My example was just one potential explanation. My main point is that when we use the term will, it's more like an umbrella term to describe a range of processes. Some people clearly fetishise will (libertarians, for instance) and we are not even certain that humans have free will.

In my experience, when people make dramatic changes in their lives, to call it an act of will is like ascribing a single, magical power as a substitute for understanding a range of contributing factors. What's the difference between the person who can make change and the person who can't? Willpower? That's a kind of a libertarian secular/religious view, right? I would argue it is more likely that the person who makes the change has other factors going on - reason/s to be motivated, a sense of hope, a connection to others, an obsession even. I've known many people with serious alcohol misuse who swapped that addiction for another addiction and never really addressed their problems. They became addicted to AA meetings, to sex, exercise, collecting. Sobriety wasn't an act of will, more of a sublimation. People are complex and messy and the 'will' account seems somewhat reductive and poetic.

But I'm happy to be wrong. If someone can identify what will is and how it works...

we are not even certain that humans have free will. — Tom Storm

Once again, we are at a fundamental impasse. The notion of free-will and, co-extensively, responsibility, is central to my entire understanding of reality. If you don't grasp that, I can only say that we must have very different experiences of what it means to exist and to think.

Plenty of respected thinkers don't believe we have free will. I have no commitments either way, since I am not qualified to make that call. But even Sam Harris (who many people dislike and does not believe we have freewill) argues that the illusion of freewill is present to almost all of us. But my modest comments on will do not rest on 'freewill or not' questions.

You don't believe there is an inherent capacity which causes will-like actions. How do you feel about certainty then? Do people have different capacities for certainty? That is, to be possessed of the truth of their own thoughts? Certainly Descartes recognized that everyone is equally capable of believing, whether in truth or in error, the will being much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, as he says. And yet there must be something fundamentally different about being certain of what is true versus what is false. One is a growth of understanding, the other is not. So the certainty which is of a falsehood must somehow be in bad faith, hence not a true certainty. And yet the more absurd the belief, the more ferociously people will commit, you see it everywhere.

Edit:
If one is correct in their certainty, than surely all of the energy being put into verbalization of that certainty can find better expression as the instrument of that certainty, better means of productively enacting knowledge. Otherwise, what is the benefit of understanding? And if the enunciation of an understanding is the incarnation of that understanding, then it is self-exemplary, and its objective should be and is to reveal its own essential nature. This is also Fichte's foundational concept of Self-Positing. Which is an act of pure willing.

I am not saying people don't appear to set and achieve goals, sometimes with the zeal of an addiction. I'm not saying that people can't be determined. I am just not convinced 'will' holds up to being fetishised or understood as a transcendent, transformative virtue. — Tom Storm

Temperament, personality, attitude - whatever you call it - I've noticed that some people are much more willful than others. More forceful, persistent. What's a nice word for stubborn. I have friends I call "people of will." I am as far from that as you can possibly be while still breathing. The Tao Te Ching is all about surrender of the will. I guess you could say it's a difference of style, but I think it goes deeper than that. I think at least some of it is built-in biologically, genetically.

I don't think any of this necessarily contradicts anything you wrote.

Intervention by someone else may or may not be helpful. But one can at least try.

There are great differences in the determination that people display in pursuing their aims and objectives. We often refer to that difference by talking about strength or weakness of will. But that, so far, is just a name. One wants an analysis of it. That’s where the mystery comes in.

It is odd, I think, that we usually seem to think that a strong will is a good thing and a weak will is a bad one. I’m not at all sure about that. It is easy to come up with examples in which a strong will is not a good thing, but actually destructive. If the determination of an addict or an obsessive to get or pursue whatever their object is the result of a strong will, it is clearly a bad thing. Yet I find it difficult to come up with examples in which a weak will is a good thing. Perhaps this is a side issue at this stage.

If the language we use in relation to actions is anything to go by, this is bound to be a complicated enterprise.

I can offer three observations which may or may not help.

1) Thinking about the will in relation to actions, it occurred to me that it is not always associated with determination. For example, if I’m willing to move to New York (in pursuit of career advancement), that is quite different from wanting to move to New York. If I’m just willing, I will move in pursuit of something, but I won’t necessarily actively pursue it. If I want to, I will actively pursue it. Again, if I’m offered a plate of cakes and point to one and say “I’ll have that one”, I’m not necessarily expressing any great determination. Or am I misinterpreting something?

2) The basics of motivation are values and reason, which together make up a practical syllogism. That seems quite clear. The mystery is, however, that one can put together a perfectly clear rationale for an action, but yet fail to undertake it. Sometimes, this can be explain by reference to priorities, but not always, as anyone who has tried to break a habit knows. Perhaps the will bridges that gap?

3) Do we need to understand the will in relation to all the other terms we have to point to the origin of actions – I mean wanting, wishing, desiring, yearning, intending and so on? Willing something doesn’t quite fit alongside them, which is puzzling. The closest I can think of is what people sometimes say about willing something to happen. The odd thing is, they usually say that when they can’t actually bring it about.

Does any of that help at all?

The closest I can think of is what people sometimes say about willing something to happen. The odd thing is, they usually say that when they can’t actually bring it about. — Ludwig V

In certain meditative states one comes alive as pure will. I suspect this is considered a distraction in Zen, but in a type of lucid dreaming it is exhilarating. To experience will in isolation, unhindered by physical restraints, gives one a deeper appreciation of its role in one's life, its power to cause change.

I know, this is not philosophical - but neither is will.

:up:

Does any of that help at all? — Ludwig V

Interesting perspective. I'm not sure I am any closer to believing that will is the key ingredient in people's success. The fact that some people can set or achieve goals is down to lots of factors. When we are successful, we like to think it's because we have innate capacity or determination. Luck plays a role too.

The basics of motivation are values and reason, which together make up a practical syllogism. That seems quite clear — Ludwig V

I'm believe that people often don't know what they want or what they are doing. Even those who appear to set goals and achieve success. I worked with a man who was a wealthy and successful lawyer. All the plans he ever made he achieved - from landing the right university, to getting a gig in the right law firm; the obligatory luxury cars and home. But at 47, he was consumed by despair and found himself to be a failure. Turns out what he really wanted to do was be an artist. He was propelled into law by family expectations and the system of privilege he grew up in. I suspect many people live similar lives of superficial success which are based on confusion and a lack of insight into their own values and needs.

How do you feel about certainty then? Do people have different capacities for certainty? — Pantagruel

Not sure how these are connected. It seems to me that certainty is often the product of ignorance (e.g., Dunning–Kruger) or confidence, education, gender, anti-social behaviour, upbringing, etc.

And yet the more absurd the belief, the more ferociously people will commit, you see it everywhere. — Pantagruel

Indeed. I think fear may be a central factor. People embrace certainty as it assists them to feel safe and act in a world which seems dangerous. It provides them with an identity, with predictability and compass points by which to navigate life. Hence the seductive nature of fundamentalisms.

In certain meditative states one comes alive as pure will. I suspect this is considered a distraction in Zen, but in a type of lucid dreaming it is exhilarating. To experience will in isolation, unhindered by physical restraints, gives one a deeper appreciation of its role in one's life, its power to cause change. — jgill

What you say here is interesting, it reminds me of something I remember reading about Zen, although I can't recall where, wherein it was said that enlightenment is a shift, not of the intellect, but of the will.

I never had much success in lucid dreaming; following Don Juan's instructions to Castaneda, I once found my hands, but immediately fell into a pit of paralysis where I thought I would die. This was a kind of weird state, pretty much impossible to describe, I used to sometimes fall into when on the verge of falling asleep, instead of falling asleep.

Anyway I've gone off-topic, so I'll stop now.

If we focus too closely on the idea of will - pure or not - we will simply circle round the mystery. If we explore allied topics, we will get a better perspective and maybe some enlightenment. But there is a lot going on here.

On altered states of consciousness, there are phenomena here and a self-certifying experience is hard to resist. But not all self-certifying experiences are what they seem, so both Zen and Carlos Castaneda (not that I would trust him very far) identify the need for a guide or guru. There's a similar story in connection with the introduction of LSD into Western Culture; the first pioneers thought that one should always have an experienced guide when taking it until one had acquired experience. It's a difficult choice to make, but if one can find the right person, outcomes will be better - or so it is said. The experience of total certainty also falls into this category.

In the end, it all comes back to ordinary life and the effect on the people around you.

The existentialists were right to high-light the importance of commitment (or leap of faith) as a way of dealing with the absurdity and confusion of the world as we are thrown into it. However, as far as I know, which is not far, they aren't very explicit about how commitment is reached. They seem to want to treat it as something that we can decide to do, but that doesn't make any sense to me; I'm inclined to see it as something that happens. We can decide to try to be committed, but whether that sticks or not is another question and only the outcome will answer it.

A leap of commitment is just as dangerous as being swept away by a self-certifying experience.

I'm not well read on Fichte, but the act of self-positing is important here. There is something that is right and important in this idea, but it would be a mistake to think that making oneself is anything like making a cake.

It seems to me that this is all the territory of the concept of will. The concept of the will encourages a strong focus on the individual as in control and capable of making choices. I feel that the role of the social and physical world in which we live in making us who we are is very important and should not be neglected.

Does that take us any further forward?

Fundamentally i think the concept of "will" speaks to the idea of determinism. Saying that i will do a thing is no more different than saying that the Sun will rise or that the fire will burn. Since "will" implies the future tense of an event it must by definition be deterministic. On the other hand from an indeterministic perspective "will" has no meaning.

indeterministic = no will
deterministic = will

Neither determinism nor indeterminism allows for "free-will", it can not exist or even make sense in any case for it would need to violate determinism in a deterministic manner while at the same time being indeterminate. Logic and Math would fall apart and we'd be left with paradoxes.

Will is simply what the universe "will" do through the mechanism of cause and effect in every one of its parts. The will that every person feels that they have is the result of universal laws playing out in the body and mind of that person. From the condition and activity of all the various systems in an organism a cascade of unconscious action reactions culminate in what we call a choice. We have no choice in our choices.

To give a simple hypothetical example consider a plant with a set of two tropisms (chemotropism and hydrotropism). The plant avoids toxic chemicals and moves toward water, but what if the water is contaminated? The plant movies towards the water and as soon as it touches the water detects the toxicity and moves away. The plant "decided" to move towards the water, and then "decided" to move back away. The plant may even oscillate between moving toward and away a few times before settling on the best move conducive to its own homeostatic condition. This is the will of the plant, it will do what it's tropisms demand, and may the strongest tropism win. For a plant to have "free-will" it would need to be able to move in ways free from the influence of it's own internal processes which have continuity with it's environment rendering it all one holistic interrelated system. Every smaller "will" in the system is a component of a larger overarching Will.

Another quick example would be the case of a negatively charged particle positioned between two other particles of negative and positive charges. The middle negative particle has two choices, but it can choose only one to move towards, the "choice" will always be without exception to move towards the positive particle.

To connect all this to reason i will say that the word "reason" is related to the word "ratio", and "will" is the ratio calculation performed by physics itself within physical processes dealing mainly with charge ratios and a couple other things. This natural process of "will" is so deep and natural in everything that many or most people feel it as if it were "free" because no opposition to the process is ever felt or perceived since nothing that can oppose it exists or is even possible. So naturally it feels internally natural and unforced.

Robocop and free will:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0ePwemubPs

It is easy to come up with examples in which a strong will is not a good thing, but actually destructive. — Ludwig V

Yes, as I describe in people who can violently defend clearly absurd positions, will can be misused. For me, they would be self-consciously acting in bad-faith at some level.

The mystery is, however, that one can put together a perfectly clear rationale for an action, but yet fail to undertake it. — Ludwig V

This is also something that interests me. Reason definitely ought to bolster will. I think it is a question of being able to achieve certainty, rational certainty, versus irrational certainty.

I'm believe that people often don't know what they want or what they are doing. — Tom Storm

This is absolute true and relevant. To use will in a non-trivial and non-destructive way (which I don't consider exemplary willing anyway, just doing) you need to have a clear understanding of your goals. Your can't will what you can't conceive.

I feel that the role of the social and physical world in which we live in making us who we are is very important and should not be neglected. — Ludwig V

Definitely. Much - I might even say most - of our 'significant doings' are no longer merely mechanical in nature but operate by invoking and engaging social norms and perceptions. Hence the will becomes entangled with both reason and ethics.

Will is simply what the universe "will" do through the mechanism of cause and effect in every one of its parts. The will that every person feels that they have is the result of universal laws playing out in the body and mind of that person. — punos

There is some truth to this. In Oneself as Another Ricoeur looks at Gertrude Anscombe's event ontology, actions versus events, wanting and the why question (why did something happen). As Anscombe puts it, "I do what happens." And in a sense, we are always following laws or rules when we make something happen. But maybe there are emerging layers. What if we become Kantian self-legislating beings? Is that also what it means to be a self-positing being?

Willing is predicated on choosing, but it is more than just choosing; willing includes an aspect and degree of difficulty. Also, significantly, willing is not just choosing to do something. Often, willing can involve choosing not to do something. Indeed, this is the most characteristic forms of what is known as will-power. — Pantagruel

I think it will be useful to expound on this separation between willing and choosing. We can characterize choosing as a feature of the rational intellect, and show that choosing to do something does not necessitate any acts toward such a doing. One might willfully delay, as you described, and we also have the problem of people who choose something, and then do not proceed toward carrying out the actions chosen.

The latter was a difficulty to ancient philosophers. How is it possible that a person can know what is right, yet proceed to act in a way contrary to this? This problem became the means by which Socrates and Plato drove a wedge between virtue and knowledge, providing efficacy for their attack on the sophists who claimed to be teaching virtue.

Aristotle went on to explain "habit" (to have), as a property of the capacity to act; the capacity to act being a potency of the soul. Thomas Aquinas inquired deeply into the nature of habit. Since a human act is a case of actualizing a potential, he inquired as to what is the habit a property of, the potential to act, or the act itself. He concluded that the habit must be a property of the potential to act.

In the question as to the nature of the will, we need to position the will in relation to the habit. The habit is the propensity to actualize a potential in a specific way, and the habit is situated as a property of the potential to act, by Aquinas. A potential however, cannot actualize itself, so the habit being a property of the potential to act, cannot be the cause of the act which is specified by a description of the habit. This leaves the will as separate, being the source of actuality, which is responsible for the act, as cause of it. Hence the will is said to be free.

That is what I was trying to catch in my intro - intending to do something is a choice, but there can be obstacles to enacting a choice. To what extent one is or isn't prevented by obstacles is where it becomes a question of will. — Pantagruel

This is a good indication as to why it is necessary to separate will from choice. Many philosophers would still like to keep these two united, and they might point to rational judgement as an indication that they are united. If the mind is thinking thoughts, and it comes to a conclusion concerning these thoughts, it would appear like that conclusion, or judgement, requires an act of will. So it appears from this perspective, that the will is a part of the rational intellect.

You might find that Augustine has already addressed this issue, and has proposed a three-part intellect consisting of memory, reason, and will. Each is a distinct part with its own purpose. So even within the intellect itself, we might find that the act of reasoning, which utilizes things provided by memory, does not necessarily produce any conclusions. The act of reasoning can be described as habitual, and even the forcing of judgement through logic would also be habitual. But the will can break that habit by preventing the reasoning process which leads to such habitual conclusions. In this case, the judgement is simply a feature of the reasoning process, as part of the habit, and the judgement is a posterior part of the act, as the concluding part of the act. The judgement does not necessarily lead to further action, so it is not properly called an act willing. It is the result of an act, the effect, rather than the initiator, or cause of an act. The act of willing is properly positioned as prior to the reasoning process which result in the conclusion, as initiating, or causing that process.

In the question as to the nature of the will, we need to position the will in relation to the habit. The habit is the propensity to actualize a potential in a specific way, and the habit is situated as a property of the potential to act, by Aquinas. A potential however, cannot actualize itself, so the habit being a property of the potential to act, cannot be the cause of the act which is specified by a description of the habit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, and behaviourism steps in and says that this is environmentally triggered and there you are. I'd propose an interpretation that is a kind of soft-determinism in conjunction with a modified conception of what constitutes free-will.

Let's assume that when we act, we are operating mechanistically in that the conditions of the success for an action trigger that action which exists in us as a tendency. Then our 'natural' actions are like instincts. But suppose also that it is possible to alter these instincts or habits through concerted and prolonged effort (the phenomenon of hysteresis, prevalent in organic systems evolution). Then, by choosing to modify our habits, we choose the direction in which our willing proceeds. Choice which is free to be determined by reasoned effort. Reasonable choice. Maybe we do not have free-will; but maybe we are free to (reasonably choose) to have will.

Really, what we are talking about is the time-frame in which this "actually free consciousness" exists. It is the time frame required "to successfully create successful habits".

Yes, as I describe in people who can violently defend clearly absurd positions, will can be misused. For me, they would be self-consciously acting in bad-faith at some level. — Pantagruel

I'm not sure that I can be described as using or misusing my own will, because that implies an act of will as the beginning of the act of will, which will give rise to an infinite regress.

You are very trusting of people's rationality and your own if you are sure that people defending positions that you find absurd must be self-consciously acting in bad faith.

The judgement does not necessarily lead to further action, so it is not properly called an act willing. It is the result of an act, the effect, rather than the initiator, or cause of an act. The act of willing is properly positioned as prior to the reasoning process which result in the conclusion, as initiating, or causing that process. — Metaphysician Undercover

So the act of will starts a reasoning process which can lead to a judgement, but the judgement doesn't necessarily initiate any action. So is it correct to say any action must be initiated by another act of will? Does there have to be another reasoning process for this second act of will?

This leaves the will as separate, being the source of actuality, which is responsible for the act, as cause of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

So am I right to conclude that an act of will is necessary to start even a habitual action? So how come I find myself carrying out habitual actions even when I don't want to?

If I imagine myself driving a car along a road, I think of myself carrying out all sorts of actions, cognitive and executive, all of them habitual. Are they the result of a single act of will, for example wanting to go to the supermarket, or are there multiple acts of will? Does each adjustment of the steering wheel involve an act of will?

Forgive me if these questions are naive. This is new territory to me.

Right, and behaviourism steps in and says that this is environmentally triggered and there you are. I'd propose an interpretation that is a kind of soft-determinism in conjunction with a modified conception of what constitutes free-will. — Pantagruel

But it is not true that actions are necessarily environmentally triggered. That is what will power, and the capacity to break habits demonstrates to us. If we cannot in every instance of a willfull act, establish a necessary relation between an environmental trigger, and the act, we cannot make the conclusion that such acts have an environmental trigger. And there are many little experiments you can carry out by yourself, to prove that acts are not necessarily environmentally triggered. Hold an object in your hand for example, and decide at some random time, to drop it to the floor, without any environmental trigger.

Let's assume that when we act, we are operating mechanistically in that the conditions of the success for an action trigger that action which exists in us as a tendency. — Pantagruel

This is not an environmental trigger, it is an internal decision, as to the probability of success.

But suppose also that it is possible to alter these instincts or habits through concerted and prolonged effort (the phenomenon of hysteresis, prevalent in organic systems evolution). Then, by choosing to modify our habits, we choose the direction in which our willing proceeds. Choice which is free to be determined by reasoned effort. Reasonable choice. Maybe we do not have free-will; but maybe we are free to (reasonably choose) to have will. — Pantagruel

We have the will to break habits, and we often do, so I do not think that there is any question here. What is a more interesting question, is how do habits, and even instinctual actions come into existence. Habits must be developed, we practise the same thing over and over again, and this requires effort. So just as much, or more, will power is required to produce a habit, as is required to break a habit. This leaves the issue of how can we account for the reality of instinctual habits.

So the act of will starts a reasoning process which can lead to a judgement, but the judgement doesn't necessarily initiate any action. So is it correct to say any action must be initiated by another act of will? Does there have to be another reasoning process for this second act of will? — Ludwig V

I don't quite see what you are asking. The act of will is what initiates an act. Are you calling the act of will a "second act", because it is the cause of the act which can be observed? So for instance, you can observe someone's act of walking, or even your own act of thinking, but there is necessarily another act, the act of will (more properly called the first act as prior to the other,) which is the cause of the observable act. In any case, since this act is prior to the reasoning act, there is no need to assume a reasoning act which is prior to this act, if that is what you are asking. That is what makes the will "free".

So am I right to conclude that an act of will is necessary to start even a habitual action? So how come I find myself carrying out habitual actions even when I don't want to? — Ludwig V

This is the separation I referred to, between what is consciously wanted, through the reasoning mind, and what is acted upon by the will. That is the issue which gave Socrates, Plato, and other ancients, much trouble, how can we do the act which we know that we do not want to do, i.e, knowingly act bad. The answer is that the will is free, and so it is not necessarily compelled by reason. So Plato posited spirit, or passion, as a medium between the body and the mind in his dualism. The spirit can be aligned with the body, or with the mind. So if you engage in habitual acts which you do not want to, I would say that this is an instance of your spirit being aligned with your body rather than your mind.

If I imagine myself driving a car along a road, I think of myself carrying out all sorts of actions, cognitive and executive, all of them habitual. Are they the result of a single act of will, for example wanting to go to the supermarket, or are there multiple acts of will? Does each adjustment of the steering wheel involve an act of will?

Forgive me if these questions are naive. This is new territory to me. — Ludwig V

I would say, that the will is continuously active, and so we are continually moving and thinking all the time, even while asleep. Have you ever tried meditation, where the goal is to calm this activity? The result of separating the will from the mind in principle, provides us with a good starting point for understanding the reality of human actions.

We are all naive here, as this is simply unknown territory. What I say on the subject is only speculation, so feel free to correct me.

But it is not true that actions are necessarily environmentally triggered. That is what will power, and the capacity to break habits demonstrates to us. If we cannot in every instance of a willfull act, establish a necessary relation between an environmental trigger, and the act, we cannot make the conclusion that such acts have an environmental trigger. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you partially misunderstand me. I'm suggesting that a mechanistic causation is the case, but that we can override even that through concerted effort. I do think we are capable of spontaneous, 'random' behaviours. But in that case, we run the risk of being even more at the mercy of external laws.

So just as much, or more, will power is required to produce a habit, as is required to break a habit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly so.

You are very trusting of people's rationality and your own if you are sure that people defending positions that you find absurd must be self-consciously acting in bad faith. — Ludwig V

I think that the role of belief is to believe accurately. So when people pour extravagant amounts of energy into defending the belief that the earth is flat, for example, they are mis-believing, or believing in bad-faith.

I think you partially misunderstand me. I'm suggesting that a mechanistic causation is the case, but that we can override even that through concerted effort. — Pantagruel

But if this is the case, then the overriding concerted effort is the manifestation of "will" rather than the mechanistic causation. That is because "will" has to match up with what actually occurs, what the person does, as "the will" is said to be cause of this, in either case.

Now this concerted effort which overrides the mechanistic causation of what could have happened, if the person did not exercise the will in this way, has to be looked at for a cause of it. If the mechanistic action has a mechanistic cause, then why wouldn't the concerted effort to prevent that action also have a mechanistic cause? Each can be said to be "the will". Either the will allows the describable mechanistic action to occur, or it disallows it, so the type of causation, as "the will", is the same in each of the two cases.

Now this concerted effort which overrides the mechanistic causation of what could have happened, if the person did not exercise the will in this way, has to be looked at for a cause of it. If the mechanistic action has a mechanistic cause, then why wouldn't the concerted effort to prevent that action also have a mechanistic cause? Each can be said to be "the will". Either the will allows the describable mechanistic action to occur, or it disallows it, so the type of causation, as "the will", is the same in each of the two cases — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly so.

I am asking whether the initiation of action goes like this, at least sometimes: -

(Act of Will) leads to (Reasoning) leads to (Act of Will) leads to (Judgement/Choice) leads to (Act of Will) leads to (Action)

Or a variation.

You say that the will is continuously active and even while asleep. That is a surprise to me. On the other hand, sleep is not like a coma, though there is a question whether what I do while asleep is really an action comparable to an action while conscious. Actually, I would think that when I do something absent-mindedly, my will not engaged (the clue is in “absent”), but I suppose you would disagree. I assume, though, that if someone is in a coma, you would agree that the will is not active.

But I don’t see what the activity of the will consists of once it has started an action off. Are you saying that the will is like the driver of a train, who always monitors, but only acts when required, or that it is like the driver of a car, who has to control the car every second it is moving? I assumed the will just gave a push to start things off and the action was performed without its intervention.

Two other points: -

1) I don’t think there is any problem about how habits are acquired. A repeated cycle of stimulus and response is enough. Pantagruel was right about that. Practice is needed for a different group of activities – skills. Admittedly they enable automatic actions and are displayed in specific circumstances, so they are like habits. Instincts are different and are often prompted by specific stimuli; in a sense, they are not actions, although, insofar as we can control them, our responses might be classified as actions.

2) I’m not at all sure that Plato’s "thumos" is equivalent to our will. For one thing, Plato does not think that "thumos" is the only precursor of action. "Epithumia" is another. But that’s a side-issue. It was a surprise that you think that my will doesn’t necessarily align with my desire. I think most people think of the times when physical events take over, as in addiction, extreme hunger, pain, what I then do is not done by me, hence not the result of my will.

I think that the role of belief is to believe accurately. So when people pour extravagant amounts of energy into defending the belief that the earth is flat, for example, they are mis-believing, or believing in bad-faith. — Pantagruel

Yes, that is a case where there are serious questions to be asked and there are conspiracy theories about that give me the same feeling. But I'm an agnostic, so I think that the amount of time and effort people spend on their religious beliefs is disproportionate. But I don't necessarily think that they are in bad faith. (I don't know what mis-believing means, I'm afraid.)

But I don’t see what the activity of the will consists of once it has started an action off. Are you saying that the will is like the driver of a train, who always monitors, but only acts when required, or that it is like the driver of a car, who has to control the car every second it is moving? — Ludwig V

I think of it more as an executive function that can assume control. Searle describes how intentional consciousness rises to the level of background abilities (which are like habits) like an expert skier who just picks a path down a slope versus a beginner who has to be aware of the mechanics of each turn. Similarly, will - assuming it has been itself been exercised, because willing itself can become a habit, or meta-habit, I suppose - I think can be alert to need.

You say that the will is continuously active and even while asleep. — Ludwig V

This is because the common way of understanding the will is to tie it to consciousness, so that a willful act is necessarily a conscious act. But that is very similar to tying will to reason, and this leads to the problem I described. How can you consciously do what you consciously do not want to do? So instead, we define "will" as the initiator or cause of our various acts, whether or not the acts are consciously decided upon. This allows for the reality that we go ahead and do things which we consciously decided not to do. The will as the first cause of motion in the body is not causally determined to follow the conscious mind.

Actually, I would think that when I do something absent-mindedly, my will not engaged (the clue is in “absent”), but I suppose you would disagree. — Ludwig V

In this case, it is not that your will is not engaged, it is. What is the case is that your conscious mind, and power of reasoning is not engaged.

I assume, though, that if someone is in a coma, you would agree that the will is not active. — Ludwig V

I would tend to think that the will still is active in some sense, when the person is in a coma, just like I said it is active when the person is sleeping. At this time, the will would be very limited in its capacity to do things. However, whenever things are being carried out for a purpose, implying the existence of intention, then the will is active. This would include things like breathing, and the beating of the heart.

But I don’t see what the activity of the will consists of once it has started an action off. Are you saying that the will is like the driver of a train, who always monitors, but only acts when required, or that it is like the driver of a car, who has to control the car every second it is moving? I assumed the will just gave a push to start things off and the action was performed without its intervention. — Ludwig V

This is a very good question. Due to the way that I understand time, I think that the will has to be active at every moment of passing time, to keep the body alive. This is similar to the way that I understand the physical universe. God's will must be active at every moment of passing time, to ensure that things remain similar to the way that they were the moment before, instead of there being complete randomness at each passing moment. I believe that in order to account for the reality of change, and freely willed acts of human beings, it is necessary to believe that the entire universe is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is why it is the case that things are not exactly the same from one moment to the next, the world gets recreated at each moment, with those changes. That the world is recreated at each passing moment in a way which is consistent with the way that it was at the last moment, implies a cause.

I don’t think there is any problem about how habits are acquired. A repeated cycle of stimulus and response is enough. — Ludwig V

Maybe, that would be the case, but in reality there is no such thing. Each set of circumstances at each moment of time is unique. So there may be similar incidents of stimulus, but the situations are not the same. How can we account for the same behaviour, same response, in different sets of circumstances, which are merely similar? It is wrong to represent this as a repeated cycle. This is the same issue we have with abstraction, and creating general principles. We make one general principle which is applicable to many different situations which are merely similar. We can't say that the situations are the same, so we cannot justify the applicability of the one general principle, by saying that it is applicable because it is based in a repetition of the same situation.

2) I’m not at all sure that Plato’s "thumos" is equivalent to our will. For one thing, Plato does not think that "thumos" is the only precursor of action. "Epithumia" is another. But that’s a side-issue. It was a surprise that you think that my will doesn’t necessarily align with my desire. I think most people think of the times when physical events take over, as in addiction, extreme hunger, pain, what I then do is not done by me, hence not the result of my will. — Ludwig V

The point is that to be consistent, the will must always be the cause of action. It would make no sense to say that sometimes the will causes a human action, and sometimes it did not. Then we'd have to differentiate between which actions are caused by the will, and which actions are caused by something else. In reality though, we see that all human actions have a similar source, and it is not the case that some are derived from one place, and others from another place. I believe, that to say my actions were caused by an addiction, or by some physical event, rather than admitting that it was my will, is just to try and make an excuse for one's wrongful actions.

I think of it more as an executive function that can assume control. — Pantagruel

OK. But that assumes some kind of continuous monitoring, doesn’t it?

I believe, that to say my actions were caused by an addiction, or by some physical event, rather than admitting that it was my will, is just to try and make an excuse for one's wrongful actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pantagruel said something similar somewhere in the discussion. Well, to me, that doesn’t explain anything and justifies a most unhelpful dismissive attitude to people who are wrestling with what they experience as a great difficulty. You and Pantagruel are entitled to your beliefs. But since you don't want to accept any involvement in their problems, what you believe doesn't really matter.

However, whenever things are being carried out for a purpose, implying the existence of intention, then the will is active. This would include things like breathing, and the beating of the heart. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. But then what is the role of consciousness? And what makes this will my will? Why can’t my heart and lungs just get on with what they need to do? (Breathing, of course is more complicated than the heart, but there are lots of other things that are fully automatic, like digestion.) In my book, my heart-beat is not a freely willed act and even though it has a purpose, it is certainly not intentional (or unintentional). To put the point another way, my impression is that the will as the source of action was designed to distinguish between conscious and unconscious action, on the basis that distinction would explain why some of the things that go on are free and others are not, and this explained what we are responsible for and what we are not responsible for. On this account, the will no longer identifies that distinction and no longer answers those questions.

The point is that to be consistent, the will must always be the cause of action. It would make no sense to say that sometimes the will causes a human action, and sometimes it did not. Then we'd have to differentiate between which actions are caused by the will, and which actions are caused by something else. In reality though, we see that all human actions have a similar source, and it is not the case that some are derived from one place, and others from another place — Metaphysician Undercover

That depends on how you define an action. I thought that the point of the concept of the will was to distinguish between actions, which can be free, and "events" caused by something else, which can’t; that’s why we are reluctant to call the latter “actions” at all. Of course, there are many complex cases and so we sometimes stretch the term. It may be true that all human actions have similar sources, but it does not follow that they all have the same source. My observation is that actions are not all alike, but have different reasons, values, aims, objectives and purposes.

Each set of circumstances at each moment of time is unique. . . . . . — Metaphysician Undercover

I guess there is a paradox involved here, in that two things that cannot be discerned as distinct must be the same thing and, contrariwise, if two things can be discerned as separate, they must be two things, not one. It then seems as if the only true or real case of identity is a thing’s identity with itself, which is a limiting case and not typical. You can use the words that way if you choose to do so. But the standard use is different. When we say that two things are identical, we mean identical in relevant respects, (relevant means appropriate to the context). In a similar vein, we can justify applying a single general principle where situations are similar in relevant respects, because it is not merely useful but fundamental to understanding things.

I don’t think this is a question of true or false, right or wrong. Your way of describing things, like Punos’, has its advantages. For example, it gives a basis for respecting everything in the world and that would be a great improvement in the way that humans live; exploiting the planet’s resources and dominating each other and the non-human world are a big problems for us now. But I don’t think that’s enough to justify your approach, since it sweeps all differences and details under a carpet labelled “the will” and prevents understanding the phenomena in detail and working out what we can do something about and what we cannot change.

An observation: – we started out, didn’t we? – asking what the will is. We’ve identified lots of things that the will does. But have we answered the question what it is? In the case of the train driver, I can identify the driver independently of his activity. How can I identify the will? If we can't do that, then the will becomes just a disposition (or potentiality) to do certain things and a label for what we do not understand.

Will is, in a sense, nature; nature is in a sense habit; habit is in a sense a compulsion; compulsion is the absence of will. :grin:

Good question OP.

compulsion is the absence of will. — Agent Smith

True enough. And compulsion also abrogates responsibility. The question is, can we ever really be compelled, or do we allow ourselves to be compelled?

I think that the real opposition is internal, and the force that counters will in us might best be understood as...temptation.

Pantagruel said something similar somewhere in the discussion. Well, to me, that doesn’t explain anything and justifies a most unhelpful dismissive attitude to people who are wrestling with what they experience as a great difficulty. You and Pantagruel are entitled to your beliefs. But since you don't want to accept any involvement in their problems, what you believe doesn't really matter. — Ludwig V

You've got this backward Ludwig. To say that your unwanted actions are caused by a habit, and therefore your will has no power to prevent them, is the dismissive helpless attitude, not vise versa.

OK. But then what is the role of consciousness? And what makes this will my will? Why can’t my heart and lungs just get on with what they need to do? (Breathing, of course is more complicated than the heart, but there are lots of other things that are fully automatic, like digestion.) — Ludwig V

Are you asking me what is the purpose of living? How am I supposed to know? Each individual person must have one's own particular purpose. We are, each one of us, a single part in a massive multitude, each with something to do, therefore a role to play. It is not my role to tell you what your role is, we all have the freedom of will to determine our own roles.

In my book, my heart-beat is not a freely willed act and even though it has a purpose, it is certainly not intentional (or unintentional). — Ludwig V

How can you separate "purpose" from "intention" in this way, to say that something with purpose is not intentional? "Intentional" is defined as having purpose. This implies that if an action has purpose it is intentional. If we separate "purpose" from "intentional" in the way that you propose here, then we have no way to understand "intentional". The definition I give here grounds "intentional" in "purpose".

If we remove that grounding, then "intentional" is left floating freely, with no real meaning. You could associate "intentional" with anything you want, and disassociate it from anything. That's what you are trying to do with "habit" disassociate intention from it, so that you can say that a habitual act is not intentional, and therefore not willed. From here you may seek to absolve yourself from responsibility for an habitual act.

I thought that the point of the concept of the will was to distinguish between actions, which can be free, and "events" caused by something else, which can’t; that’s why we are reluctant to call the latter “actions” at all. — Ludwig V

This all depends on what philosophy you are interested in. Different philosophies have a different purpose behind the way they define "will". I am interested in metaphysics, so my purpose in defining "will" is to fit the will into an ontology, give it a place in the overall reality of existence. Other philosophies, or fields of study might seek to position will in relation to some specific aspect of reality, giving "will" a different definition, for a different purpose. The legal system for example produces its own definition of "will" suited to its purpose.

guess there is a paradox involved here, in that two things that cannot be discerned as distinct must be the same thing and, contrariwise, if two things can be discerned as separate, they must be two things, not one. It then seems as if the only true or real case of identity is a thing’s identity with itself, which is a limiting case and not typical. You can use the words that way if you choose to do so. But the standard use is different. When we say that two things are identical, we mean identical in relevant respects, (relevant means appropriate to the context). In a similar vein, we can justify applying a single general principle where situations are similar in relevant respects, because it is not merely useful but fundamental to understanding things. — Ludwig V

A thing's "identity with itself" is the law of identity. That's the definition of "identity" or "same" which we are interested in, in ontology. When you say that two different things are "identical in relevant respects", you are not saying that the two things are the same, you are saying that they are the same in certain respects. This is like saying that they are the same type. In this case "same" does not refer to the thing itself, but to the type. They are "the same type". This is the basis for the concept of equality, and equivalence, saying that two things are the same in some respect. You and I are equal as human beings for example (assuming you are not a bot), because we are the same type, "human". Notice however, that this form of sameness (of the same type) does not produce identity. Identity is what is given to the individual, so "identity" in its proper sense means "identity with itself".

But I don’t think that’s enough to justify your approach, since it sweeps all differences and details under a carpet labelled “the will” and prevents understanding the phenomena in detail and working out what we can do something about and what we cannot change. — Ludwig V

I am not looking at sweeping "the will" under the carpet, just looking for a realistic way of representing it. If the will is supposed to be the initiator of human actions, then we need to maintain this principle in a consistent way. It makes no sense to say some actions are willed, and some are not, and then produce some arbitrary principles in an attempt to produce a separation between the two. If the desire is to produce an understanding, then we need fast principles to adhere to in our inquiry, and see how far this takes us. So, I propose we begin with the principle that the will is the initiator of action, and we see how much sense this makes, and how far we can go with this, until we meet unresolvable problems. When we meet the unresolvable problems, we might get an indication of where the principle is faulty. But if we start with the principle that some human actions are willed, and others are not, we will forever be in discussion trying to establish the boundary, due to the arbitrariness.

An observation: – we started out, didn’t we? – asking what the will is. We’ve identified lots of things that the will does. But have we answered the question what it is? In the case of the train driver, I can identify the driver independently of his activity. How can I identify the will? If we can't do that, then the will becomes just a disposition (or potentiality) to do certain things and a label for what we do not understand. — Ludwig V

Try looking at it this way. You can identify the train engineer individually because you can see the person. But if you just see the train, you cannot identify the engineer, nor can you even say that there is an engineer (the train might be automated). Now, look at the human person. We cannot see the driver. So there is a possibility that the person is automated. However, people's actions indicate that human beings are not automated. So it's a better conclusion that there is a driver which cannot be seen, then no driver at all. Now we have identified "the will" as the driver. The next task is to look at all the different types of human activities existing on the planet, and proceed with the use of logic, to describe the driver. From the actions, we ought to be able to say something about the driver, or at least start with a confirmation that there is a driver, and not an automation, or vise versa.