The problem of actualization of potentia brings science and philosophy forcefully together IMO. — jgill

See Quantum mysteries dissolve if possibilities are realities.

David Pearce (transhumanist) opened an account as a guest speaker, a year or so ago. Spent about a week answering questions and responding to comments. He has a grand vision for the future of humanity and I hope we have more guest speakers in the future as well.

Interesting, basic and to the point. It may be, that reality is far different from the way that it is conceived by scientists.

I believe the key to understanding this principle is to recognize the reality of time. If the future consists of possibilities, and the past consists of events which have been actualized, then the present must be conceived as the time when possibilities are actualized. This "present" would need to be be a "time period" which consists of some duration, during which possibilities from the future become actualities in the past. For reasons demonstrated by some philosophers, this transition can not be instantaneous, the present is not a "moment", not a non-dimensional division between past and future. "Actualization" itself implies an act which requires some amount of time for possibilities to be actualized at the present time.

Time is measured as it passes, so all measured time is in the past, necessarily, requiring action (actual motion) to make a measurement of time. As we move toward measuring faster and faster motions (pure energy) in our experimentation and practise, we deal with shorter and shorter periods of time. When the present is conceived as having temporal duration, then part is future-like, and part is past-like. In dealing with extremely short periods of time we deal with the part which is future-like, consisting of possibilities, just starting to become actualized. Moving further into the future-like part of the present in our practises provides us with more "power" over how possibilities are actualized at the present.

As the article states, this "new" perspective is not actually "new". It is as old as philosophy itself, and has manifested as the theological perspective. It is from this perspective that moral principles, and our understanding of free-will is derived. The human mind partakes in the future-like part of the present, that part which is immaterial, being prior to the measurable physical activity which occurs as time passes. From this position it has the capacity to direct the actualization of possibilities as time passes. This is the Aristotelian biology, which places the soul as the first actuality of a living body. All the capacities (potencies or powers) that the living being has, are understood as possibilities for actualization (potentials), under direction of that first actuality.

What Kripke fails to see is that by denying just such a fact Wittgenstein is not agreeing with the skeptic, but rather calling into question the very assumption that there is such a fact. — Fooloso4

My memory may be fallible, but I'm not sure W directly confronts the sceptic. He certainly thinks that many of the philosophical questions that he does address contain mistakes and he certainly does philosophy in a unique way.

Hacker, in his categorial framework, mentions with approval the idea that philosophy is conceptual, or rather grammatical, in an extended sense of the word. That's helpful in some ways, but still gives a purchase to the idea the philosophy should make progress.

My suggestion to understand this is to look more widely at the intellectual and cultural world that we live in. There are many disciplines that can be said to change and develop, but are misunderstood if one supposes that they should or could progress. It seems to me that the Arts, by which I mean music painting dance drama stories etc. are all like this; the obvious explanation is that they have no goal or purpose, because they are done for their own sake. They are done in their cultural and historical traditions, but add to them rather than superseding them. Mathematics, it seems to me, is like them in that respect - it adds to its traditions without superseding them. It is true, of course, that mathematics often turns out to be useful, but I can't accept that that is its point. Science seems more like an outlier in that it seems to have a goal, though I'm not absolutely sure that is the whole story. In this context, our question becomes how philosophy fits in to this collection of activities. It's probably best to think of them as a family united and divided by family resemblances.

Interesting link. It's not quite what I had in mind, but probably more reasonable. I had thought of a continuum between the world of ideas and the physical world.



Thought-provoking. Thanks. Goes back to constituting mathematical (and physical) reality from the continuum to the discrete, not the other way around. Traces of Bergson.

Mathematics, it seems to me, is like them in that respect - it adds to its traditions without superseding them — Ludwig V

That's the way it usually works. Math people "create" or "discover", building more or less on preceding results, sometimes obviously but at other times seemingly "new".

It is true, of course, that mathematics often turns out to be useful, but I can't accept that that is its point — Ludwig V

Bingo! :clap:

There are various forms of skepticism and it is misleading to conclude that Wittgenstein either accepts or rejects it. In On Certainty Wittgenstein addresses examines claims about such things as knowledge and certainty. He denies certain claims and argues in favor of others.

... but still gives a purchase to the idea the philosophy should make progress. — Ludwig V

Good point. What are we to make of this?:

Philosophy hasn't made any progress? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn't genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching itching? And can't this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before a cure for the itching is discovered? (Culture and Value)

Yes, all that. You've added to the discussion of whether Kripke interpreted or misinterpreted Wittgenstein. This supposes that there is what we might call a categorical (as in unqualified) interpretation of Wittgenstein (Plato, Quine...). It's the existence of such that is being questioned.

Is there a Philosophical Investigations, or are there only un-detached Philosophical Investigations parts?

Given a rejection of

First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character. — Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs

it seems not.

This supposes that there is what we might call a categorical (as in unqualified) interpretation of Wittgenstein (Plato, Quine...). It's the existence of such that is being questioned. — Banno

It is not that there is a categorical or unqualified interpretation but rather that problems with a particular interpretation can be identified. That a strong case can be made that this or that interpretation is wrong. This does not mean that there is or ever will be an interpretation without problems. As I said above, there is always interpretive indeterminacy. There are also different interpretive practices. There is an attempt to understand what an author means, as well interpretations based on the assumption that this is not possible. There are interpretations based on what the text means for a reader. There is the attempt to situate the text in time and place or in response to something or other. There is deliberate appropriation in which the text is used to present the interpreters own story. There is the attempt to deconstruct or uncover the author's unspoken assumptions. Interpretation that points to the fact that an interpretation is itself interpreted. And so on.

Then it seems we are in agreement.

It seems that there is something of a consensus here.

In On Certainty Wittgenstein addresses examines claims about such things as knowledge and certainty. — Fooloso4

What I was getting at it that Wittgenstein doesn't say "Here is scepticism. This is my solution." in the way that Descartes, Berkeley, Hume &c. &c. He seldom does that. I think there are reasons, even good reasons for that. It doesn't mean that I think that nothing that he says is relevant to scepticism and intended to be relevant to it.

What I make of the itch and scratch metaphor is that what progress means can be different in different contexts. My point was that the despair about progress in philosophy depends on a particular definition of what progress is and that definition does not apply in a lot of other cases - including, of course, scratching an itch.

Is there a Philosophical Investigations, or are there only un-detached Philosophical Investigationsparts? — Banno

I'm not sure I want to answer that question. I think the point is that the themes in the Investigations are linked and interwoven. That's one of the strengths of his writing.

This does not mean that there is or ever will be an interpretation without problems. — Fooloso4

In addition to the different practices you mention, there is also the point that interpretations will vary to work in different contexts - which will include questions and interest that the author could not have had in mind.

Is there a Philosophical Investigations, or are there only un-detached Philosophical Investigations parts?
— Banno

I'm not sure I want to answer that question. — Ludwig V

Haha! Certainly not after a career in philosophy... :lol:

I started down that road long ago, only to opt for the safety of more mundane pursuits. I admire your courage.

I think the point is that the themes in the Investigations are linked and interwoven. That's one of the strengths of his writing. — Ludwig V

Of course he can't provide explicit answers; he must show how to think about the problems at hand. If he is to be consistent in wanting us to look to use instead of meaning, that's the only consistent approach he could take. The meaning of Philosophical Investigations is the use to which it is put, so the book must show us how it is to be used.

It doesn't matter if "gavagai" is a rabbit or an undetached rabbit leg. What counts is making the stew.

It doesn't matter if "gavagai" is a rabbit or an undetached rabbit leg. What counts is making the stew. — Banno

How very pragmatic of you. :smile:

How very pragmatic of you. :smile: — Ludwig V

That's just rude. :wink:

No, not pragmatism. It's just preferable to argue about the meaning of "gavagai" on a full belly. That's pretty much the reason i decided not to pursue academia.

It's just preferable to argue about the meaning of "gavagai" on a full belly. That's pretty much the reason i decided not to pursue academia — Banno

You must have had a feeling of knowing what was in store. Or was it more than that? :smile:

I have a recollection of being in a staff meeting at which future directions were being discussed. The subtext was that to survive, the Department had to attract more students, and so was to both accept students with less ability and offer less demanding courses.

The result is apparent in this forum. Folk think philosophy easy, a topic for dabbling dilettanti.

To it's credit, the Department still exists.

The result is apparent in this forum. Folk think philosophy easy, a topic for dabbling dilettanti. — Banno

The one-eyed king surveys his blind subjects.

Like Nuñez, my gifts remain unrecognisable to the blind throngs.

“Those queer things that are called the eyes, and which exist to make an agreeable depression in the face, are diseased, in the case of Nunez, in such a way as to affect his brain. They are greatly distended, he has eyelashes, and his eyelids move, and consequently his brain is in a state of constant irritation and distraction.”
“Yes?” said old Yacob. “Yes?”
“And I think I may say with reasonable certainty that, in order to cure him complete, all that we need to do is a simple and easy surgical operation--namely, to remove these irritant bodies.”
“And then he will be sane?”
“Then he will be perfectly sane, and a quite admirable citizen.”
“Thank Heaven for science!” said old Yacob, and went forth at once to tell Nunez of his happy hopes.

.. the Department had to attract more students, and so was to both accept students with less ability and offer less demanding courses. — Banno

And inflate grades. And be prepared to be held responsible when students fail. And go along with the pretense that you are not dumbing things down.

the Department had to attract more students, and so was to both accept students with less ability and offer less demanding courses — Banno

We (mathematics) were mostly a service department, with courses we designed for liberal art majors, business majors, engineering tech majors, etc. We occasionally had run-ins with those departments about grades and standards, and we could adjust those without abandoning our self-respect. I mostly became responsibly involved in these things when I headed up the department for a couple of years.

Because of the service factor we were able to keep courses for our majors at a reasonably high level, with me designing and teaching the senior level offerings in real analysis (intro), complex variables, and topology. I was considered the most demanding, but mostly about giving a B instead of an A. :cool:

The result is apparent in this forum. Folk think philosophy easy, a topic for dabbling dilettanti — Banno

I plead guilty. I am learning slowly about what makes a philosopher tick. My one senior level course in the subject in 1958 was more of a survey and little was said about the practice of philosophy.

It's just preferable to argue about the meaning of "gavagai" on a full belly. That's pretty much the reason i decided not to pursue academia. — Banno

I agree about the full belly. However, having started another career which would have provided considerable comfort as well as a full belly, I had to put up with feeling like a fish out of water. In the end, I decided that a full belly had too high a price and started postgraduate work to put off making another choice between unappetising options and see how it went. Somewhat to my surprise, in the end, I got a job.

I see from later comments that others had experiences similar to mine. I compromised, because what I was doing was better than any alternative that I could think of and it kept my belly (and my family's belly) full, though holidays tended to be on the cheap. Perhaps I was just hooked on philosophy. But it was all a severe disappointment; I started with idealistic ideas about philosophy being available to everyone and working closely with other subjects. Some of that has happened, but a great deal of it has not. My Department no longer exists, in spite of trying hard to adapt to the changes; the University decided it could not afford any luxuries. We did try arguing that philosophy was not a luxury, but no dice.

Folk think philosophy easy, a topic for dabbling dilettanti. — Banno

Yes. But. I knew some quite annoying professionals. In any case, philosophy, like sport and classical music benefits from a lively fan base and surely should be available to as many people as possible.

The truth is, that although I have some regrets, I don't regret my career. What surprised me most was that when I retired, I had had enough and I turned my back on philosophy for some years. But gradually I found myself drifting back to it, and now here I am - obsessed with it again and much happier for it.

Folk think philosophy easy, a topic for dabbling dilettanti. — Banno

I recently came across the term philosophunculist.

Well, if you haven't any regrets then you haven't had to make enduring choices.

Philosophy is like a broken tooth that you cannot prevent your tongue from prodding. Or Midgley's plumbing, where you can't ignore that smell or the constant dripping.

,

In any case, philosophy, like sport and classical music benefits from a lively fan base and surely should be available to as many people as possible. — Ludwig V

To be more specific, It's clear that there are folk here with little formal education, yet they are engaging with material outside of the forums, and growing in their understanding of philosophical issues. Ire should perhaps properly be reserved for those who drop in to the forum supposing themselves to have the answers, which are of course obvious and simple and we should have already seen them, silly us.

Philosophy is like..... — Banno

:up:

..... supposing themselves to have the answers — Banno

:up: There are two things about philosophy that are not quite polite to mention. But they are important, nonetheless. Answers are not the point, and in fact are the death of philosophy. Similarly, agreement about the answers are welcome as an episode, but disagreement is what keeps us going.

:up: There are two things about philosophy that are not quite polite to mention. But they are important, nonetheless. Answers are not the point, and in fact are the death of philosophy. Similarly, agreement about the answers are welcome as an episode, but disagreement is what keeps us going. — Ludwig V

I suppose it depends on what you mean by answers. A given philosophical position can be seen as an answer to a question that a previous philosophy stimulates. It does this by offering a way of understanding that allows us to clear up confusions or problems that are generated from within the history of philosophy (skepticism, nihilism, dualism and the Hard Problem). An answer can resolve by dissolving rather than solving.
What Ive said about philosophy is true of science. The power of a scientific theory is not in the specific answers its predictions give, but in the way it re-poses problems relative to the theory it replaces. Questions and answers pre-suppose each other in philosophy, not just in the sense that an answer is a response to a question but in that philosophy must offer answers in order to generate new questions.

philosophy must offer answers in order to generate new questions. — Joshs

I agree with that. But then, an answer that is correct, job done, doesn't generate new questions.

Perhaps we should distinguish between answers (2+2=? Answer 4) and responses, which do. Or perhaps we can just rely on disagreement and elaboration to keep the conversating going?

Answers are not the point, and in fact are the death of philosophy. Similarly, agreement about the answers are welcome as an episode, but disagreement is what keeps us going — Ludwig V

My perception of the nature of philosophy keeps changing.

...disagreement is what keeps us going. — Ludwig V

I can't resist the urge to reply "No it isn't!"

I agree with that. But then, an answer that is correct, job done, doesn't generate new questions. — Ludwig V

Does this mean that you think answers are unhelpful? I guess one might ask, about what matter?

I agree that questions are important but do we need to take from this that answers are always anathema?

What exactly is an answer to a philosophical question - is it a solution or dissolution? Or the best available, but tentative hypothesis?

I'm not a philosopher, I'm wondering is there a single philosophical question that has been 'answered' definitively for eternity?

Yes and No. ;)