This thing being sipped will always be the same coffee experience iff the sensation of the thing being piped sufficiently replicates the sensation by which coffee became known. — Mww
Coffee with sugar will always be experienced as coffee with sugar — Mww
It manifests in how a thing elicits a feeling. — Mww
what constitutes a move in the direction of greater valuation as opposed to the lesser (more true, more harmonious, more intelligible...) from where one started. If one starts with "this is how things seem to me" and then conducts any kind of 'investigation', one is implicitly affirming that the way things seem to one is lesser, by whatever measure, than the potential result of that investigation. Less true, less harmonious, less intelligible - whatever. — Isaac
So the very nature of an investigation has, at it's core, an acceptance that the way things currently seem to one is flawed in some way - in whatever measure you're using to judge the model you have.
Once one has accepted that the ways things seem to one is potentially flawed, one cannot rationally, at the same time, use "but that's the way it seems to me" as a counter to any alternative model put forward. — Isaac
iff the sensation of the thing being piped sufficiently replicates the sensation by which coffee became known.
— Mww
Sufficiently? — Isaac
Coffee with sugar will always be experienced as coffee with sugar
— Mww
I don't think even this is the case. On a nice day it will taste better than on a bad day. — Isaac
But surely how a thing does something is the result of an investigation, it's not just given to us. We don't get to see howbthd engine works unless we look under the bonnet. — Isaac
The problem here is the truncated "nothing but" pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. That's pretty much the assumption of @Joshs and @Constance, too.The smell of coffee is nothing but a sensation that belongs to a certain thing
— @Mww
Don't like nothing buts, for the same sort of reason that I don't like transcendental arguments. That it's the smell of coffee is down to the place of coffee in one's day to day antics. The "nothing but" hides that. — Banno
The problem here is the truncated "nothing but" pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. That's pretty much the assumption of Joshs and @Constance, too. More or less the same criticism by the homunculus applies to phenomenology. — Banno
There need be nothing in common between various cases for which we use the same word. Hence the discussion of family resemblance. And hence the rejection of the essentialism that requires some one thing to be the same in order to justify the use of that word.
It's just not what we do. — Banno
(reds) more closely resemble one another than they do experiences we could say are of green or any other colour. — Janus
Once one has accepted that the ways things seem to one is potentially flawed, one cannot rationally, at the same time, use "but that's the way it seems to me" as a counter to any alternative model put forward. we've just accepted that the whole reason we're undertaking an 'investigation' in the first place is because of a lack of certainty about the way things currently seem to us. — Isaac
It's still essentialism. Is yellow a red or a green? What of orange? Brown? — Banno
GO back to the point of talk of family resemblance again: there need not be something held in common for all the members of a family. Hence we cannot expect to proceed to examine classes or predicates by finding the feature that they supposedly have in common. There might be no such feature. — Banno
Can you give an example of two things that should be thought of as belonging to the same family, but which have nothing in common with each other? — Janus
Yeah, me and my brother-in-law. He's a bloody insurance salesman. Parasite. — Banno
Psychologising the argument. No.Is essentialism some kind of bogeyman for you? — Janus
Worth pointing out, although as you can see those who don't grasp the notion of family resemblance or who adhere to some form of essentialism will have trouble following that discussion. Add to that the non-representational nature of neural networks and you have Buckle's chance of achieving some sort of understanding. — Banno
But of course you can find something common between any two things. What this shows is that you've missed the point. Oh well.I would still like to see an example of two things that are considered to belong to a family that yet have nothing in common. I can't think of any. — Janus
One of the points of this is methodological. It's It's contrary to the near ubiquitous supposition that "we call all these things red, therefore there is a thing, redness, that all these have in common" — Banno
But of course you can find something common between any two things. What this shows is that you've missed the point. Oh well. — Banno
The point is that there need be no similarity for someone to be counted as part of a family. — Banno
there is a quality of redness — Janus
Now if you say there is a set of things belonging to a family, then it seems to follow that all members of that family must possess some salient resemblance or similarity to the other members that justifies including it in that family.
Now, I ask you again if you can provide an examples of two things which could be said to belong to the same family that possess nothing in common that would qualify them for being included in that family. Don't try to move the goalposts this time, but just attempt to give an honest answer. If you can give a satisfactory answer then I will concede the point, not otherwise, no matter how much you protest that I have missed the point. — Janus
You introduce the word "quality" like it was clear what it means. What's a quality, then?
I submit that it's just a way of using a word. "Using" is the pertinent term. Red things need have nothing in common beyond our saying that they are red. — Banno
Again, I've already replied to this. Given any rule for inclusion in a family, we can chose a new member which does not satisfy the rule. — Banno
Transcendental arguments are those with roughly the following form: — Banno
1) A is true
2) The only way in which A could be so is if B
3) Hence, B is so. — Banno
The problem here is the truncated "nothing but" pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. — Banno
that "we call all these things red, therefore there is a thing, redness, that all these have in common" - another transcendental argument, for ↪Mww. — Banno
e are however social creatures such that our sensations are not prior to but partially constitutive of a mind embedded in a world. You are not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant's a priori scripts, looking out at a world to which you have no direct access. — Banno
And its undermining is the further spinning of new fibers of a thread, correct? — Joshs
you are going to play that game? — Janus
What makes that transcendental — Mww
Presumably except when they are dreams or hallucinations...The “nothing but” merely indicates sensation is always related to objects in the world... — Mww
Why shouldn't we just use a word for a variety of different things, without those things having something in common? — Banno
Because the uses of words that denote perceived qualities are not arbitrary — Janus
Again, it's not arbitrary, because of what we do with the apples. The cart and the horse are the same thing - it's an automobile.You get the red one and not the green because it's not arbitrary. You seem to be saying that it's not arbitrary because you get the red one not the green one; that would be to put the cart before the horse. — Janus
Dogs can see blue and yellow apparently — Janus
Again, it's not arbitrary, because of what we do with the apples. The cart and the horse are the same thing - it's an automobile. — Banno
...and we know this not as a result of the quality of blue and yellow, but because of what dogs do. QED. — Banno
The ability to distinguish colours is not dependent on what we do, some of what what we do is dependent on the ability to distinguish colours. — Janus
That's rather my point....what they do, their observable actions, is not their ability to distinguish blue and yellow, but what that ability enables. — Janus
What makes that transcendental
— Mww
It's the name for arguments with that sort of logical structure... — Banno
The “nothing but” merely indicates sensation is always related to objects in the world...
— Mww
Presumably except when they are dreams or hallucinations... — Banno
You are not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant's a priori scripts, looking out at a world to which you have no direct access. — Banno
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