Is that true? I thought I had £20 in my wallet. I looked and there was £0 I think I just proved something doesn't exist. The 'something' was £20. Its non-existence was proved by inspection. — Cuthbert

The £20 note is a concept in the mind which may be instantiated in particular locations in the world. The £20 note exists as a concept in the mind, regardless of whether it exists in the world or not.

True, you can prove that a particular instantiation of a £20 note doesn't exist in your wallet by inspection.

But as you cannot prove that there are not instantiations of a £20 note other than in your wallet, you cannot prove that £20 notes don't exist in the world.

I don't. I was taking a bet. The odds of me winning are proportional to the amount of evidence I have that the North Pole exists. The odds of me losing are proportional to the amount of evidence I have that it doesn't. I think my bet is fairly safe, but nothing is guaranteed. — Herg

The problem is that the evidence that The North Pole exists is descriptive, We may see a travel company advertising "Join us on the family adventure of a lifetime aboard the magical Journey to the North Pole". We may see the documentary "The Last Degree - North Pole Documentary", yet ultimately our evidence is descriptive, is linguistic.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions may be relevant.

As I understand it, in the sentence "The author of Waverly is Scott", the phrase "the author of Waverly" is not a reference to Scott but is a quantifier of "Scott". Similarly, in the sentence "the northernmost point on the Earth is The North Pole", the phrase " the northernmost point on the Earth" is not a reference to The North Pole but is a quantifier of "The North Pole".

Our evidence of the existence of The North Pole may be linguistic descriptions such as "the northernmost point on the Earth", yet as Russell's Theory of Descriptions points out, these descriptions are not references to The North Pole but quantifiers of "The North Pole".

Descriptive evidence therefore doesn't refer to something that may or may not exist in the world but is a reference to another word in the language and is in this sense self-referential.

Evidence that is linguistic is evidence that the language is coherent, not evidence of something that exists outside of language.

Whether you win your bet depends on the decision of the betting company. As the betting company is basing their decision on linguistic evidence, which is more about a coherent language than about what exists outside of language, your win will be based on the coherence of "The North Pole" within language rather than the actual existence of The north Pole outside language.

you cannot prove that £20 notes don't exist in the world. — RussellA

That's because they do. I can prove that £19 notes don't exist in the world. I mean, really I can. Outside the philosophy schoolroom. And if it can be done outside - but I am prevented from doing it inside by some theory - then I think it's the theory that is probably at fault, not the proof.

I can prove that £19 notes don't exist in the world — Cuthbert

A challenge.

The Bank of England web site says"There are four denominations (values) of Bank of England notes in circulation: £5, £10, £20 and £50" and "There are over 4.7 billion Bank of England notes in circulation."

One possible proof would be to inspect the 4.7 billion bank notes, but this assumes that only the Bank of England has printed £ sterling notes.

The other possible proof would be to prove true the statement "There are four denominations (values) of Bank of England notes in circulation: £5, £10, £20 and £50".

Both difficult, if not impossible.

A challenge — RussellA

No. Just everyday proof - as I say, outside the philosophy schoolroom. Think how you would sincerely answer a visitor's question whether there are twenty pound notes and their second question whether there are nineteen pound notes. If you hesitate for purely theoretical reasons over the second question then you are tripping over your own theory and not doing them any service at all. You know there are no £19 notes and you can prove it whenever it might be needed.

If you hesitate............You know there are no £19 notes — Cuthbert

Yes, I believe that there are no £19 notes and can justify my belief through the Bank of England web site, but I don't know that there are no £19 notes in that I cannot prove that my belief is true. I believe that my belief is true, but I don't know that my belief is true.

Fair enough. That would be a case for saying to my visitor - "Well, I believe there are no such things as £19 notes but I can't prove it and in fact I don't know." Again, I would be tripped up by your theory. Because, of course, I do know. And if there's any doubt I can prove it. The sample statement is exactly what I would say about £100 notes. Honestly, I'm not sure where there are £100 notes. But if a theory of evidence and proof cannot distinguish between my states of knowledge about £19 vs £100 notes then it's an inadequate theory.

@Banno and @Sam26, I beg your pardon, but would you prefer to splinter off the discussion you both had into a seperate thread about the distinction of concepts from ideas and use as traditionally utilized by Wittgenstein?

I just don't want to jumble up all this talk about descriptors, beliefs, and qualifiers into the discussion ongoing between other users.

For the matter, I think Banno is right about use instead of concepts existing in separate categories of existence.

Compare the following 4 entities

1. Vladimir Putin
2. Santa Claus
3. Sherlock Holmes
4. Arthur Conan Doyle

I beg your pardon, but would you prefer to splinter off the discussion you both had into a seperate thread about the distinction of concepts from ideas and use as traditionally utilized by Wittgenstein? — Shawn

Consideration of concepts (or their status) is perhaps relevant in the analysis of the existence predicate. Frege maintained that existence wasn't a first order predicate because that could entail absurdities like "There is an x such that x doesn't exist". Frege held rather, that existence is a second order predicate: a property of concepts, not individuals. This existence property can be instantiated or not.

A. Santa does not exist.
B. The property of being santa is not instantiated by any individual object


Here is the relevant SEP entry.

You might find this irrelevant. Depends how you want to analyse "exists".

In what sense does Santa Claus exist? He doesn't. Santa Claus- a plump old man with a long white bear who lives at the North Pole and delivers presents to children on Christmas- does not exist; there is no such person. And I agree with Banno about not reifying concepts. So what does exist is a bunch of loosely associated literary/oral traditions of people talking and writing about this fictional character, Santa Claus. In other words, language. Stories. Words. That's all.

And just because we use words in a similar way (e.g. proper names, definite descriptions, etc) when we talk about people/entities that do exist as we do when we talk about fictional characters (who do not exist) doesn't mean that both cases must be alike in having an existing referent, that there must always be a referent whenever we use such language: language is far more flexible than this, people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts. And after all, not existing is what distinguishes fictional characters as such.

So I guess I just don't see the advantage of venturing down the Meinongian path towards an ontology littered with non-existent existents (not an ideal result), especially after Russell's analysis. It seems easier and less problematic to just say that fictional characters don't exist.

Compare the following 4 entities 1. Vladimir Putin 2. Santa Claus 3. Sherlock Holmes 4. Arthur Conan Doyle — Agent Smith

I could play devil's advocate and say that the mainstream media's analysis of real people often approaches that of an analysis of fictional characters.

How many "documentaries" presented as fact are in reality "imaginative speculations".

people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts. And after all, not existing is what distinguishes fictional characters as such. — busycuttingcrap

As you say "people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts". Fictional characters exist as fictional characters, and real people exist as real people.

In one sense of "exist", fictional characters exist and in another sense of "exist", real people exist.

As you say "people can and do use the same words or expressions for different purposes in different contexts". — RussellA

If I may help you to grasp the point here... People can and do use the same kinds of words (e.g. names) for the purpose of referring to people or objects in some contexts and for the purpose of non-referring word-use in others.

That's one way to look at it. What follows if I may ask?

That's one way to look at it. What follows if I may ask? — Agent Smith

I'm afraid it's the blurring of fact and fiction in a Postmodern world.

If I may help you to grasp the point here... People can and do use the same kinds of words (e.g. names) for the purpose of referring to people or objects in some contexts and for the purpose of non-referring word-use in others. — bongo fury

"Apple" and "dragon" are concepts that exist in the mind. Concepts are fictional in the sense that they don't exist in the world - in the belief that neither abstracts nor universals ontologically exist in the world.

An "apple" can be instantiated in the world, but a "dragon" cannot be - even though a model of a "dragon" can be instantiated in the world.

"Apple" can refer to either a fictional concept in the mind or an actual instantiation in the world. "Dragon" can only refer to a fictional concept in the mind.

"Apples" and "dragons" both exist, but in different senses.

In other words, language. Stories. Words. That's all. — busycuttingcrap

Yes. Apart from real beardy old men, and the real north pole. And real charity workers, as @unenlightened rightly points out.

That's one, but here's the thing Saint Nicholas was a real person. :chin: I don't know how to deal with that (historical) fact and how it relates to Santa Claus.

That's one, but here's the thing Saint Nicholas was a real person. I don't know how to deal with that (historical) fact and how it relates to Santa Claus. — Agent Smith

The real Saint Nicholas has many miracles attributed to his intercession, is said to have calmed a storm at sea, saved three innocent soldiers from wrongful execution, and chopped down a tree possessed by a demon.

The fictional Santa Claus is said to bring children gifts during the late evening and overnight hours on Christmas Eve. Either toys and candy or coal or nothing, depending on whether they have been "naughty or nice".

It is the nature of language that the real can become indistinguishable from the fictional, and vice versa.

Saint Nicholas = Santa Claus. He's no more yes, but Saint Nicholas = Santa Claus.

Fictional characters don't exist. That's what makes them fictional characters. As far as Santa Claus is concerned, all that exists are the traditions we have of talking/writing about this fictional character Santa Claus. The jolly old man at the North Pole doesn't exist- there is no such person- but the stories, books, words, language, does.

I mean, solving the issue of non-referring expressions at the expense of not being able to differentiate between things that exist and things that don't, or between fiction and non-fiction, strikes me as a very poor bargain. Better to just say that non-existent things like fictional characters don't exist than to have to create a special category of existence for non-existent existents like Santa Claus and unicorns and so forth.

If I may help you to grasp the point here... People can and do use the same kinds of words (e.g. names) for the purpose of referring to people or objects in some contexts and for the purpose of non-referring word-use in others. — bongo fury

Exactly :up:

non-existent things like fictional characters don't exist. — busycuttingcrap

I agree that non-existent things don't exist, and that there shouldn't be a special category of existence for non-existent things. If we accept Bertrand Russell"s On Denoting, then I also agree that Santa Claus is not a referring expression, but rather a quantificational expression.

For Russell, existence is not a first-order property of individuals but instead a second-order property of concepts.

Santa Claus is a fictional character, and as a fictional character doesn't exist in the world, but as we are discussing Santa Claus, Santa Claus must exist as a concept in our minds.

To argue the blanket statement "fictional characters don't exist", accepting that fictional characters don't exist in the world, you must also be able to argue that fictional characters don't exist as concepts in the mind.

I agree that non-existent things don't exist, and that there shouldn't be a special category of existence for non-existent things. If we accept Bertrand Russell"s On Denoting, then I also agree that Santa Claus is not a referring expression, but rather a quantificational expression.

For Russell, existence is not a first-order property of individuals but instead a second-order property of concepts. — RussellA

Hey! That's what I said (Frege and Russel were in concurrence here). I tend to agree with this line of thinking.

Consideration of concepts (or their status) is perhaps relevant in the analysis of the existence predicate. Frege maintained that existence wasn't a first order predicate because that could entail absurdities like "There is an x such that x doesn't exist". Frege held rather, that existence is a second order predicate: a property of concepts, not individuals. This existence property can be instantiated or not.

A. Santa does not exist.
B. The property of being santa is not instantiated by any individual object — Heracloitus

Frege held rather, that existence is a second order predicate: a property of concepts, not individuals. — Heracloitus

Good old Frege and Russell :100:

To argue the blanket statement "fictional characters don't exist", accepting that fictional characters don't exist in the world, you must also be able to argue that fictional characters don't exist as concepts in the mind. — RussellA

No, it can follow that Santa only exists as a concept or idea and not an individual or object in the world.

Santa Claus is a fictional character, and as a fictional character doesn't exist in the world, but as we are discussing Santa Claus, Santa Claus must exist as a concept in our minds.

To argue the blanket statement "fictional characters don't exist", accepting that fictional characters don't exist in the world, you must also be able to argue that fictional characters don't exist as concepts in the mind. — RussellA

Santa Claus is fictional, and fictional people differ from real people precisely in that they don't exist. Its really that straightforward. And leaving aside beetles and boxes and reifying concepts and all that tricky philosophical stuff, to say that something exists only as a "concept in a mind", and not in reality or the world, is just another way of saying that that something doesn't exist.

So the answer to the OP's question is that Santa Claus does not exist, period, full stop, because Santa Claus is fictional.

to say that something exists only as a "concept in a mind", and not in reality or the world, is just another way of saying that that something doesn't exist. — busycuttingcrap

Isn't your position contradictory, when you say: "something exists only as a "concept in a mind" is "another way of saying that something doesn't exist".

If something exists, it exists. The fact that something exists does not mean that it has to exist everywhere.

No, I don't see any contradiction in saying that there does not exist a plump old man living at the North Pole delivering presents to children on Christmas, but that there does exist a body of literary/oral traditions involving such a character.

Remember, I was only humoring you with this talk of "existing as a concept in a mind"; this is not the way I would say it- I think reifying concepts in this way is philosophically problematic- I instead would prefer to speak of language/linguistic activity (concepts being inherently linguistic, after all): so Santa Claus does not exist, he is fictional, but stories involving a character named Santa certainly do exist. But as these are not the same, there can't be any contradiction here. And colloquially, to say that something exists only as a concept in your mind is simply a different way of saying that something doesn't exist (consider: a conspiracy theory, an imaginary friend, etc)