.. which is only a "problem" for philosophers and not for neuroscientists. — 180 Proof
a neuroscientist who believes that neuroscience is giving a representation of consciousness, such that the neurological activity being studied is equivalent (or something like that) to consciousness — Metaphysician Undercover
If that's what you mean, bert, I admitted that I don't. — 180 Proof
You seem quite adamant that the concept is there, but some are 'missing' it, yet you don't seem to be able to provide the necessity that would set it apart from, say, ether, or humours, or phlem...loads of concepts which we made use of at one time, but turned out just not to refer to anything at all. — Isaac
It's just a name for something we know exists, namely whatever it is in us by virtue of which we can have experiences. — bert1
unless you want to deny that we have experiences, which you might. — bert1
Do we know there's something by virtue of which we have experiences? Can't we just have them, does some additional factor need to 'allow' it? — Isaac
The hard problem has, as a foundational axiom, the notion that the things we talk about - experiences, awareness,... - ought to be causally connected to the objects of empirical sciences. — Isaac
We all know what each other is talking about to some extent in each case (enough to get by) but it doesn't require any of those objects to correlate with something empirical science might reify. — Isaac
If we define consciousness as a physical function, for example, the hard problem disappears. That's why definitions are absolutely crucial. — bert1
Yeah, which we can, of course. Hence my invoking the Glasgow coma scale earlier. We can (and do) use the term sometimes in a perfectly 'physical function' kind of way. There's no one thing 'consciousness' is. It's just a word. Like most words, it's used in all sorts of ways with all sorts of degrees of success. — Isaac
it is incoherent to doubt consciousness. Because doubting itself (arguably, I guess) entails consciousness. — bert1
My old tutor at university, Stephen Priest, once said to me "Some of my colleagues haven't noticed they are conscious." I didn't take him seriously at the time. I thought it was absurd, these guys were smart guys. But I'm reluctantly coming to the view that he was right. It seems like the only realistic explanation for what is happening. — bert1
Are you saying 180 proof and I lack awareness, or lack the concept of awareness, or what? And how do you know this? What basis do you have for your claim? — Banno
I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it. — frank
↪Tom Storm It reeks of the No True Scotsman fallacy. Only true Scotsmen will understand Bert.
↪bert1 has yet to provide us with anything like a definition of consciousness. But he says he is a panpsyhist, (↪bert1), so if he thinks rocks are conscious then it would be best for him not to provide such a definition. — Banno
I was just saying this same thing. Worldview comes into play in the assumptions people make about it.
— frank
Which renders the 'hard problem' meaningless. — Isaac
Remember that when gravity was first introduced into physics as a thing to be explained — frank
I've offered synonyms. That qualifies as a definition. — bert1
Equivalently:
- sentience
- the capacity to feel
- the capacity to know
- that in X whereby there is 'something it is like' to be X — bert1
Presumably sentience, knowledge and feeling are synonymous for rocks.Well, knowing and feeling and sentience are not each equivalent to the others.
— Banno
They can be equivalent, in this sense I'm trying to talk about. — bert1
What utter rubbish:I have invited you to be aware of your awareness, which you haven't yet done. — bert1
But I am aware of your post; so that's not right. — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.