As usual, more assertions without arguments, but with strawmen & ad hominrms instead ... You completely lack credibility, @Gnomon. — 180 Proof

2) Solipsism says my mind creates other people. Let’s suppose some sort of universal mind creates me and everyone else. The idea is that a tiny bit of universal consciousness splits off and becomes me. I forget I’m a tiny part of universal consciousness and take myself to be a person, independently existing and free to choose. In effect, I am the Uncle Pete in the solipsist’s dream, thinking that I exist as an independent person when in reality I’m merely a figment of the solipsist’s consciousness. — Art48

This resembles a summary of philosopher Bernado Kastrup's idea of analytic idealism where all people are dissociated alters of mind at large (cosmic consciousness). The nature of this great mind is similar to Schopenhauer's notion of Will - it is instinctive, blind and striving, it is not metacognitive. In this view the entire world of physicality is the product or mind at large - the physical is simply what consciousness looks like when seen from a particular perspective. Kasturp argues that human beings might be attempts by mind at large to be metacognitive. Each alter is a separate expression of stand alone consciousnesses, behaving independently of the others while it briefly exists.

Bernado Kastrup's panpsychist-fantasy more resembles to me Berkeley's metaphysics than Schopenhauer's but I agree with the gist of your summary. I'm probably mistaken but it seems Kastrup has derived, at least in part, his analytic idealism from Max Tegmark's 'pancomputationalist' mathematical universe hypothesis (MUH) ...

Bernado Kastrup's panpsychist-fantasy more resembles to me Berkeley's metaphysics than Schopenhauer's — 180 Proof

Berkeley's God (mind at large) is metacognitive, whereas Schopenhauer's Will is not and afaik is not thought of as "mind" or even as being cognitive at all, so Kastrup's notion looks like it resembles neither. If "mind at large" is not cognitive, how could it "attempt" anything purposive like creating humans beings in order to become metacognitive? Sounds like Kuhscheiße to me.

Berkeley's God (mind at large) is metacognitive, whereas Schopenhauer's Will is not and afaik is not thought of as "mind" or even as being cognitive at all, so Kastrup's notion looks like it resembles neither. — Janus

Could be. Kastrup describes his mind-at-large as a blind, striving and not metacognitive - this does resemble Will. He himself says Schopenhauer did most of the work for him.

The big problem raised (and I think we've talked this through before) is how reality is held together by this 'great mind' in what does resemble Berkeley - the overarching consciousness which ensures we all experience the same reality. You might even say by this that great mind plays the role of foundational guarantor - so beloved of the apologists. Are we essentially looking at an account of theism renovated using Plato and the world of Quantum speculations?

Are we essentially looking at an account of theism renovated using Plato and the world of Quantum speculations? — Tom Storm

:up:

Sounds like Kuhscheiße to me. — Janus

Jawohl.

Could be. Kastrup describes his mind-at-large as a blind, striving and not metacognitive - this does resemble Will. He himself says Schopenhauer did most of the work for him. — Tom Storm

Oh right, I haven't actually read any Kastrup; but then that seems wrong because a "blind striving" would not seem to qualify as a mind or as being cognitive. Animals (at least some of the :higher" ones) are generally considered to have minds, to be cognitive and to be purposive, so it seems that a "blind striving" would be more like an amoeba than an animal.

You might even say by this that great mind plays the role of foundational guarantor - so beloved of the apologists. Are we essentially looking at an account of theism renovated using Plato and the world of Quantum speculations? — Tom Storm

Could a "blind striving" ever fulfill such a role? Kastrup's philosophy sounds like it's plagued with inconsistency from what I've seen (which admittedly is very little).

Jawohl. — 180 Proof

Es klingt so, als ob Kastrup zum Aufräumen der Fahrerlager gemacht werden sollte.

Could a "blind striving" ever fulfill such a role? Kastrup's philosophy sounds like it's plagued with inconsistency from what I've seen (which admittedly is very little). — Janus

I think he sets it out fairly well and with clarity. But I think it needs more than my brief, clumsy summary to gain a clear view of it. Idealism seems to be one of those subjects people may be sympathetic towards in theory, but when it comes to specific versions it may seem less compelling or convincing.

I think the problem with any form of idealism is that we cannot adequately model what we imagine might be going on. We can model the physical because it is observable, but we can model mind only in terms of reasons (and along the lines of how we understand our own), it seems to me.

Sounds right. Do you think idealism is a coherent ontology, or is it largely a product of the limitations of direct realism and philosophical naturalism?

:smirk:

Janus, of course, will answer for himself; as far as I'm concerned, to the degree an expression of 'idealism' is the result of conflating epistemology (maps) & ontology (territory) I think it is incoherent.

↪Tom Storm
I think the problem with any form of idealism is that we cannot adequately model what we imagine might be going on. We can model the physical because it is observable, but we can model mind only in terms of reasons (and along the lines of how we understand our own), it seems to me. — Janus

That is the crux of the Realism vs Idealism controversy. Our common language is inherently concrete-based (realistic) because our mutual experience is of the (external ; objective) Real world. We only know of other people's mental models from their metaphorical expressions. Only the individual knows what's going on in their own psyche. So the Mind Doctor is working blind.

The physical sciences, such as Physics & Chemistry, can describe their observations in terms of visual & tangible physical properties. But the meta-physical sciences, such as Psychology & History, must communicate their "observations" in terms of analogies to physical behaviors. But analogies & metaphors are subject to contrary subjective interpretations. That's why Psychology & Philosophy are not considered to be hard (concrete) sciences. They are sciences of invisible intangible minds, not quivering jello-brains.

For example, B.F. Skinner assumed that he could put the philosophical Psychology of Freud on a more scientific basis, by ignoring occult mental processes, and focusing on overt physical behavior. IOW, treating humans like non-verbal animals. Consequently, Psychology soon developed in Psychiatry, using drugs & surgery to modify behavior, without much concern for "what it's like" for the patient. Likewise, science-emulating Philosophy tends to treat verbal persons like dumb animals

Today, self-help Pop-Psychology attempts to allow the person to heal their own mind via non-physical interventions such as Meditation. Its methods & language have lapsed back into ancient Western & Eastern forms of mind-centered Philosophy. Yet, there is at least one intermediate mainstream approach that successfully combines both mental & physical treatments : Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy. It's a kind of guided self-help process that allows the anxious or depressed patient to "heal thyself". Its technical vocabulary is necessarily analogous to physical treatments, but also metaphorical enough to be understandable by non-professionals. It allows us to "model the mind . . . along the lines of how we understand our own". Maybe we need to develop a Cognitive-Behavioral Philosophy. :smile:

What do you make of the QM claim that consciousness is vital to physical processes e.g. in the double slit experiment?

That's only an interpretation (i.e. speculation) about QM and not a feature or prediction of QM. The latter would be scientific and the former not. An alternative like the MWI takes Occam's Razor to "observer consciousness collapses the wave function". Interpretations of a scientific theory are decidable as scientific only to the degree they imply new conjectures or predictions which are experimentally testable; otherwise, they are mostly idle speculations – puzzle-piece thought-experiments for assembling a (hopefully coherent) 'metaphysical framework' – that, while it may be interesting, says something about one's ideas but, in effect, demonstrates nothing about nature, or the phenomena at issue.

:up:

Science! Yep, that's how it works, but no scientific hypothesis is true is it? Does that mean anything? What they are is not false until, of course, proven to be so.

The MWI is unfalsifiable, I know that's true for reasons laid down for lay audiences like myself.

That an observer allegedly causes the collapse of a wave function is too unfalsifiable? Seems like it, it is.

These are all (known) knowns of course and I'm grateful to you for joggin' my memory.

We're at this stage in a tight spot, scientifically speaking, oui monsieur?

This resembles a summary of philosopher Bernado Kastrup's idea of analytic idealism where all people are dissociated alters of mind at large (cosmic consciousness). — Tom Storm

I've listened to some Kastrup videos and I think you're right. It's also similar to non-dual Vedanta.

Also, I'd say taking consciousness as foundational and the world as derivative is similar to Descartes’ certainty about inner sensations (I think therefore I am) while admitting the world he perceived might be caused by some evil demon.

Bernardo Kastrup's paper, it's very good:
https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAOS.pdf

https://ctmucommunity.org/wiki/Distributed_solipsism

What do you make of the QM claim that consciousness is vital to physical processes e.g. in the double slit experiment? — Agent Smith

I doubt that Consciousness per se is responsible for the QM "collapse". Instead, I would say that extraction of Information from superposed (holistic) waveforms cause the statistical state (probability ; potential) to collapse (like a pricked balloon) into particular states (actual photons). That's the basis of John A. Wheeler's "It from Bit" postulate. His idea is sometimes misinterpreted as "mind over matter", because of the confusion between Human Consciousness and Generic Information (i.e. EnFormAction ; the essence of Energy).

"Consciousness" is associated with a particular person, and brain. But Information (EnFormAction) is the general causal process of the world. In my thesis, EnFormAction (the teleological program of Nature) was the driving force of evolution for billions of years --- before Human consciousness emerged in the last million years or so. Therefore, during the pre-human era, waveforms were caused to collapse by energy (information) exchanges when waves intersected & interacted to produce the peaks our senses interpret as particles of matter or energy.

Information (EnFormAction) was entirely physical until evolution complexified the interactions of energy & matter into brains that could process general information into personal meaning (measurement of the environment). Ut Sensum? :smile:

Information exchange vs Conscious measurement :
The claim that an observer is needed to collapse the wave function has injected a severely anthropomorphic element into quantum theory, suggesting that nothing happens in the universe except when physicists are making measurements. An extreme example is Hugh Everett’s Many Worlds theory, which says that the universe splits into two nearly identical universes whenever a measurement is made.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/experiments/wave-function_collapse/
Note -- the measurement occurs only when the new pattern is interpreted by a mind. Yet physics works in the absence of minds.

NON-CONSCIOUS SLITS CAUSE CONTINUOUS WAVES TO BECOME PARTICULAR

For what it's worth, Smith, my layman's story:

The MWI is unfalsifiable ... — Agent Smith

First, it's not offered as a testable model but an interpretation that simplifies the model. Second, David Deutsch, a founder of quantum computing, et al argue that the interference patterns of a single photon in the double slit experiment exhibits the wavefunction of that photon (i.e. that it follows many paths (worlds / histories / worldlines) simultanously and that a measurenent 'selects' one of those paths without "collapsing" them all into one). Lastly, he speculates how the MWI might be falsifiable eventually using human-level AGI instantiated on a quantum computer (i.e. the AGI would either (A) collapse the wavefunction of a photon or (B) observe (experience) its many histories in superposition). Check out this short video featuring David Deutsch:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kNAR74SWOho

NB: Consider what is said about the relationship of information to physics – @Gnomon et al get this backwards like typical (transcendental) idealists who conceive of "disembodied mind" as prior to embodiment (as a phenomenal illusion / construct of "mind" (or in Gnomon's terms "teleological generic information" :sweat:)).

That an observer allegedly causes the collapse of a wave function is too unfalsifiable? — Agent Smith

More than that, the Copenhagen interpretation (of the 1920s-30s) isn't needed because it doesn't explain quantum phenomena so much as it attempts, in effect (not necessarily by design) to reify the Neo-Kantian 'epistemology-determines-ontology' paradigm that dominated much of philosophical, scientific and cultural life in Mitteleuropa from the late 19th to the mid-20th centuries.

Your theory doesn't require minds then - information is self-sufficient and yet ...



Did you read Gnomon's latest post (right above yours)?

I sympathize with your view. In the simplest sense, brains are specific combinations of matter.

Yes, I read it as I always do for a laugh. My reply to you also indirectly comments on Gnomon's quantum-woo. The video I've linked briefly discusses these issues in an accessible manner for a layman. I've posted it before but s/he seems to have ignored it; I hope you consider what's said there.

:up:

Sounds right. Do you think idealism is a coherent ontology, or is it largely a product of the limitations of direct realism and philosophical naturalism? — Tom Storm

I tend to think that idealism and religion are generally seen as being more closely allied than religion and materialism; I'm not sure the latter are easily made compatible. Then when you think about the general human search for meaning and the common idea that without religion, ethics and morality are without ground, then idealism as a philosophical position begins to look like it is inevitably bound to idealism in the more ordinary sense; that is idealism seems to be inevitably idealistic (as opposed to realistic).

So, if idealism is an idealistically imagined ontology that reflects our aspirations, rather than a more realistic ontology that aligns with our actual ordinary, everyday embodied material experience, then I suppose you could say idealism is incoherent in that it doesn't cohere with that ordinary experience.

On the other hand we have the ordinary experience of freedom and moral responsibility that, on the face of it at least, seems more in accord with idealism than it does with materialism. Just as we have the common notion of idealism as consisting in a concern with universal values, we have the ordinary notion of materialism as being a negation of values other than that of personal possession and material assets.

But then, is idealism better seen as being opposed to materialism or to realism, or perhaps to naturalism? All these isms take different forms and interact conceptually in different ways accordingly, so it seems to be a complex picture taking shape, which seems fitting since this "debate" in all its forms is pretty much the story of western philosophy from its beginnings to now.

That is the crux of the Realism vs Idealism controversy. Our common language is inherently concrete-based (realistic) because our mutual experience is of the (external ; objective) Real world. We only know of other people's mental models from their metaphorical expressions. Only the individual knows what's going on in their own psyche. So the Mind Doctor is working blind. — Gnomon

As I said above, apart from the experience of the "external, objective" world there is also the experience of freedom and moral responsibility, and although we don't directly experience what goes on in other minds, similarly we don't directly experience an external world either, although we do have plenty of experience that provides individual evidence that something exists outside of our skins, just as we have plenty of experience that provides evidence for the existence of other people..

All these isms take different forms and interact conceptually in different ways accordingly, so it seems to be complex picture taking shape, which seems fitting since this "debate" in all its forms is pretty much the story of western philosophy from its beginnings to now. — Janus

Indeed.

Thanks for that nicely worded overview.

Cheers Tom, you ask good questions, and provide some good answers yourself. and I appreciate your interest in the ideas of others.

Your theory doesn't require minds then - information is self-sufficient and yet ... — Agent Smith

That's not what I said, or intended. Instead, Generic Information (programmed causation) was responsible for gradual emergence of Minds -- among many other things -- from eons of information processing. For billions of years, Nature got along fine without Minds -- or Universal Consciousness. But natural EnFormAction (energy + direction) laid groundwork for the eventual emergence of rational Minds. Those mammalian minds later evolved self-conscious homo sapiens Minds, that only recently began to take over the creative function of Evolution via Culture.

With that in mind, I would re-word your statement to say that "self-sufficient" Information (EnFormAction) worked automatically for eons (no need for miracles), to construct a world and local environment suitable for warm-blooded vertebrate creatures to proliferate, and to evolve complex brains on top of their up-right spines. Those information-processing brains then evolved cooperative Culture (combined minds) to expand the reach of subjective Information via communication to all sentient creatures on Earth.

What I was implying is that evolutionary EnFormAction functions automatically (self-controlled) like a computer program, with creative feedback loops, to process initial general Information (Forms) into novel & unique forms as outputs. That's an imaginative metaphor, as an attempt to make sense of a world that makes sense to rational minds. The universe is much more "self-sufficient" than any current computer though. For example, it has produced interim outputs (organisms ) that are self-organizing. Does any of that make sense, not as a scientific conclusion, but as a philosophical metaphor? :smile:

Intitial Program Data :
In mathematics and particularly in dynamic systems, an initial condition, in some contexts called a seed value,[1]: pp. 160  is a value of an evolving variable at some point in time designated as the initial time (typically denoted t = 0).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_condition
Note -- Metaphorically, the Singularity was the program for evolution, and Generic Information was the "seed" containing coded directions (like DNA) and selection criteria for eventual development of Conscious Minds. Unfortunately, the implicit Programmer is beyond the scope of Science, but not out of reach for philosophical conjecture.
Can you see the analogy? Evolution works like a computer, using natural selection to filter out wrong answers to the original question. Today, human programmed computers use artificial selection (programmer's intentions) to weed-out a range of variables, down to a precious few that meet the programmer's criteria. :nerd:


"To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn presents a rational aspect."
___Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Ok. It makes sense alright and I have a feeling you'll find many takers with regard to self-organization. It also seems to square, quite perfectly, with your Enformy which is G*D (you should learn some Latin, quidquid Latine dictum sit altum videtur). Good job!

Ok. It makes sense alright and I have a feeling you'll find many takers with regard to self-organization. It also seems to square, quite perfectly, with your Enformy which is G*D (you should learn some Latin, quidquid Latine dictum sit altum videtur). Good job! — Agent Smith

Just a quibble : "Enformy" is a technical scientific concept, equal & opposite to "Entropy" -- not a miracle-working deity. The term is not intended to sound profound, but to be an accurate assessment of how evolution progresses -- via self-organization -- despite the digressive laws of Thermodynamics. :smile:

Enformy : neo-Latin, for Pro (forward) Gressus (to move)

As I said above, apart from the experience of the "external, objective" world there is also the experience of freedom and moral responsibility, and although we don't directly experience what goes on in other minds, similarly we don't directly experience an external world either, although we do have plenty of experience that provides individual evidence that something exists outside of our skins, just as we have plenty of experience that provides evidence for the existence of other people.. — Janus

I assume you're referring to Kant's ding an sich noumenon*1, which presumably exists "independent of representation and observation". Yet "Universal Mind/Consciousness" as an abstract idea, lacks phenomenal experience. So Realists tend to dismiss such unverifiable ideas, asserting that their phenomenal existence (as brain states)*2 is the only reality. Anything else suffers from the major limitation of Idealism : subjectivity. Which can be dismissed as "imaginary", or "mere opinion", or even "woo-woo" -- if it clashes with the Realist's noumenal worldview.

I just discovered the notion of "Phenomenal Experience"*3 as an argument in favor of Consciousness as a real thing. But I doubt that a Realist would be convinced. They might admit that the human Mind has a general function : processing ideas (representations of experience), while insisting that the mechanism generating that useful function is the material brain. Hence the "function" does not exist "independent of observation". Materialism reserves "experience" for the five physical senses of the body*4. Whereas Functionalism*5 seems to be a half-step toward Idealism.

The hard distinction between Realism & Idealism seems to imply that "my sensory experience counts as real" but your subjective experience counts only as hearsay. As a defense against manipulations via Faith, such skepticism might be necessary, in order to screen for truth. But openness to the experiences of others results in social cooperation, even in the profession we call Science. But the soft distinction typical of the profession of Philosophy makes a forum for sharing personal, non-empirical, opinions possible. I can import some of your ideas into my own worldview, as long as they pass the Plausible (logical, but not necessarily factual) test. From my perspective, "Universal Mind" may sound reasonable, depending on prior assumptions -- which may or may not be acceptable. :smile:

PS__Personally, I can't make a black vs white distinction between Real & Ideal or Mind & Matter. As you seem to imply, what we know as real is a subjective feeling about the representation of an observation.

*1. Ding An Sich :
In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself

*2. But what is a brain state, other than a temporary pattern of interrelationships? Its function is in motivated behavior based on belief in a the represented idea.

*3. Phenomenal experiencemight act as a mental currency of sorts, which not only endows conscious mental states with intrinsic value but also makes it possible for conscious agents to compare vastly different experiences in a common subject-centred space—a feature that readily explains the fact that consciousness is ‘unified’.
https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2022/1/niac007/6573727

*4. . . . .Omitting the sixth sense of Reason, which ties separate sensory inputs into meaningful, non-physical, patterns of relationships.

*5. In philosophy of mind, functionalism is the thesis that mental states are constituted solely by their functional role, which means, their causal relations with other mental states, sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. Functionalism developed largely as an alternative to the identity theory of mind and behaviorism. ___Wikipedia