So, massless particles don't count, then?

They should which is why I said:

I prefer "stuff" to "matter", and I prefer "arrangement" to "pattern"
— unenlightened

Yea that sounds better. — khaled

But before we do anything know that it's 1:30 am here so excuse me if I just suddenly disappear.

↪Bylaw They should which is why I said:
I prefer "stuff" to "matter", and I prefer "arrangement" to "pattern"
— unenlightened

Yea that sounds better.
— khaled — khaled

What's stuff?
What are we ruling out? If it's not matter, then this isn't materialism, or?

What's stuff? — Bylaw

What you'd find discussed in a physics or chemistry book.

What are we ruling out? — Bylaw

"mental stuff" as dualists and idealists have it.

My initial response to this would be to ask: how do we recognise and distinguish patterns of matter without acknowledging the absence of matter? Indeed, how do we distinguish matter? Or material ‘things’ with the same pattern?

Binary consists of three aspects: 1s, 0s and patterns (relational structures) of 1s and 0s. You can’t just ignore the 0s. Negation is an essential and frequently overlooked aspect of ontology.

But I’ll read the rest of the discussion now, before I comment further…

Well I wouldn't say "absence of matter" is a "thing that exists" so I didn't include it in the system, but that's not to say I don't believe there are no places where there is no matter.

Maybe it's hypocritical of me to believe that a pattern is a "thing that exists" but an absence isn't. Hmm...

But within the mind-independent world, where is the information within A that it is part of the same pattern as B but not the same pattern as D. — RussellA

In its behaviour (or range of). In the mind-independent world there exists an interface between different behaviours (of groups of particles - i.e., rock and water); the existence of the interface requires a distinction between the groups of particles that form the interface (or there would not be an interface); this distinction materializes in the behaviour of the particles that make up the interacting surfaces.

In the mind-independent world there exists an interface between different behaviours (of groups of particles - i.e., rock and water); the existence of the interface requires a distinction between the groups of particles that form the interface (or there would not be an interface); this distinction materializes in the behaviour of the particles that make up the interacting surfaces. — Daniel

Yes, an outside observer of the water and rock can see that molecule A behaves differently to molecule D, because molecule A is part of water and molecule B is part of rock.

Yet, within the mind-independent world of molecules A, D, etc, excluding any external observer, no single part can have any information within itself about its behaviour, as behaviour is an external property of a part.

As no single part can have information within itself about its behaviour, no single part can have information within it that its behaviour is due to being a part of one pattern, such as water, or another pattern, such as rock.

Here is a little piece of experimental technology that may be useful in this project (which has merit I think).

The Fibonacci sequence exemplifies a pattern. It has a purely numeric representation, and it is widely instantiated in nature. Recently, researchers attempting to overcome quantum decoherence subjected qbits to laser pulses based on the Fibonacci sequence. In so doing, they created a new phase of matter with two time dimensions, which indeed enhances quantum coherence.

I find this utterly fascinating, because not only are patterns instantiated in nature, but nature is also receptive to patterns apparently.

New Phase of Matter and Fibonacci Sequence

not only are patterns instantiated in nature, but nature is also receptive to patterns — Pantagruel

Patterns we see in nature are inevitable if things move and the laws of nature are constant.

If a particular event ends as it began, for example, the earth travelling around the sun, given the constancy in the laws of nature, and all things being equal, the same event will happen a second time, and a third, etc, and this is a pattern.

Nature is receptive to patterns in that at one time the metronome didn't exist in nature, but once a part of the natural world exhibits a pattern in its behaviour.

One of my problems with the ontological existence of patterns in a mind-independent world, and the relations between their parts, is where exactly do they exist.

When looking at the image, we know that A and B are part of one pattern and D and E are part of a different pattern.

But within the mind-independent world, where is the information within A that it is part of the same pattern as B but not the same pattern as D. If there is no such information, then within the mind-independent world, patterns, and the relations between their parts, cannot have an ontological existence.

One could say that patterns and relations have an abstract existence, in that they exist but outside of time and space. This leaves the problem of how do we know about something that exists outside of time and space. I could say that I believe that unicorns exist in the world but outside of time and space, but as I have no knowledge of anything outside of time and space, my belief would be completely unjustifiable.

One could say that the force experienced by A due to B is sufficient to argue that as A and B are related by a force, this is sufficient to show that A and B are part of the same pattern. However, even though A may experience a force, there is no information within the force that can determine the source of the force, whether originating from B or D. This means that there is no information within the force experienced by A that can determine one pattern from another.

Question: Sentient beings observe patterns in a mind-independent world, but for patterns to ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, there must be information within A that relates it to B but not D. Where is this information? — RussellA

Clearly you speak of Plato's forms and also Aristotle's declaration that only matter is real.

Your picture shows the movement of water and the movement of land but the pattern is a result of temperature not just the movement of water and land. The picture does not tell the whole story but leaves out the most important part. Rapid expansion and rapid contraction that changes the form of land.

I am not sure that matter contains ontological information? I think information is what our minds do when we observe something. This is a little tricky. If we see a fossil in the dirt, we take measurements and determine what the animal was and perhaps even when it died, but are those facts information? Do the rings of a tree give us information or just facts and from there it takes an intelligence to make the facts meaningful information.

Do the rings of a tree give us information or just facts and from there it takes an intelligence to make the facts meaningful information. — Athena

I would say that the rings of a tree give us facts and from there it takes an intelligence to make the facts meaningful information.

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus: i) “The facts in logical space are the world” and ii) "A logical picture of facts is a thought"

Yet, within the mind-independent world of molecules A, D, etc, excluding any external observer, no single part can have any information within itself about its behaviour, as behaviour is an external property of a part. — RussellA

We are debating if patterns exist independently of minds, where a pattern is a behaviour - regular or irregular - of (a group of) "stuff"; a behaviour which is not widespread, that is patterns are localized - in the sense that not all stuff behaves exactly the same and there is difference in the behaviours of "stuff". Following this definition, patterns rely on differences to exist; if there were no differences between "stuff" there would be no patterns. If we focus on the amount of change a thing can undergo, we can see it is limited to a certain range; that is, a water molecule on the surface of planet Earth won't change into a rock molecule spontaneously, but instead it will change within certain degrees of freedom determined by its composition and its surroundings - a water molecule surrounded by water molecules will probably behave differently to a water molecule surrounded by rock molecules (think of bond vibrations, bond rotations, dipole distribution, and all that stuff). So, we have that patterns depend on localized differences, and these differences are limited in their "range of" change (of behaviour). A molecule of water of course is not aware/conscious it is surrounded by molecules of water or rock or air; however, the change it undergoes depends on what it is surrounded by and the way its surroundings are organized (a molecule of water surrounded by molecules of rock at 0 degrees celsius will behave differently to a molecule of water surrounded by molecules of rock at 1 degree celsius). That is, not all molecules of water behave the same. By extension not all molecules behave the same; and further, not all stuff behaves the same. There is difference in the way stuff behaves. Another way to see this is that the behaviour of a point in space varies to the behaviour of other points in space (not all points in space have the same properties) - and again, the quality of there being variation across space exists. I would say a mind requires variation to exist and not the other way around, for there must be variation before a mind capable of distinguishing variation exists (specially when such a mind collects information by detecting changes in the environment through the senses of its body). If there is variation and there is "stuff" then there are patterns automatically.

So, a part may not have intrinsic information (tbh, I would like an example of intrinsic information) that it is part of a pattern, but its behaviour is characteristic to the pattern it is a part of - and even if different patterns may lead to the same behaviour of a part, not all patterns a part can be a part of lead to the same behaviour, and not all behaviours that result from being part of a pattern are the same.

Now, just to make this post a bit more confusing, if we focus on the fact that a thing in itself can be it and only it, and we assume that because it is limited to its nature it can change limitedly, then by it being itself it has all the information that "tells it" it is part of a pattern, for it is being itself all the time in contrast to what it is not, and by being something in contrast to something else, it is already a part of a pattern, and the pattern exists because it is in-itself in the sense that its parts behave different to their behaviour if they were parts of other patterns.

I'll try to come with some better polished ideas that go against your view that patterns are mind dependent, I really like this topic and it deserves more thought form my part because to be hones your position is really difficult to refute, and it makes it fun. What I don't like about your view is that in the absence of minds then every point in space would have to be assumed to experience the same relations as every other point in space - there would be no differences of any sort; and I just can picture that when all I see is variation all around me. Again, I am assuming a pattern to be the result of differences in the distribution and hence behaviour of stuff. Those difference cannot be mind dependent.

Well I wouldn't say "absence of matter" is a "thing that exists" so I didn't include it in the system, but that's not to say I don't believe there are no places where there is no matter.

Maybe it's hypocritical of me to believe that a pattern is a "thing that exists" but an absence isn't. Hmm... — khaled

I would say the main issue is that it needs to be ‘a thing that exists’ in order to feature in the system. Ontology doesn’t preclude being sans ‘thing’ness. If pattern or arrangement subsists (which relates to your earlier discussion with RussellA), then so too does absence - of matter and of pattern.

Whether ‘matter’ is given its traditional primacy or not, I would argue that any ontological system would need these three aspects at minimum: existence, absence and relation. There can be no accurate description of reality without a notable absence: no existence without relation to absence, no absence without relation to existence, no relation without a binary, and vice versa.

As for the question of whether patterns are mind dependent, I think we need to get away from the notion that we’re talking about patterns as things. What we seem to be referring to here is not a pattern, but arrangement, structure or relation as an aspect of reality. This is not simply about points in space, but is inclusive of space itself, and its relation to time, value and meaning as structures of reality.

I would say that any pattern we identify as such is mind dependent, or at least structurally determined, but ‘pattern’ as an aspect of reality is not. Pattern - independent of existence/absence of mind or anything else - refers to structure: the underlying logic of the system.

Patterns we see in nature are inevitable if things move and the laws of nature are constant. — RussellA

And what are these "laws of nature" exactly in your view? Given that you do not believe patterns exist ontologically.

I would say the main issue is that it needs to be ‘a thing that exists’ in order to feature in the system. Ontology doesn’t preclude being sans ‘thing’ness. If pattern or arrangement subsists (which relates to your earlier discussion with RussellA), then so too does absence - of matter and of pattern. — Possibility

Well, this seems to be a critique to basically every ontological system, and one that's easily fixable by including "absence" in whatever ontological system is missing it, so I don't believe it's exactly a problem with mine specifically or that it's a hard problem to fix.

I think this needs a separate op talking about whether "absence exists".

What you'd find discussed in a physics or chemistry book. — khaled

That's an expanding set of 'things' and openended as far as qualities.

"mental stuff" as dualists and idealists have it. — khaled

But within science you don't rule out things. You find a negative result about X, but it is conceded that future research may demonstrate Xs existence. You don't say, well that sounds like a thing that requires dualism or even rule out dualism. If, later, the consensus is that X exists, regardless of its qualities or lacks thereof, it is included in what is considered real.

That's an expanding set of 'things' and openended as far as qualities. — Bylaw

Yes. But any dualist you find will insist that there is mental stuff on top of this set of things as a whole seperate set of things. That's what's ruled out.

But within science you don't rule out things. — Bylaw

Yes you do, when they contradict what you find. Galileo ruled out the geocentric system for example. Mental stuff (if it has any agency) will contradict conservation of energy.

And also this is thephilosophyforum not thescienceforum. I don't intend to strictly adhere to the scientific method.

If, later, the consensus is that X exists, regardless of its qualities or lacks thereof, it is included in what is considered real. — Bylaw

Sure and if scientists find "consciousness" or "emotion" as some sort of matter then I'll scrap my beliefs on the spot. Until then, this is how I make sense of things.

And what are these "laws of nature" exactly in your view? Given that you do not believe patterns exist ontologically. — khaled

The phrase "laws of nature" is a metaphor.

The problem of trying to describe literal truths in the world using language is that language is inherently metaphorical. For example, just taking the sentence "Patterns we see in nature are inevitable if things move and the laws of nature are constant", the following words are metaphors - patterns, we, see, in, nature, are, inevitable, if, things, move, and, the, laws, of, constant.

"Ah but you see all the words we use are X so what I said makes sense". Regardless of what X is (in this case metaphor) I can't see this as anything other than bullshit.

Actually due to the limitations of using language that is inherently apowiehnfao I am right and you are wrong. Sorry! Not very convincing is it?

@RussellA

Though I'll ask, what is "laws of nature" a metaphor for then?

I would say a mind requires variation to exist and not the other way around, for there must be variation before a mind capable of distinguishing variation exists (specially when such a mind collects information by detecting changes in the environment through the senses of its body). If there is variation and there is "stuff" then there are patterns automatically. — Daniel

I agree that within a mind-independent world variations exist, and it is these variations that a sentient being observes as patterns. However, "pattern" is a word that exists in language, and the question is, what exactly does this word correspond to in the world it is describing.

My starting position is my belief that elementary particles and elementary forces do exist in a mind-independent world of time and space. These elementary particles and forces combine to form what we know as patterns, rocks, water, etc.

What we see in the world as a whole is a set of parts. In a sense, a "part" is a metaphorical rather than real entity, in that parts have parts which have parts, etc until we arrive at the elementary particles.

In treating a pattern, rock, water as a whole made up as a set of parts, in accepting that the parts exist mind-independently, the question is, does the whole also exist mind-independently, or only in the mind of an observer.

I agree that a water molecule surrounded by water molecules will behave differently to a water molecule surrounded by rock molecules, ultimately because the behaviour of an elementary particle is affected by the elementary forces acting upon it, and it is this difference in behaviour that eventually accounts for what we observe as patterns, water, rocks, etc.

One doubt I have that patterns, etc exist mind-independently (though I have another) stems from the problem of naming. For example, a sentient being can judge when a rock is worn away and becomes a pebble, in that a sentient being can judge the difference between a rock and a pebble. But if rocks exist mind-independently, and pebbles exist mind-independently, when a rock is slowly worn away to become a pebble, at what stage does the set of molecules change from existing as a rock to existing as a pebble. I agree that as outside observers we could judge, but what is there in a mind-independent world to make that same judgement

Similarly for patterns, as a pattern slowly becomes a non-pattern. Midway between a set of molecules existing first as a pattern and then as a non-pattern, what in a mind-independent world can determine that the set of molecules has changed from existing as a pattern to existing as a non-pattern. My belief is that if there is nothing in a mind-independent world that can determine when a pattern becomes a non-pattern, then neither can there be anything to determine when something exists as a pattern rather than a non-pattern.

Basically, "patterns", "rocks" and "water" exist as names within language, and as Bertrand Russell pointed out in On Denoting, names don't refer to an individual having an independent existence, but are definite descriptions, quantificational expressions, of the parts that make them up.

Regardless of what X is (in this case metaphor) I can't see this as anything other than bullshit. — khaled

Bye.

Yes. But any dualist you find will insist that there is mental stuff on top of this set of things as a whole seperate set of things. That's what's ruled out. — khaled

That is certainly ruled out if you take a monist stand. But to me at least science is a methodology, not a stand on ontology.

Yes you do, when they contradict what you find. Galileo ruled out the geocentric system for example. Mental stuff (if it has any agency) will contradict conservation of energy. — khaled

He showed that the solar system was heliocentric. No one has shown that the universe cannot be dualist or that any phenomenon that for some reason a physicalist or a dualist or anyone else thinks is not physical (a term that has no meaning or an expanding meaning) that doesn't mean we can rule out the phenomenon. We can of course say there is insufficient or no evidence at this time. But we have no grounds to rule it out based on substance (in the philosophical sense). I mean right now there a millions of neutrinos coursing through out bodies hitting nothing. There are massless particles. There are thing in superposition. In addition there are many things that we now know are real that we ruled out given then current models. I see no reason to not be agnostic on such things.

And also this is thephilosophyforum not thescienceforum. I don't intend to strictly adhere to the scientific method. — khaled

That's fine. I don't think anyone here needs to see things from a scientific point of view. But sometimes it seems like a good starting point in these kinds of dialogue since often the position you seemed to have that I first responded is one that is often batched with science.

Sure and if scientists find "consciousness" or "emotion" as some sort of matter then I'll scrap my beliefs on the spot. Until then, this is how I make sense of things. — khaled

that sounds like you might be a dualist, or....? What belief would you have to scrap`?

that sounds like you might be a dualist, or....? What belief would you have to scrap`? — Bylaw

The one that says that "mental stuff" is patterns in the op. If scientists find it to be some sort of matter I'll have to change that.

No one has shown that the universe cannot be dualist — Bylaw

Nor did I claim anyone has.

You claimed that scientists do not rule out anything. I gave a counter example.

We can of course say there is insufficient or no evidence at this time. But we have no grounds to rule it out based on substance (in the philosophical sense). — Bylaw

If there is mental stuff that is different from physical stuff that does anything at all, then it violates conservation of energy, allowing us to rule it out.

If said mental stuff doesn't do anything at all then you get epiphenomenalism which comes with its own issues (like how do you know mental stuff exists if it does literally nothing)

But sometimes it seems like a good starting point in these kinds of dialogue since often the position you seemed to have that I first responded is one that is often batched with science. — Bylaw

Sure and I have done nothing unscientific here. You said that scientists don't rule anything out, but that's clearly false, and all I've done is rule out the dualist conception of mental stuff. Where have I been unscientific (again, not that I intend to be scientific or think that the scientific method is even applicable to philosophy)

Sure and I have done nothing unscientific here. You said that scientists don't rule anything out, but that's clearly false, — khaled

In the context, I am correct. Gallileo found evidence that the solar system is heliocentric not geocentric. That's a different kind of situation from ruling out that some substance or entity cannot exist, which is what we were talking about. He found evidence for how things are organized and heleocentrism fit the evidence better, the patterns in the things that were known. He didn't so something that parallels, say, ruling out the existence of ghosts or telekinesis or that some facet of mind is a different substance. It was not that kind of ruling out. As far as the law of conservation of energy, this has not been proved, it's just we have never found a counterexample. There is nothing in scientific methodology that means if we find evidence that there may be changes in convervation of energy, we should simply ignore it, because this cannot be the case. But more importantly you are doing deduction that may or may not be sound. You think that if there is mental stuff and this is of a different substance than matter then this must necessarily violate conservation of energy. Perhaps you are correct, perhaps not. If we went back hundred and fifty years many of the processes and things discovered under quantum mechanics would have been ruled out due to deduction. Something is either a wave or a particle. Things have to be in one place. No two things can be in the same place at the same time. And other seemingly deducible or self-evident truths have turned out not to be true. Further there IS controversy about whether the law of conservation of energy is a law. This relates to the Big Bang and quantum phenomena also.

Your speculation certainly falls into the kinds of things that scientists speculate about, and also of course philosophers, but it is speculative. If this was supposed to be taken as on a par with conclusions held generally in consensus in science, that would be unscientific. Of course we can use deduction in philosophy to propose things and draw conclusions, but when these are taken as proofs or 'now that is ruled out period'..well, I disagree.

I will now present my ontological view for everyone to have fun tearing down. I don't know if this ontology has a name already but if it does please tell me.
It is a dualist ontology, but not substance (ew), or property dualism. I believe that what exists is matter, and patterns of matter. — khaled

Except for its Material foundation, your ontology sounds similar to mine, which I call Enformationism*1 : everything in the world is a form of Generic Information (EnFormAction). You might think of it as an update of Aristotle's hylomorphism (matter + form), except that it is a monistic concept in that Enformation is the essence (defining pattern) of everything, both Matter & Mind. "Information" is simply meaningful patterns in both matter & minds.

My thesis is based primarily on Information Theory and Quantum Theory. "EnFormAction" is a term coined to encapsulate the multiple roles of Generic Information in the world : it is the creative power to enform, to give form to the formless. The hierarchy of physical reality from-which-all-things-flow begins with EnFormAction (energy ; causation), which takes-on the various forms of Matter (the furniture of the world), and eventually even of Mind (the observer of the world).

Patterns are inter-relationships as known by the mind, not the eye. And Information is basically meaningful or functional relationships. So, EnFormAction is the cause of all things knowable by the senses, and manifest to the mind. Einstein expressed that hylomorphic relationship as E = MC^2 : Causal Energy is made manifest by turning Potential (C^2) into Actual stuff with the measurable property of Mass (M). Anything with that essential property is called Matter (hyle).

Of course, the physical Arrangements*2 that we interpret as Patterns*3, have existed for eons in the absence of intelligent minds. But they appeal to the mind as-if they were originally intended*4 to resonate with natural brains, due to their common evolutionary origins. So, the ambiguity (two sides of same coin) of natural patterns allows us to interpret them as accidental or intentional. But the Enformationism perspective, as a philosophical method, is looking for meaning, and finds it even in the natural patterns that Science views as meaningless. :smile:


*1. Enformationism :
A philosophical worldview or belief system grounded on the 20th century discovery that Information, rather than Matter, is the fundamental substance of everything in the universe. It is intended to be the 21st century successor to ancient Materialism. An Update from Bronze Age to Information Age. It's a Theory of Everything that covers, not just matter & energy, but also Life & Mind & Love.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

*2. Arrangement :
the way that things or people are organized for a particular purpose or activity
https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/arrangement

*3. Pattern :
any regularly repeated arrangement, a design.*3
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/pattern
Note -- A pattern is by definition non-random, and seems to be intentional : e.g. the Giant's Causeway, in which the pattern is due to natural processes, and to the regulatory intentions we call Natural Laws. We could debate how the beautiful & orderly patterns of Nature could arise repeatedly & consistently from random processes. Darwin attributed the organization of evolution to Natural Selection. Which raised the question of how such design choices came to be inherent in natural processes : "design without designer". Darwin concluded that the "design" was illusory. But why would Nature want to deceive intelligent observers? Cognitive scientist, Donald Hoffman*5 has proposed a reason for human awareness to "see" simple superficial patterns instead of complex underlying processes. It seems to be a case of human intelligence viewing Nature through patterned glasses.

*4. Purpose :
the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists -- intention or objective. ___Oxford

*5. The Case Against Reality :
He presents a comprehensive argument that we don’t see or otherwise sense reality, but only an interface with reality.
https://social-epistemology.com/2019/12/05/do-we-see-icons-or-reality-a-review-of-donald-hoffmans-the-case-against-reality-brian-martin/

Well, this seems to be a critique to basically every ontological system, and one that's easily fixable by including "absence" in whatever ontological system is missing it, so I don't believe it's exactly a problem with mine specifically or that it's a hard problem to fix.

I think this needs a separate op talking about whether "absence exists". — khaled

We’re always so quick to isolate and exclude absence from the discussion, as if it can simply be tacked onto the system as an afterthought, and doesn’t impact on what exists. I’m not arguing that ‘absence exists’, but rather that it subsists as essentially as pattern or arrangement - a third aspect of the system.

Absence is not a problem to ‘fix’ unless you’re trying to ignore it. It is as essential to identifying pattern and structure as matter - whether elementary or virtual particles or water and rocks.

It’s the reason for positing ‘a mind-independent world’ in this discussion - where the notion of ‘mind’ is whatever is NOT ‘matter’. This absent notion of ‘mind’ is then embodied in the use of language, which becomes an important aspect in the discussion about the nature of ‘pattern’. And all of a sudden we’re bogged down in arguing over the structure of what is absent from the world we were attempting to describe…

The Tao Te Ching interestingly incorporates the structure of traditional Chinese language as a metaphor for its ontological system. Recognising that something will always be absent from any description of reality, the TTC posits that absence as chi or a directional flow of energy, which we identify in ourselves as affect/desire, and bring subjectively to the written text.

First off, I want to ask what you're trying to do here exactly. Because I don't see a critique of the OP so much as proof that I cannot say what I'm saying with 110% certainty. Sure, I don't think I've just solved philosophy, but just debating on whether or not one can be sure their ontological system is "correct" isn't exactly what I had in mind for this post.

What you're saying seems to just boil down to this:

Perhaps you are correct, perhaps not. — Bylaw

If this was supposed to be taken as on a par with conclusions held generally in consensus in science, that would be unscientific. — Bylaw

It wasn't:

I will now present my ontological view for everyone to have fun tearing down. — khaled

As far as the law of conservation of energy, this has not been proved, it's just we have never found a counterexample. — Bylaw

You're approaching the point of unreasonable doubt. At that point I can say something like "The idea that you need proof for something to be proven has not been proved, it's just that we have never found a counterexample" and it wouldn't be too far off from what you're doing.

We have to assume SOME things to say anything at all, and conservation of energy is not that big of an assumption relatively.

'now that is ruled out period'..well, I disagree. — Bylaw

Again, I do not believe my post on thephilosophyforum has single handedly ended thousands of years of debate about ontology. But I'd rather discuss problems with the OP rather than continuously prove that I have not single handedly solved philosophy which I never claimed to have done.

Would it not be better to say that "what exists is energy (what matter is or is made of), and information (pattern). Matter is patterned energy, or in other words energy infused with information."? — punos

That is closer to my own worldview. However, I go one step farther from Physics toward Metaphysics to assume that "all that exists is Information"*1. With that premise, we provide a possible explanation for the emergence of immaterial Minds (awareness) from a material world. Matter is indeed "patterned energy", but Information (EnFormAction) is the Pattern Maker.

A pattern begins with differentiation, like a checkerboard : a simple two value pattern. But in Physics the difference between high & low energy values (hot & cold) is what we experience as Energy*2. Likewise, we experience Matter fundamentally in terms of differing Mass/Space ratios : some elementary particles seem to occupy space but possess no mass, depending on their rate of motion through space. The upper limit is the speed of light, which maximizes energy while minimizing mass. (note -- this is an oversimplification)

All patterns experienced by human senses result from "energy infused with information". Potential Energy is patternless. But Enformed Energy is the cause of Actual material patterns that our senses detect. Hence, Generic Information (Energy >> Matter >> Mind) is the Enforming (causal) power of the universe. A conscious Mind interprets the patterned (informational) structure by judging the complex ratios of inter-relationships in terms of personal meaning. Such abstruse concepts are not commonly known, even on a Philosophical forum. So how did you arrive at the assertion quoted above? :smile:

*1. Is ‘Information’ Fundamental for a Scientific Theory of Consciousness? :
After a brief primer on Shannon’s information, we are led to the exciting proposition of David Chalmers’ ‘double-aspect information’ as a bridge between physical and phenomenal aspects of reality. Subsequently, we discuss Tononi’s axiomatic approach which takes phenomenology of experience and its characteristics as primary and built a theory to explain consciousness as the capacity of a system of mechanisms (neurons or logic gates) to integrate intrinsic information.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_21#Abs1

*2. Information :
Knowledge and the ability to know. Technically, it's the ratio of order to disorder, of positive to negative, of knowledge to ignorance. It's measured in degrees of uncertainty (entropy). Those ratios are also called "differences". So Gregory Bateson defined Information as "the difference that makes a difference". The latter distinction refers to "value" or "meaning". Babbage called his prototype computer a "difference engine". Difference is the cause or agent of Change. In Physics it’s called "Thermodynamics" or "Energy". In Sociology it’s called "Conflict".
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

TWO-VALUE PATTERN


MULTI-VALUE PATTERN

Not to necro my own thread, but I had a thought recently and wanted to see how someone with a similar view dealt with it.

Since yours is a monist view, I assume all people in your view are also patterns at the end of the day correct? Wouldn't that result in fictional people "existing" in the same way you and I exist?

My working solution is that we use the word "exist" on patterns sometimes say the pattern exists, and sometimes to say that there is a material instantiation of it. Not sure if that's a good one.

For example, "the number 4 exists" does not imply the existence of 4 of something, but "Jeff exists" implies the existence of a person named Jeff irl, not just as a fictional character.

How would you deal with it without a material basis though?