You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon
1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon
Can one overcome a born predisposition to harm others? — jgill
In the end we are largely responsible for our actions. — jgill
1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon
(1) You do what you do because of the way you are.
So
(2) To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly responsible for the way you are – at least in certain crucial mental respects.
But
(3) You cannot be truly responsible for the way you are, so you cannot be truly responsible for what you do.
Why can’t you be truly responsible for the way you are? Because
(4) To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have intentionally brought it about that you are the way you are, and this is impossible.
Why is it impossible? Well, suppose it is not. Suppose that
(5) You have somehow intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are, and that you have brought this about in such a way that you can now be said to be truly responsible for being the way you are now.
For this to be true
(6) You must already have had a certain nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are as you now are.
But then
(7) For it to be true that you and you alone are truly responsible for how you now are, you must be truly responsible for having had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are.
So
(8) You must have intentionally brought it about that you had that nature N, in which case you must have existed already with a prior nature in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are …
Here one is setting off on the regress. Nothing can be causa sui in the required way. — Strawson
This is problematic. The argument declares for determinism in the first premise, and then discovers it at the end as if it has proved it. — unenlightened
But of course the cause of my actions is my imagination. I imagine the pleasant taste of beer and that might cause me to head to the fridge, or I might catch sight of my burgeoning beer-gut and think again. The causal path of thought cannot be predicted even if it is mechanical because of the halting problem. So the question is begged as it always must be. — unenlightened
But the argument is further disguised by talk of "ultimate responsibility" as if it is something deeper than ordinary responsibility. Which it clearly isn't. I choose to drink beer and then I am drunk, and I am responsible for the way I am - drunk. And if I get in a fight or run someone down, I am responsible for that because I am responsible for the way I am. And of course the law recognises that one attains an age of responsibility, one is not born with it, but develops the capacity to change one's state. It also recognises diminished responsibility, when circumstances are overwhelming. There is a lot of work being done by that weasel word, 'ultimate', that it has no permit for. — unenlightened
I don't know what he means by "ultimate" responsibility. — ChrisH
Not if I have free will, because if I have free will, I can do what I do in spite of the way I am. Strawson's initial premise therefore begs the question, and his argument is therefore circular. Why are we wasting our time with this?Here is Strawson's paper: Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility (1994)
↪Sargon summarizes it accurately. Much of the short paper consists of restatements and elaborations (or belaboring) of this thesis. Here is a longer version from the paper:
(1) You do what you do because of the way you are. — SophistiCat
1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon
Why are we wasting our time with this? — Herg
If we instead inquire why the individual ensconced within a modernist deterministic or postmodern relativist world performed the same action, we would be able to make use of the wider explanatory framework of the natural or discursive order in situating the causes of behavior. — Joshs
8) "You must have intentionally brought it about that you had that nature N, in which case you must have existed already with a prior nature in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are …" — Strawson
Some people are born bad. End of story — jgill
Strawson believes that to be morally responsible you need to have created yourself. And he believes that is impossible. That's his justification for 3. — Bartricks
I think Galen was not convince of this argument
, but was caused by his rebellion to his father, P.F Strawson, who defended free will. I think he would have to agree to stay consistent with his argument. — Richard B
In sum, Strawson et al are not arguing against blame , punishment and justice but against revenge, retribution and backward-looking blame, which they see as the outcome of a traditional belief in free-will. — Joshs
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