know, and knowledge-production, and that we can learn. — Moliere

This is all knowledge-related.

So I think I want to use "the ineffable" in a specialized way to mean that which cannot even be learned by creatures like us. Immortality is the case I like to use because it's clear-cut -- in order for creatures like us to learn if they are immortal, we have to die. If we die, we're no longer a creature. Therefore, a creature like us will never learn if we are immortal. It's ineffable. — Moliere

Okay, then not all knowledge is effable.

I want to say this specialized case is different from the case of learning how to ride a bike. How to ride a bike, in the dictionary . com definition way, is ineffable. But immortality, in this specialized sense, is ineffable in principle (again, for creatures like us). — Moliere

I don't follow why you believe that knowledge of how to ride a bike is not also at least partially ineffable (knowledge) in principle, especially given your hesitation to concede that an exhaustive list of instructions would give one knowledge.

Sensations are profoundly ineffable, for a simple reason: we lack words for describing them. At the most elemental level, we can describe the physical world in terms of the sensations that it elicits. But that's as far as it goes, we lack the language to describe the sensations themselves. The best we can do is to compare them to other, similar sensations, or to list other sensations that the sensations invoke ("red is like orange and makes me feel warm").But the actual, qualitative sensory experience is indescribable .

If you doubt this, just consider that all of our ways of experiencing the world might be basically identical, or they might be radically different: we each might experience our own private sets of colors, sounds, smells, or our ways of perceiving might be more profoundly different in ways that are difficult to conceive without taking serious drugs. But we will never know, one way or the other, because lacking the words we simply cannot describe our internal state.

There is no possibility of inventing a language to describe sensations. We can have words for sensations because we can point to things that invoke the sensation. But we cannot point to the sensations themselves, as they are internal. Therefore we can never assign words to features that would describe them. And so they will forever remain both immediate and indescribable.

At the most elemental level, we can describe the physical world in terms of the sensations that it elicits. — hypericin

I agree sensations are entirely ineffable. As are feelings, and for much the same reasons.

But if you’re right, what is it about objects that can elicit descriptive terms from sensation?