Of course, being creative in any subject is another matter and is more akin to the arts and cannot be reliably taught. — Janus

An inquiring mind is a springboard to creativity.

I don't think it's the same for all subjects; if learning a subject is a matter of learning a bunch of facts or formulas, then there is a definite process of teaching which will definitely yield results if the student is willing and has the necessary intellectual capacity. Of course, being creative in any subject is another matter and is more akin to the arts and cannot be reliably taught. — Janus

I agree with this.

Also, probably shows some of the shortcomings of my proposal of using teaching as a stand-in for the ineffable. It was just an honest answer to the original bike question, i.e., why I would not count riding a bike as ineffable. My answer being, because it's teachable, so it just seems like not a very interesting case for philosophers.

Well, that's what it says on the label: The Philosophy Forum. — Banno

Hawt damn, I managed to stay on topic for once! :D

An inquiring mind is a springboard to creativity. — jgill

:up: Yes, you do need the interest, but I'm not sure that alone is any guarantee of capacity.

Well, it seems to me that if we talk about something, then that something is not ineffable....

Hence if we talk about sensations - the aroma of coffee being the case in point - then the sensation is not ineffable — Banno

I’m trying to recall how Davidson thinks about this, since you relate to his work. I believe he posits perceptual experience , such as the aroma of coffee, as non-conceptually causal. Wouldn’t he argue that not only my attempt to communicate the smell of coffee to someone involves language, but my thinking about the experience in my own head requires a propositional articulation of the causal event? This of course, makes the causal sensation , or whatever it is, not only inaccessible to others but also to me in a certain sense. At the very least, there is a gap between the causal event and my thinking to myself, and to talking to others, about it.

I would just say at this point that this gap seems to be a product of Davidson’s insistence that perception is non-conceptual while language is conceptual This led Mcdowell to comment that Davidson makes language into a “frictionless spinning in a void”.

The sorts of arguments I've used here here are closer to Davidson's criticism of the supposed subject/object or scheme/content dichotomies than to his arguments concerning causation. See for example "The myth of the subjective".

You say "but we can't put the smell of coffee into words!". Of course not, it's a smell….. — Banno

Thanks….made my day.

The rest of it…..ehhh, anti-climatic.

At the very least, there is a gap between the causal event and my thinking to myself, and to talking to others, about it. — Joshs

Seems to me that we can have two descriptions, one listing the chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee, and another saying that I smell coffee, and that these are two different ways of saying much the same thing. @Isaac?

But Mcdowell would have us think there is a gap between these two.

Is that what you are suggesting, Josh? I'm not seeing it.

(Davidson would have us think that the physiology causes the belief. I'm not in complete agreement with that.)

But Mcdowell would have us think there is a gap between these two.

Is that what you are suggesting, Josh? I'm not seeing it.

(Davidson would have us think that the physiology causes the belief. I'm not in complete agreement with that.) — Banno

When Davidson says the physiology is a cause, he seems to mean something other than a direct relation between it and a belief. McDowell is trying to get him to make sensory cause into something more ‘visible’ without quite turning it into a proposition.
Davidson and Mcdowell discuss this very issue here

Let me know how you interpret the discussion. Start at 22:20

Yes, I'm familiar with the video.

My present position is different to Davidson's, since as I said I do not agree that physiology causes intentional states - that the relation is like that between colliding billiard balls - I'm not comfortable using the word "cause" here, for reasons that are discussed in Causality, Determination and such stuff. My view on causation is closer to, say, Midgley, Anscombe and perhaps Wittgenstein.

Of course such a view comes with its own issues, but McDowell 's misplaced criticism of Davidson is not amongst them.

Hence:

Seems to me that we can have two descriptions, one listing the chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee, and another saying that I smell coffee, and that these are two different ways of saying much the same thing. — Banno

Which also seems to me to be an alternative way of understanding anomalous monism. Sorting all that out is one of my mooted doctoral topics, so I will not say I have a complete answer. More a rough outline.

And then it's pretty easy to see how people experience these things differently, upon listening to them. In some way I'd have to accommodate the apparent inconsistency. — Moliere

I don't see this. Other people see things differently, true. But this doesn't mean there is no objective basis for comparison. My view is that phenomenology gets overlooked due to the overwhelming privileging of empirical science in our society. If one has any philosophical inclinations at all in an anglo american setting, one is simply not introduced to Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger and so on.
Philosophy struggles with acceptance, and the continental tradition seems too fuzzy compared to what is popular, which is in our time the kind of thing that makes cell phones work. What they, philosophy departments, have done is sacrifice content for clarity. So people in the profession are clear headed and logical, e.g., read Rorty's The Social Hope. He was logically gifted and really, could have done anything academic. He chose philosophy because it suited him. Just that. there are lots of puzzles and localized problematic entanglements, but, as I have seen, little of broad thematic works of continental philosophy. It has all moved away from the Husserl and the Heidegger and the rest because in the age of reason, science rules.

And they were sick of over a hundred years of Kantian based thinking. But idealism was never refuted. Complained about, certainly, with good cause, the the idea that the world is phenomena is not refutable'

But it's not consistent. And so it seems we've left the standards of reason behind in seeking to speak truth about the mystical, when the mystical is neither true nor false. — Moliere

But again, true and false are propositional terms. Reason has no biases and nothing to say; it is an empty form of judgment. Not reason, content of culture.

Heh, that might be a agree-to-disagree. We can mark our departure, at least. If philosophy has a grounding, I do not see it. Maybe it's firm. But I think it just goes back to an individual's convictions and desires (themself a social product of the process of life). — Moliere

I know you think like this, and all I can say is, it isn't true that just anything is okay and that philosophers are just talking about themselves and their cultures. If I ask you one of my favorite questions, How does anything out there, get in here (in one's brain)? I am not asking about what one should wear for a wedding in Kenya. The former is objectively demonstrable, the latter is made up in historical affairs. There is, however, a dividing line, but take Quine, the quintessential analytic philosopher and consider my previous quotes. You can see that his thesis indeterminacy in translation is actually very close to the kinds of things Derrida says! And for this, you would have to read these guys (not that I am so well read myself, remember. I mean, I am an amateur philosopher, like most others here. But I have read the things I talk about).

Frankly, I don't see your point on this at all.

Yeh, but here I'm saying -- bury the hatchet. This distinction will be forgotten because it's just a blip in the history of philosophy. — Moliere

Grrrr. It's not a blip. Phenomenology holds the key to the final resolution of the human religious condition. Buddha was the ultimate phenomenologist. As popular religions' narratives lose standing, the essential religious situation will rise to awareness, and then, basic questions, rid of the burden of myths and history, will be clear.

Heh, heh....you'll see. Or, no you won't, because it will never happen in our life time.

This probably goes some way to our disagreement, too, and goes some way to elucidate what I mean by everyday/exotic experience.

I was raised in a very religious household. I figured out science later. The arguments from experience and all that were my bread and butter, and I've seen how people in communities react to and use such arguments "in the wild", outside of the philosophers concerns. My skepticism in such things is based in experience -- hence my doubts about phenomenology leading one to God, but rather, from my story, it leads one to nature. — Moliere

But God in the "household" meaning of the term is instantly assailable. Religious households are the worst places to discover phenomenological inquiry. Worse than empirical science classrooms, perhaps. Tell me you were raised in a household where Kierkegaard's arguments with Hegel were discussed regularly, say, then you will have been somewhat prepared.

But God in the "household" meaning of the term is instantly assailable. — Constance

Are you sure?

The household meaning is the important meaning -- not the philosophers meaning. It's the household meaning that holds the house together, that connects the family to the community, that provides consolation and guidance and a means for talking about and to one another so that the family can live its life in economic productivity and safety.

Or, at least, that'd be one way to put it. And reason feels cold in relation to such luxuries.

The household meaning is the important meaning -- not the philosophers meaning. It's the household meaning that holds the house together, that connects the family to the community, that provides consolation and guidance and a means for talking about and to one another so that the family can live its life in economic productivity and safety. — Moliere

But those important ideas of family solidarity are incidental to God as a concept. It could be sort of thing that works like this that holds people together. The idea here is, is it an idea that is defensible when brought before inquiry. This is an important question, as, for one thing, religions have a great deal of influence on how we deal with our general affairs, and foolish beliefs can engender prejudice and impaired judgment in social issues. For another, clear thinking about religion can actually bring about startling insights.

I am in a minority position in holding that there actually IS a Truth with a capital T, so to speak, notwithstanding how this sits with modern thinking.

Seems to me that we can have two descriptions, one listing the chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee, and another saying that I smell coffee, and that these are two different ways of saying much the same thing. Isaac? — Banno

Yes, but the key thing that some miss, I think, is that there's no one-to-one relationship between the two, such that a small and variable number of 'chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee' might be described by us as "I smell coffee". There's no one set of neural goings-on which correspond to 'smelling coffee', we estimate, make up, narrate, story-tell... We make a Bayesian inference that what's going on fits with the story that "I smell coffee". Which, of course, is where the unavoidably culturally-embedded nature of 'experiencing coffee' comes in, since we wouldn't have the rules, the criteria for what sorts of mental goings on might fit the narrative 'smelling coffee' without learning the words 'smelling' and 'coffee' (or the non-linguistic equivalent, for the dumb, or the deaf).

If there were a direct one-to-one correspondence between some neural goings on and us wanting to say "I smell coffee", then I think the 'ineffable' crowd might have a better argument (though still flawed). They might say, "well, those neural goings-on is what 'smelling coffee' is and you can't tell us exactly what's going on there". But there is no such correspondence, so they can't. We 'assign' narratives to the various neural happenings according to some rules-of-assignment, and those rules almost exclusively come from our culture.

But such an argument seems lost here, among the phenomenologist's bizarre claims.

I do think, however, that there's a possible (more charitable) interpretation of the 'gap' here which might be something more like a gap between my identifying the neural activity as 'smelling coffee' and my being inclined to describe it thus, verbally. I suppose it's possible that I might choose to do otherwise at that juncture, but I can't see what ontological consequence that might have.

Yes, but the key thing that some miss, I think, is that there's no one-to-one relationship between the two, such that a small and variable number of 'chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee' might be described by us as "I smell coffee". — Isaac

Correct, and the existence of this gap means that there is a lot missing between these two. Within that gap is the ineffable. We know there's more to it than what we say, from either side, but we haven't the words to say it even if we try.

the existence of this gap means that there is a lot missing between these two. — Metaphysician Undercover

What. I don't see anything missing. There's some neural activity and there's the name we give it. What's missing?

What. I don't see anything missing. There's some neural activity and there's the name we give it. What's missing? — Isaac

You said there's a gap between the two. What do you think constitutes a "gap"? How is there a gap between the two descriptions, neural activity and I smell coffee, unless there is something missing between these two descriptions? "I smell coffee" is not the name we give to neural activity, "neural activity" is the name we give to neural activity. And "it smells like coffee" is not the name we give to neural activity.

You said there's a gap between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't, you did. I said there's no one-to-one correspondence. several patterns of neural activity could be given the same name, and the criteria for such naming might change over time.

"I smell coffee" is not the name we give to neural activity — Metaphysician Undercover

It is. Your not knowing that it is doesn't change that fact. If you name your car "bob" then you are naming (in part) a carburettor even if you don't know what a carburettor is because there's one in your car and you named your car. Your personal awareness of what you do does not exhaust all it is you do.

didn't, you did. I said there's no one-to-one correspondence. several patterns of neural activity could be given the same name, and the criteria for such naming might change over time. — Isaac

"Gap" is your word. Look.

do think, however, that there's a possible (more charitable) interpretation of the 'gap' here which might be something more like a gap between my identifying the neural activity as 'smelling coffee' and my being inclined to describe it thus, verbally. I suppose it's possible that I might choose to do otherwise at that juncture, but I can't see what ontological consequence that might have. — Isaac

But it's not a semantic issue. If two separate descriptions of the very same thing cannot produce a one-to-one relation, then something is missing, whether you call it a gap or whatever.

If you name your car "bob" then you are naming (in part) a carburettor even if you don't know what a carburettor is because there's one in your car and you named your car. — Isaac

You utter nonsense. To name a car is not to name an engine, or any component of the engine. That is simply ridiculous. That my name is MU does not imply that my heart or my lungs are named MU, that's a division fallacy.

"Gap" is your word. Look. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but that says there's a gap between my narrative and my my speech, not between my neural activity and my narrative.

If two separate descriptions of the very same thing cannot produce a one-to-one relation, then something is missing, whether you call it a gap or whatever. — Metaphysician Undercover

What? You claiming it doesn't make it so. what is missing. I can, at any point, declare some book from my library to be 'my favourite book'. Such a collection might change at whim, it might, be constituted of a different book, but always from the same collection of books. there's nothing missing. the books, my name for them. that's all there is.

That my name is MU does not imply that my heart or my lungs are named MU — Metaphysician Undercover

No, but that's not the claim I made is it. If someone we to say ask to which person your spleen belonged, the answer would be "MU". That would be the correct category even if you didn't even know you had a spleen. Naming you "MU" creates a category of stuff which is something like {all the stuff inside this layer of skin}, so it includes a whole load of stuff the people naming you didn't even know was there. What you term 'my brain' is made up of elements you're not even aware of by naming the whole. It still contains those elements and they still form part of what you've called 'my brain' even though you're not aware of them.

Maybe a clearer explanation...

Imagine you have a box in front of you but you don't know what's in it. You refer to the contents as 'the contents of that box' If I then throw that box on the fire, you might say "Isaac has just incinerated the contents of that box". At no time need you know what's in the box, but if you later find out it contained a notebook, then you know that all along you were referring to a notebook (that's what was incinerated) even though you didn't know it then. The actual contents of the box is not affected by your knowledge of it. Likewise the causal relationship between your neural activity and the ideas you form about your experience is not affected by your knowledge of it.

es, but that says there's a gap between my narrative and my my speech, not between my neural activity and my narrative. — Isaac

That's exactly the point. There's a gap between what "neural activity" means, and what "I smell coffee" means, which indicates that the two do not refer to the same thing. If we assert that the two do refer to the same thing, then our supposed understanding is missing all the reality of the difference between what these two actually refer to, which manifests as the real difference between them. That is to say, all the aspects of reality which constitute the difference between them is not being described, so asserting that they refer to the same thing denies the reality of that difference, but recognizing the gap acknowledges the difference between them.

It seems to be your intention to recognize the difference, by talking about the gap, and the fact that there is no correspondence relation between the two modes of description, yet assert that the thing refer to by each is the same thing. If so, that's simply contradiction.

No, but that's not the claim I made is it. — Isaac

You said "If you name your car 'bob; then you are naming (in part) a carburettor". That's nonsense, by way of division fallacy, face it.

What you term 'my brain' is made up of elements you're not even aware of by naming the whole. It still contains those elements and they still form part of what you've called 'my brain' even though you're not aware of them. — Isaac

Sure, the supposed parts make up the whole, but to name the whole is to name the whole, and this in no way names the parts. That's simple, and to try to stretch this into a case where the person naming the whole, is also naming a multitude of completely unknown parts, is a serious epistemological mistake.

If there were a direct one-to-one correspondence between some neural goings on and us wanting to say "I smell coffee", then I think the 'ineffable' crowd might have a better argument (though still flawed) — Isaac

To deny the correspondence is to deny the brain as the singular source of all mental activities. Flawed insofar as to merely affirm the correspondence is not to prove it, and the correspondence itself does not lend itself to being proven. We are left with the impossibility of it being otherwise, given the undeniable validity of mental events themselves, but cannot isolate and thereby verify the relation we insist must be the case.

But there is no such correspondence…. — Isaac

So epiphenomenalism then? Just because a correspondence has yet to be empirically demonstrated does not mean there isn’t one. The “ineffable crowd” merely grants the necessity of the correspondence as a function of natural law accorded to all physical substances, and simultaneously the impossibility of proving the form it must have, as a cause/effect relation, so ending up with the very epitome of the conception the crowd endorses. From which is derivable the principle, for that which is granted as necessary but at the same time impossible to describe in the same terms as the necessity requires, nothing for that can be said.
———-

We 'assign' narratives to the various neural happenings according to some rules-of-assignment….. — Isaac

Exactly right. But does this not leave us with a bigger problem than being unable to demonstrate how physical conditions permit non-physical activities, iff such is in fact the case? You should have already determined what all you just said means, before you can proceed with actually doing it. And for the particular you…in this case because you said it….so it is for all you’s in general, which is precisely the same as any “me” in general. Wherein lay the problem.

But those important ideas of family solidarity are incidental to God as a concept. It could be sort of thing that works like this that holds people together. The idea here is, is it an idea that is defensible when brought before inquiry. This is an important question, as, for one thing, religions have a great deal of influence on how we deal with our general affairs, and foolish beliefs can engender prejudice and impaired judgment in social issues. For another, clear thinking about religion can actually bring about startling insights.

I am in a minority position in holding that there actually IS a Truth with a capital T, so to speak, notwithstanding how this sits with modern thinking. — Constance

Yeah :) -- though, to be honest, there are others here who believe in such things, too. And, I have to note, I've been absolutely loving this conversation. But I think we've probably reached the last stop, and we're a far cry from the opening (not that I mind such things, but I try my best to not go too far down my various rabbit holes that are easy to distract me into)

My criticisms are meant as encouragements for a more developed line of thinking and warnings to ward off disappointment -- hopefully they weren't too discouraging, because you got something to say, and while I sit on the anthropological side of religion (rather than the practitioner's side), I do actually enjoy the project of "religion within the bounds of reason alone" -- so hopefully we'll get to touch on these ideas throughout the threads.

But for now, I think it best to leave things here, and think the thoughts that come.

There's no one-to-one relationship between the two, such that a small and variable number of 'chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee' might be described by us as "I smell coffee".

We 'assign' narratives to the various neural happenings according to some rules-of-assignment, and those rules almost exclusively come from our culture. — Isaac

Is there a one-to-one relationship between a small and variable number of chemical and physiological reactions of my brain and cultural rules of assignment?

But such an argument seems lost here, among the phenomenologist's bizarre claims — Isaac

Does this sound like a bizarre claim to you?

From phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty:
” My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul's finger, which is pointing out the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is Paul's finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul's world and guide his gaze. When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history.”(Phenomenology of Perception, p.471)

“ In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity.

Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. In the present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person's thoughts are certainly his; they are not of my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them. And indeed, the objection which my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me thoughts which I had no idea I possessed, so that at the same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life and make of it an episode in my private history”. (Phenomenology of Perception, p.413))

'

But for now, I think it best to leave things here, and think the thoughts that come. — Moliere

K:blush:

Yes, but the key thing that some miss, I think, is that there's no one-to-one relationship between the two, — Isaac

Worth pointing out, although as you can see those who don't grasp the notion of family resemblance or who adhere to some form of essentialism will have trouble following that discussion. Add to that the non-representational nature of neural networks and you have Buckle's chance of achieving some sort of understanding.

Thanks for your comments.

my reply to ↪Luke
, repeating a point made on page one:

"Suppose someone had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would they then be a bike rider? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike." — Banno

We can't put the tree or the smell or the bike ride or ↪jgill
's olympic diver into words. they are things in the world, not sentences. If you like, call them ineffable, but don't make the mistake of thinking that we can't therefor talk about them. We can, and we do. — Banno

Is this your response to my questions? I can possibly overlook all that you said about knowledge on page 1, including the set of instructions specified to whatever detail we desire, and accept your explanation that you did not intend for that example to concern knowledge. However, that only covers one of my questions. You did not answer this one:

You said that we do talk about sensations. However, Wittgenstein says of his beetle that "The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all". If the beetle in the box represents sensations (as Richard B suggests here), then it seems like you are advocating both positions? — Luke

In case it was unclear, the "both positions" I was referring to were your claim that we do talk about sensations, but also (what Wittgenstein seems to imply with his beetle) that sensations do not belong to the language game at all. How can it be that we both talk about sensations but that they do not belong to the language game at all? I will proceed to attempt to sketch a case for the latter, as I see it in PI.

At 244, W gives us a possible explanation of how a child learns sensations words, such as "pain". His story is that this occurs by association with the child's natural expressions of pain. For example, an adult sees the child crying and asks them if they are "in pain". The child gradually learns to associate the meaning of the word "pain" with their own external behaviour (and presumably, also, with their own internal sensation).

W proceeds with the private language argument against the possibility of having a private language that can only be used with respect to an individual's private sensations.

At 304 (and elsewhere), W distinguishes between pain and pain-behaviour. W notes that we can have pain-behaviour either with or without pain.

W does not deny that we have private sensations or that we can concentrate our attention on them (e.g. see 258, 305, 306), only that our public language does not work by describing them.

At 272 W does not deny the possibility of inverted spectra, or that we might each have a different "visual impression" of the colour red.

W is an expressivist regarding sensations, i.e. we express pain; we don't describe it. At 244-245 "the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it."

At 307: "“Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” — If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction."

This all demonstrates that our sensation words/language do not describe something internal, but instead refer to external behaviours. I cannot describe my own personal "visual impression" of red because that's not how language works. Like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box, my personal visual impression of red "doesnt belong to the language game at all" (293). Like inverted spectra "it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box" (293). My personal visual impression of red "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" (293). As you yourself note, Banno, a blind person can learn to use colour terms.

This is why private sensations are not a Something but not a Nothing either. Since language only works with respect to public external behaviours - expressions of pain - and does not describe private internal experiences, then an individual's private internal experiences are ineffable.

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here.
The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever. — Philosophical Investigations

Yes, but the key thing that some miss, I think, is that there's no one-to-one relationship between the two, such that a small and variable number of 'chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee' might be described by us as "I smell coffee". There's no one set of neural goings-on which correspond to 'smelling coffee', we estimate, make up, narrate, story-tell... We make a Bayesian inference that what's going on fits with the story that "I smell coffee". Which, of course, is where the unavoidably culturally-embedded nature of 'experiencing coffee' comes in, since we wouldn't have the rules, the criteria for what sorts of mental goings on might fit the narrative 'smelling coffee' without learning the words 'smelling' and 'coffee' (or the non-linguistic equivalent, for the dumb, or the deaf). — Isaac

FWIW, "the deaf" also use language. And I wouldn't say "the dumb" in public.

I think, is that there's no one-to-one relationship between the two, such that a small and variable number of 'chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee' might be described by us as "I smell coffee". There's no one set of neural goings-on which correspond to 'smelling coffee', we estimate, make up, narrate, story-tell... — Isaac

This is confusing to me, maybe in part because the sensation of smelling coffee is not distinguished from the verbal utterance "I smell coffee".

There are really three things:

1/ Neural activity in response to smelling coffee
2. The subjective sense of that neural activity: (smell-of-coffee)
3. The verbalization "I smell coffee"

* No one is claiming a one-to-one relationship between 1 and 3.
* No one is claiming even claiming that between 1 and 2: for all we know many distinct neural activities correspond with 2.
* No one is claiming that the relationship between 2 and 3 is not culturally bound
* No one is claiming that 1 is not expressible with language, at least in principle.

What is claimed is that the contents of 2 are not expressible with language. We can express we are having the sensation with "I smell coffee", but we cannot express what it is like.There is a state of affairs where A's (smell-of-coffee) is the same as B's. There is a state of affairs where A's (smell-of-coffee) is same as B's (smell-of-feces), and vice versa. There exists no verbal exchange between A and B which can tell them which state of affairs holds. because 2 is inexpressible. The can only express the culturally bound mapping from 2 to 3: "I smell coffee".

That's exactly the point. There's a gap between what "neural activity" means, and what "I smell coffee" means — Metaphysician Undercover

That's your claim. It's not what I've said.

If we assert that the two do refer to the same thing, then our supposed understanding is missing all the reality of the difference between what these two actually refer to, which manifests as the real difference between them — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not missing. The difference is that one's a name and the other is a

So epiphenomenalism then? Just because a correspondence has yet to be empirically demonstrated does not mean there isn’t one. — Mww

collection of neurons firing.

the thing refer to by each is the same thing — Metaphysician Undercover

You've misunderstood reference. 'The apple' refers to the apple. They're two different things (one an expression, the other a fruit). They don't both 'refer' to different things. 'The apple' refers. The apple is just an apple.

the supposed parts make up the whole, but to name the whole is to name the whole, and this in no way names the parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it does. Your spleen is in the group {parts of MU}. That group was christened by naming something MU which was not a simple. You christened that group by naming the entity MU even though you do not know it's actual constituents. The point of all this being that you don't need to know what makes up the sensation 'smelling coffee' in order to name it.

To deny the correspondence is to deny the brain as the singular source of all mental activities. — Mww

Indeed, but denying a one-to-one correspondence is not, I think, the same as denying a correspondence of any sort.

What I'm saying is that we group some loose collection of neural activity as 'smelling coffee' so whenever any activity which falls into that group occurs we're inclined to think that we're smelling coffee.

It's like saying "any collection including 2, 3 and, 5 shall be 'Set A'. It won't matter if we get {3,4,5,2} or {2,3,4,5} they'll both be considered Set A because they both meet the criteria. A correspondence, but not one-to-one.

So epiphenomenalism then? Just because a correspondence has yet to be empirically demonstrated does not mean there isn’t one. — Mww

But it has been empirically shown that there probably isn't one (demonstrated being too strong a word). We have quite a lot of empirical evidence showing that more than one set of neural goings on elicits the exact same reported experience.

I think maybe my poor writing is creating some confusion here. In arguing that there's no one-t-one correspondence, I'm not arguing there's no correspondence at all, but rather as suggests, a 'family resemblance'.

But does this not leave us with a bigger problem than being unable to demonstrate how physical conditions permit non-physical activities, iff such is in fact the case? You should have already determined what all you just said means, before you can proceed with actually doing it. And for the particular you…in this case because you said it….so it is for all you’s in general, which is precisely the same as any “me” in general. Wherein lay the problem. — Mww

Eh? Sorry, you might have to unpick that a little. Are you pointing to the problem of self-referential interpretation?

Is there a one-to-one relationship between a small and variable number of chemical and physiological reactions of my brain and cultural rules of assignment? — Joshs

I assume so (the alternative being that such cultural rules are random, which seems unlikely given their coherence). Like with perception in general, the models we come up with are constrained by the external states they're trying to model because we want them to act in some way upon those external states so not just any model will do.

Does this sound like a bizarre claim to you? — Joshs

To be honest, yes. I can't make any sense of it at all, but that may just be my unfamiliarity with the text. The 'bizarre claim' I was actually referring to was the one implied by an 'investigation' into they way things seem to us without (bracketing out) the question of reality (external states). I just don't believe one approaches the question of how some thing seems to one with a blank slate. I think given almost any question at all one will have preconceptions about it.

you have Buckle's chance of achieving some sort of understanding. — Banno

So it seems ^.

What is claimed is that the contents of 2 are not expressible with language. — hypericin

Yes. I understand the nature of the claim. I'm disputing it. I'm claiming that the evidence we have thus far points to such a lack of neural criteria for the collection of the various activities at 1 into the grouping of 2 that we must have learned those groups. There's no other biological mechanism or cause for us to group such a range of neural activity into the category 'smelling coffee' other than by having learned culturally to do so.

We've no apparent biological reason to group the various neural goings on in the way we do. No reason to have the collection 'smelling coffee' at all, other than for communication. All other biological responses do not seem to require them to be grouped thus.