The Aristotelian solution is to affirm that ideas, i.e. abstract objects, have potential existence prior to being "discovered". Discovery of abstract objects is the actualization of potential.

The use of "potential" here is very important to Aristotle's understanding of necessity and contingency. The point is that any potential, by its very nature of "potential", provides no necessity toward actualization or even the way that it is actualized. So in general, a potential admits to many possible different forms of actuality, being capable of being caused to be actualized, in numerous possible ways. That is the basis of "contingency". When a thing comes to be from potential, its existence is contingent on the causes which actualize it, making it that thing rather than something else.

Therefore, under the Aristotelian resolution, ideas and abstract objects have contingent existence rather than necessary existence. This is because they require this cause, the actualization by a human mind, to bring them from that realm of potential, to having an actual form (formula). And, because there is no necessity here, they may be actualized in different ways. So for example, the true nature of space and time is very difficult for human beings to understand, and is fundamentally not understood when approached by human beings. The mathematicians in the field of pure mathematics are free to produce axioms as they please. They are not constrained by necessity, and the axioms produced are contingent on the workings of their minds. But this this contingency turns out to be "necessary", in the sense of needed. The mathematicians may produce axioms freely, and the ones deemed as needed are adopted. This principle is very evident within the scientific method. A variety of hypotheses can be produced freely, and tried (the trial and error of the scientific method of exprimentation), allowing us to judge which of the freely produced axioms best match the reality of the universe.

When the mathematical axioms seem to work very well, and are assumed to adequately match the reality of the universe, we start to take them for granted, and assume of them, the status of "eternal truth". This feeds the illusion that they have always existed as such, and are "necessary" (in the sense of could not be otherwise), manifesting in the ontology of Platonism. But the real sense of "necessary" which is applicable here, is that these axioms are the ones which are deemed as needed for our purposes, and the adoption of these principles is based in pragmaticism. Therefore the specific ideas and abstractions which come into being in the human mind are contingent on the desires and intentions of free willing human beings, which act as the final cause of their existence.

"Final cause" is Aristotle's rendition of Plato's "the good", and Plato can be understood as refuting Pythagorean Idealism which is now called "Platonism". This begins in Plato's middle period where he proposes "the good" in The Republic as that which makes the intelligible objects intelligible. Modern day "Platonism" receives its name from a misunderstanding of Plato, which interprets Plato as supporting Pythagorean Idealism rather than rejecting it. Socrates was fascinated by Parmenides, and the Eleatics had a sort of contentious relationship with the Pythagoreans revealing fundamental faults in idealism. These were arguments like Zeno's which contemporaries dismissed as sophistry.

This rift in ancient idealism, I believe was the beginning of the demise of it, which Plato seized upon. The misunderstanding, that Plato supported this ancient idealism rather than exposing its weaknesses, has been propagating ever since the time of Plato through a form of Neo-Platonism. There are what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who continued with Pythagorean Idealism even after Plato decisively replaced the mathematical Form of One with "the good" as the first principle. Placing "the good" as higher than any Form, and the prerequisite cause for the "discovery" of Forms, effectively dismisses that form of idealism. I believe it wasn't until Aquinas showed true consistency between Aristotle and Plato, that Aristotle became respected as the true follower of Plato.

A few comments in support of what you said:

In the Apology Socrates says:

Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. (22d)

Note how often knowledge and its cognates are used in the text I bolded. Far from denying knowledge he says that he and others have knowledge. What he denies is having knowledge of anything "πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ", very much or great and good or beautiful. (21d)

With regard to justified true belief, this is a long standing but, in my opinion, incorrect interpretation of the Theaetetus. The question is: what is knowledge? The first thing to be noted is that one must have knowledge in order to correctly say what knowledge is. The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief.

Outstanding synopsis, and thank you for it. I can actually follow all that, and even if I don’t quite agree with it, it makes its own kinda sense. I’d even go so far as to say, for its time, both those guys thought deeper into the human condition than any one else ever has, at least those present in the historical record. That being said….I’m going to allow myself to take exception to Plato’s notion of “the good”, preferring to relegate the idea to the irreducible ground for a specific moral philosophy.
————-

Sidebar: I would like to say there are no false judgements. Regarding….

the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..what was the conclusion? Are they, or are they not, possible?

I’m going to allow myself to take exception to Plato’s notion of “the good”, preferring to relegate the idea to the irreducible ground for a specific moral philosophy. — Mww

Socrates Argument For Why the Good Cannot Be Known

The argument is not easily seen because it stretches over three books of the Republic, as if Plato wanted only those who are sufficiently attentive to see it.

I begin by collecting the releverent statements. Bloom translation. Bold added.

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)

"Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
"Yes."
"While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

"You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

He makes a threefold distinction -

Being or what is
Something other than that which is
What is not


And corresponding to them

Knowledge
Opinion
Ignorance



The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not.

What is entirely is entirely knowable. The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. The good is then not entirely knowable. As if to confirm this Socrates says that he is giving his opinions about the good, but that what is knowable and unknowable is a matter of fact. As to the soul’s journey to the intelligible and the sight of the idea of the good, he says that a god knows if it happens to be true, but this is how it looks to him. He plays on the meaning of the cognate terms idea and look, which can be translated as Form. A god knows if it “happens to be true” but we are not gods, and what may happen to be true might also happen to be false.

The quote at 517 continues:

… but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence —and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it. (517c)

But it is not seen, for it is not something that is and thus not something knowable, and so no conclusion must follow. In order to act prudently, he says, one must see the good itself. Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers.

Kudos. You guys sure seem to know your way around Greek thought.

I appreciate the lesson.

With regard to justified true belief, this is a long standing but, in my opinion, incorrect interpretation of the Theaetetus. — Fooloso4

I was stunned to learn how prevalent this interpretation is. It is directly negated by this:

Soc: And it’s totally silly, when we’re inquiring about knowledge, to claim that it’s correct opinion along with knowledge, whether about differentness or about anything whatever. Therefore, Theaetetus, neither perception nor true opinion, nor even an articulation that’s become attached to a true opinion would be knowledge. — Plato. Theaetetus 129b, translated by Joe Sachs

I wonder if the idea developed from failing to distinguish between Socrates' role as the mid-wife from that of Theaetetus as the pregnant one. It seems that some of the means that Socrates used to test Theaetetus' assertions were taken to be views Socrates was advancing. Perhaps this is an example of the last entry in the Appendix you provided above:

For if a book has been written for just a few readers that
will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must
automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. Even the
foreword is written just for those who understand the book.
Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add
that he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.)
If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!
The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 7-8

Because the dialogue is given through the form of a drama, perhaps this has a double nature. There is the show of what the interlocutors do not understand between themselves. There is the conversation between the drama and its audience where doors wait to be unlocked.

I was stunned to learn how prevalent this interpretation is. — Paine

I think there are two reasons for this. The first is, as you point out, a deliberate attempt to separate readers. The second, which you hint at, is that many academics do not bother to do the painstaking work of careful interpretation. Questionable claims get passed on, and sometimes, as is the case here, these things become a subject of interest in and of themselves. JTB is argued about, and whether or not this conclusion is supported by the dialogue is not even questioned.

Because the dialogue is given through the form of a drama, perhaps this has a double nature. — Paine

Too little attention is given to the function of dialogue. Things have improved but there are still some who regard it as being a matter of style with little or no philosophic importance. The argument is abstracted from the character of the person making the argument.

Perhaps nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the Meno. He asks whether virtue is taught, acquired by practice, or comes by nature or in some other way. The question becomes more significant if we know something about him. Meno's question can be rephrased to ask whether he can be taught virtue, that is, whether an ambitious and ruthless young man can be taught to be virtuous. Further, Meno thinks he already knows what virtue is. In line with his ambitions he thinks it is the ability of a man to manage public affairs for the benefit of himself and his friends and harm his enemies.

Asking whether someone like Meno can be made virtuous is not the same as asking whether anyone can be made virtuous. It is against this that Socrates introduces the myth of recollection. There must already be something in us that "recognizes" virtue, if one is or is to become virtuous. Of the options given by Meno I think "by nature" comes closest to the matter. The answer to the question depends on the kind of person you are. Given Meno's lack of virtue together with the fact that he thinks he already knows what it is and that he is already virtuous, the answer in his case is no. But others can be taught to be virtuous. As in the case of the slave boy being led to solve a complex mathematical problem, some can be led to virtue.

A footnote:

The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. — Fooloso4

The way I parse this in the modern lexicon is to use the expression 'beyond existence' rather than 'beyond being'. 'Existence' is what 'the transcendent' is transcendent with respect to, whereas 'being' may denote 'domains of being' beyond what we understand as 'existence'.

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a) — Fooloso4

This is clearly derived from or descended from Parmenides, is it not?

The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief. — Fooloso4

Actually the problem with justification is laid out in the discussion of the relationship between the parts and the whole. Justification is said to be "an account", which is to break the thing into parts in analysis and explain the reason for each part. However, there is a need to assume base parts which are indivisible, to avoid infinite regress. But then these base parts cannot themselves be justified. Wittgenstein investigates this. The other issue is the question of whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. If so, then justification cannot properly disclose the true idea, and any account will fall short of accounting for the whole.

Since justification is shown to be inadequate Socrates falls back on true judgement, near the end of the dialogue, and asks how could justification add anything substantial to true judgement anyway. But true judgement has already been shown to be inadequate because it produces the conclusion that false judgement is impossible, therefore any judgement would be knowledge. So the dialogue ends without anything conclusive.

I’d even go so far as to say, for its time, both those guys thought deeper into the human condition than any one else ever has, at least those present in the historical record. — Mww

Well, there's always Thomas Aquinas as well, a very adept thinker himself, who showed a good grasp of both Plato and Aristotle. He worked very hard to prove consistency between the various thinkers who came before him, and he provided a synthesis of numerous different philosophers. That's not an easy task.

Sidebar: I would like to say there are no false judgements. Regarding….

the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible.
— Metaphysician Undercover

…..what was the conclusion? Are they, or are they not, possible? — Mww

As I interpret the dialogue, false judgement is shown to be impossible. But this conclusion is derived from the premise that knowledge is true judgement. So there's a dichotomy set up between knowing (truth) and not knowing (falsity), and its by adhering to this dichotomy, and allowing nothing in between, that the conclusion is produced.

But Socrates prepares us for this by discussing the difference between Parmenides (all that is is, and all that is not is not) and Heraclitus (all is becoming). Starting with dichotomous principles as the premises for understanding the nature of knowledge, as Parmenides did, would render knowledge as unintelligible if knowledge is a from of becoming. The principles of being and not being are fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, becoming. That's what Zeno showed. So I would say that the lesson to be learned is that describing judgements in terms of true and false, doesn't provide an adequate description of judgement.

This is clearly derived from or descended from Parmenides, is it not? — Wayfarer

He is referring to what we know as Parmenides fragment three:

A couple of translations:

... for this is the same, to think and to be

... for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be

I think the argument in the Republic goes in a different direction. It points to the limits of what can be thought and known and said.

:up:

false judgement is shown to be impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's another thing which this brings to mind. It occurs with respect to 'akrasia', a term used by Socrates to describe the state of acting against one's better judgement, or weakness of will. It refers to a lack of self-control or discipline, where an individual acts on their desires or emotions rather than following their rational beliefs. Akrasia is often considered a form of moral failing or lack of virtue. Famously, in Protagoras, Socrates attests that akrasia does not exist, claiming "No one goes willingly toward the bad" (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the way he determines to be best, he will pursue this action, as the best course is also the good course, i.e. man's natural goal.

I think this has clear parallels with the argument about 'false judgement'. Just as real knowledge is only possible with respect to what truly is, Socrates denies that it is possible to act against your better judgement. Of course, Socrates' account is often questioned or even rejected, because we all know that humans do, in fact, have moments of 'akrasia' (sure as hell I do, and lots of 'em). And Aristotle considerably modifies it (and makes it far more realistic) in the Nichomachean ethics. But what I'm trying to get at is the resonance between the impossibility of having knowledge of what is not truly existent, with the impossibility of acting against one's better judgement. Both of these ideas strike us today, I think, as highly implausible, as I'm sure we would normally say that judgements can be mistaken and actions conflict with our better judgement. But I think both these ideas, which perhaps are two different facets of the one overall principle, says something about the character and attributes of Plato's Socrates.

Trust and hope in a transcendent reality is one option, one that I held at one time. Accepting that this world here and now is beyond our limited comprehension is enough. No need to imagine a true world beyond this one.

I am very mindful of some parallels with Buddhist philosophy in this regard. One of the attributes of the Buddha is described in the Sanskrit term, yathābhūtaṃ, generally translated as 'to see things as they truly are' (dictionary entry.) The principle is the Buddha sees things clearly because his cognition is unclouded by ignorance (clinging, hatred, passion.) But the point I wanted to make in particular is that Buddhas doesn't posit 'another world'. Rather, seeing 'this realm' for what it is, is itself liberation (although paradoxically from the perspective of the ordinary person there is indeed a higher truth and a path by which to seek it.)

In contrast, it is often said that Platonism posits a higher, real world and deprecates what we nowadays take to be the real world i.e. the sensory domain. (But then, it shouldn't be forgotten that the original Platonic Academy included a very rounded curriculum with a lot of emphasis on athletics and physical training.)

All that aside, I, for one, fully accept that there is a such a thing as the 'philosophical ascent', although whether I personally will ever succeed in getting to the first base is well and truly moot.

All that aside, I, for one, fully accept that there is a such a thing as the 'philosophical ascent', although whether I personally will ever succeed in getting to the first base is well and truly moot. — Wayfarer

The way I see it there is the possibility of philosophical insight and understanding, but the idea of "ascent" is tendentious and potentially misleading.

You might, in a sense, " get to first base" if you can give up the idea of getting to first base.

In contrast, it is often said that Platonism posits a higher, real world and deprecates what we nowadays take to be the real world i.e. the sensory domain. — Wayfarer

This is a good reason to separate the works of Plato and Platonism. Just as Socrates spoke differently and said different things to different people, Plato manages to say different things with the same words. He presents a salutary teaching and a philosophic teaching, an exoteric teaching suited for most and an esoteric teaching suited to a few, an image of truth and the truth that such "truths" are not available to us.

In pointing elsewhere Plato is at the same time pointing us back here. It is against the backdrop of an imagined world in which all things are fixed, seen clearly and unambiguously that we turn to the reality of our ignorance, our not knowing, and the indeterminacy of life. The famous turning of the soul is both a turn to and a turn away from this imagined other world. The move is dialectical. Socrates' claim that philosophy is preparation for death works in the same way. In death he says there is knowledge, but in truth we know nothing of death. In death is the promise of rewards and punishment for how we live, but he also says that death may be nothingness. In either case we are turned back to an examination of how we live.

:up: Thank you for these posts.

The Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them; and the negative conclusion of the whole discussion means that, as Plato had taught ever since the discovery of the Forms, without them there is no knowledge at all. — F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, page 28

Cornford's epochal work still had shadows of Kant, especially in being mindful of the unknowable noumenal universe and its original in Plato. What can be known is limited by our senses. rational resources, plus what humanity brought into the world. For Plato that is the objectively real Ideas that guide us. Without this guidance we are lost.
As you say,

Theaetetus ... shows the need for an intelligible world not possible through the relativity of Protagoras or Heraclitus. It is done without recourse to Anamnesis and the separate realm of Forms — Paine

Therefore, Theaetetus, neither perception nor true opinion, nor even an articulation that’s become attached to a true opinion would be knowledge. — Plato. Theaetetus 129b, translated by Joe Sachs

That is, it would not be Platonic knowledge. If Protagoras had been allowed into the argument at this point he would have thanked Plato for properly developing Protagorian subjective knowledge. The difference is that subjectively I can always be certain of my knowledge of this moment and this moment alone.

The puzzle arises because modern Aristotelians and materialists take JTB for granted as the sound definition of knowledge and are shocked to discover that Plato demonstrated that this cannot be. What could be the difference? Cornford suggests that according to Plato, only the Forms can be known unconditionally. If we dismiss the Forms as abstract nonsense then which way should we look for an answer?

….false judgement is shown to be impossible. But this conclusion is derived from the premise that knowledge is true judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgement. All-important, hardly comprehensible. As in other things, the ancients didn’t attribute to judgement its due, while on the other hand, subsequent philosophies may just as well have made theoretical expositions regarding it, damn near incomprehensible.

At the very least, seriously complicated. Like…what is it, are there different kinds, from different sources, relating, and related to, different conditions. Is it its own faculty, or is it part of another.

All that being said, I’ve come to reject JTB as inadequate, and “knowledge as true judgement” as misplaced functionality. Which, of course, are themselves merely judgements of mine, which in turn suggests I should know how I came by them. (Sigh)

Anyway, thanks for the input.

There's another thing which this brings to mind. It occurs with respect to 'akrasia', a term used by Socrates to describe the state of acting against one's better judgement, or weakness of will. It refers to a lack of self-control or discipline, where an individual acts on their desires or emotions rather than following their rational beliefs. Akrasia is often considered a form of moral failing or lack of virtue. Famously, in Protagoras, Socrates attests that akrasia does not exist, claiming "No one goes willingly toward the bad" (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the way he determines to be best, he will pursue this action, as the best course is also the good course, i.e. man's natural goal. — Wayfarer

I think this is a very difficult, deep and twisted subject. If I could make it intelligible to you you'd have to change my name to "the unmuddler". Augustine gave it much consideration and only progressed slightly. Aquinas gave some guidance by expounding on Aristotle's concept of "habit". "Habit" is a very strange concept, fundamentally meaning "to have" as a property or attribute, but the attribute is understood as a potential (being the propensity to act in a specific way), rather than something actual. This means that it's not a property in the sense of a formal aspect of a thing (describable in terms of form), it is a property of a thing's potential. So the habit, under Aquinas, becomes the property of potential, and it is very difficult, if not unintelligible, to conceive of something without actual existence having properties. It appears like the properties can only be imaginary. So I think we should not jump to any conclusions about what Plato is arguing in the passage you quote.

Notice I say Plato, rather than Socrates. This is because I believe that what Plato is demonstrating often varies greatly from what Socrates argues. Plato uses an argumentative form whereby Socrates will put forward a common fundamental belief, something which it appears like no rational person would doubt (perhaps even a Wittgensteinian bedrock or hinge belief). Then Socrates will show absurd logical conclusions which will follow from that belief if it is steadfastly adhered to as a premise. In this way Plato demonstrates problems with commonly held beliefs. In the argument of the Theaetetus, it is shown that if we adhere to the premise that knowledge is true judgement, then there is no such thing as false judgement.

The argument which you refer to in Protagoras is somewhat more difficult because there is a number of premises which are involved, which need to be isolated. Plato does not properly separate the premises to give a good indication of which ones are causing which problems. First, there is the general idea that pleasure is good and pain is bad (354-355). But this basic premise causes a problem because there is something known as "being overcome by pleasure", in which case the person acts badly. So if pleasure is good, being overcome with good (pleasure) could cause a man to act badly. That's nonsensical. This produces a discussion about how we judge immediate things relative to far away things, and the immediate appear bigger than the far away things, so skill in the art of measurement is required for judging pleasures near in time in relation to pleasures far away in time.

From here (357) there is difficulty because Plato has driven a wedge between pleasure and good (I believe this division is more evident in The Gorgias). The problem is that true pleasure occurs at the present in time, while knowledge and judgement are in relation to future pleasures. Notice that both the near and far away pleasures are each equally in the future. The future pleasures are not true pleasures, but potential pleasures, existing only in relation to the mind or imagination. So the separation between pleasure and good relies on having "good" relate to future possibilities, and "pleasure" refer to what occurs at the present. This allows one's judgement of "good" (measurement in relation to future pleasures) to be "overcome by pleasure"(which is occurring at the present), and the person acts badly. The difficulty is that now there is nothing real to relate "good" to, how to scale future pleasures. The supposed future pleasures which are compared, and measured by principles of knowledge are not real pleasures (pleasure being what occurs at the moment), they are "goods", what is desired for the future.

So from this point onward in the dialogue we have no grounding or basic principle for understanding the influence of what is occurring at the present moment (pleasure or pain), on our knowledge based judgements toward future goods. The division has been established to allow for "being overcome by pleasure" at the present moment. This is important toward understanding the quote you produced: "No one goes willingly toward the bad". The type of action referred to as "being overcome by pleasure" is characterized as something other than a willful act. It is not the manifestation of a knowledge based judgement concerning the future, it is the persistence of what is occurring at the present (bodily based, like inertia). We can call this type of act an act which is devoid of end, no view toward the future, just a living in the moment, and we must assume that it has real presence in human activity.

This separation becomes evident in the next part of the dialogue, concerning "courage". Protagoras separates courage from the other virtues, the others being knowledge based, courage is claimed not to be knowledge based. This is because the other virtues require will power to prevent being "overcome" at the present time, for the sake of future goods. "Courage" appears to be of the opposite type, requiring one to act swiftly at the present without a view toward the future. It involves turning away from what we know about the future (the fears this knowledge causes), to act against this knowledge. However, Socrates insists that "courage" has an opposite, "cowardice", one being an inclination to move toward what is feared and the other an inclination away from what is feared. So both are characterized as an inclination to act toward the future, therefore knowledge based, and distinct from "being overcome by pleasure" which is more like inaction.

Back to your quote now. "No one goes willingly toward the bad". The truth of this statement relies on how we define "willingly". If we define it as a knowledge based action derived from conscious judgement, the statement holds true. But then there is the tendency for bodies to persist in their movements, as they have done in the past (law of inertia), and these actions are distinct from knowledge based actions derived from conscious judgement toward the future. And this is where "habit" enters the scenario. People do move toward the bad, but it's not "willingly" by that definition, it's the continuation of past action, inertia, a body will continue to move as it has, unless forced to change its course. Notice we have the advantage of the concept of "inertia", which the presocratics did not have. .

But this opens a whole can of worms, because legally we need to hold people responsible for their actions even if they are derived from habit (inertial based rather than consciously willed). Therefore that definition of "willingly" or "willful" is fundamentally unacceptable, and we need to go back to the drawing board.

Socrates denies that it is possible to act against your better judgement. — Wayfarer

Based on what I wrote above, we need to be very careful in stating what Socrates affirms or denies. Many of his statements, as written by Plato, are expressed as a necessary conclusion which results if we adhere to specific premises. And, Plato is often questioning those very premises in a skeptical way. So he shows that by adhering to the premise which he doubts, a conclusion which is completely inconsistent with common evidence will result. In other words he is showing inconsistency between common conventional beliefs.

That it is impossible for a person to act against one's better judgement is one of those conclusions, absurdly contrary to common evidence. It is produced from the premise that virtue is knowledge. So this premise "virtue is knowledge" is what is at question. The common evidence which is contrary to the conclusion is what is called "being overcome by pleasure", in which case a person does act against one's better judgement. Now, "virtue is knowledge" is highly doubtful because virtue requires the capacity to resist being overcome by pleasure, which is the situation where knowledge actually does not rule one's activities. So in those situations where knowledge is not ruling, virtue requires something other than knowledge. No degree of knowledge can give one the capacity to overrule the reality that pleasure often overrules knowledge. This is why "the good" appears to be outside the apprehension of the mind, as ais arguing.

Now, we do have a compromised solution, the proper quote: "No one goes willingly toward the bad". But this only ties the willful act to the knowledge based act, producing the conclusion that all those instances of being overcome by pleasure are not willful or knowledge based acts. But this leaves a whole class of human acts which cannot be called "willful".

Judgement. All-important, hardly comprehensible. As in other things, the ancients didn’t attribute to judgement its due, while on the other hand, subsequent philosophies may just as well have made theoretical expositions regarding it, damn near incomprehensible.

At the very least, seriously complicated. Like…what is it, are there different kinds, from different sources, relating, and related to, different conditions. Is it its own faculty, or is it part of another.

All that being said, I’ve come to reject JTB as inadequate, and “knowledge as true judgement” as misplaced functionality. Which, of course, are themselves merely judgements of mine. — Mww

I'm in agreement. Judgement is not well understood, by anyone. And judgement is not the same as knowledge, nor is true judgement knowledge, whatever "true judgement" means. I like the approach of Augustine, which is a theoretical separation of distinct functions of the mind, or intellect. He proposes three aspects, memory, reason, and will, which seem fairly consistent with what I experience. But when I look at judgement it appears sometimes to be associated with reason, as logic forces judgement, and sometimes it appears to be associated with will, as I am free to make judgements without even employing reason. Aquinas shows a similar issue, will he says, is generally subservient to reason. But ultimately, in the absolute sense, will as the initiator of action must be free from reason, and this is why we can make unreasonable judgements.

Because there is this crossover of the categories, it is likely that those three categories are not formulated quite right. I think I would prefer to completely remove will from the intellect, leaving memory, reason, and judgement. Will, as the initiator of action must be separate from judgement to allow for the common temporal separation between judgement and action which results in things like procrastination.

If Protagoras had been allowed into the argument at this point he would have thanked Plato for properly developing Protagorian subjective knowledge. The difference is that subjectively I can always be certain of my knowledge of this moment and thi — magritte

What the claim that man is the measure means is still a matter of dispute. Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it. But if man means mankind a stronger argument can be made. If we are not the measure than who or what is? That man is the measure can be understood to mean that this is how things are for us human beings, in distinction for example from how things are for the gods.

If we dismiss the Forms as abstract nonsense then which way should we look for an answer? — magritte

I don't the alternative is abstract nonsense. Socrates describes his "second sailing" (Pheado 99d-100a). Rather than looking at things themselves:

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.”

In the dialogue Parmenides, after his criticisms of the Forms Parmenides says that one who does not “allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same" will “destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (135b8–c2).

Something like the Forms underlies (hypo - under, thesis - to place or set) thought and speech.

Since the dialogue takes place when Socrates was a young man the implication is that whatever Socrates says in other dialogues is informed by this. This is not a historical claim but a literary one.

Rather than refute the claim that man(kind) is the measure it supports it. This is how we human beings make sense of things.

But if man means mankind a stronger argument can be made. — Fooloso4

This is addressed in the Theaetetus, discussed above. Some men, the followers of Parmenides, have standards which are completely incommensurable with the standards of other men, the followers of Heraclitus. So the idea that a unity of "mankind" could produce an uncontestable measurement is discredited. Then we are thrust backward toward the idea that true measurement is relative to the individual. But that subjective position cast doubt on the validity of measurement in general, making it completely relative.

You are responding to something I did not say. I did not say anything about a unity of mankind or uncontestable measurement. Whether it is Parmenides or Heraclitus or their followers or anyone else, whether they have different standards or not, the measure is always taken by man.

What the claim that man is the measure means is still a matter of dispute. — Fooloso4

Plato himself made the 'man is the measure' doctrine sufficiently clear in the Theaetetus. “just as each thing appears to me, so too it is for me, and just as it appears to you, so too again for you” (Theaetetus 152a) The meaning of 'appears' was and still is ambiguous because the ancients couldn't have a clear distinction between sensation, psychological perception or insight, and logical judgment based on memories of personal experience. Plato suggested all of these for Protagoras (157d, 170a–171a). Mathematics and today's public scientific facts are not in the scope of subjective philosophy.

Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it. — Fooloso4

No he is not able to do any such thing. A refutation would need to show that Protagorean premises are inconsistent or absurd and Plato can't do that, nor can anyone else because it is logically impossible. It then comes down to looking for the flaws or fallacies in Plato's arguments as presented with an eye on the list of ancient sophistical refutations. Typically, Plato saddles his opponents with one or more absurd premises just for the purpose.

Socrates describes his "second sailing" (Pheado 99d-100a). Rather than looking at things themselves:
~~So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true~~.” — Fooloso4

Fabulous, isn't it? Unfortunately this scientific method in search of forms, occupying an intermediate position between knowledge and ignorance, does not come up in the Theaetetus.

judgement it appears sometimes to be associated with reason, as logic forces judgement, and sometimes it appears to be associated with will — Metaphysician Undercover

On the first, agreed, that judgement being called discursive, that is, its objects, whether phenomena or mere ideas, are logically constructed in association with pure reason but in accordance with a particular cognition.

On the second, however, I think I’d go with judgement associated with desire rather than will, in which case the judgement is aesthetic, in association with practical reason, but in accordance with a particular feeling, or perhaps more accurately, in accordance to some arbitrary degree of a general feeling. As has been hinted elsewhere herein, account must be made for necessarily different causalities corresponding to these thoroughly incongruent kinds of objects.

Aquinas shows a similar issue, will he says, is generally subservient to reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ehhh….I’m reluctant to let the will be subservient to anything within the human condition. If there is any way whatsoever, in which the subject has even the slightest modicum of self-control, in which he is the arbiter of his own circumstance, only restrained by natural limitations, then there must be a means for it, and if that means is called will, so be it. It’s as simple and certainly as plausible as….we might think we can talk and swallow at the same time, only to find out we cannot, an altogether empirical determination, but we can always think a thing within our limitations we might do, then find out we can either cause or not cause the doing of it, which is a rational rather than empirical determination.
————

I think I would prefer to completely remove will from the intellect — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe parts of it, but not altogether, I don’t think. I’d be ok with moving will from, say, intuition or even understanding, but there are non-empirical judgements, and as dedicated as that kind of judgement may be to mere feelings in the form of desires, inclinations, persuasions and so on, there must be a way to determine which object is sufficient to cause an act by the subject because of them, or determine a range of objects sufficient to explain them if the subject is acted upon, which, either way, is the purview of reason in its practical employment which we must admit as being a part of the intellect.

More agreement than not, overall, methinks.

I think you are right to see a Kantian world view in Cornford's thesis. I suspect he assumes what he sets out to prove regarding, as you describe it, "according to Plato, only the Forms can be known unconditionally." I want talk about those assumptions before trying to address your thought about subjectivity.

A central element in Cornford's thesis is the distinction he makes between ideas of Socrates and Plato. The dialogues are seen as a progression from the 'agnosticism' of Socrates to Plato's belief in the immortality of the soul (see the paragraphs preceding my quote of page 28 and page 3 of the introduction). My tiny ship would capsize if it attempted to cross the sea of arguments brought into being through Cornford' thesis. I will confine myself to observing some of the starting points. Cornford says the Anamnesis model reveals what the Midwifery model cannot. I have found nothing in Plato's writing that sets these two models against each other in some kind of zero-sum game. If one drops the requirement that there can only be one or the other, the absence of anamnesis in the dialogue is not an argument against it. To notice that, however, is not to argue that its absence is insignificant. It is an occasion to question how anamnesis is used in other dialogues. They do not perform identical roles there. Cornford does not open up that question.

That door is also closed for questioning the 'replacement' role Cornford assigned to the practice of Midwifery. The model emphasizes the limits of particular interlocutors. Those limits play an obvious role in all the other dialogues. It is not like a Stranger who shows up from out of town.

I need to change tunics and environment before addressing your remarks about Protagoras. Sooner than later, I hope.

Plato himself made the 'man is the measure' doctrine sufficiently clear in the Theaetetus. “just as each thing appears to me, so too it is for me, and just as it appears to you, so too again for you” — magritte

But we do not know that this is what Protagoras claimed. Perhaps his point was not about "me" and "you" but about how things appear to us.

The meaning of 'appears' was and still is ambiguous because the ancients couldn't have a clear distinction between sensation, psychological perception or insight, and logical judgment based on memories of personal experience. — magritte

I think you underestimate what they were capable of. But yes, I agree that 'appears' is ambiguous.

... today's public scientific facts are not in the scope of subjective philosophy. — magritte

This is changing with cross disciplinary approaches such as cognitive science.

Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it.
— Fooloso4
No he is not able to do any such thing. — magritte

If what each man says is true then if Protagoras says man is the measure and Socrates says man is not the measure, then according to Protagoras what Socrates says is true, in which case what Protagoras says is false.

Plato saddles his opponents with one or more absurd premises just for the purpose. — magritte

Yup, but not just Plato. On another thread on academic philosophers I just made a similar point with regard to commentary.

Unfortunately this scientific method in search of forms, occupying an intermediate position between knowledge and ignorance, does not come up in the Theaetetus. — magritte

@Paine made the point above that the forms play no part in the Theaetetus.

On the second, however, I think I’d go with judgement associated with desire rather than will, in which case the judgement is aesthetic, in association with practical reason, but in accordance with a particular feeling, or perhaps more accurately, in accordance to some arbitrary degree of a general feeling. As has been hinted elsewhere herein, account must be made for necessarily different causalities corresponding to these thoroughly incongruent kinds of objects. — Mww

But isn't what you describe here really just an instance of willing? Judgement according to an arbitrary feeling, or according to logical reasoning, each, if it initiates action, is an instance of willing. But the problem I have, is that we can make a judgement that a specific act is needed, yet not proceed toward the action, as in procrastination. So that's why I thought a separation between judgement and will is required.

Ehhh….I’m reluctant to let the will be subservient to anything within the human condition. If there is any way whatsoever, in which the subject has even the slightest modicum of self-control, in which he is the arbiter of his own circumstance, only restrained by natural limitations, then there must be a means for it, and if that means is called will, so be it. It’s as simple and certainly as plausible as….we might think we can talk and swallow at the same time, only to find out we cannot, an altogether empirical determination, but we can always think a thing within our limitations we might do, then find out we can either cause or not cause the doing of it, which is a rational rather than empirical determination.
———— — Mww

I agree, that's why I think will ought to be separated from judgement. But then where does that leave will? Let's assume that the subject actually is "the arbiter of his own circumstance", yet is still "restrained by natural limitations". How could this be possible? The law of inertia says that a body will continue to move as it has in the past, unless caused to change by a force. It would appear like "natural limitations" would include the law of inertia, therefore the subject would have to act on itself, as a force, through the means of the will, to cause change to one's own motion.

Suppose the will is such a force now. How can it be directed as to where to act within the body, and when to act on that part of the body? This is the issue Aristotle approached with the powers (potencies) of the soul, powers such as subsistence, self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. These powers are not necessarily active all the time, so they must exist as potentials which must be actualized when required.

The soul itself is the fundamental principle of actuality of the living body. But I ask now, how can that fundamental actuality (what we're calling the will here) direct itself as to which potentials to actualize, to create activity? Acting as a force, from within a body, with some sort of choice as to which parts of the body it acts on and when, means that it must be itself, not behaving according to the law of inertia. This is why we can understand the soul, or the will, as immaterial, it is a cause which does not act according to the laws which apply to material bodies.

But even that is just a diversion, because I've still not addressed my own question, how can these actions be directed. The will is not moving according to the laws of material bodies, but can it be truly directing its own movements? So, I'll go back to the gap between "natural limitations" and "arbiter of his own circumstance". The natural limitations are the laws of nature, which enforce a specific order to actions. But there appears to be some sort of loop hole which allows for a type of random action, exempt from the laws of natural order. The soul can make use of this loop hole to make randomish acts in a sort of trial and error way. But still, trial and error requires some sort of judgement as to which acts are successful, and which are not, and success is measured in relation to an end. So I still haven't really freed the will from the need for an end, and the need for a judgement.

then according to Protagoras what Socrates says is true, in which case what Protagoras says is false. — Fooloso4

I don't know about this. If what Protagoras says is false, then we cannot conclude that what Socrates says is true either. So it's just a vicious circle of nothing, which doesn't tell us anything about the truth or falsity of what either of them says.

That is why I said:

Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it — Fooloso4

Judgement (…) is an instance of willing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it more correct to say judgement depends on, or follows from, an instance of willing, but one is not the other. An instance of willing is the immediate determination of an act, therein called a volition, in accordance with a feeling; to judge is to relate the correspondence of the volition to the feeling that caused it.

But there appears to be some sort of loop hole which allows for a type of random action, exempt from the laws of natural order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ahhhh….possibly the greatest source of abhorrence in metaphysical practices, in which the warrant for a principle which is both entirely sufficient in itself and absolutely necessary as a merely logical terminus, yet completely unavailable to empirical justification, must be given a place in a sub-system of the human condition. It is here your loophole makes its appearance, as the very epitome of abstract rationality.

It’s abhorrent because to be useful it must be accepted as legitimate, and hardly anybody wants to merely accept anything carte blanche. Made worse by the stipulation that the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance. It’s the same as…conceiving a thing, but prohibiting that conception from acting on or even within the system that conceived it. How absurd is that!!!! Can you walk without moving your foot???

Who was that guy that said…metaphysical statements are neither true or false, they just don’t make sense.

So….I have no reservations that you know the name of that loophole. Acceptance of it, of course, is another matter.
————

I still haven't really freed the will from the need for an end, and the need for a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I submit you won’t, for the will needs an end, which represents the human being’s inevitable feeling for a need to act or respond to an act, which is very far from objectively consummating it. (“…if you choose not to decide you still have made a choice…”)

The purpose of a will is to cause an end. It is the end itself that is judged, the willing of it be what it may. The secondary question would then be….what end does the will purpose itself toward, but the primary question must remain…how is the agent in possession of such a will informed as to does or does not the end he wills satisfy the need he feels. And TA-DAAAA!!!, there’s where your preference to…..

….completely remove will from the intellect — Metaphysician Undercover

….meets its authority, but…..

I think will ought to be separated from judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

….is contestable on theoretical grounds, insofar as will remains connected to judgement of a certain kind, itself removed from the intellect as well.

But we’ve wandered afield from Socrates and Platonic forms.