What degree of certainty do we have about the immediate outcome of taking the red pill and forgoing simulated happiness? I feel like the red pill offers an absolute unknown. What if the truth is really horrible/regrettable, like one is forced into a condition where whatever constitutes this new found "truth" of another world is next to useless.

Depends what you mean by rational. If rational means a process of attaining true knowledge then the red pill would be rational. An analog would be antipsychotic medication, or the scientific method. If rational is the classical economic type where you act according to your best self interest then maybe the blue pill would be rational. If rational is following the rules of established order as in legal rational then the blue pill would be rational. There are more rationalisms than that.

Surely there is only one way to be rational - one is rational to the extent that one does what one has overall reason to do. (The word 'reason' in 'overall reason' here denotes a normative reason).

So, the question is whether taking the blue pill - that is, whether opting to live in a fantasy - is something we have overall reason to do if, that is, doing it would mean that we get what we want (or, and this would need clarifying, if we would be maximally happy).

P.s This isn't a question whether the choice is right or wrong. I want to see if anyone can make the case that the red pill is the rational choice, and explore the implications of it in real life. — TheMadMan

It includes matters of right and wrong, for if doing x is wrong, then we have overall reason not to do it, and thus doing it would be irrational.

But anyway, there's an ambiguity in your description of what the blue pill does. Does taking it make one experience a life containing the maximum quantity of happiness, or does taking it mean that one will have one's preferences met?

These are not the same. For meeting some of my preferences may make me unhappy, and I may also not wish to be maximally happy.

Note too, that I typically prefer actually to be doing the things I want to do, not merely to have the experience 'as if' I am doing them. So, for example, if I want to be a famous painter, then that preference will not be met unless I actually become one. If taking the pill will merely result in me having a virtual experience of being a famous painter, then my preference has not been met (I will just not realize that it has not been met).

So, I think the question is really whether it is sometimes more rational to live in a fantasy world than the real one. And yes, I think that can often be more rational.

For the most part it is more efficient, in terms of securing happiness for yourself, to imagine you are doing things rather than actually to do them. Let's say that you quite like the idea of being president. Well, just imagine you are for a bit - engage in the fantasy. That won't be quite as good as the real thing - not unless you're incredibly good at imagining things - but it'll be a hell of a lot easier than actually going to the trouble of becoming the president. Imagining things is really easy and can often give one as much happiness, or near enough, as doing the real thing, but without the hassle of actually doing it.

But there are some things where it seems better to seek the real thing than simply to fantasize that you have it already, even when other things are equal. For example, to be in a real loving relationship is surely better than simply imagining you are, even if there is no experiential difference between the two.

That might be one of the many definitions of rational, but having a reason (cause) is not necessarily having reason (logic). Rational is irreducible to having a reason.

Imagine you are in a loving relationship with Marjory. You are offered the following choice. You can take a blue pill that will give you the experience of continuing your loving relationship with Marjory happily for the rest of your life (but because the pill will render you unconscious for the rest of your life, your actual relationship with Marjory will come to an end. Alternatively, you can not take the pill and just continue your relationship with Marjory - a relationship that may, in reality, come to an end, or it may not. Well, it seems clear in this case that you ought not to take the pill - and that goes for both of you - even though, experientially, this is more hazardous than taking it.

That might be one of the many definitions of rational, but having a reason (cause) is not necessarily having reason (logic). — introbert

You're confusing normative reasons with causal reasons. When it comes to 'being rational' we're talking about what it is rational 'to do'. That is, which actions are the rational ones. Reasons for action are known as 'normative reasons'. So the question of what is rational is one that concerns what we have normative reason to do, not what is the cause of what. Now, it cannot - as a conceptual matter - be rational to do something that you have overall normative reason not to do.

If all rationality is reducible to normative reason then how is it possible that I have demonstrated opposing outcomes in differing forms of rationality?

It's not reducible to normative reason, rather 'being rational' is 'being responsive to normative reasons'. And so being rational - perfectly rational, that is - would involve always doing what one has overall reason to do (a reason-to-do something is what a normative reason is).

If I understand you correctly, you are asking how this can be if there can be two or more equally rational actions.

How is that inconsistent with what I have said, though? The claim that being rational involves doing what one has overall reason to do is entirely consistent with there being many occasions where one has as much reason to do one thing as another. It is just no more rational to do one than the other, when that's the case.

Should I have peas or carrots? Well, I have as much reason to go for one option as the other. So I am not irrational whichever I do.

The contention is not about two or more equally rational actions, but when one is rational and the other is irrational as in the topical question.

Yes, but YOU just asked how what I said about what rationality involves was consistent with it sometimes being the case that two actions can be equally rational, yes? So I answered you. Jeez, do pay attention.

Now, there is one form of rationality: doing what one has overall reason to do. Okay?

And the question is whether we have overall reason to take the blue pill, if the blue pill does x.

Rationality can transcend normative reason. That is one of the ways 'red pill' has been interpreted, as one notorious online forum uses the term to describe non-normative or politically incorrect viewpoints on conventionally understood subjects. That's not the best example, but a better example would be Galileo red-pilling Catholics on science. That's a rational red-pill, but there is also a rational blue-pill of "when in Rome...". Irreducible to normative reason.

Rationality can transcend normative reason. — introbert

No. It. Can't. I don't think you know what the words you are using mean.

Do you accept that rationality concerns action? That is, it is only actions - whether the act of doing something or believing something - that can be rational? Or do you think, say, that sunsets can be rational and that bits of cheese can be?

If normative reason is "when in Rome do as the Romans do" and that is rational then being deemed a heretic for espousing science in a catholic country can't be. But science is more rational than religion.

Why can't you people answer questions?

Do you accept that 'rationality' concerns 'action'? That is, that only actions - construed broadly so that we include the 'act' of believing a thing - can be rational?

Or are you going to put it beyond doubt that you really don't know what the words you are using mean and you're just cobbling them together in ways that you hope will constitute something profound?

reason to act is not in itself rational. Rational is a quality of certain reasons to act. Conventionally that is logic. But even logic is not the end of the story. There are certain ways of acting rationally using nonrational methods such as intuiting the local customs of a strange place without justification.

Once more, try and answer the question. Stop saying stuff that you hope makes sense. Answer the well formed question I asked you.

Rationality concerns action? Possibly. It's a standard dichotomy to separate thought and action. I could argue the dichotomy, but I'll give you that. Then?

No, not possibly. It's a conceptual truth.

Acts and beliefs - and only acts and beliefs (and note, to-believe something is to be doing something - so 'believing' is a kind of action) - can be rational.

Note too that in the OP the questioner is askng whether it is 'rational' for us to do something, namely take a blue pill or a red pill.

Rationality is a feature of actions.

Only agents can perform actions.

And it essentially requires reason-responsiveness. That is, to qualify as an agent you need to be reason-responsive.

Why?

Because if you behave without your behaviour being a product of a reason-responsive process, then that's just behaviour and not 'action'.

See?

Actions and only actions are rational or irrational.

To behave 'rationally' is to behave in ways that you have overall normative reason to behave in.

A 'normative reason' is another name for a 'reason-to-do something'. That is, it's another name for a 'reason-for-action'.

Now, to get back to topic: the question is whether it is rational to take the blue pill. Another way to express the same question would be "do we have overall normative reason to take the blue pill?"

And the answer, unsurprisingly, is that 'it depends'. It depends for one thing on what exactly the blue pill does.

No, I don't see. You have your own ideas about it, but they seem to be mostly semantic traps rather than philosophy.

Back on topic, is taking the blue pill rational? I would say the blue pill is not rational, but it is possibly utilitarian. If the blue pill pays homage to Platonist and Cartesian traditions then it is not in the spirit of rationality to take it. The common spirit of rationality in these cases is to overcome illusions.

No, I don't see. You have your own ideas about it, but they seem to be mostly semantic traps rather than philosophy. — introbert

No, they're called conceptual truths. It's a conceptual truth that 'rationality' is only something an agent can exhibit.

Look, you don't really know what the words you're using mean, yes? For example:

reason to act is not in itself rational — introbert

That's incoherent. So's this:

Rationality can transcend normative reason. — introbert

It's just a combination of words that you think sounds impressive, but actually makes no sense.

There's no such thing as 'normative reason'. There are normative reasons. You can have a normative reason to do something. But there can't just be 'normative reason' simpliciter.

Now, no such incoherence attends anything I am saying. That's because I know what I'm talking about.

Normative reasons are reasons-to-do things. That is, they are one and the same. A 'normative reason' is just fancy for 'a reason to do something'.

Only an agent can be rational. If you think that things that are not agents can be rational, then you're a crazy person. That is, if you think that 'the sun' can be rational, or that the colour green can be, then you're nuts. Yes? Can you see that it makes no sense to ask "is that sunset rational or not?"?

Take it from someone who knows: only agents and their actions can be rational.

An action is 'rational' when it is an action that the agent has reason-to-do. That is, to get technical, when they have a normative reason to do it.

And an action is fully rational when it is an action that the agent has overall reason-to-do (for there are different sorts of reason-to-do things and they can compete).

Something is not incoherent because it is missing a single letter.

Back on topic, is taking the blue pill rational? I would say the blue pill is not rational, but it is possibly utilitarian. If the blue pill pays homage to Platonist and Cartesian traditions then it is not in the spirit of rationality to take it. The common spirit of rationality in these cases is to overcome illusions. — introbert

How can you get back on topic when you don't even know what the topic is? You don't know what you mean by ratonality, do you? And now you're at it again - you're throwing in big words in the hope that you're saying something meaningful. You're not.

"the blue pill is not rational, but it is possibly utilitarian". What does that mean? What are you on about? It's gibberish. Do you know what utilitarianism is? No, clearly. (It's a view about what it is rational to do! And it is not the blue pill that is rational, but the act of taking it. So it's just nonsense.

And we are not on a date so stop throwing in 'Platonist' and 'Cartesian' to sound clever. I know you haven't a clue what they mean. Say what you mean.

Something is not incoherent because it is missing a single letter. — introbert

What you were saying was incoherent. It was not missing a single letter. For you didn't intend to say "a normative reason' and accidentally left off the 'a'. No, you didn't have a clue what you meant to say and so just stuck some words together. You didn't leave off the a. You had no idea it needed to be there for the sentence to make any sense at all. Correct?

Most people on the forum would agree that you talk nonsense,

Most people on the forum would agree that you talk nonsense, — introbert

Yes, and who are they?

If 10 of your dumb friends think that the mole on your arm is nothing to worry about, but one medical doctor thinks it looks suspect and you should get it checked out, are you a total idiot if you a) think the judgement of your friends trumps the judgement of the doctor or b) think the judgement of the doctor trumps your friends?

Now, you and I both know that you don't know what you're talking about. None of your sentences make sense. Nothing you say is getting by.

Distinguish for me the different meanings the word 'reason' can have. Let's see what you know.

I don't really care to talk to you, you're not a civilized person.

To behave 'rationally' is to behave in ways that you have overall normative reason to behave in. — Bartricks

I don't really care to talk to you, you're not a civilized person. — introbert

No, it is because I keep calling you on your nonsense.

This:

If normative reason is "when in Rome do as the Romans do" and that is rational then being deemed a heretic for espousing science in a catholic country can't be. But science is more rational than religion. — introbert

doesn't begin to make sense.

And note that we once more have 'normative reason' and not 'a normative reason' (not that the addition of the 'a' would make the sentence any more coherent). So again, it isn't the case that you left off the a, rather you did not know that it needed it at all.

I think people should be called on their nonsense, don't you? At least in a philosophy forum they should. I mean, that's part of the point of philosophy. Anyone can just string big words together

Why did you quote me without comment? Are you suggesting that the sentence you quoted -

To behave 'rationally' is to behave in ways that you have overall normative reason to behave in — Bartricks

- makes no sense?

Show your working. Explain why you think it makes no sense. Shall we go through it word by word?