compulsion is the absence of will.
— Agent Smith

True enough. And compulsion also abrogates responsibility. The question is, can we ever really be compelled, or do we allow ourselves to be compelled?

I think that the real opposition is internal, and the force that counters will in us might best be understood as...temptation. — Pantagruel

The will seems related to the idea of self, to the idea of independence, to the idea of responsbility (you mentioned that) but then that amounts to overlooking an obvious truth about what will is; either that or we're unsure of what will is.

The will seems related to the idea of self, to the idea of independence, to the idea of responsibility (you mentioned that) but then that amounts to overlooking an obvious truth about what will is; — Agent Smith

What truth is does that overlook?

I'm relyin' on me intuition mate - it doesn't mean anything.

Talking out of me bung hole? :chin:

I think that will is something that presents in degrees, just like consciousness. In fact, I'd say there is a relationship between the two.

arelationship between will and consciousness? Ok, but what kinda relationship is it?

Will, to me, is simply a kind of desire.

Well, the concept of consciousness as primarily intentional is often a starting point in phenomenology (i.e Brentano). From consciousness being directed in the sense of intentionality it seems a short step to being directed in the sense of conation. It seems an essential feature to me.

Will, to me, is simply a kind of desire. — Agent Smith

Desire is just an inclination toward an object or goal. Will is what acts on the desire. That we do not necessarily act on our desires indicates that will is not a kind of desire.

Well, the concept of consciousness as primarily intentional is often a starting point in phenomenology (i.e Brentano). From consciousness being directed in the sense of intentionality it seems a short step to being directed in the sense of conation. It seems an essential feature to me. — Pantagruel

I agree.

Desire is just an inclination toward an object or goal. Will is what acts on the desire. That we do not necessarily act on our desires indicates that will is not a kind of desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

In there's a puzzle I haven't been able to solve. Perhaps it's a pseudoproblem like many of my problems are.

---

To both of the above posters.

It seems that some other posters are of the view that will is tied/linked to choice.

It seems that some other posters are of the view that will is tied/linked to choice. — Agent Smith

Why else talk about it? If the topic is not germane to situations where the desire to make a difference between possibilities is what is being discussed, what is being discussed?

Why else talk about it? If the topic is not germane to situations where the desire to make a difference between possibilities is what is being discussed, what is being discussed? — Paine

True, true!

It seems that some other posters are of the view that will is tied/linked to choice. — Agent Smith

I addressed this issue already. Choice is made by the mind, reason, or rational intellect, and the will is not "tied" to that choice or else it would not be free. If the will were tied to choice, we would not be able to do other than what we choose as the right thing to do. But experience shows us that people often make a choice about what ought to be done, then still end up acting otherwise, without being forced to act otherwise. That is because the will is free, and not tied to choice.

Will is associated with choice is what I meant.

Sure there is an association but the question is how closely are these two related. If we premise that all willed acts are chosen acts, then we run into the problem which Socrates and Plato exposed. Sometimes choices are not acted upon, we do not end up doing what we choose to do. This would demonstrate "choice" to be more broadly defined than "will". Not all choices are willed.

And when we start driving this wedge between choice and will, it starts to appear possible that some willful acts might not even be chosen. This is what happens sometimes when we act from habit. You might willfully choose to walk to the store, for example, but you do not consciously choose all the particular actions which get you there, like each individual movement of your legs and feet. So there is a cause and effect process which proceeds from the willful act which makes it not required to choose each particular aspect of a willful act, after the causal chain is put into action. Therefore we do not necessarily choose the particular acts which follow from the habit, but in relation to moral responsibility, and law, these acts are still willful acts.

Now we've broken the association between will and choice, showing that it is a faulty representation. Not all chosen acts are willed, and not all willed acts are chosen. We have no means for logical implication either way. Choice does not imply will and will does not imply choice.

But this dead end does necessarily impede our process of understanding "will", because we have other alternatives. And by the process of elimination, understanding advances. "Will" is commonly associated with "intention", such that a willed act is necessarily an intentional act and vise versa. We might assume that there is an equivalence between the two. All willed acts are intentional, and intentional acts are willed. And when we look at the defining feature of "intentional", we find "purpose". The common definition is such that all purposeful acts are intentional acts. "Intention" is what gives purpose to an act. So when we look at an act, and judge that there is purpose to the act, we can say that it is an intentional act, and being intentional implies that it was willed. We can conclude that a purposeful act is an intentional act, and rely on our judgement of "purpose" in acts, as an indication of whether the act is willed. ( "Choice" having been shown to be unreliable.)

Of course you will see all sorts of mechanistic acts in artificial things, which have purpose, and wonder how it is that each of these acts is a willed act. But artificial things are created, so their very existence is willed, and so by extension each act of the artificial thing is instilled with intention by the willful act which creates the thing. So the intention of a willed act has the capacity to continue in time far beyond the point in time which the act was willed, through the chain of cause and effect. This is the consequences of a willed act. The "end" might be far in the future from the beginning, but it is still intentional as the result of a willed act.

Something like that, si!

Will is then linked to choice and as you say, we can drive a wedge between the two. What does the world look like now?

Will is then linked to choice and as you say, we can drive a wedge between the two. What does the world look like now? — Agent Smith

As I said, will is wrongfully linked to choice. When we drive a wedge between the two it is to change the way we look at the world. Then the world looks more real because we see causation in a realistic way. Consider Plato's cave allegory, the real existence of "the good" is not even acknowledged by those still in the cave.

Will - the faculty by which an act or event is determined and initiated - is essentially a perceived relation between potential and actuality. As humans, we have the capacity and awareness to craft will, but it is not a property we possess, if we’re honest. Having said that, it is language that presents the illusion of will as a property, attributing it arbitrarily to a subject as agency. This is an heuristic device that brings moral significance to an act, and enables us to judge a person wholly accountable for events that occur.

To say that will is linked to choice is an oversimplification. Yes, the choices we make help to determine and initiate events, but many aspects of these events are pre-determined, and the part our choice plays is much smaller than we like to think. It is only in language that we conceptualise an event as an act between subject and object, assuming will to be solely a property of the subject, in determining and initiating their choice.

It’s an inaccurate description - one that informs us adequately in the moment, to help determine and initiate subsequent actions. But it was never the only way to describe or to perceive the event.

As I said, will is wrongfully linked to choice. When we drive a wedge between the two it is to change the way we look at the world. Then the world looks more real because we see causation in a realistic way. Consider Plato's cave allegory, the real existence of "the good" is not even acknowledged by those still in the cave. — Metaphysician Undercover

Will and choice to be delinked, si!

Causation, again si!

As for Plato's cave, really big cave if you ask me! After 2.5k years of dedicated effort, we're still inside it. :groan:

As for Plato's cave, really big cave if you ask me! After 2.5k years of dedicated effort, we're still inside it. — Agent Smith

That is due to the failure of philosophy. The philosopher's task is to lead the people out of the cave. After 2.5k years, the philosophers have failed, and we remain, in the cave.

The philosopher's task — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it the philosopher's task or aspiration? It isn't like the relevant information hasn't been presented. The public at large is responsible for what it consumes. Perhaps philosophy should try to sensationalize itself?

Is it the philosopher's task or aspiration? It isn't like the relevant information hasn't been presented. The public at large is responsible for what it consumes. Perhaps philosophy should try to sensationalize itself? — Pantagruel

In Plato's cave allegory it is the task of the philosopher. After escaping the cave, and getting a glimpse of the true reality, it is the responsibility of the philosopher to go back, and educate the others. The task is very difficult because the public, as you imply, is already happy in its current consumption. So I don't think it's a matter of simply presenting the reality to the public, it's more like a matter of forcing them to face reality.

That is due to the failure of philosophy. The philosopher's task is to lead the people out of the cave. After 2.5k years, the philosophers have failed, and we remain, in the cave. — Metaphysician Undercover

That hurt! I'm not a professional philosopher, but that hurt!

I'd say to those scientists who hold a dim view of philosophy (there a quite a number of big names on that list) to trade places with philosophers. Let's see how they fare?

Headline: Science makes a great leap forward. Philosophy on the verge of extinction!

:smile:

In Plato's cave allegory it is the task of the philosopher. After escaping the cave, and getting a glimpse of the true reality, it is the responsibility of the philosopher to go back, and educate the others. The task is very difficult because the public, as you imply, is already happy in its current consumption — Metaphysician Undercover

People are very judgmental of the 'stupid, misled public' it often seems to me. They just want dumb things and are happy with the status quo...

I think it is true that people ignore philosophy (for the most part) but given the levels of chaos and dissatisfactions we find about us, I doubt people are happy with that they know.

Which philosopher would anyone read or listen to and why? The world is pullulating gurus, experts and sages - how would we establish where to begin? And it would seem that the case has not been made that philosophy is helpful.