Language enables, and language is social -- but not institutional. Not even as a status-function derived from we-intentions. — Moliere
What is a prediction for you? Is it the relation between an S and a P?
— Joshs
You are asking what is the "...is..." in S is P?
It isn't anything; certainly not a relation.
Let's not reify syntax. — Banno
It has to be something. — Joshs
It has a use? What does it do? It doesn't even occur in certain other languages, where the concatenation of a predicate and a noun will suffice. It does Fa in standard logical parlance.It carries a meaning, — Joshs
"...how to..."? It's a set of instructions?It tells us how to bind or separate them. — Joshs
That is , its use points to a category that can be symbolized. — Joshs
It doesn't even occur in certain other languages, where the concatenation of a predicate and a noun will suffice — Banno
It has a use? What does it do? It doesn't even occur in certain other languages, where the concatenation of a predicate and a noun will suffice. It does Fa in standard logical parlance.
It tells us how to bind or separate them.
— Joshs
"...how to..."? It's a set of instructions? — Banno
Better, use is creating a category — Banno
That certain noises or marks count as utterances, while others do not, shows that language is institutional. — Banno
Far as Searle's account is from Marx, they do agree in that the social is not reducible to the mental. In Searle's analysis we-intent is not reducible to I-intent.
And I think he is correct here.
↪Joshs "Snow is white" is just a noun and a predicate... f(a). The "is" does nothing. — Banno
If it is in a sentence, it plays a semantic role in that sentence — Joshs
No response to the rest of my post? — Joshs
...but it wasn't the institution that made the utterance, but the other way around. — Moliere
I'm not sure I'm following how Searle escapes the charge of reducing the social to the mental. — Moliere
Just looking at linguistic institutions, it seems to me that all linguistic institutions do the opposite of making certain marks count as utterances. They categorize what happened to work before, but it wasn't the institution that made the utterance, but the other way around. Language pre-dates institutions, after all. — Moliere
Again, there are languages in which it doesn't occur; it is not needed in first order logic; and supposing that it is a relation leads immediately to Bradley's regress. That is, you are suggesting that "fa" is an incomplete analysis of predication, that we must represent as well the relation between f and a. — Banno
As I explained, it's to stop "Snow White" from being confused with "snow is white".My point was that whenever the ‘is’ makes its appearance in a sentence it does so for a reason. — Joshs
Hmmm. I read Searle as claiming that the difference between a grunt and an utterance is exactly that the utterance makes use of an institution... it counts as a warning or an admonition or some such. It has a normative role. — Banno
There are many different theories, but as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution. — Dawnstorm
Well, I'm not sure what "mental" entails. Do we agree that social intent is not private? "mental" stuff tends to be regarded as private. I would like to avoid seeing, say, buying a pizza as a mental activity. — Banno
Language itself is an institution (at least in sociology). I'm not sure I remember how Marx used the word, but I doubt modern Marxist sociologist would find the idea that language is an institution surprising. There are many different theories, but as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution. When you speak of linguistic institutions above do you mean stuff like dictionaries, linguistics, crossword puzzles...? Or the organisations that make them? — Dawnstorm
Yeah, the utterance makes the institution: without the utterance, no language. But, generally, people draw on their expectations of the institution to make those utterances. Chicken-egg situation, at that point. — Dawnstorm
My point was that whenever the ‘is’ makes its appearance in a sentence it does so for a reason.
— Joshs
As I explained, it's to stop "Snow White" from being confused with "snow is white". — Banno
You might have caught my subtle hint that you seem to be running up against Bradley's regress. I gather you don't agree. — Banno
I don’t think you mean to say that this is the only function of the word ‘is’ — Joshs
I don’t think Bradley’s regress has any relevance to my argument. — Joshs
That is, you are suggesting that "fa" is an incomplete analysis of predication, that we must represent as well the relation between f and a... and that the "is" is needed to explicate something in addition to "fa". So instead of analysing the first-order predicate as "fa" you say we must write "a is f". But now you have two more relations, that between "a" and "is f" and that between "a is" and "f"... and off you go. — Banno
, you are suggesting that "fa" is an incomplete analysis of predication, that we must represent as well the relation between f and a... and that the "is" is needed to explicate something in addition to "fa". — Banno
I don;t have any strong opinion here. I suppose that if alienation is not compatible with the broader notion of institutions, we could re-think alienation. But it's not clear to me that this is needed. — Banno
as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution. — Dawnstorm
the difference between a grunt and an utterance is exactly that the utterance makes use of an institution... it counts as a warning or an admonition or some such. It has a normative role. — Banno
↪Joshs
All that seems overly complicated. Putting it more directly, seem to me that "snow is white" is about two things, snow and white; but you insist that it is about three things: snow, white and being — Banno
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