Other nations have more than a rhetorical interest in the outcome. The security crisis in Europe is real. The economic crisis is real. The refugee crisis is real. — Paine
But to depict Russia as merely defending itself is to turn a blind eye to what they have been doing and what they are capable of. — Paine
Asked about whether she regretted opposing the US-led membership action plan for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, Merkel said: “Ukraine was not the country that we know now. It was a Ukraine that was very split … even the reformist forces [Yulia] Tymoshenko and [Viktor] Yushchenko were very at odds. That means it was not a country whose democracy was inwardly strengthened.” She said Ukraine at the time was “ruled by oligarchs”.
From the Russian president’s perspective, “it was a declaration of war”. While she didn’t share Putin’s perspective, Merkel said she “knew how he thought” and “didn’t want to provoke it further”.
She claimed to have blocked Ukraine’s route to membership of the military alliance with the country’s best interests at heart. “You cannot become a member of Nato from one day to the next,” Merkel said. “It’s a process, and during this process I knew Putin would have done something to Ukraine that would not have been good for it.”
China has said that they are against the use of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine.It's unlikely the Chinese will alter their stance towards Russia much, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. — Tzeentch
The international community, said Xi, should “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons,” according to a statement carried by Xinhua, China’s state news agency. The world should also “advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used, a nuclear war cannot be waged, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis” in Europe or Asia, Xi added.
But then you aren't highly in doubt that the Russian leader and military will want to escalate the war and face a possible conventional NATO attack when they have experienced severe losses in Ukraine?I highly doubt that Western leaders are willing to enter a protracted land war in Eastern Europe and/or nuclear conflict just to save face for the Americans after they overplayed their hand in Ukraine. — Tzeentch
During the Cold War, which seems to be continuing now, US and Soviet forces did clash. When they did, both sides didn't opt to escalate to the next level and go to a declared war. First and foremost, this is rhetoric on both sides now. Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons and hence NATO's response is also hypothetical. But when the issue has already come up, I think that the situation is different than where the West was in 2014. The West has given an unified response and I don't thinkWe also seem to agree that NATO would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, why would it?
As for conventional retaliation, this is really a problematic thing. You don't just casually destroy Russian forces. The options are fairly limited. — boethius
Why would they be sending ground troops? If the response to a hypothetical use of nukes would be a conventional attack, that likely would be done by cruise missiles and aircraft. Then Russia would have to think if it wants to escalate further and strike NATO countries. And really, if it now has problems to fight a war with Ukraine, is the solution to start a war with countries it even before it's attack in February didn't match? De-escalation through escalation is simply a shock-and-awe strategy which can work when the other side is totally unprepared for it.Sending in boots on the ground into Ukraine ... does any Western nation actually want this? — boethius
Russia has gotten already the benefit from it's nuclear weapons: NATO hasn't openly interfered in the war. There aren't any "no-fly-zones" being patrolled over Ukraine.Certainly, there are plenty of reasons not to use nuclear weapons we would agree on (domestic politics, China and India's reaction); however, that Russia is reasonably deterred by conventional military means, or reasonably deterred by nuclear means, or believes nuclear weapons are not useful, are fairly weak arguments. — boethius
Which happened all the time everywhere during the Cold war with the Soviet Union and the West.Sending funding (basically bankrolling the entire Ukrainian military payroll), sending weapons, providing intelligence, covert meddling, are all in themselves interventions. — boethius
Lol.No, the West can definitely fuckup now by actively obstructing peaceful resolutions, encouraging hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives and the complete destruction of Ukraine which Zelensky does not hesitate to tell us is being done for "your values" (i.e. the West, not necessarily good for Ukraine) and to protect Eastern Europe (not necessarily good for Ukraine). — boethius
After D+10, the role of Russia’s conventional forces was to transition to a supporting function
to Russia’s special services, responsible for establishing occupation administrations on the
territories. Since these activities were critical to the Russian theory of victory in the operation,
it is important to outline these plans to appropriately contextualise the role of the conventional force. The assumption appears to have been that Ukrainian government officials would either flee or be captured as a result of the speed of the invasion. It was also anticipated that shock would prevent the immediate mobilisation of the population, and that protests and other civil resistance could be managed through the targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society. To manage these protests Russian forces would be supported by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and riot control units. Meanwhile the FSB was tasked with capturing local officials.
The Russian counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories had compiled lists that divided Ukrainians into four categories:
• Those to be physically liquidated.
• Those in need of suppression and intimidation.
Those considered neutral who could be induced to collaborate.
• Those prepared to collaborate.
For those in the top category, the FSB had conducted wargames with detachments of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to conduct kill-or-capture missions. In many cases, the purpose of capture was to put individuals involved in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity (often referred to as the Maidan Revolution) on trial to be executed. Although initial lists of persons in the second category existed, the approach was to be more methodical, with the registration of the population through door-to-door sweeps and the use of filtration camps to establish counterintelligence files on large portions of the population in the occupied territories. Filtration would be used to intimidate people, to determine whether they needed to be displaced into Russia, and to lay the groundwork for records to monitor and disrupt resistance networks. Over time, Russia would bring teachers and other officials from Russia itself to engage in the re-education of Ukrainians.
China has said that they are against the use of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine. — ssu
But then you aren't highly in doubt that the Russian leader and military will want to escalate the war and face a possible conventional NATO attack when they have experienced severe losses in Ukraine? — ssu
You seemed to be on the verge of recognizing those aforementioned crises are real ones and then you say: "European stake in this conflict is mostly the ego of its deluded leaders." It sounds like you are saying that the leaders could solve those problems if Russia wins or not. You will have to explain what the former scenario would look like. The latter has already been established as the basis for policy decisions. — Paine
To "teach Russia a lesson" - what a joke, but I don't know whether to laugh or cry.
Such rhetoric belongs in the children's playground — Tzeentch
First and foremost, this is rhetoric on both sides now. Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons and hence NATO's response is also hypothetical. But when the issue has already come up, I think that the situation is different than where the West was in 2014. — ssu
Why would they be sending ground troops? If the response to a hypothetical use of nukes would be a conventional attack, that likely would be done by cruise missiles and aircraft. Then Russia would have to think if it wants to escalate further and strike NATO countries. And really, if it now has problems to fight a war with Ukraine, is the solution to start a war with countries it even before it's attack in February didn't match? De-escalation through escalation is simply a shock-and-awe strategy which can work when the other side is totally unprepared for it. — ssu
Russia has gotten already the benefit from it's nuclear weapons: NATO hasn't openly interfered in the war. There aren't any "no-fly-zones" being patrolled over Ukraine.
Hence to start actually using them is in my view really pushing the limit. Russian armed forces aren't on the verge of imminent collapse in Ukraine. Hence it would be really strange just why to continue to be so reckless. — ssu
Lol.
Let's first notice just what Russia had in mind if their planned 10-day operation would have been successful and they would have gotten Kyiv: — ssu
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Our mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate to help build a safer and more stable world. — Rusi.org
Over £1,000,000
European Commission
£500,000 to £999,999
United States Department of State
£200,000 to £499,999
BAE Systems plc
British Army, Futures Directorate
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
Global Affairs Canada
John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tetra Tech International Development Ltd
Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC)
ZemiTek, LLC
£100,000 to £199,999
Alion (US DoD/EUCOM)
Alliance for Intellectual Property
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Goldman Sachs Gives
Google, Inc.
Lockheed Martin UK
Palantir Technologies Ltd
Philip Morris International Management SA (PMI Impact Fund)
Redacted, Inc — Rusi funders
Again, "normative legal force" is just pseudo-intellectual bullshit. Are you adding "normative" to "legal force" because you are aware there is no actual legal force involved in the situation? Or do you just have no idea what you're talking about? — boethius
In terms of the situation, legal justification for military action under the UN system requires a security council vote, which Russia obviously vetos.
As for the votes you're talking about in the general assembly of the UN, they have no legal force in military matters — boethius
Indeed, justification can be anything you mention, but the essential element is we are justifying it to others with some relation to the concept of "justice" that's universal in some way. Of course, what sorts of theories and arguments can be used to justify an action is wide open, the common element is that justification is towards others; arguments we want other to agree with
"Regardless of justification" in the context I use it, refers to the US/NATO, or you own, justifications to others about the policies. You've made it quite clear you are on the "side of the West" and simply want the West to win. That is not a justification to me, or to other third parties that need not pick a side (India, Africa etc.), and certainly not less Russia. — boethius
Now, you may accept that what you want you cannot justify to others (although it maybe still useful to your purposes to fool them into believing the actions are justified) and have a separate internal justification for your actions. In this case, within your own head, there becomes two uses of the word justification; one use is essentially how you try to trick others, say a public position on the matter, and another use is why you are actually doing what you're doing, say a private position. So, in this duelism it can make sense to talk of your justifications for trying to convince others of your justifications which are not your real justifications, but it serves your real justification if others believe your justifications for other reasons. — boethius
if US hegemonic status is a justification, which you clearly state it is, then if Russia wins the war then it's just asserting its hegemonic power over Ukraine, and likewise justified. If the US can't stop Russia then clearly it isn't a global hegemone, as it was unable to determine the outcome of this even that happened on the globe. US may, nevertheles, have a larger sphere of hegemoning than Russia, but it is not global. — boethius
In particular, your point 3 is extremely clear "the end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian."
Your "end game" involves zero consideration of Ukrainian welfare nor any notion that it would be justified — boethius
Which, whether the war is even doing that, would be an interesting question which I'm happy to debate. It could be the war is harming Russia, but it could also be Russia will come out of this war with a far more efficient and powerful army, more autonomous economy and new international banking system and so little reason to ever stop "defying the West" (had Putin implemented the sanctions himself this would have certainly caused serious domestic problems, but since the West did it for him, it's easy to say the West doesn't want to do business with Russia ... sort of what sanctions mean), rapidly replace any equipment, and all its neighbour's far less (rather than more) willing to "defy" Russia, seeing as they clearly can and will do what it takes to destroy your entire economy and the West clearly doesn't have a solution to the needing gas problem. — boethius
So, if you want to stop advancing propaganda, we could discuss what you actually believe, which is that the US / West can and should use this war to harm Russia in pure power competition terms. Ukrainian welfare doesn't matter, nor any other justification, just harming Russia. — boethius
The problem with your position is that historically wars, even extremely harmful wars in the short term (such as the American civil war, or WWI or WWII), generally result in any non-losing-party having far more powerful military at the end of the war.
Indeed, even losing parties can radically increase their real military power, such as Germany after WWI still had all sorts of "war experience" benefits even if physical war fighting capacity was essentially dismantled, despite this and the high casualties it is applying the experience and lessons of WWI that Germany could then rapidly rebuild their military power and fight WWII. — boethius
However, in the case of the war at hand, there is little probability that Russia will lose. At best, it "won't win". — boethius
Furthermore, in your hegemon's got to hegemon, you don't consider at all China.
Viewed as a proxy war between Russia and the US, perhaps US is winning something at some expense (at the expense of the destruction of Ukraine), but viewed as a proxy war between China and the West, China is winning a great deal at no expense; indeed, if the first view is correct, the West is weakening due to this war as well as Russia, an otherwise regional competitor.
So, if this war with Russia is satisfying some "rational requirement" of a global hegemon, there should be some argument as to why this helps against China, a more economically powerful adversary.
For, if China is a larger threat to US hegenomic power, which was the basis of all this talk of "pivoting" to East-Asia for over 2 decades, then optimum hegemomic strategy would be to "divide and conquer" the would be Russia-China alliance, and certainly not expend immense material and political capital in trying to harm the weaker of the two in such a team. — boethius
In “normative legal force” the expression “normative” refers to the fact that laws are norms and “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. Now “normative force” and “law” or “legal system”, or “legal force” are part of very common jargon in the juridical domain. Google it if you have no idea what I am talking about. — neomac
After distinguishing some other senses of the “normativity” of law, this chapter addresses its moral force. It is argued that all deontological accounts of a prima facie duty to obey the law, other than the argument from consent, fail for being unable to show that the moral value of law as an institutional order implies a duty to obey each and every legal rule. The argument from consent fails for familiar reasons. This leaves an instrumental account of the moral force of law as the only option. The upshot is that, for individuals, the moral force of law is variable, and often weak. The case is different for state officials, as subjects of either domestic or international law. Here the instrumental case for obedience is typically strong. — Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy
Besides your legal quibble is irrelevant wrt he original point of contention: I referred to the UN resolution against the Russian invasion of Ukraine to clarify my original claim about Russian defiant attitude toward the West. — neomac
As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!). — neomac
The fact that I didn’t mention "Ukrainian welfare” in that statement is not enough to conclude that there is zero consideration of the Ukrainian welfare on the NATO/US’s part. — neomac
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac
And what have they been doing? Winning and having huge victories?My expectation is that they will escalate if they start to lose — Tzeentch
Anyone with a shred of sense can see the hollowness of the "everything is America's fault" argument. Never mind that Russia isn't just intervening in it's neighbors, but annexing parts of them. That too, Russia wanting create Novorossiya again, must be the fault of the Americans.Anyone with a shred of sense can see that the Americans purposefully pissed off the Russians in Ukraine, in Europe's backyard, as it always does - stirring up shit far away from their island so other people can bear the cost of war and conflict.
I've always argued that the European leaders should not have played America's lapdogs, and not let Europe become a pawn in America's game, as it is now. — Tzeentch
Russia hasn't made this change recently. They have said this far earlier than now, actually.. Putin recently harmonising Russian nuclear policy with United States policy to allow first strike against a non-nuclear opponent, is not rhetoric. — boethius
Conventional response means non-nuclear in this case. NATO and the US use the arm of the forces that is most powerful, which is the air forces and cruise missiles. I don't know why you are insisting the case for ground forces, which make an obvious target. Air attack is the way to keep the response limited. You can stop the attacks instantly. It's Russia's choice then to escalate.Ground troops are the other conventional response, but if you agree that's unlikely then no need to debate it further. — boethius
NATO letting Russia to win? Bit of hubris there from you.All this analysis, in my view, NATO has done, which explains their policy to let Russia slowly win but inflicting (tolerable) damage and limiting the scope of victory. — boethius
LOL!Which is difficult to take you seriously when you don't mention their top funders 2020-2021: — boethius
And what have they been doing? Winning and having huge victories? — ssu
Anyone with a shred of sense can see the hollowness of the "everything is America's fault" argument. — ssu
That too, Russia wanting create Novorossiya again, must be the fault of the Americans. — ssu
Russia hasn't made this change recently. They have said this far earlier than now, actually. — ssu
Russia is thought to be considering adding a preemptive aspect to its nuclear doctrine, Vladimir Putin has said.
If added this policy would allow it to strike with nukes first, not just in a retaliatory manner.
The Russian doctrine of using nuclear weapons is currently different to that of the USA, which does have a first strike clause. — Daily Star
Conventional response means non-nuclear in this case. NATO and the US use the arm of the forces that is most powerful, which is the air forces and cruise missiles. I don't know why you are insisting the case for ground forces, which make an obvious target. Air attack is the way to keep the response limited. You can stop the attacks instantly. It's Russia's choice then to escalate.
The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is. — ssu
The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is. — ssu
NATO letting Russia to win? Bit of hubris there from you. — ssu
LOL!
Oh you are so funny again. Yes... the evil Commission of the European Union!!!
The next argument will be that I'm referring to experts with military intelligence background or military leaders themselves. Or perhaps all the interviews of Ukrainian people that have been tortured? All of them are just propaganda! — ssu
Since these activities were critical to the Russian theory of victory in the operation,
it is important to outline these plans to appropriately contextualise the role of the conventional
force. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
The assumption appears to have been that Ukrainian government officials would either
flee or be captured as a result of the speed of the invasion. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
It was also anticipated that shock would prevent the immediate mobilisation of the population, and that protests and other civil resistance could be managed through the targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society. To manage these protests Russian forces would be supported by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and riot control units. Meanwhile the FSB was tasked with capturing local officials. The Russian counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories had compiled lists that divided — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
Ukrainians into four categories:
• Those to be physically liquidated.
• Those in need of suppression and intimidation.
• Those considered neutral who could be induced to collaborate.
• Those prepared to collaborate. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
Oleksandr V Danylyuk served as the Special Adviser to the head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, and as an adviser to Ukraine’s Minister of Defence. He currently heads the Centre for Defence Reforms and is a coordinator of the NATO–Ukraine intergovernmental platform for
early detection and countering hybrid threats. Oleksandr is an Associate Fellow at RUSI. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi was born in 1973 in Dnipro, Ukraine.
[blah blah blah got promoted a bunch]
Today he serves as First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of
Ukraine on National Security, Defense and Intelligence. He has been awarded with state awards, including the Golden Star (with the Hero of Ukraine status), Danylo Halytskiy Award ІІІ class, and Bohdan Khmelnytskiy Award III class, as well as Military Distinguished Service Medal І and ІІ classes, and the Military Virtue Medal. In 2012, he was also awarded with personal arms by the minister of defence of Ukraine. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org
As clearly stated even in this thread, Russia has desired Ukrainian territories right when Ukraine got it's independence. If this was about NATO, Putin wouldn't be annexing territories, talking about how artificial the whole construct of Ukraine is and how Ukraine belongs to Russia. The frozen conflict in Moldova shows that this isn't about NATO, as Moldova has never tried to join NATO.This is just the knee-jerk deflection for anyone who doesn't like to think about the obvious role the US and the EU have played in provoking this conflict. — Tzeentch
Well, it's a war.Can't help but notice you ignore the "s" to "funders" and don't bother to even put United States Department of State and BAE Systems plc as the next entries on the list. — boethius
Likely it would be of limited damage, at least in the long run.Yes, air attacks are the likely option, but as I point out using only cruise missiles is of limited damage, and there are large risks in sending NATO planes into Ukraine. — boethius
Nope, this view is based on an alternative reality where causes and effects have changed places: that NATO is the hostile aggressor, not that countries next to Russia have frantically tried to protect themselves from a hostile militant nation that by force tries to conquer it's lost Empire. — ssu
normative statement is not the same as a legal statement. — boethius
.Now, if you actually do google "normative legal force" you get a whole list of entries that explain the difference between normative and legal statements — boethius
After distinguishing some other senses of the “normativity” of law, this chapter addresses its moral force. It is argued that all deontological accounts of a prima facie duty to obey the law, other than the argument from consent, fail for being unable to show that the moral value of law as an institutional order implies a duty to obey each and every legal rule. The argument from consent fails for familiar reasons. This leaves an instrumental account of the moral force of law as the only option. The upshot is that, for individuals, the moral force of law is variable, and often weak. The case is different for state officials, as subjects of either domestic or international law. Here the instrumental case for obedience is typically strong. — Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy
Is literally the first result for doing as you suggest, which is a paper explaining how there is no prima facie normative connection to law. — boethius
“Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case and just prepending ‘normative’ to ‘legal force’ means you don't understand the subject matter.” — boethius
Not only, as you account for yourself in your next paragraph, no actual UN legal basis for the West's intervention (no security council resolution) — boethius
.If you're moving the goal posts back to this argument, then certainly you’d agree that Russia's actions in Ukraine are entirely justified by Ukraine's defiant attitude toward Russia, and that Russia is only "wrong" in your framework if they fail to teach Ukraine a lesson — “boethius
.As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!). — neomac
What a ludicrous straw man — “boethius
First, justifying one's actions to others is independent of whether the actions are justified or if others agree. The actions can be justified but you fail to convince anyone. Likewise, the actions could unjust but everyone agrees with you.
Indeed, one maybe engaged in a process of justification one knows to be false (lying to investigators, or throwing out UN resolutions as having "legal force"), but hope other parties agree. Of course, in this scenario, presumably one has some internal justification for presenting a false justification.
Even more bizarre is the idea the entire world would need to agree as a condition for justification, which doesn't even make any internal sense. For, if the proposition isn't justified until everyone agrees ... why would one be justified to try to convince people of it's truth, which is by definition is false until everyone agrees.
Obviously in any remotely common sense ethical framework, the truth of a justification is independent of others agreeing it's true.
Since your arguments don't make any sense and are mutually incompatible, also take note of your trying to flip the burden of proof of what "justification" means, as it's very clear your actual position is that you're a fan of US hegemony, which, by definition, non-US partisans should not be a fan of by the same logic of lust power. Of course, if people under hegemonic control, such as Europe, can be convinced the hegemony is good for them, that's a better situation, even if one knows that's the self delusion copium of de facto captives and advancing their own interests, rather than the hegemon's, would, by definition, be in their interest to do. — “boethius
Describing how the US / NATO endgame need not be Ukrainian “victory” but just sufficient harm to Russia could nevertheless be compatible with maximising Ukrainian welfare is just a farce.
In what plausible version of the world, would Ukraine losing the war, with the death and casualties so far and likely at least as much but likely many multiples on the way to losing, and then losing, would be compatible with Ukrainian welfare? — “boethius
You literally state NATO/US involvement need not be to "stop Russia".
And you accuse me of quibbling? You literally need basically magic to imagine a scenario in which "not stopping Russia" is in the welfare of Ukrainians. Sure, "logically" we can imagine by some unexpected turn of events that magic is real, reincarnation a breeze, memory replacement facile, and so on, Russia isn't "stopped" and this is actually great for Ukraine.
Indeed, "logically" there is nothing that prevents Russia winning but this somehow results in Zelensky becoming emperor of the entire planet, immortal, and a just and wise ruler who solves all our problems.
Do you even consider a few seconds what you are writing? — “boethius
You do not mention Ukrainian welfare in your "endgame" because you do not care about Ukrainian welfare. You care only about harming Russia due to some irrational fear (especially when combined with the belief that the Russian military is incompetent ... of which the corollary is they are nothing to fear); i.e. your entire position rests upon Russuphobia and, as you say, not mentioning Ukrainian welfare. — “boethius
I thought "practical rationality" was your pseudo-intellectual slogan, and you dare move the goal posts to "logical compatibility"? — “boethius
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia — neomac
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia — neomac
BTW, since you seem to care and know about the Ukrainian welfare more than I do, I still have to ask: how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly? — neomac
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac
They consider Russia a second-class country that has no right to exist. This is the whole problem, the whole trouble. — Putin
Ukraine's parliament enacts reform laws recommended by EU - SpeakerThis story has drawn to a close. But the story of reforms continues – it continues, even in the time of such a war. — Zelenskyy
Stop funding Russia’s nuclear weapons
— Henry Sokolski; The Hill; Nov 13, 2022 — Nov 14, 2022
The Ukrainian side needs to take into account the realities that have developed during this time. And these realities indicate that new subjects have appeared in the Russian Federation. They appeared as a result of referendums that took place in these territories. Without taking these new realities into account, no kind of progress is possible. — Peskov
Sorry, but that is the most ludicrous statement, which shows your ignorance. The threat of Russia acting as it has now was obvious... at least to a minority. Of course the mainstream hope was that Russia would transform. Remember all the reboots in US Russian relations!You won't find a credible source portraying Russia as a "hostile militant aggressor" before 2014. — Tzeentch
(Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 Summer, 1993) Most Western observers want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become "the only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union."
-
President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.
A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two reasons. First, it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive.
As much after the Soviet collapse as before it, the "Russian Problem" remains Europe's single biggest security issue. The collapse of the Soviet Union did, of course, end the threat of continental war in Europe, making the world a much safer place. The retreat of Soviet power also unmasked a broad range of other security threats ethnic and nationalist conflicts; unstable governments and concomitant crime and terrorism; unrest due to economic collapse; and a power vacuum in East-Central Europe. Yet it is Russia itself that has dominated the attention of Western policy makers, and for good reason: it is Russia's attitude toward these issues, and toward the West in general, which will have the most decisive impact in shaping the political atmosphere in Europe in the coming years.
NATO expansion is a consequence of Russia's ambitions — ssu
It is simply absurd after all the annexations to insist that Russia is acting defensively and NATO would be here the culprit and aggressor in this war. — ssu
The basic fact is that Russia thanks to it's own policies constituted that threat. Naturally countries tried to do have good relations and hope for the best, but the unpredictability of Russia was totally obvious to many.They are simply aware of the geopolitical issues that exist, and assume conflict will break out at one point or another. That's the realist view. — Tzeentch
The US can be defined in such away in the Middle East and Central America or the Caribbean. Unlike some, I don't have that as "a hard pill to swallow". I've been critical of the US policy in the Middle East for a very long time. It's usually the leftists that have this problem that when they are critical about the US, they cannot be critical about the countries that oppose the US. That's their own illogical behaviour.If discussions about geopolitical issues that a country is involved in brands them as a "hostile militant aggressor" then I suppose the United States more than fits that bill, but that seems to be a hard pill for you to swallow. — Tzeentch
Just because people are so keen to quote him as an expert. Well, he has his views and they sell very well to one segment of the audience. What should be obvious (which seems not to be for some) is that you can agree with some issues and disagree with other issues what an individual expert says. The counterarguments to Mearsheimer's present views are simply compelling. Besides, the view that one has to accept all views of some academic person and you have to put them on a pedestal and support them is very naive.And since you're keen on quoting Mearsheimer, I assume you take his analysis of the current state of affairs very seriously then? Or do you only quote him when you believe it suits your argument? — Tzeentch
How did the US force Russia to annex Ukraine, to see Crimea as a historical and essential part of Russia? How did the US make Putin to see Ukraine as an artificial state?Nonsense. After the Cold War ended the subsequent NATO tranches have been a result of American ambitions, seeking to take advantage of Russia's weakness. — Tzeentch
Naturally countries tried to do have good relations and hope for the best, ... — ssu
The US can be defined in such away in the Middle East and Central America or the Caribbean. — ssu
What should be obvious (which seems not to be for some) is that you can agree with some issues and disagree with other issues what an individual expert says. — ssu
How did the US force Russia to annex Ukraine, to see Crimea as a historical and essential part of Russia? How did the US make Putin to see Ukraine as an artificial state?
How did US ambitions make Sweden to through away it's neutral stance after few hundred years? How did US ambitious makes us apply for NATO with more support than when we joined the EU? — ssu
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