If you want to increase the benefits of cooperation in ways that will better achieve your goals, then you ought to follow your cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and abandon them when they will create cooperation problems”. — Mark S

Cultural moral norms have been destructive and abusive. Cooperation can be a bad thing. There was a lot of cooperation and self sacrifice in the two world wars and amongst Nazis and in other acts of cruelty and destruction.

Maximising cooperation would only be moral or good if people were not being harmed by the goals involved.

I don't accept there is a science of morality or the authors analysis of moral norms.

You could study religion in the same way and make a compilation of religious aspirations and beliefs and see what commonalities were between them but it wouldn't validate the beliefs.

It seems a very arbitrary and self serving analysis to try and find some kind of unifying feature to very diverse data.

The notion of what a benefit is will be subjective based on individual preferences even if these individual preferences are widely shared they are not universalizable.

I don't accept there is a science of morality or the authors analysis of moral norms. — Andrew4Handel

I agree. Science is about how things are, ethics is about what to do; these are very different questions.

At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.

Science is about how things are, ethics is about what to do; these are very different questions.
At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate. — Banno

Of course, science and ethics answer different questions.

“How should I live?” – this is a question for moral philosophy about what to do.

“Why do cultural moral norms exist?” - this is a scientific question about what things are.

“That we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.” Right. To think otherwise would be a category error confusing what is with what ought to be.

Where do you think my OP or the rest of my comments contradict either of your two points?

The “mysticism” of cultural moral norms that science debunks is the mystery of their origins and why they have the strange intuitive properties (that John Mackie described as queerness) of bindingness and violations deserving punishment.

By explaining the “queerness” of our intuitions about cultural moral norms as subcomponents of cooperation strategies, science debunks the mysticism that shields cultural moral norms from rational discussion. — Mark S

Science can only "dubunk" the mysticism of moral norms when it is opposed to mystical narratives concerning their origins and operation, such as those offered by some religious traditions. But we are not talking about that. There is no mysticism involved in accepting moral norms without or independently of an awareness of history and mechanism. (The "queerness" of which Mackie wrote is something else - it concerns moral "properties" when viewed alongside items in a naturalistic ontology of properties.)

And while conservative religious societies may indeed oppose the kind of scientific research into the anthropology of morality that you have been championing in this thread, somehow I don't think that is what you have in mind when you talk about debunking and shielding. What then? The questions that science opens to rational discussion concern the whats and the hows of morality: What norms are there? How did they arise? How do they operate in society and in individual? Etc. What it cannot do is advance the discussion of norms as such - that is, whether one ought to accept them - except indirectly and arationally, similarly to how learning and life experience can over time affect one's moral outlook.

Science reveals an objective basis for evaluating cultural moral norms as instrumental oughts. If you want the benefits of cooperation, you ought not follow cultural moral norms when they predictably will create rather than solve cooperation problems. That seems simple to me.

We can set aside the question of naturalizing morality via scientific insights into its origins, which I think has not progressed much in this discussion, and talk instead about putting those insights to practical use. But I don't know how much there is to be said here. Morality is a social institution, and just about anything having to do with sociality involves cooperation strategies - even conflict above individual level. "Solving cooperation problems" can describe everything that goes on in society, from family life to wars.

Where do you think my OP or the rest of my comments contradict either of your two points? — Mark S

Contradiction? Perhaps not.

Could this knowledge help resolve disputes about moral norms? — Mark S

But as you agree, it does not tell us what to do. Sure, cooperation is a core characteristic of humanity, but it is adept at doing wrong as at doing right.

That seems to be pretty much the same critique as , , , and so on.

The scientific study of cultural moral norms reveals that, as heuristics for cooperation strategies, advocating or not advocating cultural moral norms can be justified as an instrumental ought. — Mark S

it looks like you want to keep your cake and eat it.

Science can only "dubunk" the mysticism of moral norms when it is opposed to mystical narratives concerning their origins and operation, such as those offered by some religious traditions. But we are not talking about that. There is no mysticism involved in accepting moral norms without or independently of an awareness of history and mechanism. (The "queerness" of which Mackie wrote is something else - it concerns moral "properties" when viewed alongside items in a naturalistic ontology of properties.) — SophistiCat

I should not have mentioned the explanatory power for Mackie’s “queer” properties of bindingness and obligation. I am trying to limit this thread to how this science reveals useful instrumental oughts relevant to refining cultural moral norms. Please ignore my mention of Mackie.

What it (science) cannot do is advance the discussion of norms as such - that is, whether one ought to accept them - except indirectly and arationally, similarly to how learning and life experience can over time affect one's moral outlook. — SophistiCat

Right, there is nothing in the science (or in what I have said here) that addresses normativity. Justifying normativity is outside science’s domain.

I want to limit this thread to only 1) introducing the science and 2) arguing for this science’s instrumental usefulness (the same kind of instrumental usefulness provided by the rest of science – “If you want to achieve that, do this”).

But perhaps you are wondering how these instrumental oughts for refining moral norms can be useful without an argument that people somehow ought to follow their moral norms?

People already follow their culture’s moral norms such as Golden Rule and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” and will continue to do so. No philosophical reasoning about normativity is required. So I don’t see the lack of imperative oughts from science as affecting this science’s usefulness for refining cultural moral norms.

On the other hand, this science does reveal the exploitative origins of domination moral norms and can debunk their mystical origins. Again, I don’t see the lack of imperative oughts against exploiting others as a serious hindrance to using the science to refine moral norms.

What about any implications this science might have for normativity, the metaphysics of morality, and so forth? I look forward to exploring these topics but prefer to have that discussion to the next thread where I can start with a fresh OP focusing only on that.

Morality is a social institution, and just about anything having to do with sociality involves cooperation strategies - even conflict above individual level. "Solving cooperation problems" can describe everything that goes on in society, from family life to wars. — SophistiCat

Exactly right. As Martin Nowak likes to say, we are SuperCooperators. Our ability to cooperate is what has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

We are near time to start a new thread on philosophical implications. That may be more interesting for this audience.

You might have a look my most recent comments above to ↪SophistiCat. I address at least some of your points.

Instrumental ought are really just conditional oughts. So it doesn't solve any problems, just kicks the can down the road to the condition. And an ought is still required on the other side of the condition.

And even then I'm not even sure instrumental oughts are oughts. Rather they are a way of trying to shoehorn the word ought in disguised behind an adjective.

As Martin Nowak likes to say, we are SuperCooperators. Our ability to cooperate is what has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

We are near time to start a new thread on philosophical implications. That may be more interesting for this audience — Mark S

Such a thread should include not just the implications for philosophy , but the metaphysical pre-suppositions of the biologically-based science of human cooperation that researchers like Nowak have contributed to and Curry and Haidt build on.

For instance, mathematical biologist Martin Nowak wrote:

“God is not only creator, but also sustainer. God's creative power and love is needed to will every moment into existence. God is atemporal. In my opinion, an atemporal Creator and Sustainer lifts the entire trajectory of the world into existence. For the atemporal God, who is the creator and sustainer of the universe, the evolutionary trajectory is not unpredictable but fully known.”

I would suggest this is not just a matter of science influencing Nowak’s theology, but of his theological and philosophical assumptions grounding his empirical model. Even though many of the other contributors to the biology of cooperation research are atheists, they share with Nowak certain universalist assumptions concerning scientific values. Sociobiology went out of favor as its ideological foundations were revealed. Current biologically-based cooperative models of morality are also amenable to such scrutiny.

Imperative ought are really just conditional oughts. ...
And even then I'm not even sure instrumental oughts are oughts. — PhilosophyRunner

I prefer “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” after Bernard Gert's definition in the SEP as my basis for what is morally normative, an imperative ought.

I did not realize "instrumental oughts" is a controversial idea.

I prefer “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” after Bernard Gert's definition in the SEP as my basis for what is morally normative, an imperative ought. — Mark S

My bad I made a typo in my post. Both my points were about instrumental oughts, but I incorrectly wrote imperative oughts in my first sentence. That point was:

"Instrumental ought are really just conditional oughts. So it doesn't solve any problems, just kicks the can down the road to the condition. And an ought is still required on the other side of the condition."

That man is struggling to breathe. Science tells me that IF I want to save his life I ought to put an oxygen mask on him. But if there was a moral disagreement on this issue, it would not be about the scientific principals behind mask usage, but whether saving that mans life is good or bad or worth the consequences. In which case your instrumental ought really doesn't help.

Such a thread should include not just the implications for philosophy , but the metaphysical pre-suppositions of the biologically-based science of human cooperation that researchers like Nowak have contributed to and Curry and Haidt build on. — Joshs

I am happy to address all of those. But I can't talk about everything at once, particularly as I aim for 600 to 1000 words per post.

Nowak's theology is a curiosity, but I am unaware it has influenced either the data he presents, his highly respected work in game theory, or his broad conclusions. And Curry and Haidt have some poorly supported ideas about cross-cultural commonality somehow implying normativity that they mention in passing, but the data they have gathered is high quality and untainted.

Please let me know immediately if you see any data or conclusions I present that appear tainted by theology.

Please let me know immediately if you see any data or conclusions I present that appear tainted by theology. — Mark S

I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar. - Nietzsche

Sorry, couldn't resist it.

Pragmatism in morality is not an effective tool for mediating conflict, as it's the very cause of the conflict. Whether a moral norm is useful depends on how it impacts you and those close to you. That's dependent upon your social position and personal circumstances, and morality is proficient in adapting to those.

Religious or not, it makes little difference. Morality functions with or without any conscious agreement, and although something like the 10 commandments seems objective, they're not applied that way. "Thou shalt not kill" but Christians did a lot of killing, the objective moral law saying not to kill was not an impediment to having pragmatic moral views whatsoever.

Why would what personally benefits me be usable as an objective mediation tool? You're emphasising golden rules such as "do not kill", but that's not how morality works, we justify killing when it's useful. To whom is it useful when that occurs? Everyone? No, it will disproportionately impact some groups more than others, and our moral views adapt well to this reality.

What conflicts could you resolve by explaining what would be useful for us? We're already doing that anyway and usefulness depends on your position, you can't explain what's most useful for everyone, right?

What conflicts could you resolve by explaining what would be useful for us? We're already doing that anyway and usefulness depends on your position, you can't explain what's most useful for everyone, right? — Judaka

Consider some cross-culturally common moral norms:
Do to others as you would have them do to you.
Do not lie, steal, or kill.

Contrary to your claim, people do not commonly try to compute the behavior that would be most useful to them when making moral judgments. Rather, people experience motivation to follow the moral norms they grow up with such as those above. This motivation comes from the biology underlying our moral sense and from the potential punishment of at least reputation damage if they are seen to violate their culture’s moral norms.

People commonly have serious conflicts over when it is moral to follow the above norms and when it is not. The mystical origins of religious and cultural moral norms tend to make rational discussion difficult and these conflicts virtually unresolvable.

The empirical observation that all cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies punctures that mysticism and provides an objective basis for agreeing on when it is and is not moral to follow the above moral norms.

From the OP,
[quote="Mark S;d13929"
]This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:
1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies).[/quote]

Contrary to your claim, people do not commonly try to compute the behavior that would be most useful to them when making moral judgments. Rather, people experience motivation to follow the moral norms they grow up with such as those above. — Mark S

I wonder if you are taking morality to be man-made? And our moral choices to be made consciously? One may not be aware of the cold & calculative process which determines what they think is moral, the calculation happens with or without their intent. Find an individual and learn what he values, and see whether or not you can't find the source of the belief in his circumstances. See whether his values promote his circumstances, his personality, and his characteristics or don't they.

Do not steal or kill, but after all, who wants to die or be robbed? What unites us is pragmatic there, that's why there's little disagreement.

Though we do find ways to break these rules all the time, they are not golden rules at all. As loopholes, we separate ideas. Theft is wrong but what is defined as theft is very calculated. Imperialism was not theft to the imperialists, paying someone below minimum wage is not theft, and tax is not theft. How many examples of "theft-like" behaviours could we find that aren't called theft? When something is morally justified, it changes shape. It's not that we can't kill others, it's that killing others is conceptually reserved for killing when it's done immorally. If we're calling it murder, then we're condemning it, if we weren't condemning it then we'd call it something else, perhaps if we're lazy we'll call it by the very word of "justice"?

Why do you imagine the cooperation must be on the scale of a nation? Isn't it naive to expect people to join together and cooperate on a culture-wide basis? What objective basis is this? You're privileging one type of cooperation over another, and yours is less pragmatic and goes against our tribalistic nature.

I wonder if you are taking morality to be man-made? And our moral choices to be made consciously? — Judaka

The point of my OP is that the cooperation strategies that compose past and present cultural moral norms are innate to our universe. So, no, morality as cooperation strategies is not man-made. People adapt these strategies as they see fit in terms of definitions of who is in ingroups and outgroups and markers of both and the like.

People make moral judgments virtually instantaneously based on their emotional responses from their moral sense. (See Hume, plus Jonathan Haidt for a modern data-driven version.) So no, moral choices are not commonly based on conscious thought processes. What can be based on conscious thought processes is resolving disputes about cultural moral norms, again as described in the OP.

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies). — Mark S

Why do you imagine the cooperation must be on the scale of a nation? Isn't it naive to expect people to join together and cooperate on a culture-wide basis? What objective basis is this? You're privileging one type of cooperation over another, and yours is less pragmatic and goes against our tribalistic nature. — Judaka

Cultures will decide what they want to about who is in ingroups who deserve full moral regard and who is in outgroups who can be ignored or exploited. Science is silent on the matter. Again, from the OP:

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. — Mark S

Those moral heuristics just get bypassed whenever they're inconvenient, they're not as in need of flexibility as you seem to propose. You say that people are not taking into account what's beneficial for them when forming opinions on morality and that they merely follow what they've been taught. However, as you yourself have noted, it is beneficial for someone to follow the status quo, as the norms are legally and socially enforced. So, it's unsurprising to see people following those norms.

However. take an example such as urbanisation, recent examples are well illustrated in China. The older generation is rural and grew up in a very different, poorer China, while their children are working in modern cities. When you examine these two generations and compare the differences in their moral codes, their rules, priorities and so on, the differences are predictable. Why is this? Because the practicalities of your circumstances weigh heavily on determining what obligations or responsibilities you have, what you should or shouldn't be allowed to do and so on.

Look at a country like the US, it's got large political divides between people who live in cities vs the country, it's a common theme.

As cultures contain many different people living in many different circumstances, with all kinds of dividing factors, it makes sense that moral views would clash for this reason. I imagine none of the above is news to you, so what's the deal? You obfuscate this problem when you just say "our ultimate moral goals" and such, as though there's a presumed unity that there would be such as thing as "our ultimate moral goals". What's your actual proposal? To turn morality into a science? To assert it'd be anti-scientific to go against whatever scientists proposed was the objectively correct way to cooperate?

What's your actual proposal? To turn morality into a science? To assert it'd be anti-scientific to go against whatever scientists proposed was the objectively correct way to cooperate? — Judaka

My proposal is that people understand that all cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of strategies to solve cooperation problems. That knowledge is instrumentally useful for resolving disputes about when or if to enforce those moral norms because it:

1) Shows that mystical explanations from religions or cultural history are, at best, suspect.
2) Provides an objective, rather than subjective, basis for resolving those disputes. (What better basis do you suggest for resolving moral norm enforcement disputes?)
3) Resolves those disputes in ways most likely to achieve the benefits of cooperation (to achieve the benefits that have made human beings the incredibly successful social species we are).
4) Provides an objective moral principle for resolving moral disputes that otherwise does not exist (so far as I know).

Perhaps your objection is that the above requires rational thought about enforcing cultural moral norms?

Sure, people benefiting from domination norms will commonly find themselves unable to reason rationally about those norms. So what?

People who are being exploited by domination moral norms will find themselves able to think rationally about those as soon as they see the advantage to themselves. So at least half the argument about enforcing domination norms can commonly have an objective basis in science. That is a big advantage in resolving disputes about enforcing cultural moral norms.

You keep pointing out that disputes exist. Again, so what? My point is that understanding why cultural moral norms exist is useful for resolving those disputes regardless of anyone's "world-view".

1) Sure.
2) No, it doesn't. Not any more than you can argue against birth control pills or condoms by pointing out sex is for making children, or against junk food by pointing out that we eat to sustain ourselves.

As I've been trying to point out, the cooperation morality is helping to create is tribal in nature. Conflicts are a part of the nature of morality, it's a healthy part of what it evolved to be. I have no desire to resolve such disputes.

3) Morality evolved for the purpose of cooperation, but it's much more than that now, just like so many other things about human behaviour. There's money to be made, power to be had, ideals to be upheld and yada yada. And as I've said, it's not about species-wide or culture-wide cooperation.

4) Why do humans care about bad things happening to other people, for example? Is that rational? Why can I listen to the story of someone going through a terrible experience and cry for them? Why do I feel such an urge to want to help them? It encourages cooperation, yes, but it's not based on the desire to cooperate.

If one person cares about X and another Y, and you say "let's cooperate!" I mean... come on... you can't be serious. They're not caring about X and Y out of love for cooperation, and they're not going to change their minds because the concept of cooperation was invoked.

I'm just trying to point out that if you engage with the complexities of the issue. If you stop analysing the concepts of morality and cooperation together in an isolated environment, then you'll see the problems. Morality is more complicated than its original function, and how it accomplishes this original function is not through a conscious love of cooperation, it's so very far away from that.

Could this knowledge help resolve disputes about moral norms? — Mark S

I think trying to find a theory that will help resolve moral disputes may be admirable, but it's the wrong place to start. It may be that the best moral theory is the one that many people have a difficult time accepting. It also may be that the theory that most people accept isn't the one that has the best moral foundation. Imagine trying to do science this way. The best arguments should win the day.

You may find similar moral norms in various cultures, but there will still be disputes as to what makes these moral norms right or wrong. Most people already agree on the basics of what's moral or immoral (lying, murder, stealing, etc.). What's disputed are the foundational questions, and you're probably not going to find consistency here. For me, the foundational questions are the real questions.

I agree. Science is about how things are, ethics is about what to do; these are very different questions. — Banno

One could easily argue that ethics is both about how things are, and how one should then act.

Most people already agree on the basics of what's moral or immoral (lying, murder, stealing, etc.). What's disputed are the foundational questions, and you're probably not going to find consistency here. For me, the foundational questions are the real questions. — Sam26

First, remember that "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems" is claimed provisionally true science with no innate normativity. People may find it useful or not. No problem if they do not.

Second, the foundational problems you reference refer to (I assume?) what ought our goals be or what ought we do regardless of our needs and preferences. These problems likely have no objective answers based on the failures of the last 2500 years of study by incredibly bright people to find any. You are advocating potentially condemning people to endless, unresolvable debates which will provide little to no objective help in resolving common moral disputes.

Third, the MACS perspective is the most useful objective basis that I am aware of for judging whether cultural moral norms fulfill or do not fulfill their function of increasing the benefits of cooperation (increasing the benefits of living in a society). Contrary to your claim, most moral disputes are about when cultural partnership moral norms will be enforced such as "lying, murder (or 'killing'), stealing" and following the Golden Rule or if domination moral norms and marker norms will be enforced. Virtually no one, except philosophy majors, argues about the ultimate source of morality as consequentialism, virtue ethics, and the like.

I see the MACS perspective as culturally useful for resolving common moral disputes. It is essentially silent regarding solving the foundational questions you seem most interested in.

Maybe that silence is a good thing. That means MACS does not directly threaten the intellectual edifices that have been constructed regarding your foundational moral questions.

As I've been trying to point out, the cooperation morality is helping to create is tribal in nature. Conflicts are a part of the nature of morality, it's a healthy part of what it evolved to be. I have no desire to resolve such disputes. — Judaka

The cooperation that morality enables does so by solving problems that are innate to our universe. The nature of moral norms is to solve conflicts. If you have no desire to resolve such disputes, you would not be a good person to associate with. OK.

There is nothing about groups in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe. Cooperating in groups (tribes) and discriminating against outgroups is just one cooperation strategy, not an innate feature of the problems being solved.

Morality evolved for the purpose of cooperation, but it's much more than that now, just like so many other things about human behaviour. There's money to be made, power to be had, ideals to be upheld and yada yada. And as I've said, it's not about species-wide or culture-wide cooperation. — Judaka

Sure, ethics has grown far beyond cooperation strategies to include answers to broader questions such as “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”

So? The subject of this thread is “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?” and “Could that knowledge help resolve disputes about moral norms?”

Morality is more complicated than its original function, and how it accomplishes this original function is not through a conscious love of cooperation, it's so very far away from that. — Judaka

Perhaps you are thinking about the complexity added by two powerful human-invented cooperation strategies: money economies and rule of law?

Money economies are fantastically more efficient means of solving cooperation problems than moral behaviors as defined by moral norms. And rule of law efficiently supplies the necessary punishment component of cooperation strategies by reducing the risk of punishment provoking escalating cycles of retribution.

Money economies and rule of law do not directly “complicate” the function of morality. Their chief effect has been to obscure the function of morality as solving cooperation problems.

Prior to the invention of money economies and rule of law, it would have been common knowledge, even obvious, that the function of morality was to increase cooperation. People knew they needed to solve cooperation problems and acting morally was the only means they had to do so, except for inefficient barter or force within hierarchies.

See Protagoras’ explanation of morality as cooperation in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Protagoras described as ancient knowledge that morality as cooperation was a gift from Zeus. Entertainingly, Socrates ignored and did not respond to 1) this correct explanation of morality (correct if we substitute biological and cultural evolution for Zeus) and 2) Protagoras’ main point in the debate about teaching morality. Perhaps Socrates ignored it because morality as cooperation was too commonplace an idea and therefore uninteresting. Or perhaps Socrates had nothing to say to criticize it and commenting favorably did not suit his purposes.

Psychopaths (people with diminished or absent empathy and conscience) will not feel any “love of cooperation” – they only love themselves.

In contrast, the spontaneous feeling of satisfaction and optimism in the cooperative (moral) company of friends and family is a primary source of durable happiness for most people.

One could easily argue that ethics is both about how things are, and how one should then act. — Sam26

Yes. At issue is how one derives what one is to do from how things are. In WIttgensteinian terms, direction of fit.

We ought cooperate in kicking puppies.

We need to introduce televised puppy-kicking events. We ought offer public rewards to those who can kick the puppy farthest. We need a breeding program specifically to find the best puppies for kicking.

We ought celebrate the high levels of cooperation needed for proper puppy kicking.

Then cultural moral norms will track cooperation strategies.

Yes. At issue is how one derives what one is to do from how things are. In WIttgensteinian terms, direction of fit. — Banno

I agree.

Second, the foundational problems you reference refer to (I assume?) what ought our goals be or what ought we do regardless of our needs and preferences. These problems likely have no objective answers based on the failures of the last 2500 years of study by incredibly bright people to find any. You are advocating potentially condemning people to endless, unresolvable debates which will provide little to no objective help in resolving common moral disputes. — Mark S

The foundational issues I'm speaking of have to do with what it is that makes murder, stealing, lying objectively immoral? I believe one can appeal to objective reality to make the case that these examples are objectively immoral. So, I disagree that they don't have objective answers. Because people disagree, this in itself doesn't mean there hasn't been progress, or that there aren't good theories. It sounds like your idea of failure is due to there not being a consensus. However, it's not about consensus, it's about good arguments, and many or most arguments aren't any good. Moreover, most people don't seem to be that good at reasoning through some of these ideas. They let a particular ideology guide their beliefs.

Indeed, if folk would just agree to cooperate in kicking puppies, there would be no more need for all this talk about morality.

And we would finally leave behind that annoying question of what to do. Just kick the pup.

Well, that's not for me personally. But I'm OK with being the guy who measures how far the pup went. It is an exciting sport, after all, that brings people together.

We ought cooperate in kicking puppies. — Banno

The OP proposes that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. That is what cooperation strategies do. How do you imagine kicking puppies solves cooperation problems? You are just making up nonsense.