speculative metaphysics, even when treated as a logically grounded science, as in pure mathematics, has no empirical proofs. And without strict empirical proofs, itself a euphemism for indubitable fact, it cannot be said such speculations are indeed the case, hence are fictions, albeit logically justified. — Mww
At any rate, I am curious what others would say is the difference between fiction and philosophy and whether one is a proper subset of the other, on they are independent units, with some common domain. (Think of Venn diagrams: one circle representing one of the two, the other circle, representing the other; is one circle completely inside the other, or they only have a common area, intersecting each other?) — god must be atheist
I consider scientism as standing for the notion that science can answer for every conceivable thing asked of it, which is false, from the point of view that science can only answer for that which is asked of it empirically conceived. From that, it follows, first, that science may very well be the only true method for obtaining knowledge about the nature of things, and second, the nature of things is not the only knowledge possible for humans to obtain. — Mww
Is philosophy really fiction, or non-fiction? — god must be atheist
This doesnt mean that science isn’t extremely useful, just that truth as pragmatic usefulness is not about knowledge of the “true nature of things”, or even knowledge at all so much as practical ways of interacting with a world. — Joshs
Non-fiction consists of narratives about social and/or natural facts (e.g. reportage, histories, sciences). Philosophy, however, is a narrative about 'narrativity and other concepts' and so I don't consider it non-fiction even though philosophical texts frequently cite or interpret non-fictional texts. Unlike poetry, which expresses heightened feelings and ideas through rigorous play with ambiguities, philosophy strives for clarity and precision in non-fallacious expressions of aporia or ideas; and yet like poetry, philosophy is not propositional (i.e. does not make empirical or formal claims) but instead is, IME, reflectively performative – in sum, consisting of proposals (e.g. suppositions, norms, interpretations, distinctions, criteria, etc).Is philosophy really fiction, or non-fiction? — god must be atheist
Unlike poetry, which expresses heightened feelings and ideas through rigorous play with ambiguities, philosophy strives for clarity and precision in non-fallacious expressions of aporia or ideas; and yet like poetry, philosophy is not propositional (i.e. does not make empirical or formal claims) but instead is, IME, reflectively performative – in sum, consisting of proposals (e.g. suppositions, norms, interpretations, distinctions, criteria, etc). — 180 Proof
Thanks. Is dramatising an issue what makes fiction successful in telling truths? — Tom Storm
If the world is imbued with meaning, no matter where you look, meaning well beyond the literal recitation of the facts can be found. — Hanover
And greater truths can derived from reality, as in the sort of truth and the prundity of meaning you may receive from experiencing a great success, failure, attending a funeral, a wedding, a childbirth, or seeing a sunrise. — Hanover
I'm not sure I would commit to calling such experiences truths as such. What they are, I can't say. Profound experiences? — Tom Storm
I guess where I was heading is that I can't think of anything new I have learned by reading fiction — Tom Storm
The other definition of scientism deals with the assumption that the world which provides us with the source of our empirical evidence of truth is not already caught up in a hermeneutic circle. That is, scientism fails to recognize that the ‘ evidence from nature’ which forms our truths belongs to a culturally constructed nature which we can never get beneath or beyond. — Joshs
Is philosophy really fiction, or non-fiction? — god must be atheist
Well put. I'd go further than "culturally constructed nature." Some of our reality is constructed based on biological, genetic, neurological, and instinctive factors, e.g. the structure of our nervous and sensory systems. We are born human with a human nature. — T Clark
You're just making claims about how learning occurs. Are you making a claim about how you specifically learn here or how everyone does? — Hanover
how does thar defeat your initial objection that fiction didn't hold truth? — Hanover
I think you're going to great lengths to sustain a dubious claim about the information provided through fiction. — Hanover
I don't see how the "Copernican" centrality of Kant's disembodied – transcendental – categories of reason "pays attention to our embodied ways of relating to the world" (à la e.g. Nietzsche, Bataille, Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, Lakoff, Dennett, Nussbaum, Metzinger ...) :chin:Kant laid the groundwork for psychologists to begin paying attention to our ‘embodied’ ways of relating to the world. — Joshs
I don't see how the "Copernican" centrality of Kant's disembodied – transcendental – categories of reason "pays attention to our embodied ways of relating to the world" — 180 Proof
What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize a priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition a posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. — Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
I'm not sure I would commit to calling such experiences truths as such. What they are, I can't say. Profound experiences?
I guess where I was heading is that I can't think of anything new I have learned by reading fiction. — Tom Storm
Kant says, in effect, the mind (somehow) 'generates' "time and space" in order to structure "preception" of "the world" which includes "embodied ways" (i.e. phenomena); we don't "perceive time and space" (which is he deems a mistake or transcendental illusion). In other words, IIRC, we "relate to the world" transcendentally, according to Kant, not corporeally, or primarily empirically.I think, for Kant, "embodied ways of relating to the world" include perception of time and space. — T Clark
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