agree. Objects such as lecterns cannot exist in the world independently of their properties, as objects in the world are no more than the set of their properties. — RussellA
And, Kripke supposes, this goes for any equivalence between heat and the motion of molecules. If "heat" is a rigid designator for that sensation, and "the motion of molecules" is a rigid designator for molecules in motion, then if heat is the motion of molecules, it is necessarily so. — Banno
So, it would seem, if an example like this is correct -- and this is what advocates of essentialism have held -- that this lectern could not have been made of ice, that is in any counterfactual situation of which we would say that this lectern existed at all, we would have to say also that it was not made from water from the Thames frozen into ice. Some have rejected, of course, any such notion of essential property as meaningless. usually, it is because (and I think this is what Quine, for example, would say) they have held that it depends on the notion of identity across possible worlds, and that this is itself meaningless. Since I have rejected this view already, I will not deal with it again
one can use the phrase "possible world", as long as one takes it metaphorically. — RussellA
if all the properties of the lectern were removed, would this lectern remain — RussellA
Especially at the beginning it goes along with his other examples where he doesn't assert the truth as much as suppose the propositions are true in order to demonstrate necessary identity across possible worlds, since possible worlds are just counter-factual circumstances that are plausible (hence why, in the circumstances which Kripke was talking, the wooden lectern was necessarily not-ice, and since it was not-ice, it was necessarily not made of the Thames from the beginning of time) — Moliere
the object picked out in both the actual and the possible circumstance are necessarily the same individual, whatever the truth of the statements made. — Moliere
I know The Red Sox will win their next game, I know The Eiffel Tower is in Paris and I know that I am looking at the colour red. The word "know" is being metaphorically, in that it has degrees of certainty, because language is inherently metaphorical — RussellA
Beginning with this lectern, this lectern is made of wood. If it had not been made of wood it would have been a different object, so this lectern is necessarily made of wood. This sounds reasonable. — RussellA
This raises the question as to whether objects such as this lectern exist over and above their properties, in that if all the properties of the lectern were removed, would this lectern remain. — RussellA
Time is a thief" is a metaphor in that time is not the same as a thief. "Object A is object B" is a metaphor in that object A may be similar to object B, but object A can never be the same as object B. — RussellA
So "heat is the motion of molecules" fits the form, and thereby are objects in terms of the logic. — Moliere
Just out of curiosity, how could we account for radiant heat with this type of definition? Radiant heat is a real form of heat which we feel. Yet in that case, heat moves from object A to object B without the medium of molecules in between. So how would that heat get from A to B without moving through molecules in between? — Metaphysician Undercover
I think we again are not in disagreement.
The wooden lectern is ipso facto necessarily wooden, yet that is understood only empirically. Unfortunately it's an example that is prone to misunderstanding, as in various posts in this thread. — Banno
This is perhaps the key concept, and the article is an articulation of how we can use this approach to talk consistently about counterfactuals. At the time of writing, under the influence of Quine, counterfactuals were generally thought senseless. After this article, and Kripke's other work, they became an important part of the analytic toolkit. — Banno
I'll say again, perhaps more explicitly, that I do not think the examples of heat and pain work to Kripke's advantage. This because heat and pain are not treated well when treated as objects. But while rejecting these last few arguments I am in agreement with much of the remainder of the article.
You only have this issue if you do not distinguish between the subject and the predicate, or object and property. — Metaphysician Undercover
I've suggested several times that possible worlds are a convenient way of dealing with counterfactuals. If you wish to call them a metaphor, go ahead. — Banno
The salient piece for proponents of descriptions is that a proper name does not refer by making use of some description. — Banno
I agree the notion of removing all of an objects properties is problematic. I don't think that is mentioned anywhere in the article - is it? — Banno
I'd also draw your attention to the difference between picking out an individual using a name and picking it out using a demonstrative. — Banno
I proposed that if in this actual world, — RussellA
as soon as the word 'if' appears, you are talking about a possible world, but then you doubly return us to 'this' and 'actual' world. But this actual world is necessarily the way it is, and not the way it would be if anything was different. — unenlightened
If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world. — RussellA
Kripke wrote page 174: "All of this talk seems to me to have taken the metaphor of possible worlds much too seriously in some way." — RussellA
doesn't Descriptivism make use of descriptions ? — RussellA
A name is a rigid designator by virtue of having certain essential properties, — RussellA
In other words, if P is the statement that the lectern is not made of ice, one knows by a priori philosophical analysis, some conditional of the form "if P, then necessarily P". — p.180
Now Kripke shows that proper names do not rely on descriptions. But that need not apply to demonstratives. — Banno
If you have a genuine criticism, set it out. — Banno
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