Suppose they round the block and are able to see their cars again. Did they know then no longer know and then know again where their cars are? — Fooloso4

Yep, justified true belief vs. feeling certain:

I hit enter before completing the post. — Fooloso4

Don't you hate doing that?

If someone asks Al where his car is and Al says that he does, is he mistaken? — Fooloso4

Yes, unless he is looking at it.

Al is stopped by a cop.

Cop: Where are you going?
Al: To get my car.
Cop: Where is your car?
Al: I don't know.

Things may not go so well for Al.

Suppose the parking lot has a high fence that you can't see over but can see through the gaps between the boards. As Al walks he gets a glimpse of his car and then his view is blocked and the pattern repeats. Does he know where his car is and then not know where his car is and then know where his car is and then not know where his car is?

If the glimpses are very closely timed then he knows where his car is in between glimpses.

Of course we can question whether he can be absolutely certain it is his car even when he stares at it. There could be an elaborate plan to fool him. But such a thing would seem to be vanishingly unlikely. Or he could be hallucinating, but then we would be in Cartesian territory where skepticism knows almost no limits.

I prefer to accept less stringent criteria for certainty and I equate certainty with knowledge and uncertainty with varying degrees of doubt and belief.

Follow up:

If instead hapless Al is on his way home and get stopped.

Cop: Where are you going?
Al: Home.
Cop: Where do you live?
Al: I don't know.

After all, Al does not know that the place he lives is still there.

He knows where he lives, but doesn't know whether his house is still there, even though he has very little reason to doubt that it is.

If the glimpses are very closely timed then he knows where his car is in between glimpses. — Janus

And if not?

Of course we can question whether he can be absolutely certain it is his car even when he stares at it. — Janus

Right, there is always the possibility of illusion or deception, but when you say that he is mistaken unless he is looking at it, such possibilities are precluded.

I prefer to accept less stringent criteria for certainty and I equate certainty with knowledge and uncertainty with varying degrees of doubt and belief. — Janus

My position is similar to yours, but I intentionally avoid the problem of certainty. I accept less stringent criteria for knowledge then some philosophers impose.

:grin:

Plato has Socrates ending the first discussion of Justified True Believe describing himself as a midwife to nothing but farts. Yet here we are two-and-a-half millennia later, still farting.

Al is playing the cop for a fool, or a philosopher. He does know where his car and his house are, within the implied conditions of the kind officer's question. is playing that game wrong.

Let's hope Al is white.

He knows where he lives, but doesn't know whether his house is still there ... — Janus

If the house is not there then he does not live in a non-existent house.

he has very little reason to doubt that it is. — Janus

I agree. All of this reminds me of the problem of object permanence.

I do not think knowledge should be defined in terms of exceptions. We should consider the phrase: "To the best of my knowledge".

Plato has Socrates ending the first discussion of Justified True Believe describing himself as a midwife to nothing but farts. Yet here we are two-and-a-half millennia later, still farting. — Banno

From another thread:

With regard to justified true belief, this is a long standing but, in my opinion, incorrect interpretation of the Theaetetus. The question is: what is knowledge? The first thing to be noted is that one must have knowledge in order to correctly say what knowledge is. The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief.

For a long time I assumed "wind egg" was a polite translation of fart, but a wind egg is an egg that is insufficient. Nothing is born of a wind egg.

Al is playing the cop for a fool, or a philosopher. — Banno

So, are you in agreement that it is only fools and philosophers who get tangled up in such problems of knowledge?

Let's hope Al is white. — Banno

Yes, that occured to me too.

So, are you in agreement that it is only fools and philosophers who get tangled up in such problems of knowledge? — Fooloso4

Well, there are issues here. It's just that the discussion in Theaetetus is not of much help.

We should consider the phrase: "To the best of my knowledge". — Fooloso4

Thanks. That's the one I use, partly to get out of the burden of certainty and absolute anything. :wink:

If you have a computer assisted proof, do you know the result? Suppose it is a proof that you cannot follow; is the feeling of certitude necessary for the claim that you know the answer? — Banno

The Four Color theorem was an interesting start in this direction. Some professionals still have doubts, while most reluctantly accept what the computer has done as "fact". I write BASIC math programs frequently to guide my intuitions, but I hope to never use a program to actually "prove" something. Luddite me.

It all becomes a matter of trust, and I fear the profession will ultimately call yield and allow CS to do the hard work. Then mathematicians will be relegated to philosophical discussions trying to interpret what the program has come up with. :worry:

If the house is not there then he does not live in a non-existent house — Fooloso4

"Where do you live" means 'where have you been living most recently' not 'where will you live'. The very question presumes that circumstances have not changed.

,

We should consider the phrase: "To the best of my knowledge". — Fooloso4

Meh, failure to commit.

We can take skepticism as far as we like. Excluding extreme skeptical possibilities is ultimately arbitrary, but useful enough.

If the chances of being wrong are extremely remote then it seems reasonable enough to speak in terms of knowing, but the threshold remains arbitrary.

For me if there is no certainty then there is no knowing and I'm happy to speak in terms of having varying degrees of reason to believe or doubt, rather than in terms of knowing or certainty.

Meh, failure to commit. — Banno

But that's my entire philosophy, Banno.

Right, it seems that only those who are discomfited by uncertainty are troubled by perceived failures to commit. Avoidance of views seems to be the most realistic philosophical approach.

Philosophers put themselves in the position of the conjuror revealing where the queen really is after taking the sap's money. — unenlightened

It's perfectly true that examples are, inevitably, constructed or selected - usually to prove a point. Al and Betty are no exception, even though this one presents itself as asking a question. The author of this one is not simply asking a question, however, but taking the reader through a process. As each complication is revealed, the doubt whether Al knows increases, and finally, the comparison with Betty puts Al in a new light because we see an inconsistency between our assessment of Al and our assessment of Betty. So the moral of the story (and presumably of the author) is that we change our assessment of these matters, not only on the basis of facts about Al, but also because of the context we see them in.

As to the question whether Al knows, and indeed, whether Betty knows until the car disappears, I wonder whether we should resist being pressured to make a decision. After all, the situation for both of them is perfectly clear. They have parked their cars and assume that they are safe and will be safe until they return. This is a perfectly rational assumption. Millions of people do the same thing every day and find their cars safe. But the story is not yet finished, so although we could grant that their car is safe while it is safe, we should hold off deciding whether either of them knows their car is safe and certainly whether it will be safe and sound on their return. Then, we make different decisions, because different decisions are appropriate, but their is no inconsistency because we didn't make a decision earlier.

Perhaps in some way this isn't a legitimate move in philosophy. Nevertheless, I think it is rational.

In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief.

Well, there are issues here. It's just that the discussion in Theaetetus is not of much help. — Banno

It's nice that people quote Plato in this context, but the Theaetetus really is no help at all. It doesn't even really represent what Plato would like to say about it.

In the Theaetetus, Plato raises the question how we distinguish knowledge from belief by means of an analogy, supposing an aviary in which various birds of knowledge and of false belief are flying about. How are we to tell the difference? That's a real question, even if the metaphor is flaky. He also raises the problem in the Meno, and resolves it by appeal to reincarnation.

In the Theaetetus the discussion of knowledge moves smoothly through belief and truth. When he reaches the final point, he does use the word logos. This is usually translated "word", but extends more widely than that to include "story" and "account" but can mean "explanation" or even "justification". Socrates suggests that an account explains the elements of which something consists. Theaetetus accepts - (he has more or less given up by this point). Socrates then asks, innocently, how we can give an account of the elements; which sets off an infinite regress. So the Theaetetus is indeed no help.

What might be more help is the Gorgias. Plato there paints a picture of the captain of a ship, who does not have knowledge but a tribe (long "e"), which is usually translated "knack". I take a knack to be what one acquires through experience without training and without necessarily understanding why it works. If he is to have knowledge, he needs episteme, which is usually translated "understanding" and is derived from the same root as one of the Greek words for "know" epistemi. (Yes - epistemology) He has in mind, of course, the understanding of a philosopher and I'm sure this is much closer to something he would accept. It is not much help to philosophers, but is a lot more help than the Theaetetus.

We distinguish between true and false accounts by means of of intellectual skills. Which are not beliefs, so the regress is ended.

Sorry if this is a long way to a short story, but I have been looking at mentions of the Theaetetus and swearing to myself for a long time and I couldn't resist telling the story that is always left out.

A posteriori, he does, but not as a necessary fact. — Wayfarer

I don't know what this means. The echo of Kripke doesn't help.

I don't get why we would say he's justified in saying he knows where the car is. He thinks he knows?

I don't see where there's a paradox. We use the word "know" in various ways? Is that the point?

It's just that the discussion in Theaetetus is not of much help. — Banno

Not much help to what end? I think it helpful in pointing to the inadequacy of JTB. But if what one wants is a definition of knowledge that provides knowledge of what knowledge is then the dialogue is of no help. Unless, of course, one comes to see that knowledge is not transmitted in this way.

The Theaetetus doesn't point to the inadequacy of the JTB, but only to the inadequacy of Plato's idea of an account or an explanation or a justification. Insofar as it can be taken to suggest that the JTB is inadequate, it doesn't offer any clue as to what the alternative might be.

Sorry, I was a bit vague. They know where they parked their car and assume that it's still safe, and where they left their respective cars. They assume that the cars are still there and that they will be there when they return. I'm waiting to see how the story turns out before I decide whether they know or not.

They assume that the cars are still there and that they will be there when they return. I'm waiting to see how the story turns out before I decide whether they know or not. — Ludwig V

If I ask Allen if he knows where his car is, he might say yes. If I nod menacingly at him, he may realize he doesn't.

He's lacking justification, so JTB doesn't work here.

The Theaetetus doesn't point to the inadequacy of the JTB, but only to the inadequacy of Plato's idea of an account or an explanation or a justification ... — Ludwig V

Can you be more specific? What is Plato's idea of an account? In what way is it inadequate? Is there an adequate idea of an account?

Theaetetus says:

Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by an account (logos) (201c)

Note the irony. Elsewhere Socrates tells the myth of recollection, but here in the dialogue about knowledge, where we might think we are most likely to find it, he is silent. Rather than recollection there is the problem of forgetting.

A posteriori, he does, but not as a necessary fact.
— Wayfarer

I don't know what this means. The echo of Kripke doesn't help. — Ludwig V

All I'm saying is the location of his car is not a necessary fact, but contingent. So his knowledge of the location of the car is also contingent on circumstances.

That's true, but did I suggest it was a necessary fact.

Certainly, I would happily agree that the location of his car is contingent and that his knowledge of the location of the car is contingent. But that's because they are different facts, as demonstrated by the fact that they are contingent on different circumstances. Yes, it is true that his knowledge is partly but not entirely contingent on the location of the car.