I would be interested to investigate what constitutes a fallacy. Fallacy is defined as reasoning which is invalid, and Wikipedia for example, gives a list of specific forms of fallacy. Each named form is a type of reasoning which has been designated as invalid, therefore an unacceptable part of the reasoning process. We could say that these are mistaken actions in the reasoning process. — Metaphysician Undercover

I too find fallacies curious. I have wanted to make a thread on these but never had the time.

There are a number formal fallacies that invalidate a logical argument as you mentioned. However there are many more informal fallacies that are not about the validity of the argument - there is a list of these in the same Wikipedia page you mentioned. I find the majority of common accusations of fallacies fall into this category - fallacies like straw man, begging the question, appeal to authority are not formal fallacies about logical structure.

Then there are common accusations of fallacies that I find are very often not fallacies. Take the slippery slope - I think that is a useful line of inductive reasoning that is rarely a fallacy. If a step is taken in a direction, it makes it easier to take another step in that direction. That is how human progression (or even regression depending on your view) happens. Sure sometimes it is a fallacy, very often it is how the world works.

Your post is important because while the concept of 'fallacy' is important in relation to the idea of falsehood, there are specific logical errors which make so much difference in the basic assumptions of human thinking. It is probably not so much as 'truth' being 'out there' in an objective realm, beyond all else. The subjective construction, as well as the intersubjective, are important in understanding of the objective. This comes into play in the whole approach to understanding, including inductive reasoning.

Even the idea of 'progress' seems to signify an ongoing progressive understanding and the nature of this does lead to the question of to what extent can this be sought objectively. Science may involve the empirical, but how this is constructed, subjectively, in human understanding is a different matter. It may lead to the question of is there is any essential value-free objective logic or evidence?

I enjoyed that. It's an interesting topic logic+empiricism. I notice that your empirical knowledge is someone's writing. It is not logic but it is rational to use authoritative work as the basis of empiricism. I personally find that work is authoritative can be because it is sanctioned by authority which is a circular argument. So there is a difference between being empirical and logical when the source of experience is academic work, and being logical and empirical when your experience is worldly and you use logic against the work. That's just a caution I advocate as I am personally against established authority, so irrational on that sense, but in the Platonic spirit use logic as it is intended ironically, whatever that means to you.

One aspect which you raise which may be important is the idea of authority, especially in regard to objectivity. Sometimes, this may be missed as a subtle subtext of how both logic and evidence are valued and critiqued. There is bias on the foundation of politics and underlying ideas of objectivity based on the way in which 'expert' knowledge and authority are conceived as the foundation for philosophy. So, the basic question may be about how is authoritative, or 'expert' opinion constructed?

'Analytical', very nice. My plane is landing. Might reply later.

I too find fallacies curious. — PhilosophyRunner

We could start with the basic fallacy, non sequitur, which means that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, or that the reasoning is not valid. I believe that what is meant by "valid", is that the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. Validity is based in this idea of necessity, that if the premises are true, it is impossible that the conclusion not be true. So the fallacy of non sequitur would be to misjudge this necessity, to attribute necessity when its not warranted, to say that a conclusion is necessary when it is not.

I am not convinced that a 'valid' proposition excludes the possibility of error. That suggests an environment where arguments would be true if made clean of attempts to make them look better than they actually are. One can make a valid argument, free of sophistical persuasion, and still be wrong.

One can make a valid argument, free of sophistical persuasion, and still be wrong. — Paine

Sure, but we need to differentiate between being valid and being sound. From what I understand, valid logic means that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. This does not mean that the conclusion is necessarily correct, because the premises might not be correct. The truth or falsity of the premises affects the soundness of the conclusion. A sound conclusion requires both valid logic and sound premises.

Danke mon ami, danke!

It may lead to the question of is there is any essential value-free objective logic or evidence? — Jack Cummins

I think that is a very big question. Here are my thoughts.

There may be an external objective reality. I go further - I operate on the basis that there is an objective external reality, which requires some axioms and assumptions on my part. But those assumptions are required to move knowing “I am” and nothing else.

However just because there is an external objective reality does not necessarily mean I can directly access that reality. My access to that reality is based on a lot of intermediary factors and assumptions – what I sense is how the world is, the sources I trust publish accurate information, my interpretations are accurate, my instruments are measuring what i think they are measuring, etc. And in these I can see many potential reasons why my access to reality may be influenced by who I am, where I am, which time period I was born, what culture I am in, what I want to do. Here values seep into my thinking.

To give a simple instance of value in logic, in order to avoid fallacies I must value truth. If I don’t value truth, then fallacies are of no concern to me.

Thus it is difficult for me to conceive a value-free objective logic or evidence through the lens of my mind (which is all I have got!), even though I accept that value free objective reality might exist out there.

But actually it is a complicated question and I have more to say, but the above would do for now.

Yes a non sequitur is a formal fallacy as you explain and means the logic is not valid.

To some extent the interpretation of evidence is the issue of subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity. On the other hand, it comes down to qualia of mental states, and how such experiences are understood. There is the question of how the 'real' is considered, especially in relation to 'truth'. Facts appear on those validated and shared by others. The basic aspects of evidence is about shared ideas and assumptions. It may be how hallucinations and delusions are established.

However, there is still the way in which evidence can be constructed to support a viewpoint rather than necessarily the other way round. With evidence based there is substantiated evidence but there while one study shows one point there may be studies that show the opposite. Evidence may be more clear in the interpretations of the real, but even then people may perceive on the biases of their own ideas and psychological motivations.

Facts appear on those validated and shared by others. The basic aspects of evidence is about shared ideas and assumptions. — Jack Cummins

Isn't this is dependent on the time you live, where you live, the culture around you? What is shared and validated today is not necessarily what was shared and validated 100 years ago, nor what will be shared and validated 100 years in the future. And hence my difficulty in seeing this as objectivity. I can only think as a person living where I am in the culture I am in the year I am - I cannot escape the subject.

Now you talk about inter-subjectivity limited to culture and time - and that is perhaps what is happening here. There is the subjective - me. There is the culture and time specific inter-subjective - common agreed knowledge at the moment in my culture. That is still a step away from objective, at least in my books.

On the subject of time and place, I read a book looking at the way in which cultural biases and interpretations come into how historical facts are viewed, by Richard Rudley, 'Lost Civilisations of the Stone Age'. He explores the idea of 'progress' critically and how people view ideas with a bias of linear progression, in relation to the understanding of civilisation, culture and knowledge. In this, he is not arguing that important developments haven't been made but that there is often a sense of cultural superiority in interpretation of facts. This is the problem of the lack of objective, and how so much is constructed intersubjectively in the way history and culture are constructed and passed on.

Indeed, and the word "progress" has values embedded in it. I think it was Collingwood who said history doesn't exist. What exist is the present and in the present we have a number of things - books, images, remains, buildings, fossils, etc. And based on these things that exist in the present, we tell a story about what happened in history. And I think he is on to something - what we know as history is an interpretation of sorts.

I find history is also useful when I want to better understand what I mean by objective and subjective. The subjective is what I perceive to be what happened in history. The inter-subjective of my culture, time and place is what is commonly agreed to have happened in history. The objective is what actually happened in history. But I do not have direct access to this objective at all. I can only build a picture based on the best my own subjective view, and inter-subjective views today in my cultural surroundings.

It is likely that the mistake is where people take the subjective as if it were objective, unable to make the clear distinction. Indeed, it may be that people see history and whatever descriptive lens through which they view reality as the ultimate way of thinking. This can happen when a religious or any worldview is regarded as literal without an awareness of other positions and their validity.

It also can be that the psychological and emotional aspects of beliefs are regarded as the 'truth'. In this, the underlying premises and assumptions are not put under examination. This may be the route source of many philosophical mistakes and fallacies, as an an antiphilosophy approach, of being unable to stand back and analyse the nature of ways of seeing and forming judgements.

I agree with all that.

Now when now get to science, I have a view that may look at first contradictory with the above, but I don't think it is. I think science should strive for a value free ideal, even though it would be impossible to achieve that. In other words, it should (and in the hard sciences does) take on a set of axioms and assumptions that what our instruments tell us is actually how the world is objectively. Now I have problems with that, but also it is the most powerful and useful system of analysis we have. And so I am of the view that it is correct for science to strive for this value free ideal.

It also can be that the psychological and emotional aspects of beliefs are regarded as the 'truth'. In this, the underlying premises and assumptions are not put under examination. This may be the route source of many philosophical mistakes and fallacies, as an an antiphilosophy approach, of being unable to stand back and analyse the nature of ways of seeing and forming judgements. — Jack Cummins

I'd agree with this. It is actually quite common to have beliefs without logic or evidence to support them.

I think science should strive for a value free ideal,,, — PhilosophyRunner

You do realize that mathematics works with values, don't you? Do you think it's possible to have science which is free from mathematics?

You do realize that mathematics works with values, don't you? Do you think it's possible to have science which is free from mathematics? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean value in the moral and ethical way - what is good, desirable and worthwhile. Science should strive for a moral free idea in this sense, though it can never achieve this as the scientists doing the science have their interpretations of what is good, desirable and worthwhile. As does the institutions that fund them. Nevertheless that ideal should be the goal.

I thought it was obvious that I was not referring to numerical value, but maybe I needed to make that clear.

I thought it was obvious that I was not referring to numerical value, but maybe I needed to make that clear. — PhilosophyRunner

The way I see it, numerical values are values just like ethical values are values. So there is a broad meaning of "value", which is roughly speaking, the worth of something. We might attribute a numerical "worth" or we might attribute a moral "worth", along with other forms of "worth", like monetary, or any type of measurement which employs a scale.

Logic is basically, as one author so eloquently put it, the art of thinking well. The point, as far as I can see, to logic is establish a connection between propositions of which there are usually 3, 2 premises and 1 conclusion (the classic syllogism, another name for an argument) - the connection aka inferential link is between the two premises and the one conclusion. The premises constitute the evidence.

A succinct and general way to describe inferential link is that the truth of the premises means the conclusion is also true to varying degrees of certainty depending on whether the argument is deductive, inductive or abductive. To elaborate, inferential links are determine by, as Aristotle and Chyrsippus found out, certain argument forms which seem to either guarantee or increase the likelihood of the conclusion being true given the premises are.

All fallacies can be put under the rubric of the most general description of reasoning gone wrong which is non sequitur (it does not follow). That is to say the proffered evidence doesn't support the conclusion. There are sundry ways this can happen - they've been named and classified by logicians since antiquity.