And I’m not eccentric. I got the proper stamped, signed, coffee-stained release papers to prove it.

Heat doesn't radiate. Heat is the transfer of thermal energy between two bodies.

There are three modes of heat transfer, conduction, convection and radiation. — RussellA

Interesting exchange between you and Banno.

Pardon the quibble/pedantry. The above looks suspiciously like an equivocation fallacy. A substitution exercise shows it nicely.

If heat is the transfer of thermal energy, and we're using the term "heat" consistently, then in each and every instance where we use "heat", we ought be able to substitute that term with "the transfer of thermal energy", and retain all sensibility. However, we cannot successfully perform this exercise with the last statement in the above quote, for doing so results in the following...

There are three modes of the transfer of thermal energy transfer...

So, something is off. Could be just the use of "heat transfer". Is it just as sensible to say that there are three modes of heat, conduction, convection, and radiation. Or perhaps, that there are three modes of thermal energy transfer, conduction, convection, and radiation?

If heat is the transfer of thermal energy, and we're using the term "heat" consistently, then in each and every instance where we use "heat", we ought be able to substitute that term with "the transfer of thermal energy", and retain all sensibility. — creativesoul

Could I be thrown off a philosophy forum for talking about the scientific nature of heat
In order to avoid being thrown off the thread for talking about the nature of heat, my reason is as follows:

Kripke concludes: "To state finally what I think, as opposed to what seems to be the case, or what others think, I think that in both cases, the case of names and the case of the theoretical identifications, the identity statements are necessary and not contingent."

One of the main planks of Kripke's justification is that “Heat is the motion of molecules will be necessary, not contingent, and one only has the illusion of contingency"

Thermal energy is due to the motion of molecules. Therefore, one of Kripke's main justifications for a posteriori necessity is his belief that heat is thermal energy.

If heat is, in fact, not thermal energy, one of Kripke's main planks disappears. This casts doubt on the other planks in his argument, which in turn casts doubt on his conclusion regarding a posteriori necessity.

The word "transfer" is being used as a metaphor
The statement "The amount of heat gained or lost by a sample (q) can be calculated using the equation q = mcΔT, where m is the mass of the sample, c is the specific heat, and ΔT is the temperature change" is being used metaphorically rather than literally. Heat is a measure of the change in energy of a body. As a thermodynamic system does not contain heat, a body cannot gain or lose heat.

Britannica writes: "heat, energy that is transferred from one body to another as the result of a difference in temperature" Again, the word "transfer" is a metaphor. Heat has not literally been transferred from one body to the other.

Language is fundamentally metaphoric
Language, both in daily and scientific use is fundamentally metaphoric. Language as we know it couldn't exist without metaphor.

When you say "The above looks suspiciously like an equivocation fallacy", "A substitution exercise shows it nicely", "If heat is the transfer of thermal energy", "perform this exercise", and "something is off" you are using language metaphorically.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By argue that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action.

Andrew May in his article Metaphors in Science writes: "What is a scientific theory if not a grand metaphor for the real world it aims to describe? Theories are generally formulated in mathematical terms, and it is difficult to see how it could be argued that, for example, F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense. Scientific metaphors possess uniquely powerful descriptive and predictive potential, but they are metaphors nonetheless."

The word "transfer" is being used as a metaphor. Language would not exist as we know it without the use of metaphor. The use of metaphors is unavoidable in language, and we have to depend on context to tell us whether a word is being used metaphorically or not.

Don't you think it's the word "heat" which is the most metaphorical here? Afterall, you say heat is not in a body, nor is it actually transferred between bodies. It's simply an outdated term which no longer has any use in modern science because it does not jive with the way we understand the world by scientific principles. Yet it maintains descriptive power by way of metaphor, so it is still used. It's sort of like "the sun rises and sets". We know that "sunrise" is just a metaphor, and there is really a more complex scientific explanation as to what is really going on, but "sunrise" maintains its descriptive power through metaphor, regardless of the facts.

We can say that there are numerous possible ways to describe the very same thing. But as soon as we say that one of these ways is the correct way, or true way, we deny the status of "possible way" to the others, because they are now designated as incorrect ways. Then if used, they are metaphor. But if we adhere strictly to relativity theory, there can be no correct or true way, no literal truth, and all of the possible descriptions are metaphor.

"Heat" is really meaningless then, because if it referred to the activity of heating or cooling, it would necessarily be in the body, in order that the body could heat up or cool down. Or is "heat" just metaphor to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

If heat is not energy, this throws a spanner in the works in Kripke's argument for a posteriori necessity.

"Heat" has meaning as a measurement.

Heat is a measurement of the change in energy of a body. Heat is not a substance. A thermodynamic system does not contain heat.

Consider two bodies, one 1,000 kJ hotter than the other. Consider two bodies, one 80 metres taller than the other.

In what sense do measurements exist. In what sense does "1,000 kJ hotter" exist. In what sense does "80 metres taller" exist.

If The Empire States Building is 80m taller than The Eiffel Tower, where does "being 80m taller" exist. Does it exist in the world independently of any object, or does it exist in the mind of an observer.

If body A is 1,000 kJ hotter than body B, where does "being 1,000kJ hotter" exist. Does it exist in the world independently of any object, or does it exist in the mind of an observer.

It can only exist in the mind of the observer as a second-order concept, as Frege and Russell argued.

If heat is the measurement "being 1,000 kJ hotter", where does "being 1,000 kJ hotter" exist. Where does heat exist?

That's the problem with monism. It has no proper ontological principles to separate what's within the mind from what's independent of the mind. So we have Banno insisting "the actual world is a possible world". And the ensuing sophistry of "the alternative would be to claim that the actual world is impossible".

Don't you think it's the word "heat" which is the most metaphorical here...Yet it maintains descriptive power by way of metaphor, so it is still used. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is a concept that exists in the mind and not the world, such as pleasure, pain, government, democracy. But as a concept, it does have great descriptive power, even if what it is describing doesn't literally exist in the world.

And I’m not eccentric. — Mww

It was a compliment.

The word "transfer" is being used as a metaphor — RussellA

No it isn't. The heat moves from one body to the other, in a process that can be described with mathematical predictability. Nothing metaphorical about it.

While we are there, any account of language as metaphorical is problematic. Metaphor is defined negatively, using a word or phrase to describe something to which it is not literally applicable. Hence in order to make use of a word metaphorically, it must already have a literal use. "Life is a highway" works because life isn't a highway, and it only works because we know what a highway is.

Hence any attempt to explain meaning in terms of metaphor begs the question.

Davidson on Metaphor.

Metaphors work by re-framing. They are verbal duck-rabbits.

The heat moves from one body to the other, in a process that can be described with mathematical predictability. — Banno

Using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described. That's why Thales could predict the solar eclipse without knowing the proper orbits. And it's also why quantum physicists can make accurate predictions without knowing what's going on.

Using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described. — Metaphysician Undercover

That made me laugh.

You've a very odd view on things, Meta. A mathematical model that makes accurate predictions is not for you a description. Fine.

You've a very odd view on things, Meta. A mathematical model that makes accurate predictions is not for you a description. — Banno

Very obviously not, for the reasons I gave. Simply put, to count something is not to describe it. And no description is required for a count because the basic count is nothing but order. That's why there is a difference between quantity and quality.

Simply put, to count something is not to describe it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, it is. This sentence contains five words. Counting can be describing.

Sure, counting can be describing, and mathematics can be used to describe things. But counting, and mathematical predictions are not necessarily descriptions. That's where the problem lies, and why I said "using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described".

This is the fallibility of essentialism. Essential features facilitate deductive conclusions, so we assume essences as necessary features, to facilitate logic. When the essences are eternal Platonic ideas, mistake is impossible. But if the named essential features are just the product of human judgement then they may not be true essential features, (like description, a posteriori, is not a true essential feature of mathematics, a priori), so the premise is unsound and the logic misleads.

So, back to the example. Heat diminishes in one body, and increases in another. Mathematical models can accurately predict this. But the process which you referred to as heat moving from one body to another, has not necessarily been described. The success of the mathematics doesn't provide you with the premise to even say that heat has moved from one to the other, as this in itself is a description which is unsupported. The mathematics shows coincident loss and gain of heat which is predictable.

Sure, counting can be describing, and mathematics can be used to describe things. But counting, and mathematical predictions are not necessarily descriptions. That's where the problem lies, and why I said "using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described". — Metaphysician Undercover

Just this first paragraph is hopelessly confused. It seems to say that describing things is not to describe them...

Might try leaving it there, again.

One of the main planks of Kripke's justification is that “Heat is the motion of molecules will be necessary, not contingent, and one only has the illusion of contingency" — RussellA

I wouldn't read it that way. Rather, Kripke has already made his case and is applying his account to heat. I think we can drop the heat argument without much impact on Kripke's approach to modality.

He is not trying to justify his account of possible world semantics by appeal to heat.

Right! I think he's more replying to the mind-brain identity theorists there. And, since it's a talk, it's more of a comment to a way of thinking that notes how his approach poses problems for that very particular philosophical theory.

Yep. Unlike the lectern, he carries the heat example into his book. He adds the example of lightening, supposing that there might have been some other phenomena, looking much the same as lightning, but without an electrical discharge. (p.132, Naming and Necessity).

Similarly for many other such identifications, say, that lightning is electricity. Flashes of lightning are flashes of electricity. Lightning is an electrical discharge. We can imagine, of course, I suppose, other ways in which the sky might be illuminated at night with the same sort of flash without any electrical discharge being present. Here too, I am inclined to say, when we imagine this, we imagine something with all the visual appearances of lightning but which is not, in fact, lightning. One could be told: this appeared to be lightning but it was not. I suppose this might even happen now. Someone might, by a clever sort of apparatus, produce some pheno­menon in the sky which would fool people into thinking that there was lightning even though in fact no lightning was present. And you wouldn't say that that phenomenon, because it looks like lightning, was in fact lightning. It was a different phenomenon from lightning, which is the phenomenon of an electrical discharge; and this is not lightning but just some­ thing that deceives us into thinking that there is lightning. — Naming and Necessity

His point is that once it is confirmed that lightening is a discharge of electricity, in any possible world with such a phenomena, if it does not have an associated discharge of electricity, it is not lightning but some other phenomena. That is, lightning is necessarily a discharge of electricity.

This example is an improvement, I think, because it does not rely in sensations.

Just this first paragraph is hopelessly confused. It seems to say that describing things is not to describe them... — Banno

Of course it seems like that to you, because you think that describing is an essential aspect of using mathematics. One cannot use mathematics without using it descriptively. So when I say that using mathematics is not necessarily descriptive, it appears to you like "describing things is not to describe them".

As I explained, that's where your essentialist attitude (the use of mathematics is descriptive in any possible world) misleads you. The essential property must be proven as such, and induction is fundamentally fallible.

I wouldn't read it that way. Rather, Kripke has already made his case and is applying his account to heat. I think we can drop the heat argument without much impact on Kripke's approach to modality. He is not trying to justify his account of possible world semantics by appeal to heat. — Banno

Yes, Kripke first makes his case that if an identity statement is true, then the identity statement is necessary, and only later introduces the examples of names, heat and my pain.

But isn't his argument circular, in that if the identity statement "the Moon is made of blue cheese " is true, then he is arguing that the moon is necessarily made of blue cheese. Similarly, if the identity statement "the Moon is not made of blue cheese" is true, then the Moon is necessarily not made of blue cheese.

Kripke wrote " Identity statements..........That is to say, they are necessary if true; of course, false identity statements are not necessary." (abstract)

The problem remains in how do we determine whether an identity statement is true or not. How do we determine that two rigid designators refer to the same thing.

Kripke's case is that true identity statements are necessary
Kripke wrote: "To state finally what I think, as opposed to what seems to be the case, or what others think, I think that in both cases, the case of names and the case of the theoretical identifications, the identity statements are necessary and not contingent". (page 171)

Kripke makes a general argument
"If names are rigid designators, then there can be no question about identities being necessary, because ‘a’ and ‘b’ will be rigid designators of a certain man or thing x. Then even in every possible world, a and will both refer to this same object x, and to no other, and so there will be no situation in which a might not have been b. That would have, to be a situation in which the object which we are also now calling ‘x’ would not have been identical with itself". (page 181)

Kripke gives an example using "this lectern"
"Here is a lectern......What are its essential properties............being made of wood, and not of ice, might be an essential property of this lectern...............could this very lectern have been made from the very beginning of its existence from ice.............If one had done so, one would have made, of course, a different object. It would not have been this very lectern........The conclusion ☐P is that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice, and this conclusion is known a posteriori, since one of the premises on which it is based is a posteriori" (page 180)

Later on, Kripke refers to names, heat and my pain.
1) "If names are rigid designators, then there can be no question about identities being necessary" (page 180)
2) "We use both the terms ‘heat’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ as rigid designators for a certain external phenomenon". (page 187)
3) "In fact, it would seem that both the terms, ‘my pain’ and ‘my being in such and such a brain state’ are, first of all, both rigid designators". (page 188)

It may well be that true identity statements are necessary. The problem remains in knowing whether the identity statement is true or not. How do we know in the first place that "Cicero is Tully", "heat is the motion of molecules" and "my pain is my being in such and such a brain state" ?

No it isn't. The heat moves from one body to the other, in a process that can be described with mathematical predictability. Nothing metaphorical about it. — Banno

Kripke said “Heat is the motion of molecules”, which is incorrect.

Heat is the energy transferred between objects due to a temperature difference between them. As you said, the amount of heat gained or lost by a sample (q) can be calculated using the equation q = mcΔT, where m is the mass of the sample, c is the specific heat, and ΔT is the temperature change. Heat is a measurement, it doesn't have an independent existence. An object does not possess heat, an object possesses internal energy.

If object A travelling at 5m/s hits a stationary object B, the speed of object A reduces to zero, and the speed of B increases to 5m/s. Something called "speed" has not literally moved from A to B. Speed is a measurement, not something that has an independent existence


If object A at 30deg C touches object B at 20deg C, the temperature of object A will reduce and the temperature of object B will increase. Something called "heat" has not literally moved from A to B. Heat is a measurement, not something that has an independent existence

The statement "The heat moves from one body to the other" is not incorrect as a figure of speech.

One cannot use mathematics without using it descriptively. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not a claim of mine.

But isn't his argument circular, in that if the identity statement "the Moon is made of blue cheese " is true, then he is arguing that the moon is necessarily made of blue cheese. Similarly, if the identity statement "the Moon is not made of blue cheese" is true, then the Moon is necessarily not made of blue cheese. — RussellA

I don't see a circularity in that. If P then Q, if ~P then ~Q.

How do we determine that two rigid designators refer to the same thing. — RussellA

Sure. But not sure what your point is here. I don't see how this is a problem specific to Kripke's account, if that is what you are thinking.

Also note that the lectern has other properties that are not necessary - Kripke points out it might have been in the other room.

Kripke said “Heat is the motion of molecules”, which is incorrect. — RussellA

I think this wrong, for reasons already given. I also think this quibbling is pointless. Have another read of my rejection of Kripke's argument at .

If object A travelling at 5m/s hits a stationary object B, the speed of object A reduces to zero, and the speed of B increases to 5m/s. Something called "speed" has not literally moved from A to B. Speed is a measurement, not something that has an independent existence — RussellA

This is a confused argument. Momentum would be conserved across the collision, and if it were frictionless and head-on, and B were stationary, the velocity would be literally transferred to B - think of a Newton's Cradle. The same point can be made using energy instead of momentum. Energy moves from one object to the other.

If P then Q, if ~P then ~Q. — Banno

'If there is smoke then there is fire'. 'If there is not smoke then there is not fire' does not seem to follow.

Perhaps you meant If P then Q, if ~Q then ~P .

does not seem to follow. — Janus

It wasn't meant to. it was showing that the structure is not circular.

It wasn't meant to. it was showing that the structure is not circular. — Banno

So, if it was valid it would be circular, otherwise not?

Sure. But not sure what your point is here. I don't see how this is a problem specific to Kripke's account, if that is what you are thinking. — Banno

How do we determine that two rigid designators refer to the same thing.

Kripke wrote: "To state the view succinctly: we use both the terms ‘heat’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ as rigid designators for a certain external phenomenon. Since heat is in fact the motion of molecules, and the designators are rigid, by the argument I have given here, it is going to be necessary that heat is the motion of molecules."

Therefore, as Kripke is saying that heat is a rigid designator, the motion of molecules is a rigid designator, and since "since heat is in fact the motion of molecules", the two rigid designators must be referring to the same thing.

As you wrote: "He provokes the difficult argument that it is necessary that heat is molecular kinetic energy, but contingent that we happen to feel this as the sensation we call heat."

When Kripke refers to "heat", is he referring to what is in the world as molecular kinetic energy, or is he referring to what is in the mind as the sensation of heat ?

As regards heat as the sensation of heat, Kripke writes:
1) "Martians, who do indeed get the very sensation that we call “the sensation of heat”"
2) "Then these creatures could be such that they were insensitive to heat; they did not feel it in the way we do; but on the other hand, they felt cold in much the same way that we feel heat."

As regards heat is the motion of molecules, Kripke writes
1) "First, imagine it inhabited by no creatures at all: then there is no one to feel any sensations of heat. But we would not say that under such circumstances it would necessarily be the case that heat did not exist; we would say that heat might have existed, for example, if there were fires that heated up the air."

If "heat" refers to the sensation of heat in the mind, then how can there be identity between something that exists in the mind and something that exists in the world, the motion of molecules.

If "heat" refers to the motion of molecules, there are two possibilities: i) heat is no more than the motion of molecules, heat is a synonym for the motion of molecules, and therefore "heat is the motion of molecules" is an analytic statement and known a priori, ii) heat exists over and above the motion of molecules, heat exists independently of the motion of molecules, and therefore heat would exist even if there were no molecules in motion, in which case heat could only be discovered a posteriori. As current scientific theory does not propose that heat exists independently of the motion of molecules, heat must be a synonym for the motion of molecules, a case of self-identity. As Kripke said "What properties, aside from trivial ones like self-identity"

Therefore, the statement "heat is the motion of molecules" is either an analytic statement known a priori or requires an understanding as to how there can be an identity between something in the mind and something in the world.

Kripke wrote: "To state the view succinctly: we use both the terms ‘heat’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ as rigid designators for a certain external phenomenon. Since heat is in fact the motion of molecules, and the designators are rigid, by the argument I have given here, it is going to be necessary that heat is the motion of molecules." — RussellA

Kripke's misuse of "necessary" is very well displayed at the point where he states "if the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice". By using the conditional "if...", possibility is implied. So necessity here, only follows from the fulfillment of that one possibility. This makes "necessary" contingent, which is a category mistake.

He employs this fallacy (category mistake) as a sophistic trick to bring "necessary" into the category of "contingent". Whether or not the table is made of ice is always a human judgement. And a human judgement is intrinsically fallible, therefore does not provide the conditions required for "necessary".

So propositions like "the table is made of ice", and "the table is not made of ice" can never express anything which is necessary, because those statement are contingent on that empirical judgement which is fallible. Kripke repositions the contingency of such a proposition, from the judgement to the conditional "if...then necessarily...", to create the illusion that the conditions of necessity may have been fulfilled. However, the proposition is conditional therefore the conditions have not been fulfilled, and "necessary" is just an illusion created by him.

Then Kripke proceeds to misuse "necessary", as in your example.

whether or not the table is made of ice is always a human judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, human judgement must come into it.

Suppose this lectern is made of wood and is in the lecture theatre

Kripke has made the judgement that being made of wood might be an essential property of this lectern, and being in a different room is a non-essential property. Someone else could have made the opposite judgement, that being made of wood is a non-essential property whilst which room this lectern is in is an essential property.

But keeping with Kripke's judgement that being made of wood might be essential property of this lectern..

Someone could say that there is a possible world where this lectern could have been made of plastic, which is highly likely. However, there can be many definitions of "possible worlds", but this is not what Kripke's means by "possible world". For Kripke, a "possible world" is a world in which this lectern keeps its essential properties.

Keeping with Kripke's understanding of "possible world" as a world where this lectern keeps its essential properties.

Therefore, this lectern, which is made of wood, has the essential property of being made of wood, meaning that in all possible worlds it is still made of wood. This lectern is necessarily made of wood in all possible worlds, because by definition, if this lectern is made of wood in the actual world it must also be made of wood in all possible worlds.

So, the statement "this lectern, which is made of wood in this actual world, must necessarily be made of wood in all possible worlds" is contingent first on Kripke's judgement that being made of wood might be an essential property of this lectern and second on Kripke's understanding of a possible world as one in which this lectern keeps its essential properties.