Additionally, the United States must have expected full-scale war because that's what they sought to prepare Ukraine for for years, through all kinds of military aid, from training, equipment, to joint military exercises, etc. — Tzeentch

I agree it's not coincidence, just that it may not have been completely thought through, or then arming Ukraine post-Russia invasion was not the original plan. — boethius

Hey guys!

Have noticed that the war between Ukraine and Russia actually has gone on since the year 2014?

And again the hubris of Ukrainians not having any role here... :smirk:

Two other things worth considering in explaining why the policy isn't all that coherent:

Cancel culture is now the preferred method of the elites to censure society, as it is de facto corporate power over speech. It's not online rage (whether genuine or fabricated) that is the actual mechanism of discipline but being fired by the corporation you work for or then suspended / demonetised / de-platformed by the corporation you work for.

However, anyone can be cancelled anytime, for what they are recorded as saying or even alleged to have said, and the rules of the cancel culture aren't really clear. What is clear is that any dissenting opinion of any kind runs the risk of getting you cancelled (if you are not already in a marginalised niche). If you want your risk of being cancelled to be zero, you need to have zero dissenting opinions from the corporate-mainstream.

So, when the war breaks out, there is fear and hesitation on anyone in a position of influence in any of the European or US institutions or mainstream media or even social media, to offer any criticism, but especially within the political institutions making the decisions. Everyone in these institutions will fear any dissent gets the cancelled if not now then in the future. Whereas before cancel culture the realpolitik, economic, as well as "what do we owe Ukraine?", realities may have been discussed in a fact-of-the-matter way by decision makers, it could very well be that once the social media pressure builds beyond a certain point, everyone falls in line and it's impossible to mitigate any risks, much less outright disagree with the policy. Indeed, that it's self-harmful, even irrational, can be proof-pooding that the motivation is truly just.

In parallel to cancel culture, essentially suppressing any critical analysis, at the bare minimum within, political institutions to arrive at coherent policies, there is also the essentially pure game theory problem, when everyone believes the other parties policies are an irrational bluff.

For example, US believes Russia's policy of threatening to invade Ukraine is an irrational bluff (and too bad for them if they do it!), and Russia believes Europes policy to risk losing access to Russian gas is irrational (and too bad for them if they do it!), and Europe believes Russia's threats are irrational because they pay them so much for the gas and the "time of tanks rolling across the fields of Easter Europe" are over anyways. Likewise, Russia may believe US policy, even if they do sell LNG to Europe, is irrational because the US does actually need its European allies and this will foment disagreement and resentment (such as Macron wondering why the US doesn't sell them gas at the same price in the US ... where's the solidarity?). Russia sees Ukraine as irrational for risking and then entering a war of total destruction of Ukraine, whereas Ukraine sees Russia as irrational for risking and entering a war that is super costly and embarrassing on the world stage. And, of course, both the US and Russia have thousands of nuclear weapons so can easily perceive anyone messing with them as irrational.

When everyone believes everyone else is irrational and bluffing, no ones policy is actually rational, especially if at someone point everyone needs to commit to their irrational bluff to prove they weren't bluffing to begin with (even if they were).

Notice how the matter of Ukraine was conspicuously absent from all of what you quoted, and military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO did not cease, but intensified.

Cabinet approves action plan for annual national plan of cooperation with NATO in 2010

As reported, in December 2008, NATO invited Ukraine to a new format of relations as part of the so-called annual national program on preparations for joining the alliance. Since then, Ukraine, along with NATO experts, has drawn up and implemented such a document for a second consecutive year.

LOL. — ssu

Hey guys!

Have noticed that the war between Ukraine and Russia actually has gone on since the year 2014?

And again the hubris of Ukrainians not having any role here... :smirk: — ssu

Ukraine is 100% dependent on NATO, in particular the US who calls the shots in NATO, for arms, intelligence, training and planning support, and bankrolling the entire government

Once you are completely dependent on a party, you are that party's pawn, whether you like it or not, whether you are convinced you want what they want or not. If the US changes policy, Ukraine has zero leverage to do anything about that, and if Ukraine complains about something (like not speaking at the World Cup) it doesn't matter what Ukraine wants, what matters is what the US wants.

Ukraine is a vassal state to the US, entirely propped up by US support and financing both by the US and by other European countries (on the insistence of the US), there is no way to argue that.

Because Ukraine's interest are not the same as the US interest, obviously bad outcomes for Ukraine (but acceptable to the US) are entirely possible.

Denying this is just not facing the potential cognitive dissonance of looking squarely at the suffering of Ukrainians right now.

2014 was clearly a US backed coup (we even have the audio of Nuland candidly calling the shots in Ukraine). That's not agency.

Furthermore, anti-Russian Ukrainian policies since, by factions or the government, since 2008, and especially since 2014, are in the context of Ukrainians truly believing they'll get into NATO ... if NATO knew that wouldn't happen, which Zelensky tells us NATO told him, that's a pretty big manipulation of Ukrainians. Again, being manipulated makes you a pawn and not a king.

Notice how the matter of Ukraine was conspicuously absent from all of what you quoted, and military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO did not cease, but intensified. — Tzeentch

Notice how many things were absent from was all the military cooperation going around then, and earlier in Central Asia even with CSTO members. The basic fact is that US and NATO has had a lot of military cooperation even with other CSTO members. Ukraine was actually neutral, unlike them.

US soldiers training with Kazakhstani officers in Steppe Eagle 2017.

It's entirely possible that the policy came into existence after seeing the Ukrainians fighting back successfully enough to halt the invasion. — boethius

Policies can and do come into existence after events. It's quite likely that ideas of a full-scale war with Ukraine came to existence after the astonishing success of capturing Crimea. In fact, the easiness of this brilliant operation can perfectly explain just why Putin would think that a 10 day operation is all what is needed to solve the Ukraine-problem once and for all.

Ukraine is 100% dependent on NATO, in particular the US who calls the shots in NATO, for arms, intelligence, training and planning support, and bankrolling the entire government — boethius

You are confusing the ability to take the initiative and make large scale offensive maneuvers with the ability to defend it's territory.

Policies can and do come into existence after events. It's quite likely that ideas of a full-scale war with Ukraine came to existence after the astonishing success of capturing Crimea. In fact, the easiness of this brilliant operation can perfectly explain just why Putin would think that a 10 day operation is all what is needed to solve the Ukraine-problem once and for all. — ssu

I'd have no problem believing this is true.

It could have been the policy just to avoid an embarrassing result in the next round.

A lot of decisions revolve around avoiding embarrassment, so it's entirely possible the US planners did not think seriously beyond just trying to make sure Russia couldn't so easily take more of Ukraine, leading Putin to conclude, due to these actions being a threat and overconfidence from Crimea annexation, to "Putin would think that a 10 day operation is all what is needed to solve the Ukraine-problem once and for all".

Generally in large institutions, people have all sorts of elaborate theories and analysis and plans, but the logic and sequence of decisions is fairly simple, since a lot of people need to agree for anything to actually happen, and the complex analysis just explains why given people support given decisions at certain times (even if it's all mutually incompatible on the whole).

You are confusing the ability to take the initiative and make large scale offensive maneuvers with the ability to defend it's territory. — ssu

This was maybe true at the very start, and had Ukraine sued for peace then, it would have been significant Ukrainian agency just as you say, both the fighting and negotiating (especially if the US disagreed and wanted more fighting to bleed the Russians).

Ukraine had a significant stockpile of weapons and equipment, and I agree (wherever it came from, mostly soviet days) it was (at the time) the basis of independent decisions action.

However, in the months that followed essentially the entirety of the Ukrainian original armour fleet and other heavy weapons were destroyed and a significant part of its officer corp killed, and munitions stockpiles fired, transitioning to complete dependence on the US / NATO to simply maintain current lines, much less make any offensive operations.

Just treading water required thousands of rounds of artillery and other munitions a day as well as attrition of vehicles, and now also the electricity grid (requiring thousands of generators to try to cope with, which again Ukraine is 100% dependent on the US for).

I'm not sure about cancel culture. That seems to be something that mostly threatens public figures, whereas the people who cook up geopolitical strategy that remains constant throughout several presidencies are almost certainly not public figures ("deep state" / elite, in the US also known as "the Blob" or the foreign policy establishment).

In parallel to cancel culture essentially suppress any critical analysis, at the bare minimum within, political institutions to arrive at coherent policies, there is also the essentially pure game theory problem, when everyone believes the other parties policies are an irrational bluff. — boethius

I don't think the Americans' actions suggest they believed the Russians were bluffing, especially after 2014. They took the threat serious enough to intensify security cooperation with Ukraine.

Generally, I am reluctant to accept explanations that rely on the big players on the world stage making irrational or ignorant decisions. I think more likely the opposite is true - that they know more than we do, and I tend to try and make sense of their actions through that lens.

Notice how many things were absent from was all the military cooperation going around then, and earlier in Central Asia even with CSTO members. The basic fact is that US and NATO has had a lot of military cooperation even with other CSTO members. — ssu

You implied that during the Obama administration there was a reversal in regards to the United States' Ukraine policy.

This is untrue, as is evidenced by the intensifying security cooperation between the US and Ukraine during this period:

From the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012:

Recalling our decisions in relation to Ukraine and our Open Door policy stated at the Bucharest and Lisbon Summits, NATO is ready to continue to develop its cooperation with Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP).

From the NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2013:

In 2013, the Alliance updated its Political-Military Framework which ensures that partners can participate more effectively in Allied assessments, planning, and decision-making on current and potential operations. [...] Through these experiences, NATO and its operational partners improved their political consultations and gained higher levels of interoperability. To secure these gains, NATO's partners will be more systematically integrated into NATO's regular training and exercise programmes.

As part of these efforts, NATO is fostering partner participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO's rapid-reaction force. In 2013, Sweden joined the NRF alongside Finland and Ukraine, while Georgia pledged to make forces available to the NRF in 2015. In the autumn, four partners participated in the Alliance's largest exercise of the last seven years, Steadfast Jazz, which served to certify the NRF rotation for 2014.

I could go on and on. This is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to publicly available documentation on NATO-Ukraine cooperation.

I'm pretty confident that if a mainstream publication was talking about it, google would put it pretty near the top. — boethius

I'm pretty confident that you have no idea what you are talking about, because the Economist IS a mainstream publication.

certainly would be interesting to see. — boethius

I would be interested in reading the Economist's interview of Zaluzhny, because I hold Zaluzhny as a genius, but wouldn't waste my time looking for someone else's commentary about that interview. I don't see the point.

↪boethius I'm not sure about cancel culture. That seems to be something that mostly threatens public figures, whereas the people who cook up geopolitical strategy that remains constant throughout several presidencies are almost certainly not public figures ("deep state" / elite, in the US also known as "the Blob" or the foreign policy establishment). — Tzeentch

No issues with your statement vis-a-vis the US.

The cancel culture aspect is to explain why Europe goes all in on the war and sanctions, which is a fantastic price.

European leaders (especially outside the France and Germany) are not better informed than a worldnews reader from reddit; they're mostly just banal bureaucrats that get up and read the headlines and get to work, manage scandals and to some extent governance, and score points against their political opponents when they can. Life is comfortable and there's no need to take anything too seriously.

NATO "takes care" of all their geopolitical concerns and military contingencies, which is another way to say the US does.

Why this matters is that the US could not have known for sure European leaders would fully back their policy in Ukraine, but it's an essential element.

The common narrative is that Zelensky was about to reach an agreement with Ukraine, but then Boris Johnson flew / train into an active war zone to convince him not to. An example of the narrative is as follows:

Russia and Ukraine may have agreed on a tentative deal to end the war in April, according to a recent piece in Foreign Affairs.

“Russian and Ukrainian negotiators appeared to have tentatively agreed on the outlines of a negotiated interim settlement,” wrote Fiona Hill and Angela Stent. “Russia would withdraw to its position on February 23, when it controlled part of the Donbas region and all of Crimea, and in exchange, Ukraine would promise not to seek NATO membership and instead receive security guarantees from a number of countries.”

The news highlights the impact of former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s efforts to stop negotiations, as journalist Branko Marcetic noted on Twitter. The decision to scuttle the deal coincided with Johnson’s April visit to Kyiv, during which he reportedly urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to break off talks with Russia for two key reasons: Putin cannot be negotiated with, and the West isn’t ready for the war to end. — Responsible Statecraft

I have never heard of this Responsible Statecraft organisation before, but it's a good summary of the story and first hit on google.

I don't think the Americans' actions suggest they believed the Russians were bluffing, especially after 2014. They took the threat serious enough to intensify security cooperation with Ukraine. — Tzeentch

Bluffing about committing to a full scale invasion and getting hit with full sanctions.

I have zero recollection of anyone representing American foreign policy analysis ever talking about the desire to have a full scale war in Ukraine; however, they talked a lot, and for years, of their "nuclear option" of total sanctions and cutting Russia off from SWIFT and so on.

So, considering all the pieces that need to fall into place to have a total war situation (Europe, Ukraine and Russia all need to make key decisions, along with public sentiment also fully supporting the war; which, before February no one in Europe seemed to care much about), it seems more likely to me that the US support for Ukraine was to ensure there is at least some sort of war, in order to impose the sanctions the US wants and for them to stick.

This would just be applying the lesson of Crimea that if it's over too quickly, "fait accomplie", then the sanctions don't stick, Europe just keeps doing business with Russia.

And this analysis I definitely do remember reading, that the US would not want an invasion of Ukraine to end too quickly for these sanctions reasons.

Now, if you're trying to make sure a war doesn't end too quickly, you may, to your own surprise, get a much bigger war than what you imagined.

At least as far as the mainstream story goes, the US overestimated Russia's strength, thought Ukraine would fall.

So, in this context, if you just want to the war to last at least a week or two, time to use the chaos to push through sanctions and then scare Europe enough to buy hundreds of billions of arms, or then, if all goes well, last a couple of months to get Finland into NATO, you'd invest a lot in training and equipping the Ukrainians.

However, if the goal was to actually beat the Russians, Javelines (and hundreds of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and NATO howitzers and self propelled artillery etc.) would have been sent to Ukraine before the war started.

So, it can be the US was aiming for some sort of balance, relatively minor geopolitical adjustments, Russia the new enemy so we can forget about Afghanistan and so on.

Of course, I would agree that to the extent the possibility of Ukraine entering total war was considered, that the US policy establishment would view that as a good thing, but I don't see much evidence anyone was pushing for it until the Ukrainians made the "grand stand" (with Zelensky handing out AK's on the street and everything).

Usually, primary objectives of the US policy establishment are talked about for years and years. For example, invading Iraq and Afghanistan (destroying Syria and Libya too) was talked about for years and years and years: why, how, when, what would be the pretext etc. before they happen.

And, in this case, bringing down full sanctions on Russia has been talked about by the US political establishment since US became a net-exporter of fossil fuels again, in particular producing a lot of natural gas. And even a limited war in Ukraine could achieve "gas diversification" from Europe to US LNG, but the fact that US can't possibly replace Russian gas is maybe evidence that US was aiming more for some adjustments than a full scale war.

The other major evidence is that the US policy establishment talks all the time about China being the main threat, so having a big war in Europe is contrary to the "pivot to Asia".

This maybe the essence of Putin's discussion with Xi, that if the war in Ukraine is a lot bigger than America expects, this will overextend them between Europe and East-Asia.

Generally, I am reluctant to accept explanations that rely on the big players on the world stage making irrational or ignorant decisions. I think more likely the opposite is true - that they know more than we do, and I tend to try and make sense of their actions through that lens. — Tzeentch

I definitely agree. Someone just following twitter and tictok and making decisions would be people like the Finnish prime minister, not a major power, but still in this situation you really needed nearly every European country to be fully on board, and dissent or logic for peace could have snowballed at any moment and put the breaks on the war.

However, even the great powers who have more information than we do, they cannot completely control events, especially as they are trying to foil each others plans.

So, certainly a big war in Ukraine was considered by the US, I just see no evidence that this was a preferred outcome before the war actually started.

I'd agree that they knew their actions would make a war inevitable, but a much more coherent policy would be "making Russia pay a price" with policy changes in Europe that benefit the US, but the war fairly limited in time and scope.

For, a limited war would have just been a repeat of Crimea annexation but the US get some of what it wants this round, mainly the sanctions.

And this is how the US policy establishment seemed to think about things prior to the full scale war, that there's going to be a Crimea "second round" in the Donbas and they need to do better than the first round, of Russia taking Crimea without a shot fired. All their actions prior to February 2022 I think are consistent with such thinking. To posit the US intended a full scale war seems to me to require too much knowledge or too much control of how all sorts of different parties would react in the span of about a week, which I don't think is plausible to do.

I think the US policy establishment was so exuberant about the war going big and the Ukrainians "holding ground" and wanting to fight the Russians fanatically and without compromise, because they were genuinely surprised by such a fortuitous turn of events.

The New York Times published a big investigative article: Putin's War

How could one of the world’s most powerful militaries, led by a celebrated tactician like Mr. Putin, have faltered so badly against its much smaller, weaker rival? To piece together the answer, we drew from hundreds of Russian government emails, documents, invasion plans, military ledgers and propaganda directives. We listened to Russian phone calls from the battlefield and spoke with dozens of soldiers, senior officials and Putin confidants who have known him for decades.

(You should be able to read without subscription if you open the link in a private/incognito window.)

It is mostly narrative interpolation, and those who have been closely following the war won't find much that they don't already know, but some specific details are intereting. Here are some highlights (per NYT):

• Some Russian soldiers described being sent to war with little food, training, bullets or equipment — and watching about two-thirds of their underprepared platoon be killed.
• Many of the people closest to Putin fed his suspicions, magnifying his grievances against the West.
• The U.S. sought to stop Ukraine from trying to kill Valery Gerasimov, a top Russian general. American officials were worried that an attempt on his life could lead to a war between the U.S. and Russia. Gerasimov survived the attack.
• A senior Russian official told the C.I.A. director that Russia would not give up, no matter how many of its soldiers were killed or injured. One NATO member has warned allies that Putin might accept the death or injury of as many as 300,000 Russian troops. Here’s how Russian data journalists calculate Moscow’s toll from the war.
• Invading Russian soldiers used their cellphones to call home, enabling the Ukrainian military to find and kill them. Phone intercepts obtained by The Times showed the bitterness Russian soldiers felt toward their own commanders.

Across Ukraine, the Russian losses mounted. A giant armored column of more than 30,000 troops at the core of Russia’s force pushing south toward the city of Chernihiv was eviscerated by a motley group of Ukrainian defenders outnumbered five to one, soldiers and senior officials said. The Ukrainians hid in the forest and picked apart the Russian column with shoulder-fired antitank weapons, like American-made Javelins. — New York Times

This popular narrative of "a motley group of Ukrainian defenders" that eviscerated Russian armored columns "with shoulder-fired antitank weapons" was challenged in a recent report by RUSI. They maintain that, contrary to popular belief, most of the Russian losses during their failed Kiev push were inflicted by conventional Ukrainian artillery.

This popular narrative of "a motley group of Ukrainian defenders" that eviscerated Russian armored columns "with shoulder-fired antitank weapons" was challenged in a recent report by RUSI. They maintain that, contrary to popular belief, most of the Russian losses during their failed Kiev push were inflicted by conventional Ukrainian artillery. — SophistiCat

Ukraine had a pretty sizeable army before the army:



It's not talked much about because it was essentially all destroyed, and it's awkward to ask "what happened to the the 12000 armoured vehicles, 2500 tanks, and 2000 artillery pieces, if they're all gone and you need more ... how does that square with winning?

However, all this equipment (even if only a part is in good working order) is going to do damage.

Where the javelins and stingers had a big effect is that Ukraine could harass Russian supply lines (that were stretched hundreds of kilometres through unsecured territory, especially the salient to East Kiev) and attack helicopters (that could otherwise fly around and destroy your artillery and armoured vehicles and tanks) with small groups of people all over the place. Any actual big battle (where the majority of losses occur) would still be mostly heavy weapons and artillery duels and not, as you say, a motley group of infantry standing up in the chaos with javelins; but 3-4 guys able to go out and blow up supply trucks and tank columns from kilometres away, has a big impact on the operation.

However, my point above was that if the US wanted to Ukraine to really "win" the war, then all these weapons systems would have already been in Ukraine; more to the point, why stop at javelins, why not already have supplied Ukraine with HIMARS, f-16s and so on, certainly train on any weapons system that maybe required, such as NATO tanks.

It's also repeated often that the US intelligence community own assessment would be Ukraine would lose within 72 hours, so maybe there was some "secret" analysis that said otherwise, but I have difficulty imagining anyone predicted the precise series of events required to get into a total war in Ukraine, much less caused all those events to happen.

A lot of decisions revolve around avoiding embarrassment, so it's entirely possible the US planners did not think seriously beyond just trying to make sure Russia couldn't so easily take more of Ukraine, leading Putin to conclude, due to these actions being a threat and overconfidence from Crimea annexation, to "Putin would think that a 10 day operation is all what is needed to solve the Ukraine-problem once and for all".

Generally in large institutions, people have all sorts of elaborate theories and analysis and plans, but the logic and sequence of decisions is fairly simple, since a lot of people need to agree for anything to actually happen, and the complex analysis just explains why given people support given decisions at certain times (even if it's all mutually incompatible on the whole). — boethius

It's been said that Putin postponed the attack several times and that it was the FSB pushing for the attack and Gerasimov and the military being hesitant. That Putin then made a "putsch" at the FSB afterwards does reinforce that this may be so. (The FSB was in charge of Ukraine, unlike other countries.)

Again we have to compare this to the 2014 operation: Russia did then get high ranking Ukrainian officers to jump on to the Russian side: for example Rear Admiral Denis Berezovsky, head of the Ukrainian navy, issued an order for the Ukrainian Navy to lay down it's arms and afterwards being dismissed, defected to Russia.

After such covert operation success and taking into account Russian bureaucratic culture, it's not crazy to assume that those in charge of covert operations in Ukraine promised similar results again. But that was eight years ago.

Former head of the Ukrainian Navy in new uniform in 2019:

This was maybe true at the very start, and had Ukraine sued for peace then, it would have been significant Ukrainian agency just as you say, both the fighting and negotiating (especially if the US disagreed and wanted more fighting to bleed the Russians). — boethius

I'm not so sure that there even then was a moment to sue for peace. Remember that in the south and east Russia was gaining ground as Ukraine concentrated on defending Kyiv. And Putin wasn't going to talk to the drug using neo-nazis.

Ukraine had a significant stockpile of weapons and equipment, and I agree (wherever it came from, mostly soviet days) it was (at the time) the basis of independent decisions action.

However, in the months that followed essentially the entirety of the Ukrainian original armour fleet and other heavy weapons were destroyed and a significant part of its officer corp killed, and munitions stockpiles fired, transitioning to complete dependence on the US / NATO to simply maintain current lines, much less make any offensive operations. — boethius

Yes. Basically Ukraine went through it's stockpiles of artillery ammunition quite quickly and then afterwards Russia enjoyed fire superiority. And obviously then was very dependent on Western assistance.

I think the simple fact neither Ukraine or actually the West was ready for such a long war fought with ammo consumption of WW1 or WW2 level. The West has basically looked at short conventional wars. The conventional wars in the Middle East (which are somewhat comparable) lasted only some days. Only basically Russia has hoarded old stuff and ammunition for such a conflict. Yet neither Russia or even the West have a military industry to produce huge amounts of munitions. At least yet.

Just treading water required thousands of rounds of artillery and other munitions a day as well as attrition of vehicles, and now also the electricity grid (requiring thousands of generators to try to cope with, which again Ukraine is 100% dependent on the US for). — boethius

Where Ukraine needs that ammo is if makes large scale maneuvers. Then it has to attack Russian forces whereas if it is on the defensive, it can just pinpoint the fires to needed points. And even without artillery (or little artillery), Ukrainian infantry still can defend.

In Ukraine, the delicate political reinvention of "pro-Russian" MPs

The parties considered too close to Moscow were dissolved after the outbreak of the Russian invasion in February, but their elected representatives kept their mandates and still participate in the life of the Parliament.

By Thomas d'Istria (Kiev) and Faustine Vincent (Strasbourg), Le Monde

The online exhibition is entitled "Pro-Russian parties, fuck off". It gathers a collection of leaflets, calendars and propaganda posters of the different pro-Russian parties that have succeeded one another in Ukrainian political life since the independence of this country, in 1991, until the beginning of the current war, on February 24. The slide show, available on the website of the Chesno ("honesty" in Ukrainian) organization, is a reminder of a time when a "fifth column" influenced Kiev politics, and when the vast majority of Ukrainians did not reject the "Russian world" wholesale.

After more than ten months of war, the political formations that were considered to be vehicles of Russian influence were dissolved by Ukrainian courts. The most important of them, the opposition platform For Life, the first opposition party in the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada), did not escape. While some parliamentarians of the former party opted to leave Ukraine, the majority remained, and continues to regularly attend Parliament sessions.

"The party has been banned but the deputies still have the right to sit as long as their mandates have not been cancelled," explains Oleksandr Salzhenko, one of the analysts of the Chesno organization, whose task is to decipher the political life of the Kiev Parliament. According to the country's laws, mandates can only be revoked in case of "loss of citizenship, resignation, death or a court decision.

This sometimes creates absurd situations. For example, Ukrainian MP and oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, co-chairman of the banned party close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was arrested by Ukrainian authorities in mid-April and was at the center of a prisoner exchange with Russia in September, is still officially a member of the Ukrainian Parliament. Other deputies continue to sit in key positions. Nestor Shufrych, who, according to Chesno, has long referred to the conflict in the Donbass as a "civil war" despite evidence of Kremlin involvement, remains today the head of the committee for freedom of expression.

The former deputies of the pro-Russian party have quickly adapted to the new reality of the war. Yurii Pavlenko, 47, says that he and his colleagues first wrote a statement condemning the Russian aggression. Later, they deleted from their party's charter all articles that "mentioned [their] desire for a good-neighbourly relationship with Russia," he says, sitting over a coffee in a Kiev bar. The deputies also voted to exclude a colleague from their party, Ilya Kiva, who had called on Kiev to capitulate on a Russian television channel.

More than ten months have passed. Today, Serhi Hladkoskok is a member of the new parliamentary group Reconstruction of Ukraine. At the end of October, he was in the European Parliament, looking for partnerships and money to rebuild the Kharkiv region. "Our objective is the same as that of President Zelensky, we want to rebuild the country," he told Le Monde. The elected official does not comment on the banning of his former party, and simply recalls that it is not the only one to have been banned after the invasion. "People should not look at the name of the party but what we do. For us, as elected officials, nothing has changed," he says. "We have remained in Kharkiv since the first day of the invasion. People have seen it and remember it, so they trust us."

In Kiev, on the other hand, civil society and some members of parliament remain highly critical of the presence of former elected officials of the largest pro-Russian opposition party in political positions. In recent days, a petition to discuss in the Verkhovna Rada the withdrawal of the mandates of former deputies has begun to circulate. According to Chesno, about fifty votes out of the one hundred and fifty needed to consider the proposal have been collected.

Political analyst Oleksandr Salzhenko remains skeptical. "It is impossible to deprive deputies of their mandates because of martial law, which prohibits amending the Ukrainian constitution and holding elections. There is still the possibility that people will not vote for them in the next elections," says the observer. "But then it will take years."

It's been said that Putin postponed the attack several times and that it was the FSB pushing for the attack and Gerasimov and the military being hesitant. That Putin then made a "putsch" at the FSB afterwards does reinforce that this may be so. (The FSB was in charge of Ukraine, unlike other countries.) — ssu

I have no problem with the idea such a narrative is true.

My position on this issue was that clearly the Russian military had a plan B of securing the land bridge to Crimea. The situation of "maybe we'll invade Ukraine" is also existing at least since 2014 and likely since 2008 so the idea things were not thought through and different contingencies planned for is not credible, which I don't think is your position.

The only difference I think we have on this topic is simply how what likelihood the Russian military, the Kremlin, FSB and Putin himself placed on certain outcomes (such as capitulation of Kiev or then military commanders).

I would, however, bet money that the nuclear deterrence relative the no-fly zone was preplanned (presenting Putin as unhinged etc.), likewise that they'd keep pressure on Kiev until the siege of Mariupol was completed, of course, in the event that Kiev does not capitulate.

Maybe they believed it was 80% likely Kiev would crumble or maybe 20% (worth a shot, and serves as a fixing operation if they don't accept the demands). And, as you say, maybe everyone involved believed something different about the odds.

I'm not so sure that there even then was a moment to sue for peace. Remember that in the south and east Russia was gaining ground as Ukraine concentrated on defending Kyiv. And Putin wasn't going to talk to the drug using neo-nazis — ssu

Russia made the offer publicly, there were negotiations in Belarus, one narrative is that Zelensky was really close to accepting when Boris Johnson arrived to convince him otherwise.

Now, what are the sources of this story I have no idea, but it's honestly difficult to imagine Boris Johnson going into a theatre of war (in which the UK is not at war) for any other reason. Nevertheless, I don't like to assign fact to unsourced and/or unverifiable narratives, especially when propaganda is flying in every direction.

Yes. Basically Ukraine went through it's stockpiles of artillery ammunition quite quickly and then afterwards Russia enjoyed fire superiority. And obviously then was very dependent on Western assistance.

I think the simple fact neither Ukraine or actually the West was ready for such a long war fought with ammo consumption of WW1 or WW2 level. The West has basically looked at short conventional wars. The conventional wars in the Middle East (which are somewhat comparable) lasted only some days. Only basically Russia has hoarded old stuff and ammunition for such a conflict. Yet neither Russia or even the West have a military industry to produce huge amounts of munitions. At least yet. — ssu

Definitely agree.

The assumption of the US is that they do everything with air power, which is definitely much better than artillery if you have air supremacy, which the US definitely assumes they will get in any conflict.

There's also value / weight ratio, as bombs and shells are super heavy, so if you're fighting on the other side of the world, a bomb (especially guide bombs) are going to be more valuable to transport to the war theatre than artillery shells. Bombs are way more flexible in where they can land but also cause way bigger explosions. Indeed ... when the US wants to fire shells at a place for effect, they even have a plane for that.

Other NATO countries just assume any conflict with Russia would be nuclear, and money is better spent elsewhere than a WWI style artillery plan.

As for producing more munitions, I think the fact the West has not really tried to significantly scale up, is a good indication of where this war is going.

Where Ukraine needs that ammo is if makes large scale maneuvers. Then it has to attack Russian forces whereas if it is on the defensive, it can just pinpoint the fires to needed points. And even without artillery (or little artillery), Ukrainian infantry still can defend. — ssu

The problem is that you need artillery to suppress enemy artillery (the other option being air superiority, but Ukraine doesn't have that).

Fact of the matter is, Russia is pretty well optimised for this kind of conflict. Its whole doctrine revolves around denying air supremacy and then relying on an artillery advantage.

It sounds bad to us Westerners that Russia doesn't have air supremacy and are still taking losses / can't fly wherever they want, but this is exactly what Russian doctrine is built for.

Absent air supremacy of either side, artillery is just so amazingly good, and even drones are mostly just a force multiplier for artillery, and the only defence against artillery is your own artillery for counter-battery fire as well as shelling advancing formations.

As we've seen, tanks are vulnerable without infantry support, and not only can artillery hit tanks (maybe not penetrate but still damage / disable) but artillery suppressed infantry. The only way to suppress artillery is with air or artillery.

What Ukraine can do is lay a lot of mines, but this only slows down an enemy and doesn't win any battles in itself. Where Russian partisans are generally wrong is that Russia is keeping lines static on purpose to draw more Ukrainians in, whereas I think the mines are a bigger factor in Russia's slow pace of advancement when they do advance (if they could advance faster that would be great to moral and propaganda, and I don't see less Ukrainian casualties in such a scenario).

Which is an additional reason why we may see another offensive elsewhere than the current lines, as the easiest way to avoid mines is to go around them. There are not really any good counters to mines except for the fact that the enemy can't literally mine the whole country as they'd then need to go through their own minefields to get anywhere.

In this photo released by the Dnipro Region Administration, Municipal workers dismantle a monument of Russian writer Alexander Pushkin in the city centre of Dnipro, Ukraine, Friday, Dec. 16, 2022. Ukraine is accelerating efforts to erase the vestiges of centuries of Soviet and Russian influence from the public space by pulling down monuments and renaming hundreds of streets to honor home-grown artists, poets, military chiefs, and independence leaders, even heroes of this year's war. (Dnipro Region Administration via AP)

Giles opines:

Opinion: Russia has shouted about escalation long enough
^{— Keir Giles · CNN · Dec 20, 2022}

There are effective NASAMS, however expensive, some have been delivered, more planned (the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, the US).
Of course, when Russia generously sprays missiles throughout, there will be damage; seems clear enough that it's an attempt to bomb/force/intimidate the Ukrainians into submission.
Where these weapons would mostly be for defense (shield, not an escalation), they can (and will likely) also be used for attacks, though, whatever the Russian response might be, if any in particular.

Seems a bit surprising with the Nazi thing an'all ...

Ukraine's Azov Regiment visits Israel: 'Mariupol is our Masada'
^{— Tzvi Joffre · The Jerusalem Post · Dec 20, 2022}

A ruse, an excuse.
Will the Putinistas keep it up?

Seems a bit surprising with the Nazi thing an'all ... — jorndoe

Azov is literally riding around making Nazi salutes with the Nazi iron cross and the SS wolf's angle painted on their vehicles.



As verified by Forbs ... just, we shouldn't be too concerned.

They say there "was Nazis" but not anymore ... but where did they go even in that narrative?

Wow.
I read several of those articles and found the talking points of boethius and Tzeentch in bold relief. In some cases, they have been transcribing the text verbatim. — Paine

Another of his sources is Brian Berletic, aka Tony Cartalucci, a far-right conspiracy theorist who has been amplifying Russian propaganda, and before that has championed Assad's regime in Syria ("independent Arab state that spends on human welfare and refuses to surrender to Israel"), Myanmar junta, and other such noble causes.

Another of his sources is Brian Berletic, aka Tony Cartalucc — SophistiCat

Before I posted 6 videos from BBC to Vice, investigating the Nazi's in Ukraine, and all concluding there is definitely Nazi's in Ukraine, with weapons, institutional power and even their own "youth camp".

Of course, main stream media doesn't investigate that kind of thing anymore, so people on the fringe do it, why expect otherwise.

In the case of the New Atlas video I posted, it's just breaking down a Forbs article that is a laughable level of apologetics, and just shows the source video of Azov guys going by on Western armoured vehicles with hitler salutes and Nazi symbols.

And in over 400 pages of discussion, no one has yet presented an argument that these Nazi's were nothing to be concerned about, other than to make the absurd claim that there's an equal amount of Nazi's everywhere.

As for Scott Ritter, I literally said preambled what I was repeating from Scott Ritter with "this is Scott Ritter's analysis", as I had not even read the article yet and if one was going to read into it, then Scott Ritters analysis would be accurate. I wouldn't be so confident Zuluhzny will be making a concession speech anytime soon, but I would put money on that option being setup with Zuluhzny speech so the there's some narrative coherence if it comes to that (both to the Western and Ukrainian audience).

Scott Ritter was literally a weapons inspector for the UN, and Colonel Macgregor a colonel.

Feel free to disagree with them, but the idea these two don't have expertise worth considering is laughable.

Now, both these guys analysing the war, and anyone else, who does not repeat Ukraine is "winning" are not welcome on the mainstream, so they literally do interviews everywhere from the extreme right to the extreme left. Why not?

The "other side" of the debate has been literally predicting Russian lines collapsing due to morale problems, and Russian economy collapsing due to sanctions, and running out of missiles and ammunitions and tanks and everything, and Ukraine taking less casualties than the Russians, and Ukraine's "winning the war".

None of which has come true in 9 months of the war.

Why would people that have made terrible predictions be more credible than people making accurate predictions.

Moreover, no one has a monopoly on analysis and prediction making, and I find the best way to keep an open mind is to just listen to as many points of view as possible.

Indeed, the only reason I got clued into a total war between Russia and Ukraine was even on the table, is because a Nazi predicted it in, if I remember correctly, the BBC video. And lo and behold it occurred, so even Nazi's can be right in predicting events.

Also, the people literally following the war everyday have a minimum of learning about their models and theories of the war. For example, most of the right wing analysts predicted Russia will hold on to Kherson. However, Colonel Macgregor predicted Russia would fall back to economise forces if they need to. So, what we learn is definitely the right is overconfident in Russia's forces, but that does not make their analysis not worth considering.

It's also interesting to listen to analysis from people with completely different world views, such as supporting Trump and denying climate change, which, in my opinion, they are totally wrong about.

In this recent exchange with and I think it's quite illuminating the effects of cancel culture on analysis and decision making.

Neither rebut anything, nor even bother to try to prove their allegations. What's their definition of "extreme right" and what makes people extreme right and why would it not be an ad hominem in this case etc.

And, on the subject of Nazis, they simply don't bother to address the main stream media (bbc, vice, guardian, reuters) reporting on these organisations before this year, don't even try to explain where these Nazi's supposedly disappeared to, the mere fact that only the "extreme right" or the "extreme left" needs to be linked to making making the same point, and everything can be dismissed.

Although I agree that some people close to decision making are "in the know", there is still a vast array of bureaucracies with people either fanatical adherents to cancel culture, like out friends and , or then afraid of career repercussions so not saying anything.

The effect of this on institutional processes I is something to contemplate as a major driver of events.

We are basically at the level of reification of social media causes du jour.

Interesting to know.
I see that Berletic is well established on the New Atlas platform.
I remember some of that messaging from the Syrian conflict. It prompts me to learn more even though I got burnt out by the Chechen wars and was hoping not to explore all of this again.

I remember some of that messaging from the Syrian conflict. — Paine

The Syrian conflict that didn't overthrow Asad as mainstream media promised and where Al Qaeda was literally a moderate faction of the "rebels".

Again, in terms of predicting events, how does accurate predictions make one less credible and totally wrong predictions make one more credible?

No matter what you want to happen, there's what actually happens.

Predicting Ukraine will win when they won't, is not "pro Ukraine" it's just wrong if Ukraine doesn't win. If you think Ukraine will win, ok, why, how, when?

And, for certain, accurate predictions are better for Ukraine than wrong predictions, as they help make better decisions. No one benefits from a wrong idea about the future. Of course, things are uncertain, which is what analysis helps try to clarify the extent that's possible.

↪Paine, or then afraid of career repercussions so not saying anything. — boethius

I am an old carpenter and a stone mason.

I haven't made any predictions.

I am an old carpenter and stone mason. — Paine

You're in the true adherent to cancel culture category.

However, even when would-be-critical thinkers see what the online mob can do, they hesitate to speak their mind.

Every political system we've seen based on severe censorship eventually loses its grip on reality and starts making terrible decisions.

You're in the true adherent to cancel culture category. — boethius

How would you guess that from my life of work? What is your life of work?