Bingo. Right on the money there, Smith. — Wayfarer

:smile:

Proof for modal realism (courtesy St. Anselm of Canterbury)

1. All possible worlds is "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"

2. If all possible worlds doesn't exist then all possible worlds isn't "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"

Ergo,

3. All possible worlds exists (1, 2 modus tollens)

↪Hallucinogen
Yep, that's something that seems possible. — Agent Smith

Misses the point + begs the question

You made a claim and it seems possible. How did I miss the point and I couldn't possibly be begging the/any question because ...

Yes, if the possible worlds become actual

Yes, if the possible worlds become actual — val p miranda

A big if! Are you up to making a wager à la Pascal?

I think that people misinterpret the multiverse hypothesis too much. The multiverse is an emergent property of the laws of the universe. Therefore, even though anything may be possible within this emergent property, it is a logical contradiction for something to exist that contradicts the property itself. All possible outcomes can occur out of the laws of the universe, but not contradict the laws themselves without breaking this continuity.

In essence, if the multiverse is an emergent property of the universe, then anything outside of the universe cannot be part of the multiverse and cannot emerge from it.

What is an example of something outside the multiverse?

What is an example of something outside the multiverse? — Agent Smith

Something outside of our laws of physics. Multiverse is a concept derived out of quantum physics, which is part of our universe's laws of physics. Therefor, concepts that cannot emerge out of our universal laws, even with infinite probability, wouldn't be able to happen.

So, for example, if there was a god, it would need to exist outside of our laws of physics to be able to be a creator of it, therefor, there can't be a world in the multiverse that has a god as an emergent property of that universe, since the probability needs to emerge out of the universal laws that all worlds are governed by.

You mean to say our universe is the radix of all other universes and so, if something violates the laws of our universe, it can't exist in any of the other universes i.e. since god is incompatible with our universe, the multiverse is too. Even if god exists, he doesn't in the multiverse because of the way he's defined.

Possible worlds, in the philosophical sense, doesn't equate to the multiverse.

Not that the multiverse cannot exist. If the hypothesis is true, it is emergent out of the universal laws that exist, i.e all possible worlds within the multiverse can only act upon the universal laws of physics. So all possible possibilities of the universe can only emerge from what is possible based on the universal laws.

If a concept cannot emerge out of those universal laws of physics, then they cannot exist as a possibility within the multiverse. So any concept that is breaking universal laws of physics has to exist outside the multiverse.

It could be that there's a field of infinite possibilities not linked to universal laws of physics that exists outside of it all, and that the existence of our universe and multiverse is a result of the eventual possibility out of infinite possibilities with unbound laws of physics.

:up:

This topic might be really interesting ... in some possible world. :grin:

This topic might be really interesting ... in some possible world. :grin: — Alkis Piskas

Time makes things interesting/boring! :grin:

You made a claim and it seems possible. How did I miss the point and I couldn't possibly be begging the/any question because ... — Agent Smith

I said:

"Possible" presumes a relation or syntax in which that which is possible is distinctly identified and related to the rest of reality. God by definition would subsume the whole of that reality by dint of omnipresence, so if your conception entails God existing in any part, God by definition subsumes the whole. — Hallucinogen

You replied that it is merely "possible" that possibility is subsumed by God's omnipresence. This misses the point that actually, it is certain that it does, not just "possible". Your response is on a par with claiming it is "possible" that bachelors are unmarried, or "possible" that 1 minus 1 equals 0.

Your reply also begs the question on what determines what "is possible". My reply provided an answer to this question - it is a syntax that relates parts of reality. You then stated this "is possible", when in fact if it were not the case then this provides no explanatory framework of what possibility is and what determines it (which makes it odder that you're asserting possibility as a response).

Apologies, as you can see some philosophical terminology are new to me and now that you explained what it is that you were trying to convey, I concur on the omnipresence bit, but of course it's too obvious to mention why omnipresence is much less defensible that God existing in some possible world. Clearly, God, a fortiori, can't be in hell, a legit possible world.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. As far as I could tell, your statements didn't imply one and hence my reply "possible".

However, possible doesn't mean actual. Are you saying there's no alternative other than to accept your statements i.e. to reject your position entails a contradiction? Please clarify.

but of course it's too obvious to mention why omnipresence is much less defensible that God existing in some possible world. — Agent Smith

Why do you think so?

Clearly, God, a fortiori, can't be in hell, a legit possible world. — Agent Smith

Why can't God be present in Hell? If he built the place it doesn't seem as if there'd be a repulsive force barring any future interaction with it.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. As far as I could tell, your statements didn't imply one and hence my reply "possible". — Agent Smith

I was also using the standard definition. I didn't say that you were in contradiction, though. Only that if God exists anywhere, He already exists everywhere, in all "worlds", and this encompasses the very law by which "possibility" is generated.

Are you saying there's no alternative other than to accept your statements i.e. to reject your position entails a contradiction? Please clarify. — Agent Smith

Yes.

I thought "Our God in heaven" for a good reason.

What contradiction? You mean to say god's everywhere doesn't entail a contradiction in any world? But it does in our world (the problem of evil). What about the omnipotence paradox?

I thought "Our God in heaven" for a good reason. — Agent Smith

God is in Heaven, but it doesn't mean He isn't anywhere else, especially if He is omnipresent.

What contradiction? — Agent Smith

You referred to the idea of contradiction here.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. — Agent Smith

So I added that I didn't say you were in contradiction about anything.

You mean to say god's everywhere doesn't entail a contradiction in any world? But it does in our world (the problem of evil). What about the omnipotence paradox? — Agent Smith

OK, so you meant that my comment entails a contradiction?
It's a different subject to that of possibility, which is what I originally commented to offer my opinion on, but I don't acknowledge that the problem of evil is based on valid reasoning. I think that belief in the problem of evil is entirely a result of those people having very particular moral intuitions about responsibility that not everyone shares.

I also don't think there's any paradox between omnipresence and omnipotence. It would seem to me that being omnipresent would be a requirement for being omnipotent, in fact. Ultimately, something has to be responsible for changing everything at every level that change occurs, by which virtue it would count as omnipotent, and no principle would stop that same thing from being present everywhere in reality.

You could be more clearer (if you wished to).

Your argument from omnipresence is a good one; after all by that we can infer god's existence in all possible worlds. However, omnipresence has a specific definition as far as I know and from that definition, your argument is a non sequitur.

Coming to your belief being a possibility, one among many others, to my reckoning, no contradiction is entailed. As for it being necessarily true, I have my doubts (vide supra).

What did you want me to be clearer about?

However, omnipresence has a specific definition as far as I know and from that definition, your argument is a non sequitur. — Agent Smith

Elaborate?

Coming to your belief being a possibility, one among many others, to my reckoning, no contradiction is entailed. — Agent Smith

Of course it's a possibility that my belief about something is true. This wasn't what I originally objected to being "just" a possibility though. You said that the claim I put forward was a possibility; I responded by saying it isn't just a possiblity: it is certain.

As for it being necessarily true, I have my doubts (vide supra). — Agent Smith

Elaborate.

In my universe, possible means consistent although not necessarily true à la scientific hypotheses. Omnipresence is consistent with god being in all worlds, but not in hell. There are only 2 kinds of beings in hell - those who hurt and those who hurt and god can't be either of them for He is sinless.

In my universe, possible means consistent although not necessarily true à la scientific hypotheses. — Agent Smith

Hence if God exists in one universe He exists in all of them -- this is in other words, not "possible" but necessarily true.

Omnipresence is consistent with god being in all worlds, but not in hell. There are only 2 kinds of beings in hell - those who hurt and those who hurt and god can't be either of them for He is sinless. — Agent Smith

Then your formulation of God, Hell and worlds is false. God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in.

Then your formulation of God, Hell and worlds is false. God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in. — Hallucinogen

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui?

Hence if God exists in one universe He exists in all of them -- this is in other words, not "possible" but necessarily true. — Hallucinogen

God being everywhere is inconsistent with hell, as I already explained. However, if god were everywhere, He would be necessary.

Why is my formulation of hell false? Is hell not for hurting (punished + punisher)? You know we could go on and on, I seen no end to this back and forth, si?

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui? — Agent Smith

No. Where's the inconsistency?

God being everywhere is inconsistent with hell, as I already explained. — Agent Smith

As I already explained: God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in.

Why is my formulation of hell false? — Agent Smith

Hell is in God, as above.

The inconsistency is that God can't be in hell and you're saying He is (re omnipotence). Then you changed tack - you now claim hell is in god (unsupported conclusion).

The inconsistency is that God can't be in hell and you're saying He is — Agent Smith

No I am not saying that. Did you not read the comment directly above? I just said Hell is in God. I’m not using a definition of God that makes it inconsistent with being in Hell, you are. I told you to explain why my God is inconsistent with Hell, not yours. You even said

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui? — Agent Smith

You were meant to explain why my God is inconsistent. Now you switch misleadingly by replying as if you are arguing against your definition of God.
I responded to your assertion that God cannot be in Hell already, by pointing out that we aren’t committed into adopting your definition of Hell/omnipresence.

Then you changed tack - you now claim hell is in god — Agent Smith

No I did not. That is what you just did. I never replied to you as if I believed God can’t be in Hell.
The only point in this discussion I phrased the relationship as such was when I asked you “Why can’t God be in Hell?” and the only reason I referred to God being in Heaven was to save redefining omnipresence when it wasn’t necessary to do so.
The first time I told you what I thought the actual omnipresent relationship between Hell and God is in my comment before the previous one.

you now claim hell is in god (unsupported conclusion) — Agent Smith

It is no less supported than your own assertion that God can’t be in Hell. Besides, you haven’t given any reason why my definition of Hell/omniprescence is unsupported, especially since you seem to be avoiding arguing against it and prefer to switch to your own definition to argue against, even when you’re told to do the opposite.
It sheds light on why you thought that we could go back and forth with no end though: you’re subconsciously anticipating that you’ll miss the point of any premise that breaks the circularity of your reasoning.
So, back to getting you to explain why omnipresence is inconsistent. You are responding to the proposition that God is omnipresent, where omniprescence is defined such that Hell is inside God. Continue.

Well, we haven't even agreed on what God or hell is then, have we? Your idiosyncratic God could exist in your, again, idiosyncratic hell.

I'd actually say the problem is we haven't agreed on what omnipresence is. We have already agreed that God needs to be omnipresent, and while I don't know if I agree to your exact wording (for hurting / punished + punisher) of what Hell is, I'll agree to it for the sake of argument.

The importance of what I am pointing out about omnipresence is that the "God is in x, for all x" formulation thereof is problematic, both for reasons pertaining to the "x" part (e.g. the conception of Hell which you raise), and because of the "in" part: because that automatically means that something is outside God by virtue of what "in" means. So expressing omnipresence in the above way entails that God isn't omnipresent.

The way forward is to conceive of omnipresence as equivalent to a mathematical fields closure over its elements.

a field is a set F that is a commutative group with respect to two compatible operations, addition and multiplication, with "compatible" being formalized by distributivity (...) Closure of F under addition and multiplication F or all a, b in F, both a + b and a × b are in F (or more formally, + and × are binary operations on F).

The field F itself is analogous to God, the elements a and b are analogous to any objects or locations therein, and the operations + and × are analogous to the means of interaction and relation between elements. Calling God omnipresent therefore is asserting that God is the field under which all elements that exist are closed and interrelated.

The fact that God in this conception isn't an element that can be pointed out and identified to be restricted to existing "in" anything, as well as the fact that physics is closed under mathematical operations, only provide further reasons to adopt this definition of omnipresence.

It also helps me support my earlier claims about possibility being the output of a syntax: syntaxes are composed of operations and possibilities are rearrangements of elements (products) thereof. So entertaining God to be "possible" in one world confuses the roles that fields, operations and elements play, since using the word "possibilities" to describe rearrangements of elements across all worlds immediately implies that operations exist that are responsible for all such possibilities, which in turn implies a single field under which those operations and elements are closed.