That's an example of baggage from outside the discussion. — Banno

It's called 'reframing'. You should try it!

I think that this is an odd tactic. — Moliere

Just a rhetorical ploy.

Now 's thrown Mary into the cauldron as well.

I think I'll try to bow out of this thread. It might be worth starting a thread on the specifics of Charmers article, or on some of the other topics covered, but i can't see this thread achieving anything.

I think there are important differences between Chalmer's approach and these two philosophers. — Paine

Agree. I only said there is a general resemblance.

So while unconscious one "lacks the capacity to feel"? — 180 Proof

Yes. But this never obtains.

Btw, is it even possible for a panpsychist to be unconscious?

No. It's not possible for anything to be unconscious in my view.

Would you believe me in saying @Banno and @180 Proof understand the problem?

At least, such is my belief. I think their contentions come from another philosophical perspective, is all. Both worth considering in thinking about consciousness philosophically.

So you have never been unconscious? I know I have and that you do not have any grounds to doubt my subjective account of having been unconscious.

Heh, yeah fair.

Might as well note that Marxism can lazily take care of this problem through the dialectic. But the solution might be considered worse than the original problem. (still makes me giggle though, even though I shouldn't)

Free-for-all anarchy is my philosophy, so why not?

Where's the metaphysics of humor angle. :D

Would you believe me in saying Banno and @180 Proof understand the problem? — Moliere

Maybe they do. 180 seems to having asked him.

I see the resemblance. Part of my bringing it up was to separate the issue from a 'ghost in the machine' matter that you have been charged with introducing.

So you have never been unconscious? — 180 Proof

In the sense of asleep or under anaesthetic, yes. What's happening there is that bert1 as a coherent subject ceases to exist. It's not that bert1 remains a constant that gains and loses consciousness, although that is how we ordinarily speak. It's that bert1 as a coherent functional identity, with memories, desires, beliefs etc ceases to exist. what is lost is identity, not consciousness.

I know I have and that you do not have any grounds to doubt my subjective account of having been unconscious.

How did you feel when you were unconscious?

There's a series of icons above the top of a reply screen. The one on the furthest left is a "B" for Bold. Then "I" for italics. As you go along one of them is an " @ " . If you click it a window will pop up with a field to enter a person's name. When I typed "180" @180 Proof immediately populated as an option.

This is also the case with @Banno or anyone -- just start typing the person's name in the field, and eventually you'll have an option to click on them.

So, would you believe me? I'm certain @Banno understands.

So, would you believe me? I'm certain Banno understands — Moliere

From what you've said so far, I don't think you do. It's just a call a theory of consciousness that includes an explanation for phenomenal consciousness. Is that your understanding?

Thanks, I should get into the habit of using that.

Of course I believe that you think that @Banno understands the problem. It's just not evident to me that he, nor even @180 Proof does most of the time. However @180 Proof's recent gloss on it seems apt, so maybe I'm wrong.

I think? I'm fine with being quizzed, but I don't have a firm answer to your first question.

So you have never been unconscious? I know I have and that you do not have any grounds to doubt my subjective account of having been unconscious. — 180 Proof

'Unconsciousness' is a deceptively named concept, given that its conditions of assertibility are identical to the empirical concept of amnesia.

E.g, " I know I was unconscious last night" ,means something like "When contemplating what happened last night, I associate my experiences with the present, as opposed to the previous night."

I think? I'm fine with being quizzed, but I don't have a firm answer to your first question. — Moliere

So if you aren't sure what the hard problem is, why would you vouch for someone else's understanding? I don't understand.

[W]hat is lost is identity, not consciousness. — bert1

The "identity" of what is "lost"? And if this is the case, then what function does "consciousness" serve? What does it do (or what do we do with it)?

How did you feel when you were unconscious?

I do not remember.

In my terms of consciousness being 'awareness of self-awareness', being unconscious is not to be aware of being self-aware or not to be self-aware.

I have an understanding of the hard problem.

I just didn't know how to answer your question.

I thought I set out my best understanding of the hard problem in my opening post. But you're saying you're not convinced I understand. And your rephrasing of my position was just confusing to me -- that's what I meant.

Ach, sorry. Didn't hit the Reply, but the above is what I meant to reply to you.

have an understanding of the hard problem. — Moliere

This was your understanding:

So, whatever that is -- why my red is my red -- that's what the hard problem of consciousness is about. It's the feeliness of the world. And the thought, so my memory of what I was lead to believe at least, is that there is as yet no scientific explanation for why my red is my red (or, perhaps another way to put it, there's no scientific way to tell what my red is -- whether it is your blue or not -- yet I certainly see red) — Moliere

I see where these speculations are coming from, but the hard problem is more basic. It's: why do you experience orgasms? Why doesn't that neural activity happen without any associated experience of it?

It's not about why your orgasms are your own and not someone else's. See the difference?

I wouldn't want to deny we have experiences, but this doesn't touch on the 'hard problem'. The hard problem has, as a foundational axiom, the notion that the things we talk about - experiences, awareness,... - ought to be causally connected to the objects of empirical sciences. That it's in some way odd that there's no direct connection. I reject that premise. It seems to me that we can talk of all sorts of things from consciousness, to god, to pixie dust... We all know what each other is talking about to some extent in each case (enough to get by) but it doesn't require any of those objects to correlate with something empirical science might reify. — Isaac

Gods and pixie dust don't exist, so no account is necessary. But you agree that we have experiences, and therefore some scientific accounting for them is necessary, to have a complete understanding of the world. If a pixie were to materialize in front of you, you would have to account for it somehow, either as a supernatural manifestation, a hologram, etc. But you can't close your eyes and pretend it's not there, or just say "well, that happened.", and still fully understand the world.

I guess I'd say the inverted spectrum argument fits with your rendition here, from the way I think of things.

What you're saying is experience causes neural activity.

The inverted spectrum argument is meant to show how experience can be different between persons, and so it's a legitimate reference. When talking about "my blue", I am making a public distinction. "blue" after all, and "my" for that matter, are public meanings. And I'm noting how our experience of the world could be somewhat different, from a functional perspective. Would it really matter that my orgasm is the same as your orgasm, from the Darwinian perspective? No, it'd just have to be good enough to keep the species alive. And some people's orgasms might be somewhat sub-par, and hence that might be why they aren't as motivated by them.

What you're saying is experience causes neural activity. — Moliere

There's no doubt that experience and neural activity go hand in hand. It could be that neural and other CNS materials give rise to experience. We don't know that, though, and we can't assume it.

The inverted spectrum argument is one of the many reasons we can't assume it.

That argument doesn't require two people. It goes:

One day you wake up and your spectrum is inverted, but no physical changes happened to your brain. Is that conceivable? Sure.

Therefore, brain function and experience are not logically identical. In order to claim that one explains the other, we'll need evidence of that.

One day you wake up and your spectrum is inverted, but no physical changes happened to your brain. Is that conceivable? Sure. — frank

Assuming you reject dualism then I don't see how that is conceivable.

Assuming you reject dualism then I don't see how that is conceivable. — hypericin

How so?

Can you give me an example of a neuroscientist you think is committing this error? — Isaac

I described the conditions which would qualify as an error. I have not intent to judge any particular individual unless you bring the person here to take part in the discussion so we could make that judgement. Sorry if this disappoints you.

So "the hard problem .." is not a scientific problem like I've stated. — 180 Proof

No not really, because the specific problem I stated is not explicitly "the hard problem". To tell you the truth, I still don't really understand the supposed "hard problem". I'm dualist so I don't see "the hard problem", it appears to be the consequence of unreasonable premises and poor ontology. I see a lot of hard headed people though.

How so? — frank

Every event must have a cause. If consciousness isn't supernatural, and the physical state of the brain remains constant, then the inversion would be left without any possible cause.

Every event must have a cause. If consciousness isn't supernatural, and the physical state of the brain remains constant, then the inversion would be left without any possible cause. — hypericin

Yes. This is metaphysical possibility. We can have a god do whatever we want as long as it's not a contradiction. The test is for conceivability, that's all.

So it's not that the neuroscientist has a "blindspot" as you stated here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/771468
and actually that it is only a "hard problem" for idealist (or subjectivist) philosophers '. I agree.