The idea that my soul can attain divine knowledge ... — introbert

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Forms hypothesis. In the dialectic of the Republic too the Forms are hypothetical, and remain so unless or until one is able to free themself from hypothesis. In the dialogue Socrates is clear in stating that he has not done so.

In none of the dialogues do we find someone who has attained divine knowledge. Philosophy is, according to the Symposium, the desire for wisdom. The philosophers in the Republic, who rule because they are divinely wise, are shadows on the cave wall. The Forms too, images on the cave wall. Irony indeed!

I entertain the idea that schizo is the manifestation of irony that was once in the premodern viewed as divine and the same manifestation of forms that is in the assemblage of collective rationality justifying the poisoning of an irrational subject for the preservation of the collective ideal which in the modern is the antischizophrenic persecution of irrational behavior and delusion.

That is reasonable of Socrates to not claim he possesses the divine knowledge, but still ironic that without true knowledge can still prove the falsity of belief. This kind of irony to a rationalist would make Socrates seem too contradictory, and the rational tendancy to unite thought with the world is in conflict with the Platonic ideal of uniting the memory of the soul to absolute truths that the world decieves us of. That irony acknowledges fundamental contradiction and uses a process of uncovering contradiction can be contrasted with other rational methods that achieve certainty by conforming to what is made agreeable by the intersubjectivity of conventional forms of reason. I'm not sure exactly what conventional forms of reason the philosophers of Ancient Greece agreed was divine, but an analogy can be drawn between scientism as a rejection of the ironic condition by a nonironic process of scientific progress, that doesn't acknowledge rational detachment from actuality as argument against fundamental belief but simply part of a futurist process that will not abandon it's antiironic foundation.

The Forms too, images on the cave wall. — Fooloso4

Really? :chin:

The Forms are said to be the things themselves of which things in the visible world are images, but what do we know of Forms beyond what we are told? Have any of us seen the Forms themselves with the mind itself, or do we only imagine what they might be? In none of the dialogues is there anyone who has seen the Forms and is able to give an account of their experience, There are only questionable stories of what we see when we are dead.

In the Phaedo Socrates calls the hypothesis of Forms “safe and ignorant” (105c). In addition to the Forms, he later recognizes the necessity of admitting physical causes such as fire and fever (105c). As to the causal relationship between Forms and sensible things, he says:

I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. (100e)

In the Philebus Plato introduces what Aristotle refers to as the indeterminate dyad, the limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron). Contrary to the fixed, unchanging nature of the Forms, indeterminacy is an ineliminable element of Plato’s metaphysics.

Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. It is important to understand that this is a feature not a defect or failure.

Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.

These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being

Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.

And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.

We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.

Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.

The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.

The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.

Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.

The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)

The Whole is by nature both good and bad.

The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.

Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.

The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.

The Timaeus introduces three kinds:

… that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes to be sprouts as something copied. And what’s more, it’s fitting to liken the receiver to a mother , the ‘from which’ to a father, and the nature between these to an offspring (50d).

Like intelligible things, the chora always is. But unlike intelligible things, it is changeable. (52a) Unlike sensible things it does not perish. Befitting its indeterminacy, the chora does not yield to simple definition.

Metaphysics for Plato was speculative and contemplative play, a form of poiesis, the making of images of the whole and parts. Without knowledge of beginnings that are forever lost to us he is saying that we cannot take any of this too seriously as true accounts. But that is not to say that we should not take such play seriously.

It may appear as though the Timaeus is a departure for Plato, but it is consistent with Socratic skepticism. An indeterminate world, one where chance and contingency play a role, is a world that cannot be known. An indeterminate world of chance and contingency is one where the unknowable, the mystical dimension of life, is not flattened and destroyed.

Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. — Fooloso4

:fire: It's going to take me some time to think through the labyrinth of your post.

For anyone that might be interested, the post is mostly excerpts from a few different forum threads I started.that provide greater textual analysis and support.

Socratic Philosophy

Plato's Metaphysics

Timaeus

Phaedo

:cool: :up:

Your contributions are wonderful. Thanks.

Thanks Tom. Good to hear. I put a lot of time and effort in and sometimes wonder if anyone is even reading.

Well, it's a good thing for this place that you do. :up:

Foolish questions coming: I'm interested in this notion of The Whole. Is it fair to say that goodness can be understood as an expression/instantiation of unified wholeness (is this a synonym for perfection?) and can we say by extension that what is bad is that which is partial or lacking coherence and the bad is in effect a form of asymmetry?

The idea that The Whole is indeterminate and not reducible to one is interesting.

I read them! Your interpretations of Plato are always a joy to read, because of your clear depth of knowledge.

What you've expressed is a brand of neo-platonism. That's fine, but do identify it as such. Intellectual honesty would demand that.

Is it fair to say that goodness can be understood as an expression/instantiation of unified wholeness ... — Tom Storm

In the Republic Socrates says:

The good is not the source of everything; rather it is the cause of things that are in a good way, while it is not responsible for the bad things. (379b)

Since bad things are part of the whole of what is, the Good and the Whole cannot be the same.

Why the Good cannot be known

Which brand?
I am pretty familiar with Plotinus and Proclus. This statement, for instance, would be strongly rejected by both.

Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought. — Fooloso4

What you've expressed is a brand of neo-platonism. That's fine, but do identify it as such. Intellectual honesty would demand that. — frank

I am surprised to hear that. What elements of neo-platonism do you find?

I am surprised to hear that. What elements of neo-platonism do you find? — Fooloso4

Neoplatonism isn't one line of thought. It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. Christianity, Plotinus, and Ficino are all neoplatonist. They aren't identical, though. As I said, what you're expressing is a brand of neoplatonism. That's not an insult. It's just a simple clarification.

Neoplatonism isn't one line of thought. It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. — frank

Does this make Aristotle a Neoplatonist?

What do the hand gestures on each figure mean?

I did not take it as an insult. It is because neoplatonism is not singular that I asked what elements of neoplatonism you find in what I said.

Neoplatonism isn't one line of thought. It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. Christianity, Plotinus, and Ficino are all neoplatonist. They aren't identical, though. As I said, what you're expressing is a brand of neoplatonism. That's not an insult. It's just a simple clarification.

It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. — frank

What is that "certain way" of filling in the blanks?

What is that "certain way" of filling in the blanks? — Fooloso4

One that creates a cohesive narrative?

So any interpretation of Plato that presents a cohesive narrative is neoplatonist?

So any interpretation of Plato that presents a cohesive narrative is neoplatonist? — Fooloso4

Any interpretation of Plato that presents a cohesive narrative could be described as "a brand of neoplatonism."

In the Phaedrus Socrates compares the well written work to a living animal with each part having a function working together to form a whole. This tells us how a well written work should be read - as a whole, with each part having its function working together in a particular way to form that whole. On the assumption that the Platonic dialogues are well written works, Plato himself tells us how they are to be read.

In the Phaedrus Socrates compares the well written work to a living animal with each part having a function working together to form a whole. This tells us how a well written work should be read - as a whole, with each part having its function working together in a particular way to form that whole. On the assumption that the Platonic dialogues are well written works, Plato himself tells us how they are to be read. — Fooloso4

It's the difference between theology and religion studies. Theology presents interpretations. Religion studies just sticks to what we've got and tries to fit the work into the era in which it was written.

Your approach to Plato is like the theological approach where you're using your own intuitions to guide you in arriving at a meaning. In particular, this is a Protestant approach.

An academic approach to Plato would not settle in any one interpretation, but would just explain what we know about the times and the various ways Plato has been interpreted since.

For obvious reasons, it's extremely important to mark out this kind of distinction. If you're going to interpret, that's great. I truly welcome that and think we should all be doing that. Philosophy comes alive in this way.

But I'm sure you agree that each of us needs to be honest and say, "This is my interpretation."

We've already got one religion based on Plato. We don't need another one.

I don't see that at all. I get a lot from Fooloso4's posts, but mainly I get how little I know about Plato, and the Herculean task of becoming more familiar with the labyrinthine layers of meaning.

A general question I have is this: I think there is a widespread mistake in the understanding of the term 'Forms'. I think it's almost universally taken to be something like shape - after all, in English, 'shape' and 'form' are very close in meaning. But I would have thought that a better modern interpretation would be something like 'principle'.

For instance, there's an argument in the Phaedo (which I don't recall being discussed in the thread on that dialogue) called The Argument from Imperfection (reference). Basically this revolves around the 'idea of Equals'. It points out that there is no physical instantiation or example of 'Equals'. It argues that things that we see as equal - two sticks, or two stones - are not really equal but merely alike. Plato argues that the ability to grasp 'Equal' amounts to grasping the Form of Equal, which is something that is done solely by the Intellect, not by sensory apprehension.

That argument has intuitive appeal to me, because I believe that it is indeed true that 'Equal' has no physical instantiation, and yet it is a fundamental element of mathematical and indeed general reasoning.

An academic approach to Plato would not settle in any one interpretation, but would just explain what we know about the times and the various ways Plato has been interpreted since. — frank

An essential part of contemporary Plato scholarship includes not only how he has been interpreted but how he is being interpreted. Arguments are made in favor or against various interpretive claims but nothing is settled.

Contrary to anything being settled I have repeatedly pointed to the indeterminacy, the openendness, the aporia of Plato's work.

Your approach to Plato is like the theological approach where you're using your own intuitions to guide you in arriving at a meaning. In particular, this is a Protestant approach. — frank

I do not use intuitions, I investigate hunches and possibilities to see whether they are supported by the text and help make sense of it. If they don't I try something else to help me make sense of the text. There is nothing "theological" or "Protestant" about this approach.

But I'm sure you agree that each of us needs to be honest and say, "This is my interpretation." — frank

Again you raise the issue of honesty. Why? Of course my interpretation is my interpretation!