Are there several clear divisions or schools when it comes to how Plato is read these days (and I'm not talking about neoplatonism). I imagine some academics would read him as actual Platonists (idealists) and others would not - that kind of thing...

Any comments on the Argument from Imperfection?

there's an argument in the Phaedo (which I don't recall being discussed in the thread on that dialogue) called The Argument from Imperfection (reference). Basically this revolves around the 'idea of Equals'. It points out that there is no physical instantiation or example of 'Equals'. It argues that things that we see as equal - two sticks, or two stones - are not really equal but merely alike. Plato argues that the ability to grasp 'Equal' amounts to grasping the Form of Equal, which is something that is done solely by the Intellect, not by sensory apprehension.

That argument has intuitive appeal to me, because I believe that it is indeed true that 'Equal' has no physical instantiation, and yet it is a fundamental element of mathematical and indeed general reasoning. — Wayfarer

It seems germane to the topic.

But, it should go without saying, this is not the only way to interpret a text or even a Platonic text. — Fooloso4

I don't think it goes without saying, and I don't know why you appear to be upset about mentioning it.

I don't see that at all
— Wayfarer

Don't see what? — frank

Any basis for your response to fooloso4's posts. If you say they're neo-platonic, or Protestant. then produce an argument for that. As for 'having one religion based on Platonism', aside from being a pretty big claim, it doesn't amount to any kind of argument, either.

Any basis for your response to fooloso4's posts. If you say they're neo-platonic, or Protestant. then produce an argument for that. As for 'having one religion based on Platonism', aside from being a pretty big claim, it doesn't amount to any kind of argument, either. — Wayfarer

I was just asking him to specify that what he's expressing is his own interpretation. He's done that, so we can move on as far as I'm concerned. I don't know why we're beating this dead horse.

I never claimed that what he's saying is early or late Neoplatonism, and I don't know why that confusion persists.

It seems germane to the topic. — Wayfarer

I agree. At first glance, it appears to me like "equal" is a completely arbitrary designation. But such a designation must be justifiable, so it requires a reason. However, the prerequisite "reason" may be extremely variable, from a specific purpose, to an underlying similarity, or a combination of both. This leads back toward "equal" being an arbitrary designation.

I read that argument somewhere, probably in a half-read book on philosophy. It does have a point to it - the extension of the word "equal" is the same as the extension of the word "unicorn" to wit the null set $\phi$. Nothing in reality is equal. How then do we have the concept of equality? It can't be a form extracted from real instances. Whence then equality?

That said we do think in terms of hypotheticals - we have a powerful imagination - the movement from very different to a little different to equality may not be as difficult as it's made out to be or impossible.

I agree. At first glance, it appears to me like "equal" is a completely arbitrary designation. But such a designation must be justifiable, so it requires a reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "equal" is not a form. The idea, equality, is. The idea isn't arbitrary, though the word may be used in any manner one wants.

If the word may be used in any way one wants, then how is it that the idea of equality is not arbitrary? Put it this way, there's a word I can use, "equal", to assign a relation between two things, the relationship of "equality". I can assign that relationship to any two things I want. How is it that the meaning of this idea "equality" is not completely arbitrary? What it means to be equal could be anything I want.

If the word may be used in any way one wants, then how is it that the idea of equality is not arbitrary? Put it this way, there's a word I can use, "equal", to assign a relation between two things, the relationship of "equality". I can assign that relationship to any two things I want. How is it that the meaning of this idea "equality" is not completely arbitrary? What it means to be equal could be anything I want. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying the idea reduces to the word, which can be used as one wishes. If we generalize this, we'll have a form of behaviorism on our hands. Is that what you were driving toward?

Actually the "idea" got reduced to the way that the word may be used. Endless possibilities for use got reduced to "arbitrary" actual use. I don't really care about any designations of "ism", so the warning that I'm on the road to behaviorism doesn't phase me. But it's surely not what I'm driving toward, so something's misdirected in your characterization.

Actually the "idea" got reduced to the way that the word may be used. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. What are the advantages of doing that? It seems absurd at face value.

This is a good overview.

There was some discussion of Equals

[Added]

I don't find the argument persuasive. Socrates says he is not talking about one thing being equal to another (74a), but I think that is where we get the idea from. We can see that one thing is larger than or more than another. The less the difference the closer they come to being equal.

So Socrates, one might say, is the basis for philosophical reflection as an actualization of the process by which we can attain divine knowledge -- if I'm reading you right.

The first thing that comes to mind for me is that while no two sticks are equal to one another, they are equal to themselves. So Socrates is equal to Socrates -- the actualization of the relationship of equality is that relationship which any individual has with itself.

However, it's true that self-relationship is a kind of funny thought -- and you can see how this is an added layer of interpretation on top of an individual, so you can see why there's confusion here: how to account for relationship in an ontological manner seems like the question buried in the argument.

The article expresses well what I found confusing about the above reference to Neoplatonism:

Neoplatonist interpretations of Plato continued to dominate until the early modern period. From then on, Neoplatonic readings tended to be displaced by the idea, now almost universally accepted, that Plato was properly to be understood from his own dialogues, not from or through anyone else. It is extraordinary, given how obvious that idea may seem to us, how recent in origin it is. But underlying its emergence is a much more significant switch: from using Plato as a source of ideas to think with to treating him as an object of study. — Christopher Rowe

now almost universally accepted, that Plato was properly to be understood from his own dialogues, not from or through anyone else. — Christopher Rowe

Interesting thing about that is that the authenticity of each of the dialogues has been called into question at some time or another. We only have best guesses as to which ones are really written by Plato and which ones are not.

Secondly, in the case of many of the dialogues, our oldest manuscripts are from the 9th Century AD. We have no way to verify which words were actually used by Plato and which were supplied by an overly imaginative monk.

For both of these reasons, it's a good idea to be timid about assigning views to Plato, especially if our interpretation hangs in a single word, like "hypothesis.". A much better approach is to signal that "this is what I get out of it "

But underlying its emergence is a much more significant switch: from using Plato as a source of ideas to think with to treating him as an object of study. — Christopher Rowe

My reading of Plato is informed by the idea of the reader as active participant, to think along with what is said, to take into consideration who he is talking to as well as the setting or circumstances, to raise objections, to work out implications, in a word, to think.

We should take seriously the fact that Plato is only mentioned in a few places in the dialogues and never speaks. We should not be too quick to assume that what Socrates or anyone else says represents Plato's own opinion. He is intentionally once removed. In the Phaedo it is reported that Plato was absent. The thoughtful reader will consider the significance of this.

We should take seriously the fact that Plato is only mentioned in a few places in the dialogues and never speaks. — Fooloso4

If you like, do something with that. I'd be more prone to seeing the early works as attempts to let Socrates speak, although that view is questionable. Later, his own views come into bloom.

There are two reasons to see the dialogues, as a whole, as Plato's views: one is that using Socrates as a mouthpiece was common at the time, and the second is that Plato was a genius.

A reason for being suspect about the written account is that we know there was apparently an unwritten teaching. Only the most arrogant, half-witted, butthead of a fool would propose to tell us what that teaching was, though, as much as the fool might suspect she knows.

Any comments on the Argument from Imperfection? — Wayfarer

As in all logical dialectics, the Argument from Imperfections would stand undiminished, if not subsequently diminished by better initial premises. The bottom line holds nonetheless, even if wearing clothing other than robes, insofar as the ideal is the perfect, the unconditioned, which is unattainable by reason, from which follows all logical arguments are from imperfection and cannot rise to the objects representing the pure ideas of them.

74b: “…Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing?…”

This presupposes the two pieces seen, are already determined to be equal. But if it is the case we don’t ever see pieces as equal, but rather, only see two things relating to each other by degree of conceptual unity with the apodeitic pre-established form of one or the other of those two things, then the determination of equality does not rely on the condition of the pieces themselves, but in their relation to that pre-established form.

An abstract ideal, in this case equality which is indeed different than being equal. is not properly a knowledge but more an intellectual presupposition, later to be transformed into Aristotle’s categories, thus not technically derivable from instances of perception. Socrates says we are born with a manifold of them, which is at least logically sufficient to proclaim, but he also says we are born with them as knowledge, which would not be logically sufficient at all, depending on the definition of it on the one hand, and the manifestation of it, regardless of its definition, on the other.

Idle musings….

Thanks

I don't find the argument persuasive. Socrates says he is not talking about one thing being equal to another (74a), but I think that is where we get the idea from. We can see that one thing is larger than or more than another. The less the difference the closer they come to being equal. — Fooloso4

I suggest you're not finding it persuasive for the reason that the empirical philosophers always give in such instances - that it is derived from experience. The counter to that is that we already have to have the conception of Equals to arrive at such judgements. It's similar to Mills argument that we derive the basic concepts of arithmetic from experience. But the counter to that is we can't recognise numbers until we are able to count, so the ability must precede the experience for us to recognise it as number. Leaving aside that some animals can recognise small groups of numbers ('count') no amount of experience will impart to a non-rational intelligence what the abstract concept of Equals conveys.

There is nothing in empirical existence which directly corresponds with '='. The fact that we use it all of the time in maths, in a vernacular sense in ordinary speech, doesn't detract from that, rather it reinforces the point that it is part of the innate architecture of reason, which Plato in particular did so much to articulate.

An abstract ideal, in this case equality which is indeed different than being equal. is not properly a knowledge but more an intellectual presupposition, later to be transformed into Aristotle’s categories, thus not technically derivable from instances of perception. — Mww

That is much nearer the mark. And those categories persist, with only very minor modifications, in Kant. And indeed I think the 'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments.

The first thing that comes to mind for me is that while no two sticks are equal to one another, they are equal to themselves. So Socrates is equal to Socrates -- the actualization of the relationship of equality is that relationship which any individual has with itself. — Moliere

I don't know if that is signicant, is it? I mean in later logic, there is the law of identity, that A=A, but I again that also appeals to the concept of Equals.

There is nothing in empirical existence which directly corresponds with '='. — Wayfarer

"Empirical" is a kind of knowledge. There is no "empirical existence." But you can certainly learn empirically that two things are equal.

I suggest you're not finding it persuasive for the reason that the empirical philosophers always give in such instances - that it is derived from experience. The counter to that is that we already have to have the conception of Equals to arrive at such judgements. — Wayfarer

The argument is that equal things remind us of "the equal itself". That we get knowledge of the equal from things:

Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? (74b)

Rather than looking at it in terms of empiricism, I look at it in terms of practice. A carpenter determines that two boards are of equal length. If they are not then one will either not fit or be too loose. A merchant puts things on a scale. They are of equal weight or not. They either balance or not. Rather than thinking of it in terms of equality they might be thought of in terms of bigger and smaller or the same.

In accord with the argument from recollection we are reminded of the Forms Bigger and Smaller or Same and Different. The problem is that if each Form is one, singular and distinct, then we must confront the problem of dyads. Bigger is unintelligible without smaller, same is not intelligible without different. So too, equal cannot be separated from unequal.

The problem is that if each Form is one, singular and distinct, then we must confront the problem of dyads. Bigger is unintelligible without smaller, same is not intelligible without different. So too, equal cannot be separated from unequal. — Fooloso4

Big and small are two sides of one coin. So the forms could be Size, Equality, and so forth.

From the Phaedo:

Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)

Yes. And then there's my all time favorite Platonic argument: the Cyclic Argument, which shows that there can be no "bigger" without the preceding "smaller".

So tell me how you resolve this, and I'll tell you how I've always done it.

The argument refers to things not Forms. What is bigger comes from what is smaller.

The argument refers to things not Forms. What is bigger comes from what is smaller. — Fooloso4

And a "thing" is what?

Rather than looking at it in terms of empiricism, I look at it in terms of practice. A carpenter determines that two boards are of equal length. If they are not then one will either not fit or be too loose. A merchant puts things on a scale. They are of equal weight or not. They either balance or not. Rather than thinking of it in terms of equality they might be thought of in terms of bigger and smaller or the same. — Fooloso4

That is discussed in the Dialogue. But a distinction is explicitly made between the equality of sensibles and absolute equality, which are said to be of different kinds. Through the comparison of larger and smaller, equal or not equal, we are reminded of the idea of equal, which we already have at time of birth but have forgotten. But the suggestion is not that we arrive at the idea of equality by seeing empirical objects of equal size, because empirical objects are not absolute, which the idea of equality is.

“Whence did we derive the knowledge of it [i.e. equality]? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?”

“Certainly.”

“Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?”

“No, Socrates, never.”

“Then,” said he, “those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.”

“Not at all, I should say, Socrates.”

“But from those equals,” said he, “which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?”

“Very true,” he replied.

“And it is either like them or unlike them?”

“Certainly.”

“It makes no difference,” said he. “Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.”

“Surely.”

“Now then,” said he, “do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?”

“They fall very far short of it,” said he.

“Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it, he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?”

“We must.”

“Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?”

“It certainly is.”

“Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, ‘All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.’”

“That is true.”

“And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike.”

“Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.”

“Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?”

“Yes.”

“Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.”

“That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates.”

“And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?”

[75c] “Certainly.”
“But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?”

“Yes.

“Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.”

“It does.”

“Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of absolute in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth.”

“That is true.”

“And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?”

“Certainly, Socrates,” said he.

“But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?”

“Assuredly.” — Phaedo

//incidentally, this, and the Meno, is practically the origin of the idea of the philosophical a priori, is it not?//