The notion of 'sense' (if you mean it the way Frege used it) introduces many other difficulties over and above the concept of meaning (frankly I don't completely understand what Frege meant by that), and I'm not quite sure what is the difference between 'meaning' and 'sense' according to Frege. Also, it seems to me that saying that words have sense appears as a violation of the context principle (so Frege appears to be a bit inconsistent here). After all, he says himself "never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition", and why shouldn't we say the same thing about 'sense'? (and by the way, something like that was Wittgensten's criticism of Frege in the Tractatus - W argued that Frege didn't go far enough, and though Wittgenstein accepted a distinction between 'sense' and 'meaning' (that is Sinn and Bedeutung), he argued that only propositions have sense (TLP 3.3)).

But the more substantial question is what the context principle supposed to deny in the first place (or what kind of view Frege sought to oppose when he formulated the principle), and what interests me in particular are contemporary views about the semantics of natural language which almost all presuppose some strong form of compositionality and also deny the context principle. Contemporary philosophers of language typically think of "meaning" as something like the definition of a term (or some other more abstract sort of rule), and argue that sentences acquire meaning only as a function of the meaning of the words from which the sentence is composed, plus fixed syntactical rules that tell you which words can go where. Now THAT I think Frege would've denied, and no doubt Wittgenstein as well (both early and late). And so the main question (in the contemporary debate about compositionality) is what is the basic semantic unit of a language, sentences or words? And it's not clear to me how exactly Frege's notion of sense is related to this more contemporary understanding of "semantics".

The analogy between putting together pieces whose 'shapes' have no reference to anything beyond themselves to form a representation of a horse, and putting together words, whose 'shapes' do have reference to things beyond themselves to form a 'representation' of a very specific action "I'll stop at the store on the way home tonight and get milk" doesn't seem very compelling to me.

Many, if not all, of the 'pieces' of that sentence, could be substituted by a potentially unlimited number of alternatives. And the ability of the listener to understand any alternative representation of 'stopping at the store on the way home from work to buy milk' would be limited only by their familiarity with the references of the pieces used to construct the representation. The shapes that fit together (presumably only one way like a jigsaw puzzle) to form a representation of a horse have their 'logic' built right into them, whereas the 'shapes' of words do not, but rather rely on external reference for their logic.

If you don't like the analogy, that's fine. I'm not in love with it. The motivation was to combine two ideas: that performing a linguistic act is like making a move or taking a turn in a game; a sentence is composed of words put together in a certain way.

(Tangrams aren't like jigsaw puzzles. There's likely more than one way to do it.)

OK, there might be more than one way to do it, so the shapes have a very determinate logic as to how the ways they can fit together, but not necessarily to form only one specific picture. That's closer to being analogous to words, but now it seems to be only analogous to grammar; there is still no analogy to reference. It is the references of the words that allow us to put the words together in various combinations (which may well be ungrammatical (but that is a matter of convention, not of logic) to represent the same very specific action (stopping at the shop). Or we can even use different shapes (words) which are related by their references.

It seems to me that reference is the key to meaning, although context and intention obviously contribute, too. What does this sentence mean, for example: "I am looking forward to more intelligent posts from you"? Is it praising or insulting? It seems that it has a determinate meaning only to me, it's specific meaning depends on what I have in mind.

Quickly, yes I'm going to be following Frege's usage. There's some exegesis you have to get through, because at the time of the Grundlagen he hadn't split meaning into sense and reference yet, and he never enunciated the context principle again later.

However, there are statements in the Grundlagen (ref. when I get home) that show Frege also believed in compositionality. So he didn't think they were incompatible.

The motto he gives goes something like this: from the word to the sense, from the sense to the reference. So the sense of a singular term is what fixes its reference, and its reference is an object. The sense of a sentence is the thought it expresses, and the reference is its truth-value.

More later.

In contemporary analytic philosophy, "referent" is more common for "the object we're pointing at."

"Reference" is often thought of as "the act or procedure of fixing the sense to the referent." A la "How does reference work?"

Or in other words, "referent" is used as a noun in an (usually external) object sense. "Reference" is used with more of a verb connotation.

Just bringing that up because it might help some folks understand it.

"Reference" is often thought of as "the act or procedure of fixing the sense to the referent. — Terrapin Station

Yes, words are related to one another in terms of their references to various objects, actions and so on. For example, the worlds 'gold', 'steel' and 'copper' are related because they all refer to metals.

So, what's your point; I'm not seeing it.

So, what's your point; I'm not seeing it. — John

Did you read the whole post? The last sentence was this: "Just bringing that up because it might help some folks understand it."

Which "folks" that you felt were in need of edification did you have in mind then?

Anyone who might be reading the thread and who might benefit from further clarification. You know that anyone can read a public message board, right? This isn't a private conversation that we're having.

What made you think there would be people reading this thread who did not possess such rudimentary knowledge? Or was it just an opportunity to show off your knowledge? It seems like a bit of unnecessary effort to go to just in case there might be someone who wasn't aware of the most basic ideas in the philosophy of language. Why would anyone who didn't have such a basic grounding even bother to read a thread called " Compositionality and Frege's context priniciple"?

What made you think there would be people reading this thread who did not possess such rudimentary knowledge? — John

We're already explaining sense and reference in Frege. That's not rudimentary?

Maybe. What if it is?

Then it's certainly not outside of the scope and tenor of the thread in general just in case it's rudimentary. (And just like having to answer your questions certainly isn't outside of the scope of rudimentariness.)

"Reference" is often thought of as "the act or procedure of fixing the sense to the referent." A la "How does reference work?" — Terrapin Station

'Reference' is not the same as the act of fixing reference (in the sense of an ostensive definition). 'Reference' is believed by philosophers to be a relation between linguistic expressions (or perhaps some mental states) and things in the world, and not a name for any act or procedure.

Secondly, referents don't have 'sense', but only the bearers of meaning do (such as linguistic expressions or beliefs) that stand in the relation of reference to their referents. The words 'Barack Obama' have sense in English (they denote a particular person, which is their referent), but Barack Obama himself doesn't posses any kind of 'sense'.

'Reference' is believed by philosophers to be a relation between linguistic expressions (or perhaps some mental states) and things in the world, — Fafner

That's only believed by deficient philosophers to not involve acts or procedures.

What does the "secondly" part have to do with anything I'd typed? (Ah, I just realized that you must have done some sort of weird Aspie reading of "fixing the sense to the referent" haha)

That's only believed by deficient philosophers to not involve acts or procedures. — Terrapin Station

But it's a question of definition, not you opinion. This is what the term means in the philosophical literature, it has nothing to do with what you or anyone else thinks about how reference is established, they are not treated as the same thing.

But it's a question of definition, — Fafner

Why would you believe that I was talking about definitions in my post? You seriously believed that I was saying that the words "act or procedure" were to be found in some formal definition of "reference"? Why would you read my post that way?

Why would you believe that I was talking about definitions in my post? You seriously believed that I was saying that the words "act or procedure" were to be found in some formal definition of "reference"? Why would you read my post that way? — Terrapin Station

Well you ought to talk about definitions because you claimed at the beginning of your post that "In contemporary analytic philosophy..." reference means such and such, and that means that we are not talking here about your personal opinion, but about how the term is commonly used/defined/understood by the majority of analytic philosophers. And yes analytic philosophers do often give precise enough definitions for the terminology they are employing (I don't know what you mean by 'formal'), so we ought to talk about definitions, or something close to this.

I explicitly said "often thought of." That doesn't denote that I'm about to give a definition. You can't read. But do go ahead and "lecture" me some more despite that fact.

I explicitly said "often thought of." That doesn't denote that I'm about to give a definition. You can't read. — Terrapin Station

First, it is a definition even if it doesn't apply to everyone who uses the term. Secondly, I don't think that any serious philosopher actually thinks that this is what reference is, because there is an obvious distinction between an expression having reference and the question about how reference is fixed, or what are the conditions under which a term acquires a referent. Read any classical text about reference such as Kripke's "Naming and Necessity" and you'll see that he makes a very sharp distinction between the two, and everyone to my best knowledge follows him.

And btw, here's the definition of reference from SEP:

"Reference is a relation that obtains between certain sorts of representational tokens (e.g., names, mental states, pictures) and objects." (my emphesis)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/

I seriously challenge you to show me even a single peer-reviewed text that doesn't treat reference as a relation but defines it as an "act" or "procedure".

First, it is a definition even if it doesn't apply to everyone who uses the term. — Fafner

What does the pronoun "it" stand for in that sentence?

What does the pronoun "it" stand for in that sentence? — Terrapin Station

Whatever you were talking about. Again, if you are trying to explain a term then it's a definition in my understanding. If you don't like the word, you can choose another one, it doesn't matter. My point is that when you make claims about how other people use a certain word, then you can't just make stuff up, you have to back it up with something.

Whatever you were talking about. — Fafner

I wasn't talking about definitions, though. So we're back to you not being able to comprehend how someone could say something like "often thought of as" and not be talking about a definition. So do we need to explain that, or . . . it sounds like you're not very attached now to whether we call my comment a statement of a definition and we can drop your first sentence, "It is a definition even if it doesn't apply to everyone who uses the term." Which option do you want to go with?

I wasn't talking about definitions, though. So we're back to you not being able to comprehend how someone could say something like "often thought of as" and not be talking about a definition. So do we need to explain that, or . . . it sounds like you're not very attached now to whether we call my comment a statement of a definition and we can drop your first sentence, "It is a definition even if it doesn't apply to everyone who uses the term." Which option do you want to go with? — Terrapin Station

I already told you that if you don't like the word 'definition' then you can drop it, I don't care. My point is the same whether you call what you said a 'definition' or something else. You say something false about the usage of the word 'reference' among all professional philosophers, and it doesn't change it even if you qualify it by 'often', because no one talks like this ever.

I already told you that if you don't like the word 'definition' then you can drop it, I don't care. — Fafner

I'm not asking what I want to do. I'm asking if you're okay in dropping that one sentence, or do you need an explanation of how my post can make sense while not being a definition? One thing at a time. Don't type something if it's not important.. (And you and John doing this major thread crapping is certainly important.)

I'm not asking what I want to do. I'm asking if you're okay in dropping that one sentence, or do you need an explanation of how my post can make sense while not being a definition One thing at a time. Don't type something if it's not important.. (And you and John doing this major thread crapping is certainly important.) — Terrapin Station

Listen, I don't want to argue about meaningless verbal questions. If you still don't understand, or want to ignore the substantial objection that I made about what you said then I'm out.

Listen, I don't want to argue about meaningless verbal questions. — Fafner

And I don't really want to have a conversation with someone who is so hell-bent on being combative (and thread-crapping in the process) that they can't even say whether they're okay with dropping a particular sentence--that's too much of a concession to make. If you like combat that much, though, continue.

And I don't really want to have a conversation with someone who is so hell-bent on being combative that they can't even say whether they're okay with dropping a particular sentence--that's too much of a concession to make. — Terrapin Station

And I don't want conversations with people who can't be bothered to properly explain themselves.

And I don't want conversations with people who can't be bothered to properly explain themselves. — Fafner

Right. So I guess you won't be talking to me any further.