I don’t think you’ll find among those philosophers ( Rorty, Rouse, Heidegger, etc) who are both conceptual and ethical relativists, any enthusiasm for the usefulness of propositional truth. — Joshs
Well, then present the argument. What is it?So I think one can justifiably argue that a belief in a world that is independent of our concepts or ethical values is a a necessary pre-condition for supporting the usefulness of bivalent logic. — Joshs
So I think one can justifiably argue that a belief in a world that is independent of our concepts or ethical values is a necessary pre-condition for supporting the usefulness of bivalent logic.
— Joshs
Well, then present the argument. What is it? — Banno
.Bivalent logic is a type of two-valued logic, which means that it only allows for two possible truth values: true or false. In other words, something is either true or it is false, and there is no in-between or middle ground. In this sense, bivalent logic does not necessarily require that the world be independent of our concepts. Instead, it simply requires that there be a clear distinction between true and false statements, regardless of how those statements relate to the world or our understanding of it. — Banno
Let me compare bivalent logic to what I will call a bipolar sense. A bipolar sense differentiates itself from its contextual background ( the contrast pole) via a unique dimension of similarity and difference. A bipolar sense isn’t just something that happens to be the case. It is something that happens to be the case in a particular way. No bipolar sense ever duplicates its exact content. To apply bivalent logic to a bipolar sense is to always come up short. That is, whenever we ask whether a particular bipolar sense is the case , the answer will be no, simply because the exact sense doesn’t repeat itself. — Joshs
In other words, bivalent logic must have context-independence. It must apply to truth-apt concepts that are independent of our actual situational sense of what is the case. — Joshs
Such boundaries and exactness are the definitive traits of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favour of appeal to similarity of a kind with family resemblance. — SEP
Notice the rejection of forms that goes along with this anti-essentialism. The concepts we use are constructed by us for our purposes, not found floating in some ideal void. They need have no centre. — Banno
No idea what you are talking about. — Janus
"Family resemblances"—remember? There is no resemblance without similarity. — Janus
What ties the ship to the wharf is a rope, and the rope consists of fibres, but it does not get its strength from any fibre which runs through it from one end to the other, but from the fact that there is a vast number of fibres overlapping' (pi, i, 65–7; bb 87).
I can only imagine that the findings that there isn’t a one-to-one correspondence comes from testing subjects’ neural activity while they are smelling coffee (or while they are “in the presence of coffee” as you originally put it). Therefore, what is in common to them all is that they are smelling coffee.
— Luke
Thinking of coffee does it too. Smelling something you think is going to be coffee but isn't, expecting coffee...
— Isaac
Does what too?
— Luke
Triggers one of a number of neural networks associated with reports of 'smelling coffee'.
I'm baffled as to why this is causing such confusion.
Several different neural events result in us reporting we experience 'smelling coffee'
There's no single thing connecting all the different events other than that they all happen to result (sometimes) in reports of 'smelling coffee'
Since there's no biological link, and no external world link, the only conclusion we can reach is that it's our own post hoc construction to conceptualise any given neural event as 'smelling coffee'. — Isaac
Somehow sensations are supposed to occupy some middle (@Moliere) ground, private, ineffable, yet somehow despite that, the foundation of our understanding (@Constance).
You clever folk all agree, but can't explain it. I call bullshit. — Banno
Many of your posts do not show in the mentions alerts. Hence they get missed. — Banno
Hence the rope example. No single thread runs through the whole rope, and yet we treat it as one thing. — Banno
phenomenology is supposed to provide a firm foundation for philosophical speculation but instead gets itself tied into a knot by presuming to talk about what it itself supposes to be ineffable. — Banno
I don't see the relevance. — Janus
To claim there's such an entity as 'the smell of coffee' requires that coffee produce a consistent experience, but it doesn't seem to. — Isaac
These are aesthetic judgements on an object already perceived, not the sensation itself given from objects themselves as they are perceived.
— Mww
Where is that sensation? What are we using as evidence (rational or empirical) that such a thing exists? — Isaac
We use the word "red" for sunsets and sports cars and blood, but these things are not the same colour. — Banno
the transcendental argument is false. — Banno
The smell of coffee is nothing but a sensation that belongs to a certain thing — Mww
The bit that is missing is that a family resemblance can grow, so there can be no definite statement of what that similarity is. — Banno
the truth or falsity of it thus being irrelevant. — Mww
What’s the point again? — Mww
So you are now saying that since George Eliot was also named Mary Ann Evans, these are two distinct individuals, and that the author of Middlemarch and Mary Ann Evans are different people. — Banno
We can have two different descriptions of the very same thing. We can have two names for the very same thing. We can have a description and a name that both refer to one thing. — Banno
You failed to note "provided this functions as part of the task at hand". Look to the use. The meaning of a sentence is found in its use. — Banno
Coffee with sugar will always be experienced as coffee with sugar, coffee with just milk will be experienced as coffee with just milk. — Mww
It was with reference toI can perceive a sports car that appears blood-red in color. What’s the point again? — Mww
The sports car is a different tone in the shade, under a street light and in the full sun, yet red in all three cases. We use the same word for a range of different things. The drink tastes different when made in slightly different ways, yet we use the same word.Why do think that? Have the same drinks not given you different experiences at different times?
— Isaac
How could it, if I call it the same drink? And conversely, if I have different experiences, how could I say such experiences are of the same drink? — Mww
You cannot make blanket generalizations like this. A small coffee with triple sugar is much different from a large with single sugar. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is why it is commonly said by philosophers that the senses deceive us. — Metaphysician Undercover
The sports car is a different tone in the shade, under a street light and in the full sun, yet red in all three cases. — Banno
There need be nothing in common between various cases for which we use the same word. — Banno
I don't like transcendental arguments — Banno
Oh, but I can, and I’m justified in doing so, if the point to make was the valid notion of differences in experiences relative to differences in the objects senses. — Mww
Deception is merely error in judgement, and judgement is not what the senses do, so….. — Mww
:up:And you really should relinquish your love affair with David Stove. — Mww
You were saying that "the smell of coffee" is experienced as a "thing" — Metaphysician Undercover
You ought to separate the means from the end. That the error in judgement occurs, as the end, is evidence that the deception has been successful. — Metaphysician Undercover
Error in judgement can have many causes. — Metaphysician Undercover
That the error in judgement occurs, as the end, is evidence that the deception has been successful. But the act of deceiving is not necessarily successful — Metaphysician Undercover
There are so many wonderful ways in which humans beings can talk about what matters to us , what is relevant and how it is relevant. For instance , harmonious, integral, intimate, consistent, similar, compatible, intelligible. Of all of these, ‘true and false’ are
particularly narrow and impoverished. — Joshs
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