I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
The act of relating two conception together, will cause a relation between them, in the mind. But it does not necessarily cause a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your use of "necessary" and "necessarily" here indicate that you are determinist, and this is either the result of, or the cause of your refusal to separate reasoning from judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me take a look at your proposition here. A collection of conceptions is necessary for cognition, and it is what results from cognition. You ought to recognize that this is a vicious circle of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a collection of cognitions is the effect of cognition….. — Metaphysician Undercover
……then how could the initial collection of conceptions come into existence….. — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose we have existing separate conceptions, not yet related so as to form a collection. — Metaphysician Undercover
And let's say that there is an act required to "synthesize" these conceptions to make them a collection, a whole. You'd be inclined to say that this is cognition. — Metaphysician Undercover
So we need another name for the act which causes the synthesis. — Metaphysician Undercover
We need an act which supports, or causes the existence of the parts, and another distinct type of act, which supports or causes the unification of the parts as a whole. — Metaphysician Undercover
You notice that at the base level of cognition there is needed a different type of act, intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am arguing that at the highest level of cognition, judgement, there is also the need for a different type of act. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you talking about changing my mind because I recognize that I made a mistaken judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover
Did I misunderstand your question? — Metaphysician Undercover
It is you who is playing a silly language game here. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not so much interested in his --and Plato's-- views about the immortality of the soul, or about Forms and Ideas, as much as his critical thinking, Q&A (maieutic) method, positive way of justifying ideas and resourcefulness in general. — Alkis Piskas
Maybe from your studies in College/University? — Alkis Piskas
The ambiguity in this is that if the stronger argument is the most persuasive argument then the most reasonable argument can become the weaker argument. In other words, Socrates too makes sophistic arguments. The difference has to do with motivation. While the sophist seeks to profit, Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors of such things as it is better to be just. — Fooloso4
I arrived at the idea that the difference between Socrates and the sophists is good faith - a desire to uncover truth - via judgement, balance, the accumulation of wisdom. — Tom Storm
... do you have any 'go to' arguments you use as a rebuttal of idealism or platonic forms? — Tom Storm
Is the philosopher a sophist or a statesman or something else? If something else then what? The question is left open. — Fooloso4
I do not regard Plato as an idealist. The term is anachronistic. — Fooloso4
I recently discussed why the Forms are hypothetical and why rather than being the reputed originals of which other things are said to be images they are themselves images. — Fooloso4
In the mini-treatise preceding this conclusion, and following from your argument just above it, there is not much with which to take exception. Pretty much conforms to what I’ve been saying. I might counter-argue that conclusions can follow immediately from the considering. The only way for there not to be a judgement at all, neither in affirmation nor negation of the considering, is if that which was under consideration wasn’t even imaginable in the first place. Hence the principle…that of which the imagination is impossible the object cannot be conceived. Or, if you prefer, the conception of the unimaginable is empty. — Mww
To which I adamantly object: the highest level of cognition is not judgement. The source of all human cognitive error, insofar as such error is in fact error in the relation of conceptions to each other, judgement, cannot be the highest level to which cognition can attain, from which follows the possibility of error far outweighs the possibility of correct thinking. — Mww
Reason the faculty subjects judgement, and thereby the cognitions given from them, to principles, by which the immediate judgement is regarded as conflicting or sustaining their antecedents. It is here phrases like, “I knew that” and “Now I know that”, hold as, or become, truths. — Mww
HA!!!! Yeah….everybody that speaks involves himself in language games. I let my abject abhorrence of analytic philosophy impinge on my transcendental nature; I only meant to try making it clear when we say stuff like we do this or that, the manifested doing has no personal pronouns connected to it. If, as you say, we think in images….kudos on that, by the way…..it is absurd to then demand that images themselves invoke personal pronouns. Recognition of this removes the Cartesian theater from being a mere oversimplication, as you claim, but eliminates it altogether. — Mww
Good point. And if Socrates actually said exactly that --I'm not always sure about the validity and/or exactness of his sayings as they have survived to our days, e.g. his "knowing nothing" is a myth-- then his statement indeed fails rationallly-wise, as you pointed out.Socrates accuses the sophists of "making the weaker argument stronger". The ambiguity in this is that if the stronger argument is the most persuasive argument then the most reasonable argument can become the weaker argument. — Fooloso4
So,these sophisms-fallacies do not make for strong arguments. — Alkis Piskas
Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow….. — Metaphysician Undercover
It (judgement) allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error — Metaphysician Undercover
This looks like a shady photo! Do we live in semi-darkness regarding ancient history?Plato does not give us a historical account of what Socrates said and did. — Fooloso4
Maybe "having knowledge of everything"? Which is very plausible?In the Apology what he denies is having knowledge of anything "πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ", very much or great and good or beautiful. — Fooloso4
Yeah. This too is a reasonable question.This is why I said the phrase is ambiguous. Stronger in what sense? — Fooloso4
Right. They seem strong to a weak mind and weak to a strong mind! :grin:By refuting them Socrates shows that although the arguments they make are weak, they make the argument seem stronger than it actually is. — Fooloso4
Ha! The "chicken or the egg" dilemma!am I persuaded because it is stronger or do I think it stronger because I am persuaded? — Fooloso4
Right. (See my coment before last.)Someone skilled at making arguments may make an argument that is stronger than someone who is less skillful at arguing, but this does not mean they are right. — Fooloso4
Do we live in semi-darkness regarding ancient history? — Alkis Piskas
I am persuaded because my logic says so. — Alkis Piskas
I think I suffer from this kind of illness! Not Misologism (hatred of logic). The opposite: Philologism (love of logic) :grin:out of a love of logical argument, out of excess expectations for its ability to provide answers. — Fooloso4
I'm a member of the same club. I admit I don't actually know.The main question of the Phaedo is what happens when we die. This is one of those big questions that Socrates admits he does not know the answer to. — Fooloso4
This is only ... logical. How can I persuade you if what I say makes no sense to you?Since logic cannot provide a clear answer logic cannot in this case be persuasive. — Fooloso4
Maybe the saying "There is only one thing I know and that is I know nothing" refers to that or something similar? Who knows? See, this is the problem with these sayings: they are used out of their context. Sometimes we are able to find that context and all looks fine. E.g. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". The reason he said that and how he came to that idea are known (although people don't care about that and prefer to interpret it as they wish). Other times, we have the context but still we cannot me sure about the meaning of a saying. E.g. Juvenal's "mens sana in corpore sano" (healthy mind in a healthy body), which is equivocal. If you try to undestand the pasage of the poem it features in, you might not be sure if he meant that a healthy body makes for a healthy mind or the opposite is or maybe both! :smile:So what is preferable, to accept a comforting answer or, as Socrates did, admit ignorance? The danger of the latter is nihilism. — Fooloso4
And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions. — Mww
Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself? — Mww
Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction. — Mww
Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices. — Mww
Interesting. I didn't know (or remember) that. I personally found (at that time) and I still find this method (Q & A) very interesting and productive. Way better of course than any teaching that does not involve the students' participation, and esp. any authoritarian or donnish kind of teaching. I can well read books instead, at my own pace and convenience. In fact, this is much better, because I can look up terms that I don't know or I am not sure about in a dictionary, which will make my understanding of the content better.The dialogues have many instances of central characters complaining about this practice. — Paine
Certainly.That clear expression of authorial intent makes it different from establishing the historical circumstances Descartes wrote within, for example. — Paine
…..philosophical dialectic practices.
— Mww
…..dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality — Metaphysician Undercover
You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things — Metaphysician Undercover
In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww
That’s not all we’re doing. Relating conceptions IS the judging. And we don’t make a judgement about a thing; we cognize a thing, from the relation of conceptions thought as belonging to it. And, need I remind you, we’re talking about things here, real spacetime objects….you know, the things not in our heads (sigh)…..represented as phenomena, which in the thinking process, requires something else from understanding not yet considered. — Mww
That which enters the mind as phenomena is that physical thing which represents how that feeling is to be understood. — Mww
Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.
But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible. — Mww
Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences. — Metaphysician Undercover
You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things
— Metaphysician Undercover
Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww
I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Relating conceptions IS the judging. Mww
OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. — Metaphysician Undercover
…if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things…. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? — Metaphysician Undercover
Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience. — Mww
**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it. — Mww
That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t. — Mww
Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.) — Mww
….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time. — Mww
“Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover
But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover
And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then? — Metaphysician Undercover
How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience. — Metaphysician Undercover
There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover
And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things? — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts — Metaphysician Undercover
In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous. — Mww
Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed. — Mww
I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is. — Mww
Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.
A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is. — Mww
The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
———— — Mww
So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. — Metaphysician Undercover
What are you to do, when perception presents to your reasoning mind something for which it has no conceptual representations already? — Mww
Is something is truly unfamiliar to us are we blind to it? — Tom Storm
One of those guess you had to be there moments? Despite that, hopefully you grasp the relevance. — Mww
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