Propositional statements aim to stay a step ahead of ineffability by capturing anything sayable within a formal logic of use. But the very formality of the logic, with its presuppositions of extant, persisting symbolic meanings ,neutral , external connectors (is , iff) and activities of shuffling and coordination achieves its triumph over ineffability at the expense of meaninglessness. — Joshs

Hardly so obscure. If the Dialogues of Plato are still readable today in English language, then meaning persists over time irrespective of what you seem to be advocating some kind of coherentist theory of meaning.

Sure.

"functioning", though, isn't the question being asked. I'm wondering about "after enlightenment".

"in tandem" suggests to me the dualism you're denying, but I suspect you'd say more on that upon questioning since you've expressed anti-dualist sentiments.

This seems to me to be the thought that began this thread:

the propositional character of empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation — Janus

I'm going to go out on a limb and say that @Banno and I agree with that. Or, from what I'm reading in the exchanges, that seems to be something we agree upon, in a rough sense. We'll all get particular down the line in our own ways, but roughly this is right.

So, upon recognition that empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation -- what now? Not in a grand sense, just philosophically.

What happens to words?

That's a big "if" tho :D

Hardly so obscure. If the dialogs of Plato are still readable today in English language, then meaning persists over time irrespective of what you seem to be advocating some kind of coherentist theory of meaning. — Shawn

I wonder if he is also referencing a Derridarian critique of logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence? I have doubts that the precise meaning of Plato today is the same as it was then. But something does seem to survive, right?

"in tandem" suggests to me the dualism you're denying, — Moliere

If it's a dualism, it's a dualism of views, not of substance. My experience has been that when in a non-dual state of awareness, dualistic views are still comprehensible, but their relativivty, their illusionistic nature, is understood.

I don't claim to have attained non-dual consciousness as a permanent state, but I don't deny the possibility. The permanent state of non-dual awareness would be what Eastern philosophers, Advaita Vedantists and Buddhists refer to as "enlightenment".

So, upon recognition that empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation -- what now? Not in a grand sense, just philosophically.

What happens to words? — Moliere

I guess it depends on what you mean by "philosophically". From the point of view of AP and OLP non-dual awareness and the realization that empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation would presumably not be of much use, because analyses and descriptions are always going to be dualistic in character. From the perspective of, for example, Pierre Hadot's 'philosophy as a way of life', practices aimed at realizing non-dual awareness, since it is an incomparably richer form of life, might be advocated.

,

Propositional statements aim to stay a step ahead of ineffability by capturing anything sayable within a formal logic of use. But the very formality of the logic, with its presuppositions of extant, persisting symbolic meanings ,neutral , external connectors (is , iff) and activities of shuffling and coordination achieves its triumph over ineffability at the expense of meaninglessness. — Joshs

What does this say?

I think he is saying that we are kidding ourselves if we think stable meaning is possible and that logic is ultimately not connected to anything foundational. But what do I know?

I have doubts that the precise meaning of Plato today is the same as it was then. — Tom Storm

Surely that's a feature not of language, no?

If it's a dualism, it's a dualism of views, not of substance. My experience has been that when in a non-dual state of awareness, dualistic views are still comprehensible, but their relativivty, their illusionistic nature, is understood.

I don't claim to have attained non-dual consciousness as a permanent state, but I don't deny the possibility. The permanent state of non-dual awareness would be what Eastern philosophers, Advaita Vedantists and Buddhists refer to as "enlightenment". — Janus

Cool.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "philosophically". From the point of view of AP and OLP non-dual awareness and the realization that empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation would presumably not be of much use, because analyses and descriptions are always going to be dualistic in character. From the perspective of, for example, Pierre Hadot's 'philosophy as a way of life', practices aimed at realizing non-dual awareness, since it is an incomparably richer form of life, might be advocated — Janus

I don't think I meant any particular philosophy.

Actually, I'd say one of the things I've been pushing against in this thread is the notion that AP and OLP are necessarily opposed to these notions. I believe that's a false belief. I can see, on the surface, how they seem opposed, but I'd say the "seeming" only covers many cases -- but not all.

Surely that's a feature not of language, no? — Shawn

You mean a feature of time and change?

Yes, and who decides to burn your books and vilify them...

Actually, I'd say one of the things I've been pushing against in this thread is the notion that AP and OLP are necessarily opposed to these notions. I believe that's a false belief. I can see, on the surface, how they seem opposed, but I'd say the "seeming" only covers many cases -- but not all. — Moliere

:up: Not all, I agree. For example, I understand Wittgenstein to have been very much in the ineffable, mystic camp on this question.

I'm not sure...

But, just generically speaking, OLP includes Sense and Sensibilia -- a book I read some time ago on @Banno's mention, and that seems to be a book about a non-dual awareness that isn't mystical, is non-dualistic, and is both analytic philosophy and OLP.

I just wanted to add this:

So snow is white. Why do I care? In what context of concerns and goals does this become a topic of interest to me? Wittgenstein tried to show how we end up in confusion by trying to pretend that ‘S is P’ makes any sense outside of a specific context of wider motivated engagement with others. This wider relevance is not peripheral to , or separable from, S is P, but inextricable to its very sense. It is what, on any occasion, we are really on about when we say ‘snow is white’. What the logical proposition does is equivalent to the way an empirical statement of fact in a natural science seems to make our affective involvement with the meaning that is being presented either non-existent, or utterly inconsequential to and separable from the apprehension of the facts.

Nice and thanks.

The world is always recognizable and intelligible to me at some level due to the intricate weave between past experience and novelty. But it has a relative stability that has the characteristic of recognizable consonances and dissonances within a flow of changing sense. This flow of morphing sense underlies and overflows the constipated formalisms of propositional logic. Those formalisms buy us the presumption of persisting self-identity, but only by depriving us of the ability to discern the underlying interconnectedness of experience — Joshs

That's very pretty writing. Again something to sit with and mull over.

Wow.. This is probably confronting for those of us who think that some stable meaning can be arrived at using language. I hadn't considered the 'transformative' power held by words like 'is' and 'as'. — Tom Storm

I quite agree, and it is simply fascinating: As I see this, generally speaking, propositional differences are not analyzable in terms of parts and rules. Rather, each propositional construction a sui generis singularity. And consider that a proposition, while never conceived outside of the historical possibilities that constitute the foundational base of knowing something is the case, is never conceived in some neutral space of interconnectivity. It is always, for lack of a better word, subjective. Dogs, cats and traffic noise are always MY dogs, etc.; this "my" is more than simply a term on the logical grid of a language. It is always an embedded "my" in an existence that imposes powerfully from "outside" the totality of what language brings to heel. This is where one encounters ineffability: where questions like, why are we born to suffer and die? address, not this totality, but an entirely OTHER than this, which must go nameless, and nameless not because it belongs to another order of thinking, but because the question drives thought beneath or outside itself. We face this OTHER, and frankly, by my lights, this should be a profound struggle, because questions go to the depth of meaning, simply because we are creatures of depth, evidenced in the aesthetic/ethical/value of our affairs.
And isn't this where philosophy must bring inquiry, finally, when the deflationary tendencies of the presumption of knowing yield to the extraordinary actualities of our existence?

This wider relevance is not peripheral to , or separable from, S is P, but inextricable to its very sense. It is what, on any occasion, we are really on about when we say ‘snow is white’. What the logical proposition does is equivalent to the way an empirical statement of fact in a natural science seems to make our affective involvement with the meaning that is being presented either non-existent, or utterly inconsequential to and separable from the apprehension of the facts. — Joshs

This is, to me, as Tom put it, "Wow." If I understand this, empirical science, and the naturalism usually associated with it, abstracts from "the wider relevance" in order to make sense of things. S is P is, if you will, the tip of an iceberg, and the "iceberg" is not something that can be made subject to the reductive, deflationary powers of logical placement, the "categories" of a totality (Levinas lifts this term from Heidegger, I am reading, and Levinas seems a bit aligned with your statement here) that in part determine meaning.

Best my thoughts can take me thus far.

Interesting to me is the way this matches up with divisions between religion and science. The latter has always left the intractable dimensions of our existence to religion; and gladly, because it had no clue as to how to deal with it. But now, religion's institutions are failing, and I see it as philosophy's mission to step up.

I find the complexity and implications of this material takes some time to sink in.

What the logical proposition does is equivalent to the way an empirical statement of fact in a natural science seems to make our affective involvement with the meaning that is being presented either non-existent, or utterly inconsequential to and separable from the apprehension of the facts. — Joshs

Constance has had a go at restating this idea below. Better than I could do, but I want to understand it better.

If I understand this, empirical science, and the naturalism usually associated with it, abstracts from "the wider relevance" in order to make sense of things. S is P is, if you will, the tip of an iceberg, and the "iceberg" is not something that can be made subject to the reductive, deflationary powers of logical placement, the "categories" of a totality (Levinas lifts this term from Heidegger, I am reading, and Levinas seems a bit aligned with your statement here) that in part determine meaning. — Constance

If philosophy involves this level of complexity - how can the average person be involved?

Interesting to me is the way this matches up with divisions between religion and science. The latter has always left the intractable dimensions of our existence to religion; and gladly, because it had no clue as to how to deal with it. But now, religion's institutions are failing, and I see it as philosophy's mission to step up. — Constance

This seems to be an important for you. How would it look if it could be done? It's difficult for people to see past Biblical literalism or scientism or naïve realism for the most part, just how would such nuanced philosophical thinking enter people's lives?

By the way, I question whether religion ever satisfactorily provided solace or explanatory power. Religion was a compulsory, even totalitarian backdrop to human life for centuries and made many people unhappy. It was feared and obeyed, and although it dealt with tragedy and loss and meaning - the ostensibly ineffable - it generally did so in the most brutish of ways (obey God's will; have faith, etc) and seemed to make demands rather than provide consolation or integration.

Language consists of units - words and phrases and phonemes and letters- that are re-usable and can be put into novel structures that are nevertheless meaningful.

Language is constructed by recursively applying a finite number of rules to a finite vocabulary.

It is because of this that language is learnable. As Davidson points out, it is because of this that "language, though it consists in an indefinitely large number of sentences, can be comprehended by a creature with finite powers" (On Saying That).

I see no way of reconciling this fact with

As I see this, generally speaking, propositional differences are not analyzable in terms of parts and rules. Rather, each propositional construction a sui generis singularity. — Constance

But, just generically speaking, OLP includes Sense and Sensibilia -- a book I read some time ago on Banno's mention, and that seems to be a book about a non-dual awareness that isn't mystical, is non-dualistic, and is both analytic philosophy and OLP. — Moliere

I have only skimmed that book quite a few years ago, so I don't remember much about it. Searching reviews online yielded one predominant theme: that Sense and Sensibilia is concerned with critiquing the "sense-datum" theory of positivists and phenomenalists, notably that of A J Ayer.

What I'm not seeing is what this has to do with nonduality. In seeing something as something, it would seem the whole dualistic conditioning of subjects seeing objects, of self and other, is involved.

I hadn't considered the 'transformative' power held by words like 'is' and 'as'. — Tom Storm

Seems to me that Frege sorted out the various uses of ...is... that were ambiguous in Aristotelian - or better - pre-modern - logic, but that this was missed by certain authors of the phenomenalist persuasion, and Wittgenstein did much the same for ...as...

That's not to say that ll such problems are solved, but that we now have more formal approaches that set out ways of using such terms that do not result in contradiction or ambiguity.

But again, I'm not at all sure what the topic is here.

What is your philosophical response to this take on propositional logic?

Wittgenstein tried to show how we end up in confusion by trying to pretend that ‘S is P’ makes any sense outside of a specific context of wider motivated engagement with others. This wider relevance is not peripheral to , or separable from, S is P, but inextricable to its very sense. It is what, on any occasion, we are really on about when we say ‘snow is white’. What the logical proposition does is equivalent to the way an empirical statement of fact in a natural science seems to make our affective involvement with the meaning that is being presented either non-existent, or utterly inconsequential to and separable from the apprehension of the facts. — Joshs

I think I need these ideas restated in plain language.

My understanding of the parable is probably different than yours.

Before studying Zen, mountains are thought to be mountains and waters are thought to be waters. this is the state of mind that thinks of mountains and waters as everyday determinate entities or phenomena.

After some study mountains are no longer thought to be mountains and waters no longer thought to be waters. This is the state of mind that thinks something more "absolute" can be seen and said about mountains and waters than that they are simply mountains and waters.

After enlightenment mountains and waters are again understood to be just mountains and waters. This is the state of mind that realizes all phenomena are empty of any determinate nature, and that nothing propositional can be said about them at all beyond the conventional "mountains are mountains and waters are waters", even though the seeing is infinitely enhanced.

It's the infinite enhancement which cannot be adequately spoken. Relating this to aesthetics; it's the impossibility of saying what beauty is.

What is your philosophical response to this take on propositional logic? — Tom Storm

You winding me up? :wink:

SO, flame on. I can't make sense of the quote. By way of example, I don't recognise "Wittgenstein tried to show how we end up in confusion by trying to pretend that ‘S is P’ makes any sense outside of a specific context of wider motivated engagement with others" from anything in Witi; I'm not even able to say if it is from the earlier or the latter...

And that's because here, and elsewhere over the last few pages, folk have been using cognates of "S is F" without explaining what they are talking about. Is it that S=F (they are equal)? Or S ≡ F (they are materially equivalent)? Or just F(S) (predicating F to S)? or S∈F (S is an element of the set or class S), or none of these, or some combination, or something else?

This is the stuff I said above was clarified in more recent logic. When, as happened earlier in this thread, folk who use such ambiguity complain that logic is somehow useless, I glaze over. It looks like an apology for their failure to learn a bit of basic logic.

Of course, I might be wrong, and there might be something profound and useful being said here, but until it is clarified, frankly, to my eye the last few pages are rambling diatribe rather than philosophy.

You asked.


(Edit: and this is why analytic philosophy is more useful than... other stuff. )

Looks pretty right to me.

No, that's good and thanks. I'm trying to find my way around here with no formal background in the subject.

I guess it is a post-modern position with an anti-foundational basis.

:cool:

What I'm not seeing is what this has to do with nonduality. In seeing something as something, it would seem the whole dualistic conditioning of subjects seeing objects, of self and other, is involved. — Janus

I think that's a point under contention :D

As @Banno put it, the subject is a Cartesian hangover which is better gotten rid of. (or, metaphysically, between mental-stuff and physical-stuff) (EDIT: At least, ala this notion that analytic philosophy is anti-dualistic. I still think on it because I think the subject has a way of creeping back up even if dissolved)

The sense-datum theory, as I understand it, is one which is still structured around the subject. A subject doesn't see mountains as mountains (except naively), rather a subject interprets the basics of experience (the sense-datum) which it has learned to call a mountain.

Dissolve the subject, though, and there's not really a place for sense-datum. Or, vice versa, dissolve sense-datum (or the raw experience, or experience as it is, or a film of subjectivity), then what is left of a subject with respect to perception? (since that was the focus of the book)

I mean, it's been a minute since I've read that too, it was just an example that comes to mind of analytic philosophers eschewing dualism, especially of the subject-object variety.

Language is constructed by recursively applying a finite number of rules to a finite vocabulary. — Banno

There might be our difference.

How language is constructed is unknown. The rules come after the fact as explanations for our usage, but even those rules are broken over time -- and whether it's a diversion or an invention I'd posit is more a historical story than a scientific one. Just meaning I'm uncertain that there's a strict functional relationship between some finite set of rules and a vocabulary. Not that we don't follow such rules, we do -- but we also invent things too. Even on the spot. Most vocabulary that's recorded "drifts up" from vernacular, where people invent terms on the spot on the regular.

Yet:

Language consists of units - words and phrases and phonemes and letters- that are re-usable and can be put into novel structures that are nevertheless meaningful. — Banno

That's true.